delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like many other States, Connecticut requires nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 10-329 (b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess. 1971).1 The constitutional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the case before us. What is at issue here is Connecticut’s statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for purposes of the above provision.
Section 126 (a) (2) of Public Act No. 5, amending § 10-329 (b), provides that an unmarried student shall be classified as a nonresident, or “out of state,” student if his “legal address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior to his application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher education was outside of Connecticut.” With respect to married students, § 126 (a)(3) of the Act provides that such a student, if living with his spouse, shall be classified as *443“out of state” if his “legal address at the time of his application for admission to- such a unit was outside of Connecticut.” These classifications are permanent and irrebuttable for the whole time that the student remains at the university, since § 126 (a) (5) of the Act commands that: “The status of a student, as established at the time of his application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher education under the provisions of this section, shall be his status for the entire period of his attendance at such constituent unit.” The present case concerns the constitutional validity of this conclusive and unchangeable presumption of nonresident status from the fact that, at the time of application for admission, the student, if married, was then living outside of Connecticut, or, if single, had lived outside the State at some point during the preceding year.
One appellee, Margaret Marsh Kline, is an undergraduate student at the University of Connecticut. In May 1971, while attending college in California, she became engaged to Peter Kline, a lifelong Connecticut resident. Because the Klines wished to reside in Connecticut after their marriage, Mrs. Kline applied to the University of Connecticut from California. In late May, she was accepted and informed by the University that she would be considered an in-state student. On June 26, 1971, the appellee and Peter Kline were married in California, and soon thereafter took up residence in Storrs, Connecticut, where they have established *444a permanent home. Mrs. Kline has a Connecticut driver’s license, her car is registered in Connecticut, and she is registered as a Connecticut voter. In July 1971, Public Act No. 5 went into effect. Accordingly, the appellant, Director of Admissions at the University of Connecticut, irreversibly classified Mrs. Kline as an out-of-state student, pursuant to § 126 (a) (3) of that Act. As a consequence, she was required to pay $150 tuition and a $200 nonresident fee for the first semester, whereas a student classified as a Connecticut resident paid no tuition; and upon registration for the second semester, she was required to pay $425 tuition plus another $200 nonresident fee, while a student classified as a Connecticut resident paid only $175 tuition.2
The other appellee, Patricia Catapano, is an unmarried graduate student at the same University. She applied for admission from Ohio in January 1971, and was accepted in February of that year. In August 1971, she moved her residence from Ohio to Connecticut and registered as a full-time student at the University. Like Mrs. Kline, she has a Connecticut driver’s license, her car is registered in Connecticut, and she is registered as a Connecticut voter. Pursuant to § 126 (a) (2) of the 1971 Act, the appellant classified her permanently as an out-of-state student. Consequently, she, too, was required to pay $150 tuition and a $200 nonresident fee for her first semester, and $425 tuition plus a $200 nonresident fee for her second semester.
Appellees then brought suit in the District Court pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, contending that they were bona fide residents of Connecticut, and that § 126 of Public Act No. 5, under which they were classified as nonresidents for purposes of their tuition and fees, infringed their rights to due process of law *445and equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.3 After the convening of a three-judge District Court, that court unanimously held §§ 126 (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(5) unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, and enjoined the appellant from enforcing those sections. 346 F. Supp. 526 (1972). The court also found that before the commencement of the spring semester in 1972, each appellee was a bona fide resident of Connecticut; and it accordingly ordered that the appellant refund to each of them the amount of tuition and fees paid in excess of the amount paid by resident students for that semester. On December 4, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 409 U. S. 1036.
The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State’s right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, the appellees attack Connecticut’s irreversible and irre-buttable statutory presumption that because a student’s legal address was outside the State at the time of his application for admission or at some point during the preceding year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is a student there. This conclusive presumption, they say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify as “out-of-state students” those who are, in fact, bona fide residents of the State. The appellees claim that they have a constitutional right to controvert *446that presumption of nonresidence by presenting evidence that they are bona fide residents of Connecticut. The District Court agreed: “Assuming that it is permissible for the state to impose a heavier burden of tuition and fees on non-resident than on resident students, the state may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do not belong in that class.” 346 F. Supp., at 528. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932), the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of death, thus requiring payment by his estate of a higher tax. In holding that this irrefutable assumption was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, the Court stated that it had “held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 329. See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926); Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U. S. 206 (1931). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 468-469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 29-53 (1969). Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 418-419 (1970).
