whom Mr. Justice Black joins, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I have expressed at some length my views as to the rationale of today’s decision in these three cases.
*626They involve two different statutory schemes for providing aid to parochial schools. Lemon deals with the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Laws 1968, Act No. 109. By its terms the-Pennsylvania Act allows the State to provide funds directly to private schools to purchase “secular educational service” such as teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and educational materials. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 5604 (Supp. 1971). Reimbursement for these services may be made only for courses in mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education. Reimbursement, is prohibited for any course containing subject matter “expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.” § 5603 (Supp. 1971). To qualify, a school must demonstrate that its pupils achieve a satisfactory level of performance in standardized tests approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and that the. textbooks, and other Instructional materials used in these courses have been approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The three-judge District Court below upheld this statute against the argument that it violates the Establishment Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 1034.
The DiCenso cases involve the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, Laws 1969, c. 246. The Rhode Island Act authorizes supplementing the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonprofit private schools. The supplement is not more than 15% of an eligible teacher’s current salary but cannot exceed the maximum salary paid to teachers in the - State’s public schools. To be eligible a teacher must teach only those subjects offered in public schools in the State, must be certified in substantially the same manner as teachers in public schools, and may use only teaching materials which-are used in the public schools. Also the teacher must agree in writing *627“not to teach a course in religion for .so long as or during such time as he or she receives any salary supplements.” R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970). The schools themselves must not be operated for profit, must meet state educational standards, and the annual per-student expenditure for secular education must not equal or exceed “the average annual per student expenditure in the public schools in the state at the samé grade level in the second preceding fiscal year.” § 16-51-2 (Supp. 1970). While the Rhode Island Act, unlike the Pennsylvania Act, provides for direct payments to the teacher, the three-judge District Court below found it unconstitutional because it “results in excessive government entanglement with religion.” Probable jurisdiction was noted'and the cases were set for oral argument with the other school cases. 400 U. S. 901.
In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674, the Court in approving a tax exemption for church property said:
“Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the énd result — the effect — is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.”
There is in my view such an entanglement here. The surveillance or supervision of the States, needed to police grants involved in these three cases, if performed, puts a public investigator into every classroom and entails a pervasive monitoring of these church agencies by the secular authorities. Yet if that surveillance or supervision does not occur the zeal of religious proseiytizers promises to carry the day and make a shambles of the Establishment Clause. Moreover, when taxpayers of *628many faiths are required to contribute money for the propagation of one faith, the Free Exercise Clause is infringed.
The analysis of the constitutional objections to these two state systems of grants to parochial or sectarian schools must start with the admitted , and obvious fact that the raison d’etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith. They also teach secular subjects; but they came into existence in this country because Protestant group® were perverting the public schools by using them to propagate their faith. The Catholics naturally rebelled. If schools were to be used to propagate a particular creed or religion, then Catholic ideals should also be served. Hence the advent of parochial schools.
By 1840 there were 200 Catholic parish schools in the United States.1 By 1964 there were 60 times as many.2 Today 67% of the 9,000 Catholic parishes in the country have their church schools. “[Ejvery diocesan chancery has its school .department, and enjoys a primacy of status.” 3 The parish schools indeed consume 40% to 66% of the parish’s total income.4 The parish is so “school centered” that “[tjhe school almost becomes the very reason for being.” 5
Early in the 19th century the Protestants obtained control of the New York school system and used it to pro:mote reading and teaching of the Scriptures as revealed in the King James version of the Bible.6 The contests *629between Protestants and Catholics, often erupting into violence including the burning of Catholic churches, are a twice-told tale;7 the Know-Nothing Party, which included in its platform “daily Bible reading in the schools,” 8 carried three States in 1854 — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.9 Parochial schools grew, but not Catholic schools alone. Other dissenting, sects established their own schools — Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and others.10 . But the major force in shaping the pattern of education in this country was the conflict between Protestants and Catholics. The Catholics logically argued that a public school was sectarian when it taught the King James version of the Bible. They therefore wanted it removed from the public schools; and in time they tried to get public funds for their own parochial schools.11
The constitutional right of dissenters to substitute their parochial schools for public schools was sustained by the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510.
The story of conflict and dissension is long and well known. The result was a state of so-called equilibrium where religious instruction was eliminated from public schools and the use of public funds to support religious schools was deemed to be banned.12
But the hydraulic pressures created by political forces and by economic stress were great and they began to *630change the situation. Laws were passed — state and federal — that dispensed public funds to sustain religious schools and the plea was always in the educational frame of reference: education in all sectors was needed, .from languages to calculus to nuclear physics. And it was forcefully argued that a linguist or mathematician or physicist trained in religious schools was just as competent as one trained in secular schools.
And so we have gradually edged into a situation where vast amounts of public funds are supplied each year to sectarian-, schools.13
And the argument is made that the private parochial school system takes about $9 billion a year off the back of government14 — as if that were enough to justify- vio-¿ting the Establishment Clause.
While the evolution of the public school system in this country marked an escape from denominational control and was therefore admirable as seen through the eyes of those who think like Madison and Jefferson, it has disadvantages. The main one is that a state system may attempt to mold all students alike according to the views of the dominant group and to discourage the .emergence of individual idiosyncrasies.
Sectarian education, however, does not remedy that condition. The advantages of sectarian education relate solely to religious or doctrinal matters. They give the *631church the opportunity to indoctrinate its creed delicately' and indirectly, or massively through doctrinal courses.
Many nations. follow that course: Moslem nations teach the Koran in their schools; Sweden vests its elementary education in the parish; Newfoundland puts its school system under three superintendents — one from the Church of England, one from the Catholic church, one from the United Church. In Ireland the public schools are under denominational managership — Catholic, Epis- j copalian, Presbyterian, and Hebrew.
