Laird v. Nelms

Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents brought this action in the United States District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-2680. They sought recovery for property damage allegedly resulting from a sonic boom caused by California-based United States military planes flying over North Carolina on a training mission. The District Court entered summary judgment for petitioners, but on respondents’ appeal the United States Court of *798Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. That court held that, although respondents had been unable to show negligence “either in the planning or operation of the flight,” they were nonetheless entitled to proceed on a theory of strict or absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities conducted by petitioners in their official capacities. That court relied on its earlier opinion in United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291 (1953), which in turn had distinguished this Court’s holding in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 45 (1953). We granted certiorari. 404 U. S. 1037.

Dalehite held that the Government was not liable for the extensive damage resulting from the explosion of two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas, in 1947. The Court’s opinion rejected various specifications of negligence on the part of Government employees that had been found by the District Court in that case, and then went on to treat petitioners’ claim that the Government was absolutely or strictly liable because of its having engaged in a dangerous activity. The Court said with respect to this aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim:

“[T]he Act does not extend to such situations, though of course well known in tort law generally. It is to be invoked only on a 'negligent or wrongful act or omission’ of an employee. Absolute liability, of course, arises irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself; it is imposed automatically when any damages are sustained as a result of the decision to engage in the dangerous activity.” 346 U. S., at 44.

This Court’s resolution of the strict-liability issue in Dalehite did not turn on the question of whether the law of Texas or of some other State did or did not recognize strict liability for the conduct of ultrahazardous activities. It turned instead on the question of whether the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act permitted *799under any circumstances the imposition of liability upon the Government where there had been neither negligence nor wrongful act. The necessary consequence of the Court’s holding in Dalehite is that the statutory language “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government,” is a uniform federal limitation on the types of acts committed by its employees for which the United States has consented to be sued. Regardless of state law characterization, the Federal Tort Claims Act itself precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negligence or other form of “misfeasance or nonfeasance,” 346 U. S., at 45, on the part of the Government.

It is at least theoretically possible to argue that since Dalehite in discussing the legislative history of the Act said that “wrongful” acts could include some kind of trespass, and since courts imposed liability in some of the early blasting cases on the theory that the plaintiff’s action sounded in trespass, liability could be imposed on the Government in this case on a theory of trespass which would be within the Act’s waiver of immunity. We believe, however, that there is more than one reason for rejecting such an alternate basis of governmental liability here.

The notion that a military plane on a high-altitude training flight itself intrudes upon any property interest of an owner of the land over which it flies was rejected in United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). There this Court, construing the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U. S. C. §401, said:

“It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe — Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. *800Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.” 328 U. S., at 260-261.

Thus, quite apart from what would very likely be insuperable problems of proof in connecting the passage of the plane over the owner’s air space with any ensuing damage from a sonic boom, this version of the trespass theory is ruled out by established federal law. Perhaps the precise holding of United States v. Causby, supra, could be skirted by analogizing the pressure wave of air characterizing a sonic boom to the concussion that on occasion accompanies blasting, and treating the air wave striking the actual land of the property owner as a direct intrusion caused by the pilot of the plane in the mold of the classical common-law theory of trespass.

It is quite clear, however, that the presently prevailing view as to the theory of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be strict liability for undertaking an ultrahazardous activity, rather than any attenuated notion of common-law trespass. See Restatement of Torts §§ 519, 520 (e); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 75 (4th ed. 1971). While a leading North Carolina case on the subject of strict liability discusses the distinction between actions on the case and actions sounding in trespass that the earlier decisions made, it, too, actually grounds liability on the basis that he who engages in ultrahazardous activity must pay his way regardless of what precautions he may have taken. Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N. C. 69, 131 S. E. 2d 900 (1963).

More importantly, however, Congress in considering the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot realistically be said *801to have dealt in terms of either the jurisprudential distinctions peculiar to the forms of action at common law or the metaphysical subtleties that crop up in even contemporary discussions of tort theory. See Prosser, supra, at 492-496. The legislative history discussed in Dalehite indicates that Congress intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful or careless conduct of Government employees, for which the Government was to be made liable according to state law under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but to exclude liability based solely on the ultrahazardous nature of an activity undertaken by the Government.

A House Judiciary Committee memorandum explaining the “discretionary function” exemption from the bill when that exemption first appeared in the draft legislation in 1942 made the comment that “the cases covered by that subsection would probably have been exempted ... by judicial construction” in any event, but that the exemption was intended to preclude any possibility

“that the act would be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of a legally authorized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no wrongful act or omission on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious . . . .” Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, pp. 65-66 (1942).

The same memorandum, after noting the erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the years, observed with respect to the bill generally:

“Yet a large and highly important area remains in which no satisfactory remedy has been provided *802for the wrongs of Government officers or employees, the ordinary 'commonlaw’ type of tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.” Id., at 39.

The type of trespass subsumed under the Act’s language making the Government liable for “wrongful” acts of its employees is exemplified by the conduct of the Government agents in Hatahley v. United States, 351 U. S. 173, 181. Liability of this type under the Act is not to be broadened beyond the intent of Congress by dressing up the substance of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities in the garments of common-law trespass. To permit respondent to proceed on a trespass theory here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front door. We do not believe the Act permits such a result.

Shortly after the decision of this Court in Dalehite, the facts of the Texas City catastrophe were presented to Congress in an effort to obtain legislative relief from that body. Congress, after conducting hearings and receiving reports, ultimately. enacted a bill granting compensation to the victims in question. 69 Stat. 707; H. R. Rep. No. 2024, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 2363, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1305, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. Rep. No. 1623, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. Rep. No. 684, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). At no time during these hearings was there any effort made to modify this Court’s construction of the Tort Claims Act in Dalehite. Both by reason of stare decisis and by reason of Congress’ failure to make any statutory change upon again reviewing the subject, we regard the principle enunciated in Dalehite as controlling here.

Since Dalehite held that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize suit against the Government on claims *803based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity, the Court of Appeals in the instant case erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. While as a matter of practice within the Circuit it may have been proper to rely upon United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291, it is clear that the holding of the latter case permitting imposition of strict liability on the Government where state law permits it is likewise inconsistent with Dalehite. Dalehite did not depend on the factual question of whether the Government was handling dangerous property, as opposed to operating a dangerous instrument but, rather, on the Court’s determination that the Act did not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon the Government. Indeed, even the dissenting opinion in Dalehite did not disagree with the conclusion of the majority on that point.

Our reaffirmation of the construction put on the Federal Tort Claims Act in Dalehite makes it unnecessary to treat the scope of the discretionary-function exemption contained in the Act, or the other matters dealt with by the Court of Appeals.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Douglas, having heard the argument, withdrew from participation in the consideration or decision of this case.