dissenting.
The arbitration clause in this collective agreement reaches “a grievance pertaining to a violation of the Agreement.” The agreement covered both the lunch period1 and overtime.2
The Iowa Supreme Court held that “[t]he present controversy is undoubtedly arbitrable” under the collective agreement. Given the presumption favoring liberal construction of arbitration clauses, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582-583, we should defer to *231that ruling. Even under that construction, it seems that a suit for overtime allegedly withheld in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. §207 (a)(1) is maintainable. That would mean affirming the Iowa Supreme Court. U. S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351, which kept the courthouse door open, would seem to control this case.3
An affirmance would follow, a fortiori, if this collective agreement be construed as not requiring arbitration of this FLSA claim. For then it would seem that the worker would have a choice to sue under the statute or to proceed to arbitration on his contractual claim arising out of the same dispute.
The petition, however, is not dismissed for those reasons but for a wholly different one. It is said that there was a requirement to be “on call” and that that duty conflicted with the lunch or overtime provisions of the agreement. The difficulty is twofold: there was no “on call” grievance ever tendered so far as the record *232shows; moreover, the agreement concededly does not cover any “on call” requirement or duty. So there is no conflict between statutory remedy and remedy by arbitration and the difficulty posed is imaginary.
We should “dismiss as improvidently granted” only in exceptional situations and where all nine members of the Court agree. In all other cases the merits of the controversy should be decided. The present case on its facts is simple and uncomplicated; and a decision on the merits is apparently important to unions and employer alike.
Article XIV, § 1, states:
“A lunch period shall be provided no later than five (5) hours from the start of an employee’s shift, except when the shift does not exceed five and one-half (5%) hours.” '
Article VII, §3, states:
“Time and one-half (1%) will be paid for hours worked in excess of eight (8) in any day. Time and one-half (1%) will be paid for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any one week.”
The Iowa Supreme Court properly stated:
“We doubt that the general Congressional intent favoring arbitration can stand against the specific Congressional intent which is manifest in the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions giving employees strong and detailed rights in court. We think Congress intended that workmen should have free access to the courts in FLSA cases. We are the more persuaded of that view by the broad Congressional policy expressed in § 2 of FLSA, 29 U. S. C. A. § 202. There the objectives of the act are set forth, and those objectives encompass more than simply wage relief for employees; they include broad economic considerations — improvement in commerce among the states. The remedies provided by the act are part of the Congressional scheme to obtain employer compliance with the act and hence achievement of those broader objectives. We believe that if Congressional intent to allow a seaman to arbitrate or sue at his option is manifest in the seaman’s act involved in Arguelles, as the Court held there, then an intent to give workmen such an option is also manifest in the Fair Labor Standards Act.” 185 N. W. 2d 738, 742.