England puts sectarian schools under the umbrella of its school system. It finances sectarian education; it exerts control by prescribing standards; it requires some free scholarships; it provides nondenominational membership on the board of director^15
The British system is, in other words,, one of surveillance over sectarian schools. We too have surveillance over sectarian schools but only to the extent of making sure that minimum educational standards are met, viz., competent teachers, accreditation of the school for diplomas, the number of hours of work and credits allowed, and so on.
But we have never faced, until recently, the problem’ of policing sectarian schools. Any surveillance to date has been minor and has related only to the consistently unchallenged matters of accreditation of the sectarian school in the State’s school system.16
The Rhode Island Act allows a supplementary salary to • a teacher in a sectarian school if he or she “does not teach a course in religion.”
*632The Pennsylvania Act provides for state financing of instruction in mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education, provided that the instruction in those courses “shall not include any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.”
Public financial support of parochial schools puts those schools under disabilities with which they were not previously burdened. For, as we held in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19, governmental activities relating to schools “must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements.” There we were concerned with equal protection; here we are faced with issues of Establishment of religion and its Free Exercise as those concepts are used in the First Amendment.
Where the governmental activity is the financing of the private school/the various limitations or restraints imposed by the Constitution on state governments come into play. Thus, Arkansas, as part of its attempt to avoid the consequences of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294, withdrew its financial support from some public schools and sent the funds instead to private schools. That state action was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944, 952. We affirmed, sub nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U. S. 197. Louisiana tried a like tactic and it too was invalidated. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 296 F. Supp. 686. Again we affirmed. 393 U. S. 17. Whatever might be the result in case of grants to students,17 it is clear that once *633one of the States finances a private school, it is duty-bound to make certain that the school stays within secular bounds and does not use the public funds to promote sectarian causes.
The government may, of course, finance a hospital though it is run by a religious order, provided it is open to people of all races and creeds. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291. The government itself could enter the hospital business; and it would, of course, make no difference if its agents who ran its hospitals were Catholics, Methodists, agnostics, pr whatnot. For the hospital is not indulging in religious instruction or, guidance or indoctrination. . As Mr. Justice Jackson said in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 26 (dissenting):
“[Each .State has] great latitude in deciding for itself, in the light of its own conditions, what shall be public purposes in its scheme of things. It may socialize utilities and economic enterprises and make taxpayers’ business out of what conventionally had. been private business. It may make public business of individual welfare, health, education, entertainment or security. But it cannot make public business of religious worship or instruction, or of attendance at religious institutions of any character.”
The reason is that given .by Madison in his Remonstrance:18
“[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for *634the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment . . .
When Madison in his Remonstrance attacked a taxing measure to support religious activities, he advanced a series of reasons for opposing it. One that is extremely relevant here-was phrased as follows: 19 “[I]t will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.” Intermeddling, to use Madison's word, or “entanglement,” to use what was said in Walz, has two aspects. The intrusion of government into religious schools through grants, supervision, or surveillance may result in establishment of religion in the constitutional sense when what the State does enthrones a particular sect for overt or subtle propagation of its faith. Those activities of the State may also intrude on the Free Exercise Clause by depriving a teacher, under threats of reprisals, of the right to give sectarian construction or interpretation of, say, history and literature, or to use the teaching of such súbjects to inculcate a religious creed or dogma.
Under these laws there will be vast governmental suppression, surveillance, or meddling in church affairs. As I indicated in Tilton v. Richardson, post, p. 689, decided this day, school prayers, the daily routine of parochial schools, must go if' our decision in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, is honored. If it is not honored, then the state has established a religious sect. Elimination of prayers is only, part of the problem. The curriculum presents subtle and difficult problems. The constitutional mandate can in part be-carried out by censoring the curricula. What is palpably a sectarian course can be marked for *635deletion. But the problem only starts there. Sectarian instruction, in which, of course, a State may not indulge, can take place in a course on Shakespeare or in one on mathematics. No matter what the curriculum, offers, the question is, what is taught f We deal not with evil teachers but with zealous ones who may use any opportunity to indoctrinate a class.20
It is well known that everything taught in most parochial schools is taught with the ultimate goal of religious education in mind. Rev. Joseph H. Fichter, S. J., stated in Parochial School: A Sociological Study 86 (1958):
“It is a commonplace observation that in the parochial school religion permeates the whole curriculum, and is not confined to a single half-hour period of the day. Even arithmetic can be used as an instrument of pious thoughts, as in the case of the teacher who gave this problem to her class: ‘If it takes forty thousand priests and a hundred and forty thousand sisters to care for forty million Catholics in the United States, how many more priests and sisters will be needed to convert and care for the hundred million non-Catholics in the United States?’ ”
One can imagine what a religious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian, can do with the Ref*636ormation or with the Inquisition. Much history can be given the- gloss of a particular religion. I would think that policing these grants to detect sectarian instruction would be insufferable to religious partisans and would breed division and dissension between church and state.
This problem looms large where the church controls the hiring and firing of teachers:
“[•I]n the public school the selection of a faculty and the administration of the school usually rests with a school board which is subject to election and recall by the voters, but in the parochial school the selection of a faculty and the administration of the school is in the hands of the bishop alone, and usually is administered through the local priest. If a faculty member in the public school believes that he has been treated unjustly in being disciplined or dismissed, he can seek redress through the civil court and he is guaranteed a hearing. But if a faculty member in a parochial school is disciplined or dismissed he has no recourse whatsoever. The word of the bishop or priest is final, even without explanation if he so chooses. The tax payers have a voice in the way their money is used in the public school, but the people who support a parochial school have no voice at all in such affairs.” L. Boettner, Roman Catholicism 375 (1962).
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, dealt only with textbooks. Even so, some had difficulty giving approval. Yet books can be easily examined independently of other aspects of the teaching process. In the present cases we deal with the totality of instruction destined to be sectarian, at least in part, if the religious character of the school is to be maintained. A school which operates to commingle religion with other instruction plainly cannot completely secularize its instruction. *637Parochial schools, in large measure, do not accept the assumption that secular subjects should be unrelated to religious teaching.