The more recent case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), involved a Georgia statute which provided that if an uninsured motorist was involved in an accident and could not post security for the amount of damages claimed, his driver’s license must be suspended without any hearing on the question of fault or responsibility. The Court held that since the State purported to be concerned with fault in suspending a driver’s license, it *447could not, consistent with procedural due process, conclusively presume fault from the fact that the uninsured motorist was involved in an accident, and could not, therefore, suspend his driver’s license without a hearing on that crucial factor.
Likewise, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), the Court struck down, as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Illinois’ irrebut-table statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children. Because of that presumption, the statute required the State, upon the death of the mother, to take custody of all such illegitimate children, without providing any hearing on the father’s parental fitness. It may be, the Court said, “that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. . . . But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.” Id., at 654. Hence, the Court held that the State could not conclusively presume that any individual unmarried father was unfit to raise his children; rather, it was required by the Due Process Clause to provide a hearing on that issue. According to the Court, Illinois “insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing . . . .” Id., at 658.4
*448The same considerations obtain here. It may be that most applicants to Connecticut’s university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers’ licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. Yet, under the State’s statutory scheme, neither was permitted any opportunity to demonstrate the bona fides of her Connecticut residency for tuition purposes, and neither will ever have such an opportunity in the future so long as she remains a student.
The State proffers three reasons to justify that permanent irrebuttable presumption. The first is that the State has a valid interest in equalizing the cost of public higher education between Connecticut residents and nonresidents, and that by freezing a student’s residential status as of the time he applies, the State ensures that its bona fide in-state students will receive their full subsidy. The State’s objective of cost equalization between bona fide residents and nonresidents may well be legitimate, but basing the bona fides of residency solely on where a student lived when he applied for admission *449to the University is using a criterion wholly unrelated to that objective. As is evident from the situation of the appellees, a student may be a bona fide resident of Connecticut even though he applied to the University from out of State. Thus, Connecticut’s conclusive presumption of nonresidence, instead of ensuring that only its bona fide residents receive their full subsidy, ensures that certain of its bona fide residents, such as the ap-pellees, do not receive their full subsidy, and can never do so while they remain students.
Second, the State argues that even if a student who applied to the University from out of State may at some point become a bona fide resident of Connecticut, the State can nonetheless reasonably decide to favor with the lower rates only its established residents, whose past tax contributions to the State have been higher. According to the State, the fact that established residents or their parents have supported the State in the past justifies the conclusion that applicants from out of State — who are presumed not to be such established residents — may be denied the lower rates, even if they have become bona fide residents.
Connecticut’s statutory scheme, however, makes no distinction on its face between established residents and new residents. Rather, through § 122, the State purports to distinguish, for tuition purposes, between residents and nonresidents by granting the lower rates to the former and denying them to the latter.5 In these circumstances, the State cannot now seek to justify its classification of certain bona fide residents as nonresidents, on the basis that their Connecticut residency is “new.”
Moreover, § 126 would not always operate to effectuate the State’s asserted interest. For it is not at all clear that the conclusive presumption required by that section prevents only “new” residents, rather than “es*450tablished” residents, from obtaining the lower tuition rates. For example, a student whose parents were lifelong residents of Connecticut, but who went to college at Harvard, established a legal address there, and applied to the University of Connecticut’s graduate school during his senior year, would be permanently classified as an “out of state student,” despite his family’s status as “established” residents of Connecticut. Similarly, the appellee Kline may herself be a “new” resident of Connecticut; but her husband is an established, lifelong resident, whose past tax contribution to the State, under the State’s theory, should entitle his family to the lower rates. Conversely, the State makes no attempt to ensure that those students to whom it does grant in-state status are “established” residents of Connecticut. Any married person, for instance, who moves to Connecticut before applying to the University would be considered a Connecticut resident, even if he has lived there only one day. Thus, even in terms of the State’s own asserted interest in favoring established residents over new residents, the provisions of § 126 are so arbitrary as to constitute a denial of due process of law.6
*451The third ground advanced to justify § 126 is that it provides a degree of administrative certainty. The State points to its interest in preventing out-of-state students from coming to Connecticut solely to obtain an education and then claiming Connecticut residence in order to secure the lower tuition and fees. The irrebutta-ble presumption, the State contends, makes it easier to separate out students who come to the State solely for its educational facilities from true Connecticut residents, by eliminating the need for an individual determination of the bona fides of a person who lived out of State at the time of his application. Such an individual determination, it is said, would not only be an expensive administrative burden, but would also be very difficult to make, since it is hard to evaluate when bona fide residency exists. Without the conclusive presumption, the State argues, it would be almost impossible to prevent out-of-state students from claiming a Connecticut residence merely to obtain the lower rates.
