with whom Mb. Justice Brennan concurs, dissenting.
This Court’s decision in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200, made in 1922, is a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should remove. Only a romantic view1 of a rather dismal business account over the last 50 years would keep that derelict in midstream.
In 1922 the Court had a narrow, parochial view of commerce. With the demise of the old landmarks of that era, particularly United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, the whole concept of commerce has changed.
Under the modern decisions such as Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, the power of Congress was recognized as broad enough to reach all phases of the vast operations of our national industrial system. *287An industry so dependent on radio and television as is baseball and gleaning vast interstate revenues (see H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 5 (1952)) would be hard put today to say with the Court in the Federal Baseball Club, case that baseball was only a local exhibition, not trade or commerce.
Baseball is today big business that is packaged with beer, with .broadcasting, and with other industries. The beneficiaries of the Federal Baseball Club decision are not the Babe Ruths, Ty Cobbs, and Lou Gehrigs.
The owners, whose records many say reveal a proclivity for predatory practices, do not come to us with equities. The equities are with the; victims of the reserve clause. I use the word “victims” in the Sherman Act sense, since a contract which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint' of trade.2 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (CA2). And see Haywood v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U. S. 1204 (Douglas, J., in chambers).
If congressional inaction is our guide, we should rely upon the fact that Congress has refused to enact bills broadly exempting professional, sports from antitrust regulation.3 H. R. Rep. No, 2002, 82d Cong., 2d. Sess. *288(1952). The only statutory exemption granted by Congress to professional sports concerns broadcasting rights. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1291-1295. I would not ascribe a broader exemption through inaction than Congress has seen fit to grant explicitly.
There can be no doubt “that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate” 4 we would hold it to be subject to federal antitrust regulation. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445, 452. The unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from correcting our own mistakes.
Me. Justice Maeshall,.with whom Me. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting
Petitioner was a majpr league baseball player from .1956, when he signed a contract with the Cincinnati Reds, until 1969, When his 12-year career with the St. Louis Cardinals, which had obtained him from the Reds, ended and he was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies. He had no notice that the Cardinals were contemplating a trade, no opportunity to indicate the teams with which he would prefer playing, and no desire to -go to .Philadelphia. After receiving formal notification of the trade, petitioner wrote to the Commissioner of Baseball protesting that he' was not *289“a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes/'1 and urging that he had the right to consider offers from other teams than the Phillies. He. requested that the Commissioner inform all of the major league teams that he was available for the 1970 season. His request was denied, and petitioner was informed that he had no choice but to play for Philadelphia or not to play at all.
To non-athletes it might appear that, petitioner' was virtually enslaved by the owners of major league baseball clubs who bartered among themselves for his services. But, athletes know that it' was not servitude that bound petitioner to the club owners; it was the reserve system. The essence of that system is that a player is bound to the club with which he first signs a contract. for ‘ the rest of his playing days.2 He cannot escape from the club except by retiring, and he cannot prevent the club from assigning his contract to any other club.
Petitioner brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. - He alleged, among other things, that the reserve system was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of *290federal antitrust laws.3 The District Court thought itself bound by prior decisions of this Court and found for the respondents after a full trial. 309 F. Supp. 793 (1970). The United States Court of Appeals -for the Second Circuit affirmed. 443 F. 2d 264 (1971). We granted certiorari on October 19, 1971, 404 U. S. 880, in order to take a further look at the precedents relied upon by the lower courts.
This is a difficult case because we are torn between the principle of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U. S. 356 (1953), are totally at odds with inore recent and better reasoned cases.
In Federal Baseball Club, a team in the Federal League brought an antitrust action against the National and American Leagues and others. In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote that.the business being considered was “giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs.” 259 U. S., at 208. Hence, the Court held that baseball was not within the purview of the antitrust laws. Thirty-one years later, the Court reaffirmed this decision, without reexamining it, in Toolson-, a one-páragraph per curiam opinion. Like this case, Toolson involved -an attack on the reserve system. The Court said:
- “The business ‘has . . . been' left for thirty years to develop,- on the understanding that it was not *291subject to existing antitrust legislation. • The present cases ask us to overrule the prior .decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.” Id., at 357.
Much more time has passed since Tpolson and Congress has not acted. We must now decide whether to adhere to the reasoning of Toolson — i. e., to refuse to reexamine the underlying basis of Federal Baseball Club— or to proceed with a re-examination and let the chips fall where they may.
In his answer to petitioner’s complaint, the Commissioner of Baseball “admits that under present concepts of interstate commerce defendants are engaged therein.” App. 40. There can .be no doubt that the admission is warranted by today’s reality. Since baseball is interstate commerce, if we re-examine baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Court’s decisions in United States v. Shubert, 348 U. S. 222 (1955), United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236 (1955), and Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957), require that .we bring baseball within the coverage of the antitrust laws. See also, Haywood v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U. S. 1204 (Douglas, J., in chambers).
We.have only recently had occasion to comment that:
“Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of. Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. . . . Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy *292because certain private citizeiis or groups believe that, such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
The importance of the antitrust laws to every citizen must not be minimized. They are as important to baseball players as. they are to football players, lawyers, doctors, or members of any other class of workers. Baseball players cannot be denied the benefits of competition merely because club owners view other economic interests as being more important, unless Congress says so.
Has Congress acquiesced in our decisions in Federal Baseball Club and Toolson? I think not. Had the Court been consistent, and treated all sports in the same way baseball was treated, Congress might have become concerned enough to take action. But, the Court was inconsistent, and baseball was isolated and distinguished from all other sports. In Toolson the Court refused .to .act because Congress had been silent. -But the Court may have read too much into this legislative inaction.