Lemon involves a state statute that prescribes that courses in mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education “shall not include any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.” The subtleties involved in applying this standard are obvious. It places the State astride a sectarian school and gives it power to dictate what is or is not secular, what is or is not religious. I can think of no more disrupting influence apt to promote rancor and ill-will between church and state than this kind of surveillance and control. They are the very opposite of the “moderation and harmony” between church and state which Madison thought was the aim and purpose of the Establishment Clause.
The DiCenso cases have all the vices which are in Lemon, because the supplementary salary payable to the teacher is conditioned on his or her not teaching “a course in religion.”
Moreover, the DiCenso cases reveal another, but related, knotty problem presented when church and state launch one of these educational programs. The Bishop of Rhode Island has a Handbook of School Regulations for the Diocese of Providence.21
The school board supervises “the education, both spiritual and secular, in the parochial schools and diocesan high schools.”
The superintendent is an agent of the bishop and he interprets and makes “effective state and diocesan educational directives.”
*638The pastors visit the schools and “give their assistance in promoting spiritual and intellectual discipline.”
Community supervisors “assist the teacher in the problems of instruction” and these duties are:
“I. To become well enough acquainted with the teachers of their communities so as to be able to advise the community superiors on matters of placement and reassignment.
“II. To act as liaison between the provincialate and the religious teacher in the school.
“III. To cooperate with the superintendent by studving the diocesan school regulations and to en-cou . the teachers of their community to observe these regulations.
“IV. To avoid giving any orders or directions to the teachers of their community that may be in conflict with diocesan regulations or policy regarding curriculum, testing, textbooks, method, or administrative matters..
“V. To refer questions concerning school administration beyond the scope of their own authority to the proper diocesan school authorities, namely, the superintendent of schools or the pastor.”
The length of the school day includes Mass:
“A full day session for Catholic schools at the elementary level consists of five and one-half hours, exclusive of lunch and Mass,22 but inclusive-of recess for pupils in grades 1-3.”
A course of study or syllabus prescribed for an elementary or secondary school is “mandatory.”
*639Religious instruction is provided as follows:
“A. Systematic religious instructions must be provided in all schools of the diocese.
“B. Modern catechetics requires a teacher with unusual aptitudes, specialized training, and such unction of the spirit that his words possess the force of a personal call. He should be so filled with his subject that he can freely improvize in discussion, dramatization, drawing, song, and prayer. A teacher so gifted and so permeated by the message of the Gospel is rare. Perhaps no teacher in a given school attains that ideal. But some teachers come nearer it than others. If our pupils are to hear the Good •News so that their minds are enlightened and their hearts respond to the love of God and His Christ, if they are to be formed into vital, twentieth-century Christians, they should receive their religious instructions only from the very best teachers.
“C. Inasmuch as the textbooks employed in religious instruction above the fifth grade require a high degree of catechetical preparation, religion should be a departmentalized subject in grade six through twelve.”
Religious activities are provided, through observance of specified holy days and participation in Mass.
“Religious formation” is not restricted to courses but is achieved “through the example of the faculty, the tone of the school . . . and religious activities.”
No unauthorized priest may address the students.
“Retreats and days of recollection form an integral part of our religious program in the Catholic schools.”
Religious factors are used in the selection of students:
“Although wealth should never .serve as a criterion for accepting,a pupil into a Catholic school, all other *640things being equal, it would seem fair to give preference to a child whose parents support the parish. Regular use of the budget, rather than the size of the contributions, would appear equitable. - It indicates whether parents regularly attend Mass.”
These are only highlights of the handbook. But they indicate how pervasive is the religious control over the school and how remote this type of school is from the secular school. Public funds supporting that structure are used to perpetuate a doctrine and creed in innumerable and in pervasive ways. Those who man these schools are good .people, zealous people, dedicated people. But they are dedicated to ideas that the Framers of our Constitution placed beyond the reach of government.
If the government closed its eyes to the manner in which these grants are actually used it would be allowing public funds to promote sectarian education. If it did not close its eyes but undertook the surveillance needed, it would, I fear, intermeddle in parochial affairs in a way that would breed only rancor and dissension.
We have announced over and over again that the use of taxpayers’ money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth.
We said in unequivocal words in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16, “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever .form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” We reiterated the same idea in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314, and in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 443, and in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 493. We repeated the same idea in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 210, and added that a State’s *641tax-supported public schools could not be used “for the dissemination of réligious doctrines” nor could a State provide the church “pupils for' their religious classes through use of the State’s compulsory public school ma- . chinery.” Id., at 212.
Yet in spite of this long and consistent history there are those who have the courage to announce that a State may nonetheless finance the secular part of a. sectarian school’s educational program. That, however, makes a grave constitutional decision turn merely on cost accounting and bookkeeping entries. A history class, a literature class, or a science class in a parochial school is not a separate institute; it is part of the organic whole which the State subsidizes. The. funds are used in these cases to pay or help pay the salaries of teachers in parochial schools; and the presence of teachers is critical to the essential purpose of the parochial school, viz., to advance the religious endeavors of the particular church. It matters not that the teacher receiving taxpayers’ money only teaches religion a fraction of the time. Nor does it matter that he or she teaches no religion. The school is an organism living on one budget. What the taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science without any trace of proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training. As Judge Coffin said, 316 F. Supp. 112, 120, we would be blind to realities if we let “sophisticated bookkeeping” sanction “almost total subsidy of a religious institution by assigning the bulk of the institution’s expenses to ‘secular’ activities.” And sophisticated attempts to avoid the Constitution are just as invalid as simple-minded ones. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275.
In my view the taxpayers’ forced contribution to the *642parochial schools in the present cases violates the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Marshall, who took no part in the con-, sideration or decision of No. 89, see ante, p. 625, whije intimating no view as to the continuing vitality of Ever-son v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), concurs in Mr. Justice Douglas’ opinion covering Nos. 569 and 570.