In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, however, the Court stated that “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” 405 U. S., at 656. The State’s interest in administrative ease and certainty cannot, in and of itself, save the conclusive presumption from invalidity under the Due Process Clause where there are other reasonable and practicable means of establishing the pertinent facts on which the State’s objective is premised. In the situation before us, reasonable alternative means for determining bona fide residence are available. Indeed, one such method has already been adopted by Connecticut; after § 126 was invalidated by the District Court, the State established reasonable criteria for evaluating bona fide residence for purposes of tuition and fees at its university system.7 These criteria, *452while perhaps more burdensome to apply than an irre-buttable presumption, are certainly sufficient to prevent abuse of the lower, in-state rates by students who come to Connecticut solely to obtain an education.8
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates. Since § 126 precluded the appellees from ever rebutting the presumption that they were nonresidents of Connecticut, that statute operated to deprive them of a significant amount of their money without due process of law.
We are aware, of course, of the special problems involved in determining the bona fide residence of college students who come from out of State to attend that State’s public university. Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status.9 We fully recognize that a State *453has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.
We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence — the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve that legitimate interest — is violative of the Due Process Clause, because it provides no opportunity for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut residents. The State can establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for educational *454purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state rates. Indeed, as stated above, such criteria exist; and since § 126 was invalidated, Connecticut, through an official opinion of its Attorney General, has adopted one such reasonable standard for determining the residential status of a student. The Attorney General’s opinion states:
“In reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. This general statement, however, is difficult of application. Each individual case must be decided on its own particular facts. In reviewing a claim, relevant criteria include year-round residence, voter registration, place of filing tax returns, property ownership, driver’s license, car registration, marital status, vacation employment, etc.” 10
Because we hold that the permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence created by subsections (a)(2), (a) (3), and (a) (5) of Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 10-329 (b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 126 (June Sess. 1971), violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 122 of that Act provides that “the board of trustees of The University of Connecticut shall fix fees for tuition of not less than three hundred fifty dollars for residents of this State and not less than eight hundred fifty dollars for nonresidents . . . .” Pursuant to this statute, the University promulgated regulations fixing the tuition per semester as follows:
*443Fall semester Spring semester
1971-72 1972, and thereafter
None $175.00 In-state student
$150.00 $425.00 Out-of-state student
In addition, out-of-state students must pay a $200 nonresident fee per semester.
See n. 1, supra.
While the case was pending in the District Court, the Connecticut Legislature passed a bill relating to tuition payments by nonresidents, House Bill No. 5302, which would have repealed the particular portions of the statute that were under constitutional attack. On May 18, 1972, however, the Governor of Connecticut vetoed that bill.
Moreover, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), the Court held that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case involved a provision of the Texas Constitution which prohibited any member of the Armed Forces who entered the service as a resident of another State and then moved his home to Texas during the course of his military duty, from ever satisfying the residence requirement for voting in Texas elections, so long as he remained a member of the Armed Forces. The effect of that provision was to create a conclusive presumption that all *448servicemen who moved to Texas during their military service, even if they became bona fide residents of Texas, nonetheless remained nonresidents for purposes of voting. The Court held that “[b]y forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constit ution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 96. See als o Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 349-352 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
See n. 1, supra.
But even if we accepted the State’s argument that its statutory scheme operates to apportion tuition rates on the basis of old and new residency, that justification itself would give rise to grave problems under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, the Court rejected the contention that a challenged classification could be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between old and new residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through past payment of taxes. That reasoning, the Court stated, “would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.” 394 U. S., at 632-633. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S., at 96; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 354.
See infra, at 454.
Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 349-352; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 636.
In Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), the District Court upheld a regulation of the University of Minnesota *453providing that no student could qualify as a resident for tuition purposes unless he had been a bona fide domiciliary of the State for at least a year immediately prior thereto. This Court affirmed summarily. 401 U. S. 985 (1971). Minnesota’s one-year durational residency requirement, however, differed in an important respect from the permanent irrebuttable presumption at issue in the present case. Under the regulation involved in Stams, a student who applied to the University from out of State could rebut the presumption of nonresidency, after having lived in the State for one year, by presenting sufficient other evidence to show bona fide domicile within Minnesota. In other words, residence within the State for one year, whether or not in student status, was merely one element which Minnesota required to demonstrate bona fide domicile. By contrast, the Connecticut statute prevents a student who applied to the University from out of State, or within a year of living out of State, from ever rebutting the presumption of nonresidence during the entire time that he remains a student, no matter how long he has been a bona fide resident of the State for other purposes. Under Minnesota’s durational residency requirement, a student could qualify for in-state rates by living within the State for a year in student status; whereas under Connecticut’s scheme, a person who applied from out of State can never so qualify so long as he remains in student status. See also Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U. S. 554 (1970).
Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972 (unreported).