This case presents the question of the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the New Jersey “Assistance to Families of the Working Poor” program, N, J. Stat. Ann. § 44:13-1 et seg., that allegedly discriminates against illegitimate children in the provision of financial assistance and other services. Specifically, appellants challenge that aspect of the program that limits benefits to only those otherwise qualified families “which consist of a household composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one minor child ... of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both . . . .” N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:13-3 (a). Appellants do not challenge the statute’s “household” requirement. Rather, they argue that although the challenged classification turns upon the marital status of the parents as well as upon the parent-child relationship, in practical effect it operates almost invariably to deny benefits to illegitimate children while granting benefits to those children who *620are legitimate. Although apparently conceding the correctness of this position, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting as a three-judge court,* upheld the statutory scheme on the grqund that it was designed “to preserve and strengthen family life.” 349 F. Supp. 491, 496 (1972).
Confronted with similar arguments in the past, we have specifically declared that:
“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as an unjust — way of deterring the parent.” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972).
Thus, in Weber we held that under the Equal Protection Clause a State may not exclude illegitimate children from sharing equally with other children in the recovery of workmen’s compensation benefits for the death of their parent. Similarly, in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968), we held that a State may not create a right *621of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a parent and' exclude illegitimate children from the benefit of such a right. And only this Term, in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973), we held that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural father, there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to illegitimate children. See also Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (Conn.), aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972).
Those decisions compel the conclusion that appellants’ claim of the denial of equal protection must be sustained, for there can be no doubt that the benefits extended under the challenged program are as indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to those who are legitimate. Accordingly, we grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, reverse the judgment of the District Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Chief Justice concurs in the result.
In prior proceedings in this case, a single judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, in an unreported opinion, denied appellants’ petition to convene a three-judge court on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was presented, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a substantial constitutional claim had been presented and therefore remanded the case with directions to convene a three-judge court. 448 F. 2d 1247, 1248 (1971).