Mr. Justice Brennan.*I agree that the judgments in Nos. 569 and 570 must be affirmed. In my view the judgment in No. 89 must be reversed outright. I dissent in No. 153 insofar as the plurality opinion and the opinion of my Brother White sustain the constitutionality, as applied to sectarian institutions, of the Federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, as amended, 77 Stat. 363, 20 U. S. C. § 711 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. V). In my view that Act is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes grants of federal tax monies to sectarian institutions, but is unconstitutional only to that extent. I therefore think that our remand of the case should be limited to the direction of a hearing to determine whether the four institutional appellees here are sectarian institutions.
I continue to adhere to the view that to give concrete meaning to the Establishment Clause
“the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers. It is a line which the Court has consistently sought to mark in its decisions expounding the religious guarantees of the First *643Amendment. What the-Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice. When the secular and religious institutions become involved in such a manner, there inhere in the relationship precisely those .dangers — as much to church as to state — which the Framers feared would subvert religious liberty and the strength of a system of secular government.” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 294-295 (1963) (concurring opinion); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 680-681 (1970) (concurring opinion).
The common feature of all three statutes before ús is the provision of a direct subsidy from public funds for activities carried on by sectarian educational institutions. We have sustained the reimbursement of parents for bus fares of students under a scheme applicable to both public and nonpublic schools, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). We have also sustained the loan of textbooks in secular subjects to students of both public and nonpublic schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). See also Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
The statutory schemes before us, however, have features not present in either'the Everson or Allen schemes. For example, the reimbursement or the loan of books ended government involvement in Everson and Allen. In contrast each of the schemes here exacts a promise in some form that the subsidy will not be used to finance *644courses in religious subjects — promises that must be and are policed to assure compliance. Again, although the federal subsidy, similar to the Everson and Allen subsidies, is available to both public and nonpublic colleges and univérsities, the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania subsidies are restricted to nonpublic schools, and for practical purposes to Roman Catholic, parochial schools.1 These and other features I shall mention mean for me that Everson and Allen do not control these cases. Rather, the history of public subsidy of sectarian schools, and the purposes and operation of these particular statutes must be examined to determine whether the statutes breach the Establishment Clause. Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 681 (concurring opinion).
*645I
In sharp contrast to the “undeviating acceptance given religious tax- exemptions from our earliest days as a Nation,” ibid., subsidy of sectarian educational institutions became enibroiled in bitter controversies very soon after the Nation was formed. Public education was, of course, virtually nonexistent when the Constitution was adopted. Colonial Massachusetts in 1647 had directed towns to establish schools, Benjamin Franklin in 1749 proposed a Philadelphia Academy, and Jefferson labored to establish a public school system in Virginia.2 But these were the exceptions. Education in the Colonies was overwhelmingly a private enterprise, usually carried on as a denominational activity by the dominant Protestant sects. In point of fact, government generally looked to the church to provide education, and often contributed support through donations of land and money. E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 171 (1919).
Nor was there substantial change in the years immediately following ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Schools continued to be local and, in the main, denominational institutions.3 But the demand for public education soon emerged. The evolution of the struggle in New York City is illustrative.4 In 1786, the first New York State Legislature ordered that one section in each township be set aside for the “gospel and schools.” With no public schools, various private agencies and churches operated “charity schools” for the poor of New *646York City and received money from the state common school fund. The forerunner of the city’s public schools was organized in 1805 when DeWitt Clinton founded “The Society for Establishment of a Free School in the City of New York for the Education of such poor Children as do not belong to or are not provided for by any Religious Society.” The State and city aided the society, and it built many schools. Gradually, however, competition and bickering among the Free School • Society and the various church schools developed oyer the apportionment of state school funds. As a result, in 1825, the legislature transferred to the city council the respon-. sibility for distributing New York City’s share of the state funds. The council stopped funding religious societies which operated 16 sectarian schools but continued supporting schools connected with the Protestant Orphan Asylum Society. Thereafter, in 1831, the Catholic Orphan Asylum Society demanded and received public funds to operate its schools but a request of Methodists for funds for the same purpose was denied. Nine years later, the Catholics enlarged their request for public monies to include all parochial schools, contending that the council was subsidizing sectarian books and instruction of the Public School Society, which Clinton’s Free School Society had become. The city’s Scotch Presbyterian and Jewish communities immediately followed with requests for funds to finance their schools. Although the Public School Society undertook to revise its texts to meet the objections, in 1842, the state legislature closed, the bitter controversy by enacting a law that established a City Board of Education to set up free public schools, prohibited the distribution of public funds to sectarian schools, and prohibited the teaching of sectarian doctrine in any public school.
The Nation’s rapidly developing religious heterogeneity, the tide of Jacksonian democracy, and growing *647urbanization soon led to widespread demands throughout the States for secular public education. At the same time strong opposition developed to use of the States’ taxing powers to support private sectarian schools.5 Although the controversy over religious exercises in the public schools continued into this century, Schempp, 374 U. S., at 268-277 (Brennan, J., concurring), the opponents of subsidy to sectarian schools had largely won their fight by 1900. In fact, after 1840, no efforts of sectarian schools to obtain a share of public school funds succeeded. Cubberley, supra, at 179. Between 1840 and 1875, 19 States added provisions to their constitutions prohibiting the use of public school funds to aid sectarian schools, id., at 180, and by 1900,16 more States had added similar provisions. In fact, no State admitted to the Union after 1858, except West Virginia, omitted such provision from its first constitution. Ibid. Today fewer than a half-dozen States omit such provisions from their constitutions.6 *648And in 1897, Congress included in its appropriation act for the District of Columbia a statement declaring it
“to be the policy of the Government of the United States to make no appropriation of money or property for the purpose of founding, maintaining, or aiding by payment for services, expenses, of otherwise, any church- or religious denomination, or any institution or society which is under sectarian or ecclesiastical control.” 29 Stat. 411.
