concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with and join in Part II of the Court’s opinion wherein it sustains the District Court’s determination that the appellees have standing to challenge the 2.5% interim surcharge on the ground that the Interstate Commerce Commission’s order of April 24 permitting the surcharge to take effect was not issued in compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. The Court goes on, however, to hold in Part III of its opinion that the District Court lacked power to issue a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the surcharge due to the Commission’s alleged failure to comply with NEPA in the suspension stage of the rate proceeding. The Court’s decision in this respect is, to be sure, a very narrow one; the decision clearly concerns only the scope of remedies available to the District Court in the context of a case of this particular character,1 that is, an ICC rate suspension case. *725The Court specifically refrains from deciding whether or not the Commission’s alleged failure to comply with' NEPA in the suspension stage is a proper subject for judicial review and, if so, what would constitute adequate compliance with NEPA at that juncture in the administrative process. See ante, at 698-699, n. 22. Nonetheless, I am unable to join the third portion of the Court’s opinion, for I am convinced that there is no lack of judicial power to issue a preliminary injunction against the interim surcharge in the context of these cases. I therefore must respectfully dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion.
At the outset, it is essential for purposes of analysis to put the issue upon which the Court disposes of the cases in proper perspective. Since the Court addresses only the issue of the District Court’s power to grant preliminary relief, we must, of course, assume for the sake of argument that the issues which the Court does not now reach — namely, whether the procedural requirements of NEPA 2 are applicable at the suspension stage and whether the issue of Commission compliance is a proper one for judicial review3 — are to be decided in appellees’ favor. In addition, we must accept for the present appellees’ assertions that the interim surcharge, by rais*726ing the cost of shipping recyclable materials, will further accentuate the allegedly unjustifiable disparity between the cost of shipping those materials and the cost of shipping primary goods, thereby irrationally encouraging the use of primary goods which will lead to a further degradation of our environment. In other words, in considering the question of judicial power, we must accept the correctness of the District Court’s determination that there was a “strong likelihood” that the Commission had erred in its conclusion that the interim surcharge “ ‘will have no significant adverse effect on . . . the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the Environmental Policy Act of 1969, ” 346 F. Supp., at 200, 201, a conclusion that had effectively excused the Commission from compliance with the procedural requirements of NEPA in the context of the surcharge, see 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (C).
Turning then to the issue of judicial power, it must first be recalled that we deal here with the grant of only a preliminary injunction; the District Court did not permanently enjoin enforcement of the interim surcharge upon determining that the Commission had, in all likelihood, failed to comply with NEPA in the suspension stage. Properly viewed, I think the injunction at issue in this case amounts to nothing more than a legitimate effort by the District Court, following the Commission’s refusal to suspend the surcharge, to maintain the status quo pending final judicial determination of the legality of the Commission’s action at the suspension stage in light of the requirements of NEPA. And, by now, the equitable power of the federal courts to grant interim injunctive relief pending determination of an appeal is well established. The nature of that power was explored at length by the Court in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942), where it was held that a court of appeals had power, pending determination of an ap*727peal, to stay the Federal Communications Commission’s grant of a construction permit although the Federal Communications Act made no provision for such a stay. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:
“No court can make time stand still. The circumstances surrounding a controversy may change irrevocably during the pendency of an appeal, despite anything a court can do. But within these limits it is reasonable that an appellate court should be able to prevent irreparable injury to the parties or to the public resulting from the premature enforcement of a determination which may later be found to have been wrong. It has always been held, therefore, that as a part of its traditional equipment for the administration of justice, a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal.” Id., at 9-10.
See also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U. S. 597, 604 (1966); Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U. S. 411, 425 (1965).
This Court has consistently adhered to the view that it will find federal courts to have been deprived of their traditional power to stay orders under review only in the face of the clearest possible evidence of a congressional intent to do so. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 11, 15. No such clear intent is to be found in the Interstate Commerce Act, at least not with respect to a case such as this where the Commission has already acted on the relevant issue and the issue lies in an area outside the Commission’s traditional expertise.4 In Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. *728Co., 372 U. S. 658, 664 (1963), this Court specifically acknowledged that “[i]t cannot be said that the legislative history of the grant of the suspension power to the Commission includes unambiguous evidence of a design to extinguish whatever judicial power may have existed prior to [the establishment of suspension powers in the Commission] to suspend proposed rates.” The Arrow Court was asked to extend by injunction the statutory seven-month suspension period, see 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7), because the Commission had not reached a decision on the lawfulness of the proposed rates at the end of the suspension period and the rail carriers, following a period of voluntary suspension, were threatening to implement the rate change without awaiting final agency action. Despite the ambiguity of the legislative history, the Court, upon careful examination of the character of and reasons for the suspension scheme, concluded that Congress must have intended to deprive the federal courts of the power to suspend rates pending completion of agency action and thus that the traditional equitable powers of the federal courts had been overridden to that extent. But, as detailed consideration of the factors that motivated the decision in Arrow reveals, this litigation presents a significantly different problem.