Americans love baseball as they love all sports. Perhaps we become so enamored of athletics that we assume that they are foremost in the minds of legislators as well as fans. We must not forget, however, that, there are only some 600 major league baseball players., Whatever muscle they might have been able to muster by combining forces with other athletes has been greatly impaired by the manner in 'which this Court has isolated them. It is this Court that has made them impotent, and this Court should correct its error.
We do not lightly overrule our' prior constructions of federal statutes, but when our errors deny substantial federal rights, like the right to compete freely and effectively to the best of one’s ability as guaranteed by the *293antitrust laws, we must admit our error and correct it. We have done so before and we should do so again here. See, e. g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 241 (1970).4
To the extent that there is concern over any reliance interests that club owners may assert, they can be . satisfied by making our decision prospective only. Baseball should be covered by the antitrust laws beginning with this case and henceforth, unless Congress decides otherwise.5
Accordingly, I would overrule Federal Baseball Club and Toolson and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.6 .
This does not mean that petitioner would necessarily prevail, however. ' Lurking in the background is a hurdle of recent vintage that petitioner still must overcome. *294In' 1966, the Major League Players Association was formed. It is the collective-bargaining representative for all major league baseball players. Respondents argue that the reserve system is now part and parcel of the collective-bargaining agreement and that because it is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the federal labor statutes are applicable, not the federal antitrust laws.7 The lower courts did not rule on this argument, having decided 'the case solely on the basis of the antitrust, exemption. ■
This Court has faced, the interrelationship between the antitrust laws and the labor laws before. The decisions make several things clear. First, “benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat’s-paw to pull employer’s chestnuts out of the antitrust fires.” United States v. Women’s Sportswear Manufacturers Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464 (1949). See also. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 8, 325 U. S. 797 (1945). Second, the very nature of a collective-bargaining agreement mandates that the parties be . able to “restrain” trade to á greater degree than management could do unilaterally. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U. S. 676 (1965); cf., Teamsters Union v, Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959). Finally, it is clear that some cases can be resolved only by examining the purposes and the competing interests of the labor and antitrust statutes and by striking a balance.
. It is apparent that none óf the prior cases is precisely in point. They involve union-management agreements that work to the detriment of management’s competitors. In this case, petitioner urges that the reserve system works to the detriment of labor.
*295While there was evidence at trial concerning the collective-bargaining relationship of the parties, the issues surrounding that relationship have not been fully explored. As one commentary has suggested, this case “has been litigated with the implications for the institution of collective bargaining only dimly perceived. The labor law issues have been in the corners of the case— the courts below, for example, did not reach them— moving in and out of the shadows like an uninvited guest at a party whom one can’t decide either to embrace or expel.” 8
It is true that in Radovich v. National Football League, supra, the Court rejected a claim that federal labor statutes governed the relationship between a professional athlete and the professional sport. But, an examination of the briefs and record in that case indicates that the issue was not squarely faced. The issue is once again before this Court without being clearly focused. It should, therefore, be the subject of further inquiry in the District Court.
There is a surface appeal to respondents’ argument that petitioner’s sole remedy lies in filing a claim with the National Labor Relations Board, but this argument is premised on the notion that management and labor have agreed to accept the reserve clause. This notion is contradicted, in part, by the record in this case. ' Petitioner suggests that the reserve system was thrust upon the players by the owners and that the recently formed players’ union has not had time to modify or eradicate it. If this is true, the question arises as to whether there would then be any exemption from the antitrust laws in this case. Petitioner also suggests that there are limits *296to the antitrust violations to which labor and management can agree. These limits should also be explored.
In light of these considerations, I . would remand this casé to the. District Court for consideration of whether petitioner can state a claim under the antitrust laws despite the collective-bargaining agreement, and, if so, for a determination of whether there has been an antitrust violation in this case.
Had this same group boycott occurred in another industry, Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U. S. 207; United States v. Shubert, 348 U. S. 222; or even in another sport, Haywood v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U. S. 1204 (Douglas, J., in chambers) ; Badovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445; United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236; we would have no difficulty in sustaining petitioner’s claim.
This case gives us for the first time a full record showing the reserve clause in actual operation.
Letter from Curt Flood to Bowie K. Kuhn, Dec. 24, 1969, App. 37.
As Mr. Justice Blackmun points out, the reserve system is not novel. It has been employed since 1887. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 202-204 (CC SDNY 1890). The club owners assert that it is necessary to preserve effective compétition and to retain fan interest. The players do not agree and argue that the reserve system is overly restrictive. Before this lawsuit was instituted, the players refused to agree that the reserve system should be a part of the collective-bargaining contract. Instead, the owners and players agreed that, the reserve system would temporarily remain in effect while they .jointly investigated possible changes.. Their activity along these lines has halted pending the outcome of this suit.
Petitioner also alleged a violation of state antitrust laws, state civil rights laws,'and of the common law, and claimed that he was forced into peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because I believe that federal antitrust laws govern baseball, I find .that state law has been pre-empted in this area. Like the lower courts, I do not believe that there has been a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In the past this Court has not hesitated, to change its view as to' what constitutes interstate commerce. Compare United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895), with Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219 (1948), and United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
“The jurist concerned with 'public confidence in, and acceptance of the judicial system’ might well consider that, however admirable . its resolute adherence to the law as it was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is ¡known, to dimmish respect for the courts and for law itself.” Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 Hastings L. J. 394, 397 (1959).
The lower courts did not reach the question of whether, assuming the antitrust laws apply, they have been violated. This should be considered on remand.
Cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
Jacobs. & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L. J. 1, 22 (1971).