Thus for more than a century, the consensus, enforced by legislatures and courts with substantial consistency, has been that public subsidy of sectarian schools constitutes an impermissible involvement of secular with *649religious institutions.7 If this history is not itself coip-pelling against the validity of the three subsidy statutes, in the sense we found in Walz that “undeviating acceptance” was highly significant in favor of the validity of religious tax exeinption, other forms of governmental involvement that each of the three statutes requires tip the scales in my view against the validity of each of them. These are involvements that threaten “dangers — as much to church as to state — which the Framers feared would subvert religious liberty and the strength of a system of secular government.” Schempp, 374 U. S., at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). “[Gjovernment and religion have discrete interests which are mutually best served when each avoids too close a proximity to the other. It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with, and dependent, upon the government.” Id., at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring). All three of these statutes require “too close a proximity” of government to the subsidized sectarian institutions and in my view create real dangers of “the secularization of a creed.”
*650II
The Rhode Island statute requires Roman Catholic teachers to surrender their right to teach religion courses and to promise not to “inject” religious teaching into their secular courses. This has led at least one teacher to stop praying with his classes,8 a concrete testimonial to the self-censorship that inevitably accompanies state regulation of delicate First Amendment freedoms. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958). Both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes prescribe extensive standardization of the content of secular courses, and of the teaching materials and textbooks to be used in teaching the courses. And the regulations to implement those requirements necessarily require policing of instruction in the schools. The picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than an imagined specter of governmental “secularization of a creed.”
The same dangers attend the federal subsidy even if less obviously. The Federal Government exacts a promise that no “sectarian instruction” or “religious worship” will take place in a subsidized building. The Office of Education polices the promise.9 In one instance federal *651officials demanded that a college cease teaching a course entitled “The History of Methodism” in a federally assisted building, although the Establishment Clause “plainly does not foreclose teaching about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in classes in literature, or history.” Schempp, 374 U. S., at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring). These examples illustrate the complete incompatibility of such surveillance with the restraints barring interference with religious freedom.10
Policing the content of courses, the specific textbooks used, and indeed the words of teachers is far different from the legitimate policing carried on under state compulsory attendance laws or laws regulating minimum levels of educational achievement. Government’s legití-mate interest in ensuring certain minimum skill levels and the acquisition of certain knowledge does not carry with it power to prescribe what shall not be taught, or what methods of instruction shall be used, or what opinions the teacher may offer in the course of teaching.
Moreover, when a sectarian institution accepts state financial aid it becomes obligated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to discriminate in admissions policies and faculty selection. *652The District Court in the Rhode Island case pinpointed the dilemma:
“Applying these standards to parochial schools might, well restrict their ability to discriminate in admissions policies and in the hiring and firing of ' eachers. At some point the school becomes 'public’ for more purposes than the Church could wish. At that point, the Church may justifiably feel that its victory on the Establishment Clause has meant abandonment of the Free Exercise Clause.” 316 F. Supp., at 121-122 (citations omitted).
Ill
In any event, I do not believe that elimination of these aspects of “too close a proximity” would save these three statutes. I expressed the view in Walz that “[gjeneral subsidies of religious activities would, of course, constitute impérmi.ssible state involvement with religion.” 397 U. S., at 690 (concurring opinion). I do not think the subsidies under these statutes fall outside “[gjeneral subsidies of religious activities” merely because they are restricted to support of the teaching of secular subjects. In Walz, the passive aspect of the benefits conferred by a tax exemption, particularly since cessation of the exemptions might easily lead to impermissible involvements and conflicts, led me to conclude that exemptions were consistent with the First Amendment values. • However, I contrasted direct government subsidies:
“Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses. resources exacted from taxpayers as' a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves no such *653transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying taxes. In other words, ‘[i]n the case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly diverts the income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches/ while ‘[i]n the cáse of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting to its own-uses income independently generated by the churches through voluntary contributions.’ Thus, ‘the symbolism of tax exemption is significant as á manifestation that organized religion is not expected to support the state; by the same token the. state,is not expected to support the church.’ ” 397 U.S., at 690-691 (footnotes and citations omitted) (concurring opinion).
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and the Federal Government argue strenuously that the government monies in all these cases are not “[gjeneral subsidies of religious activities” because they are paid specifically and solely for the secular education that the sectarian institutions. provide.11
Before turning to the decisions of this Court on which this argument is based, it is important to recall again the history of subsidies to sectarian schools. See Part *654I, supra. The universality of state constitutional provisions forbidding such grants, as well as the weight of judicial authority disapproving such aid as a violation of our tradition of separation of church and state, reflects a time-tested judgment that such grants do indeed constitute impermissible aid to religion.- See nn. 6 and 7, supra. The recurrent argument, consistently rejected in the past, has been that government grants to sectarian schools ought not be viewed as impermissible subsidies “because [the schools] relieve the State of a burden, which it would otherwise be itself required to bear .... they will render a service to the state by performing for it its duty of educating the children of the people.” Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540, 571, 18 N. E. 183, 197 (1888).
Nonetheless, it is argued once again in these cases that sectarian schools and-universities perform two separable functions. First, they provide. secular education, and second, they teach the tenets of a particular sect. Since the State has determined that the secular education provided in sectarian schools serves the legitimate state interest in the education of its citizens, it is contended that state aid solply to the secular education function does not involve the State in aid to religion. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and Board of Education v. Allen, supra, are relied on as support for the argument.
Our opinion in Allen, recognized that sectarian schools provide both a secular and a sectarian education:
“[T]his Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education. In the leading case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), the Court held that . . . Oregon had not. shown that its interest in secular, education required that all children attend publicly operated schools. A premise of this *655holding was the view that the State’s interest in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools maintained by the Society of Sisters.