The Arrow Court felt that an injunction extending the suspension period pending final agency action would involve a serious, unintended intrusion on the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. This problem of primary jurisdiction had two aspects in Arrow. First, where the issue is the reasonableness of proposed rates, an application for an injunction against implementation of *729those rates pending final agency action would necessarily require a federal court “to pass before final Commission action upon the question of reasonableness of a rate,” 372 U. S., at 671, thereby providing, in effect, an advisory judicial opinion to the Commission on an issue which Congress intended that the Commission decide in the first instance. Certainly, the Commission’s expertise in matters of rail carrier operations and economics is well recognized, and Arrow clearly indicates that the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that expertise. However, the grant of preliminary relief here involves no such interference with the Commission’s initial exercise of its particular expertise.
So far as I am aware, the Commission has never been deemed especially expert in matters of environmental policy or impact.5 It is, of course, true that the Commission must decide in the first instance whether particular proposed action constitutes “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” thus necessitating agency compliance with the detailed requirements of § 102 (2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2)(C). But that decision had already been made in this case prior to the time when judicial intervention by the District Court was sought — in contrast to the situation in Arrow where the question of the reasonableness of the rates remained unresolved by the Commission. Even assuming that some element of agency expertise is involved in the decision at issue here, the District Court, in granting preliminary relief against the interim surcharge, passed only upon a question of which the Commission had finally disposed, namely, the environmental impact of not suspending the interim sur*730charge and of permitting it to take effect at once. Thus, for purposes of the particular issue raised here, the District Court was presented with final agency action6 and was not in danger of interfering with the Commission's expertise when it stayed the Commission's order pending final determination of the appeals.7
The other aspect of the problem of primary jurisdiction focused upon in Arrow was the timing of the implementation of new rates. The Court concluded that Congress had intended that the Commission should determine when new rates should take effect. See 372 U. S., at 668. Insofar as the economic impact of rate increases was concerned, Congress enacted a scheme which permitted the Commission to take into account the interests of both rail carriers and shippers. Thus, Congress recognized that economic necessity might persuade the Commission to permit otherwise questionable rates to go unsuspended while they were being investigated, and, at most, it allowed the Commission to suspend proposed rates for only seven months, see 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7). At the same time, Congress attempted to accommodate the economic interests of shippers, for it gave the Commission power, pending final agency action, to require the rail carriers to maintain detailed records of monies received due to the increase and to compel payment of refunds if a rate increase was ultimately found to be unreasonable.8 See ibid.
*731But where does the Interstate Commerce Act make provision for an accounting and “refund” to the people of our Nation for the irreversible ecological damage that results from a rate increase which discriminates unreasonably against recyclable materials and has been allowed to take effect without compliance with the procedural requirements of NEPA? 9 The Court today says that “[t]o allow judicial suspension for noncompliance with NEPA, would disturb the careful balance of interests” struck by Congress in the suspension and refund provisions. Ante, at 697. Yet the simple fact is that in the *732carefully designed suspension and refund scheme no balance was struck with respect to the environmental interests that have been recognized by Congress in NEPA since the introduction of the suspension provisions into the Interstate Commerce Act. Under these circumstances, we can hardly infer an intent on the part of Congress to deprive the federal courts of their traditional responsibility, in passing upon a request for equitable relief, to work an accommodation in each particular case of the competing interests of the relevant parties10— that is, of a rail carrier’s alleged need for increased income that will otherwise be forever lost each day that the new rate is not charged and of the extent of irreversible environmental damage that might result if the rates are not suspended. The District Court, in its effort to preserve the status quo pending final review of the Commission’s April 24 order, gave full consideration to the effects on all parties of either granting or denying preliminary relief against the interim surcharge.11 In then temporarily enjoining the surcharge, I believe that the District Court acted within the scope of its legitimate powers.
To summarize, then, I obviously cannot agree with the Court’s assertion that “each of the policies that we identified in Arrow as the basis for § 15 (7) would be substantially undermined if the courts were found' to have suspension powers simply because noncomplianee with NEPA was alleged.” Ante, at 696. In Arrow itself, the Court was at pains to point out that its deci*733sion did not "reflect in any way upon decisions which have recognized a limited judicial power to preserve the court’s jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency’s action through the prescribed statutory channels.” 372 U. S., at 671 n. 22. True, the Court went on to say there that “[s]uch power . . . has never been recognized in derogation of such a clear congressional purpose to oust judicial power as that manifested in the Interstate Commerce Act.” Ibid. But the import of that remark must be judged with a full understanding of the factors underlying the Arrow Court’s finding of “such a clear congressional purpose.” As has been seen, close analysis of those factors identified certainly does not compel extension of the Arrow holding to the request for preliminary injunctive relief in this litigation.12 The Court would do well to re*734member that “[w]here Congress wished to deprive the courts of [their] historic power [to enjoin orders pending review], it knew how to use apt words ... .” Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S., at 17. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944). Nothing in the language of the Interstate Commerce Act or in the particular structure of that Act or even in our decision in Arrow compels the conclusion that Congress has done so here. I must therefore dissent from the Court’s ultimate disposition of these cases.