“[T]he continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their students. This judgment is further evidence that parochial schools are performing, in addition to their sectarian function, the task of secular education.” Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S., at 245, 247-248 (footnote omitted).
But I do not read Pierce or Allen as supporting the proposition that public subsidy of a sectarian institution’s secular training is permissible state involvement. I read them as supporting the proposition that as an identifiable set of skills and an identifiable quantum, of knowledge, secular education may be effectively provided either in the religious context of parochial schools, or outside the context of religion in public schools. The State’s interest in secular education may be defined broadly as an interest in ensuring that all children within its boundaries acquire a. minimum level - of competency in certain skills, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as a minimum amount of information and knowledge in certain subjects such as history, geography, science, literature, and law. Without such skills and knowledge, an individual will be at a severe disadvantage both in participating in democratic self-government and in earning a living in a modern industrial economy. But the State has no proper interest in prescribing the precise forum in which such skills and knowledge are learned since acquisition of this *656secular education is neither incompatible with religious learning, nor is it inconsistent with or inimical to religious precepts.
When the same secular educational process occurs in both public and sectarian schools, Allen held that the State could provide secular textbooks for use in that process to students in both public and sectarian school's. Of course, the State could not provide textbooks giving religious instruction. But since the textbooks involved in Allen -would, at least in theory,'be limited to secular education, no aid to sectarian instruction was involved.
More important, since the textbooks in Allen had been previously provided by the parents, and not the schools, 392 U. S., at 244 n. 6, no. aid to the institution was involved. Rather, as in the case of the bus transportation in Everson, the general program of providing all children in the State with free secular textbooks assisted all parents in schooling their children. And as in Everson, there was undoubtedly the possibility that some parents might not have been able to exercise their constitutional right to send their children to parochial school if the parents were compelled themselves to pay for textbooks. However, as my Brother Black wrote for the Court in Everson,
“[Cjutting off church schools from these [general] services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function, would make it far more' difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups off-religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” 330 U. S., at 18.
*657Allen, in my view, simply sustained -a statute in which the State was “neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.” The only .context in which the Court in Allen émployed' the distinction between secular and religious in a parochial school was to reach its conclusion tl>at the textbooks that the State was providing could and would be secular.12 The present cases, however, involve direct subsidies of tax monies to the schools themselves and we cannot blink the fact that the secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is - the only reason for the schools’ existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably intertwined.
The .District Court in the DiCenso case found that all the varied aspects of the parochial school’s program — the nature of its faculty, its supervision, decor, program, extracurricular activities, assemblies, courses, etc. — produced an “intangible 'religious atmosphere,’ ” since the “diocesan school system is an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church” and “a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation.” 316 F. Supp., at 117. Quality teaching in sécular subjects is an integral part of this religious énter-prise. “Good secular teaching is as essential to the religious mission of the parochial schools as a roof for the school or desks for the classrooms.” 316 F. Supp., at 117-118. That teaching cannot be separated from, the environment in which it occurs, for its integration with the religious mission is both the theory and the strength of the religious school. •
The common ingredient of the three prongs of the test *658set forth at .the outset of this opinion is whether the statutes involve government in the “essentially religious activities” of religious institutions. My analysis of the operation, purposes, and effects of these statutes leads me inescapably to the conclusion that they do impermissibly involve the States and the Federal Government with the “essentially religious activities” of sectarian educational institutions. More specifically, for the reasons stated, I think each government uses “essentially religious'means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.” This Nation long ago committed itself to primary reliance upon publicly supported public education to serve its important goals in secular education. Our religious diversity gave strong impetus to that commitment.
“[T]h'e American experiment in free public education available to all children has been guided m large measure by the dramatic evolution of the religious diversity among the population which our public schools serve. . . . The public schools are supported entirely, in most communities, by public funds — funds exacted not only from parents, nor alone from those who hold particular religious views, nor indeed from those who subscribe to any creed at all. It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort — an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage ’ common to all American groups and religions. This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and patriotic.” Schempp, 374 U. S., at 241-242 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
*659I conclude that, in using sectarian institutions to further goals in secular education, the three statutes do violence to the principle that “government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice.” Schempp, supra, at 265 (Brennan, J., concurring).
IV.
The plurality’s treatment of the. issues in Tilton, No. 153, diverges so substantially from my own that I add these further comments. I believe that the Establishment Clause forbids the Federal Government to provide funds to sectarian universities in which the propagation . and advancement of a particular religion are a function or purpose of the institution. Since the District Court made no findings whether the. four institutional appellees here are sectarian, I would remand the case to the District’ Court with directions to determine whether the institutional appellees are “sectarian” institutions.
I reach this conclusion for the reasons I have stated: the necessarily deep involvement of government in the religious activities of such an institution through the’ policing of restrictions, and the fact that subsidies of tax monies directly to a sectarian institution necessarily aid the proselytizing function of the institution. The plurah ity argues that neither of these dangers is present.13
At the risk of repetition, I emphasize that a sectarian university is the equivalent in the realm of higher education of the Catholic elementary schools in Rhode Island; it is an educational institution in which the propagation *660and advancement of a particular religion are a primary function of the institution. I do not believe that, construction grants to such a sectarian institution are permissible. The reason is not that religion “permeates” the secular education that is provided. Rather, it is that the secular education is provided within the environment of religion; the institution is dedicated to two goals, secular education and religious instruction. When aid flows directly to the institution, both functions benefit. The plurality, would examine only the activities that occur within the federally assisted building and ignore the religious nature of the school of which it is a part. The “religious enterprise” aided by the construction grants involves the maintenance of an educational. environment — which includes high-quality, purely secular educational courses — within which religious instruction occurs in a variety of ways.
The plurality also argues that no impermissible entanglement exists here. My Brother White cogently comments upon that argument: “Why the federal program in the Tilton, case is not embroiled in .the same difficulties [as the Rhode Island program] is never adequately explained.” Post, at 668. I do not see any significant difference in the Federal Government’s telling the sectarian university not to teach any nonsecular subjects in a certain building, and Rhode Island’s telling the Catholic school teacher not to teach religion. The vice is the creation through .subsidy of a relationship in which the government polices the teaching practices of a religious ■school or university. The plurality suggests that the facts that college students are less impressionable and that college courses are less susceptible to religious permeation . may lessen the need for federal policing. But the record shows that such policing has occurred and occurred in a. heavy-handed way. Given the dangers of self-censorship in such a situation, I cannot agree that the dangers of *661entanglement are insubstantial. Finally, the plurality suggests that the “nonideological” nature of a building, as contrasted with a teacher, reduces the need for policing. But the Federal Government imposes restrictions on every class taught in the federally assisted building. It is therefore not the “nonideological” building that is policed; rather, it is' the courses given there and the teachers who teach them. Thus, the policing is precisely the same as under the state statutes, and that is what offends the Constitution.
V
I, therefore, agree that the two state statutes that focüs primarily on providing public funds to sectarian schools are unconstitutional. However, the federal statute in No. 153 is a general program of construction grants to all colleges and universities, including sectarian institutions. Since I believe the statute’s extension of eligibility to sectarian institutions is severable from the broad general program authorized, I would hold the Higher Education Facilities Act unconstitutional only insofar as it authorized grants of federal tax monies to sectarian institutions — institutions that have a purpose or function to propagate or advance a particular religion. Therefore, if the District Court determines that any of the four institutional appellees here are “sectarian,” that court, in my view, should enjoin the other appellees from making grants to it.
A. Stokes & L. Pfeifer, Church and State in the United States 229 (1964).
Ibid.
Deedy, Should Catholic Schools Survive?, New Republic, Mar. 13, 1971, pp. 15, 16.
Id., at 17.
Ibid.
Stokes & Pfeifer, supra, n. 1, at 231.
Id., at 231-239.
Id., at 237.
Ibid.
R. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education 115 (1950).
Id., at 118. And see R. Finney, A Brief History of the American Public School 44-45 (1924).
See E. Knight, Education in the United States 3, 314 (3d rev. ed. 1951); E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 164 et seq. (1919).
In 1960 the Federal Government provided $500 million to private colleges and universities. Amounts contributed by state and local governments to private schools at any level were negligible. Just one decade later federal aid to private • colleges and universities had grown to $2.1 billion. State aid had begun and reached $100 million. Statistical Abstract of the United States 105 (1970). As the present cases demonstrate, we are now reaching a point where state aid is being given to private elementary and secondary schools as well as colleges and universities.
Deedy, supra, n. 3, at 16.
S. Curtis, History of Education in Great Britain 316-383 (5th ed. 1963); W. Alexander, Education in England, c. II (2d ed. 1964).
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 402.
Grants to students in the context of the problems of desegregated public schools have without exception been stricken down as tools of the forbidden discrimination. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218; Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, aff’d, 368 U. S. 515; Lee v. Macon County Bd., 267 F. Supp. 458, aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United *633States, 389 U. S. 215; Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 275 F. Supp. 833, aff’d, 389 U. S. 571; Brown v. South Carolina State Bd., 296 F. Supp. 199, aff’d, 393 U. S. 222; Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Commission, 296 F. Supp. 1389; Lee v. Macon County Bd., 231 F. Supp. 743.
Remonstrance ¶ 3. The Memorial and -Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments has been reproduced in appendices to the *634opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson, 330 U. S., at 63, and to that of Douglas, 3., in Walz, 397 U. S., at 719.
Remonstrance ¶ 11.
“In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in every subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Roman Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is filled with propaganda. That, of course, is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to all of the work and expense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scrioture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do, and what to think.” L. Boettner, Roman Catholicism 360 (1962).“
It was said on oral argument that the handbook shown as an exhibit in record had been superseded. The provisions hereinafter quásífo^; are fronrtj-jhe handbook as it reads after all the deletions toíwbich we wer^-referred.
“The use of school time to participate in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass on the feasts of All Saints, Ascension, and the patronal saint of the parish or school, as well as during the 40 Hours Devotion, is proper and commendable.”
This opinion also applies to No. 153, Tilton et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al., post, p. 672.
At the time of trial, 95% of the elementary school children in private schools in Rhode Island attended Roman Catholic schools. Only nonpublic school teachers could receive the subsidy and then only if they taught in schools in which the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education did not equal or exceed the average for the State’s public schools. Some 250 of the 342 lay teachers employed in Rhode Island Roman Catholic schools had applied for and been declared eligible for the subsidy. To receive it the teacher must (1) have a state teaching certificate; (2) teach exclusively secular subjects taught in the State’s public schools; (3) use only teaching materials approved for use in the public schools; (4) not teach religion; and (5) promise in writing not to teach a course in religion while receiving the salary supplement.
Unlike the Rhode Island case, the Pennsylvania case lacks a factual record since the complaint was dismissed on motion. We must therefore decide the constitutional challenge as addressed to the face of the Pennsylvania statute. Appellants allege that the nonpublic schools are segregated in Pennsylvania by race and religion and that the Act perpetrates and promotes the segregation of races “with the ultimate result of promoting two school systems in Pennsylvania — a public school system predominantly black, poor and inferior and a private, subsidized school system predominantly white, affluent and superior.” Brief for Appellants Lemon et al. 9. The District Court held that appellants lacked standing to assert this equal protection claim. In my view this was plain error.
E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 17 (1919); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 238 n. 7 and authorities cited therein (BrennaN, J., concurring).
C. Antieau, A. Downey, E. Roberts, Freedom from Federal Establishment 174 (1964).
B. Confrey, Secularism in American Education: Its History 127-129 (1931)..
See generally R. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education 111-145 (1950); 2 A. Stokes, Church and State in the United States 47-72 (1950); Cubberley, supra n. 2, at 155-181.