Given that the Court holds only that the District Court lacked power to grant preliminary injunctive relief, it presumably remains open to appellees to challenge the Commission’s alleged failure to comply with NEPA in the suspension stage of the proceedings concerning the interim surcharge in an action for declaratory relief. Nor does anything in the Court’s opinion today deny to the dis*725trict courts power to enjoin the Commission to comply with NEPA in the context of a particular rate proceeding so long as no injunction is issued barring implementation of the rates themselves, cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, post, p. 800.
See in particular § 102 (2) (C) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C).
Cf., e. g., Upper Pecos Assn. v. Stans, 452 F. 2d 1233 (CA10 1971), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom. Upper Pecos Assn. v. Peterson, 409 U. S. 1021 (1972); Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 449 F. 2d 1109 (1971); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 158-160 (EDNY 1972).
Thus, I cannot accept the Court’s assertion that the question here is “whether in a specific context NEPA sub silentio revived *728judicial power that had been explicitly eliminated by Congress.” Ante, at 696. That is a question which I do not believe need ever be reached here, for — as shall be seen — Congress has not, to begin with, deprived the federal courts of their traditional equitable powers in the context of these cases.
Administrative expertise in such matters is surely lodged with the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality.
Cf. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 688 (1965).
Contrast Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, post, p. 800.
Moreover, even if the Commission fails to require recordkeeping and the payment of refunds sua sponte, Congress also provided a mechanism by which shippers may initiate an action before the Commission to seek reparations from a carrier on the ground that particular rates are unreasonable. See 49 U. S. C. §13 (1).
Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 *731(1963), to be sure, did not involve an economic dispute between shippers and rail carriers, but was, instead, an action brought by water carriers which contended that certain challenged decreases in the rates of competing rail carriers were designed to destroy them rather than to reach legitimate economic objectives. Obviously, the refund and reparation provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act were of no more value to the water carriers in Arrow than they are to the nonshipper appellees in this case. But, as the Court pointed out in Arrow, “[c]onflicts over rates between competing carriers were familiar to the Commission long before [the enactment of the suspension provisions] .... Indeed, in another provision [namely, 49 U. S. C. § 4 (2)] of the very same statute [that established the suspension powers] Congress . . . dealt explicitly with the reduction of rates by railroads competing with water carriers . . . . In addition § 8 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 8, creates a private right of action for damages — based upon conduct violative of the Act — which might be available . . . .” 372 U. S., at 669. Thus, Congress had taken into account, and had provided for, disputes between competing carriers, as well as between shippers and carriers, in enacting the suspension provisions. The same can hardly be said for conflicts between the environmental policies of NEPA and the Commission’s suspension power.
Indeed, given the substantial element of public interest at stake in a case such as this, it is appropriate to recall Mr. Justice Stone’s oft-quoted admonition: "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.” Virginian R. Co. v. Systems Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 552 (1937).
Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944).
Thus, the District Court, fully recognizing the financial plight of the rail carriers, carefully limited its preliminary injunction to the application of the interim surcharge to recyclable materials, “allowing [the rail carriers] to collect the surcharge on all non-recyclable goods.” 346 F. Supp., at 202.
The Arrow Court also pointed out that experience with judicial injunctions against rates prior to the establishment of the Commission’s suspension powers in § 16 (7) had “resulted in disparity of treatment as between different shippers, carriers, and sections of the country, causing in turn ‘discrimination and hardship to the general public.’ ” 372 U. S., at 664. These results were due both to the conflicting views of lower federal courts as to their power to enjoin rates pending agency determination of their lawfulness and conflicting judgments of different courts as to the reasonableness of the same rates. See id., at 663-664. But the danger of conflicting judgments concerning the same rates and unevenhanded treatment of shippers and carriers, merely because of the fortuity of the particular judicial district in which they are located, is not present where, as here, the allegation is that the Commission has failed to follow the requirements of a statute — NEPA—relevant to the exercise of its regulatory jurisdiction and the Commission has, as a consequence, been joined in the suit as a defendant. So long as the Commission has been made a party, it is possible to ensure uniformity of treatment by enjoining the Commission to exercise its suspension powers where a failure to comply with NEPA is believed to exist. This is what the District Court did here when it enjoined the Commission “from permitting . . . the 2.5 per cent surcharge” to be collected by the rail *734carriers “pending further order of this court.” See Jurisdictional Statement 30a. It may be that the danger of conflicting results where the Commission has not been made a party would warrant a court staying its hand, but that is not a problem here.