See Ala. Const., Art. XIV, § 263; Alaska Const., Art. VII, § 1; Ariz. Const., Art. II, § 12, Art. XI, §§ 7, 8; Ark. Const., Art. XIV, § 2; Calif. Const., Art. IX, § 8; Colo. Const., Art. IX, § 7; Conn. Const., Art. VIII, § 4; Del. Const., Art. X, § 3; Fla. Const., Decl. of Rights, Art. I, § 3; Ga. Const., Art. VIII, § 12, par. 1; Hawaii Const., Art. IX, § 1; Idaho Const., Art. IX, § 5; Ill. Const., Art. VIII, § 3; Ind. Const., Art. 8, § 3; Kan. Const., Art. 6, § 6 (c); Ky. Const., § 189; La. Const., Art. XII, § 13; Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVI, § 2; Mich. Const., Art. I, § 4; Minn. Const., Art. VIII, § 2; Miss. Const., Art. 8, § 208; Mo. Const., Art. IX, § 8; Mont. Const., Art. XI, § 8; Neb. Const., Art. VII, § 11; Nev. Const., Art. 11, § 10; N. H. Const., Pt. II, Art. 83; N. J. Const., Art. VIII, § 4, par. 2; N. Mex. Const., Art. XII, § 3; N. Y. Const., Art. XI, § 3; N. Car. Const., Art. IX, §§ 4, 12; N. Dak. Const., Art. VIII, § 152; Ohio Const., Art. VI, § 2; Okla. Const., Art. II, § 5; Ore. Const., Art. VIII, § 2; Penn. Const., Art. 3, § 15; R. I. Const., Art. XII, § 4; S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 9; S. Dak. Const., Art. VIII, § 16; Tenn. *648Const., Art. XI, § 12; Tex. Const., Art. VII, § 5; Utah Const., Art. X, § 13; Va. Const., Art. IX, § 141; Wash. Const., Art. IX, § 4; W. Va. Const., Art. XII, § 4; Wis. Const., Art. I, § 18, Art. X, § 2; Wyo. Const., Art. 7, § 8.
The overwhelming majority of these constitutional provisions either prohibit expenditures of public funds on sectarian schools, or prohibit the expenditure of public school funds for any purpose other than support of public schools. For a discussion and categorization of the various constitutional formulations, see Note, Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 Yale L. J. 917 (1941). Many of the constitutional provisions are collected in B. Confrey, Secularism . in American Education: Its History 47-125 (1931).
Many state constitutions explicitly apply the prohibition to aid to sectarian colleges and universities. See, e. g., Colo. Const., Art. IX, § 7; Idaho Const., Art. IX, § 5; Ill. Const., Art. VIII, § 3; Kan. Const., Art. 6, § 6 (c); Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVI, § 2; Mo. Const., Art. IX, § 8; Mont. Const., Art. XI, § 8; Neb. Const., Art. VII, § 11; N. Mex. Const., Art. XII, § 3; S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 9; Utah Const., Art. X, § 13; Wyo. Const., Art. 7, § 8. At least one judicial decision construing the word “schools” held that the word does not include colleges and universities, Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N. E. 464 (1913), but that decision was overruled by constitutional amendment. Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVI, § 2.
See, e. g., Wright v. School Dist., 151 Kan. 485, 99 P. 2d 737 (1940); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. City of Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 28 P. 1000 (1892); Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S. W. 507 (1917); Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N. E. 464 (1913); Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 (1869); Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S. W. 2d 609 (1942); State ex rel. Public School Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N. W. 573 (1932); State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882); Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. D. 366, 50 N. W. 632 (1891).
“Already the Act has restricted the role of teachers. The evidence before us indicates that some otherwise qualified teachers have stopped teaching courses in religion in order to qualify for aid under the Act. One teacher, in fact, testified that he no longer prays with his class lest he endanger his subsidy.” 316 F. Supp., at 121.
The Office of Education stipulated as follows:
“The Office of Education is now engaged in making a series of on-site reviews of completed projects to verify that conditions under which Federal assistance was .provided are being implemented. During these visits, class schedules and course descriptions contained in the school catalog are analyzed to ascertain that nothing in the nature of sectarian instruction is scheduled in any area constructed with the *651use of Federal funds. If there is found to be an indication that a portion of academic facilities constructed with Federal assistance is used in any way for sectarian purposes, either the questionable practice must be terminated or the institution must assume full responsibility for the cost of constructing the area involved.” App. in No. 153, p. 82 (emphasis added).
The plurality opinion in No. 153 would strike down the 20-year “period of Federal interest,” 20 U. S. C. § 754 (a), upon the ground that “[t]he restrictive obligations of a recipient institution under § 751 (a) (2) cannot, compatibly with the Religion Clauses, expire while the building has substantial value.” Post, at 683. Thus the surveillance constituting the “too close a proximity” which for me offends the Establishment Clause continues for the life of the building.
The Pennsylvania statute differs from Rhode Island’s in providing the subsidy without regard to whether the sectarian school’s average per-pupil expenditure on secular education equals or exceeds the average of the State’s public schools. Nor is there any limitation of the subsidy to nonpublic schools that are financially embarrassed. Thus the statute on its face permits use of the state subsidy' for the purpose of maintaining or attracting an audience for religious education, and also permits sectarian schools not needing the aid to apply it to exceed the quality of. secular education provided in public schools. These features' of the Pennsylvania scheme seem to me to invalidate it under the Establishment Clause as granting preferences to sectarian schools.
The three dissenters in Allen focused primarily on their disagreement with the Court that the textbooks provided would be secular. See 392 U. S., at 252-253 (Black, J., dissenting),; id., at 257 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 270 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Much of the plurality’s argument is directed at establishing that the specific institutional appellees here, as well' as most church-related colleges, are not sectarian in that they do not have a purpose or function to advance or propagate a specific religion. Those questions must await hearings and findings by the District Court.