with whom Mr. Justice Black-mun joins, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.
For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, I agree that the provisions of 5 U. S. C. § 7501 (a) are neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. I also agree that appellee’s discharge did not contravene the Fifth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process. Because I reach that conclusion on the basis of. different reasoning, I state my views separately.
I
The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends in the first instance on the presence of a legitimate “property” ór “liberty” interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Aip^ndment.: Governmental deprivation of such an interest must be accompanied by' minimum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing.1 *165The Court’s decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), provide the proper framework for analysis of whether appellee’s employment constituted a “property” interest under the Fifth Amendment. In Roth, the Court stated:
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a, hearing to provide an opportunity for a person toi vindicate those claims.
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” 408 U. S., at 577.
The Court recognized that the “wooden distinction” between “rights” and “privileges” was not determinative of the applicability of procedural due process and that a property interest may be created by statute as well as by contract. Id., at 571. In particular, the Court stated that a person may have a protected property interest in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent “sufficient cause” for discharge. Id., at 576-578.
In Sindermann, the Court again emphasized that a person may have a protected property interest in con*166tinued public employment. There, a state college teacher alleged that the college had established a de facto system of tenure and that he had obtained tenure under that system. The Court stated that proof- of these allegations would establish the teacher’s legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent “sufficient cause” for discharge. In these circumstances, the teacher would have a property interest safeguarded by due process, and deprivation of that interest would have to be accompanied by some form of notice and a hearing.
Application of these precedents to the instant case makes plain that appellee is entitled to invoke the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Appellee was a nonprobationary federal- employee, and as such he could be discharged only for “cause.” 5 U. S. C. §7501 (a). The federal statute guaranteeing appellee continued employment-, absent “cause” for discharge conferred on him a legitimate claim of entitlement which, constituted a “property” interest under the Fifth Amendment. - Thus termination of his employment requires notice and a hearing.
The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee’s interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statutory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural düe process accords to appellee no. procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the nature of appellee’s property interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in Roth and Sindermann. Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature *167of an individual’s statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This,. view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment,2 it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory' procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in -constitutional terms. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970);3 Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, supra.
II
Having determined that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applies to appellee’s discharge from public employment, the question arises whether an evidentiary* hearing, including the right to present favorable witnesses and to confront and examine adverse witnesses, must be accorded before removal. The resolution of this issue depends on a balancing process in which the Government’s interest in expeditious removal *168of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-266. As the Court stated in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961), “consideration of 'what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well- as of the private interest that has been affected by govérnmental action.”
In the present case, the Government’s interest, and hence the public’s, interest, is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline. Such factors are essential if the Government is to perform its responsibilities effectively and economically. To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. Moreover, a requirement of a prior evidentiary hearing would impose additional administrative costs, create delay, and deter warranted discharges. Thus, the Government’s interest in being able to act expeditiously to remove an unsatisfactory employee is substantial.4
*169Appellee’s- countervailing interest is the continuation of his public employment pending an evidentiary hearing. Since appellee would be reinstated and awarded backpay if he prevails on the merits of his claim, appellee’s actual injury would consist of a temporary interruption of his income during the interim. To be sure, even a temporary interruption of income could constitute a serious loss in many instances. But the possible deprivation is considerably less severe than that involved in Goldberg, for example, where- termination of welfare benefits to the recipient would have Occurred in the face of “brutal need.” 397 U. S., at-261. Indeed, as the Court stated in that case, “the crucial factor in this context — a factor not present in the case of . . . the discharged government employee .. . . — is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy Over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.” Id., at 264 (emphasis added). By contrast, a. public employee may well have independent rest-urces to overcome any temporary hardship, and he may be able to secure a job in the private sector. Alternatively, he will be eligible for welfare benefits.
*170Appellee also argues that the absence of a prior evidentiary hearing increases the' possibility of wrongful removal and that delay in conducting a post-termination evidentiary hearing further aggravates his loss. The present statute and regulations, however, already respond -to-these concerns. The affected employee is provided with 30 days’ advance written notice of the feasons for his proposed discharge, and the materials on which the notice is based. He is accorded the right to respond to the charges both ^orally and in writing, including the submission of affidavits/ Upon request, he is entitled to an opportunity to appear personally before the official having the authority-to make or recommend the final decision. Although an evidentiary hearing is not held, the employee may make any representations he believes relevant to his case. After removal, the employee receives a full evidentiary hearing, and is awarded backpay if reinstated. See '5 CFR §§ 771.208 and 772.305; 5 U. S. C. § 5596. These procedures minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision and provide for compensation for the affected employee should that decision eventually prove wrongful.5
*171On balance, I would conclude that a prior evidentiary hearing is not required and that the present statute and regulations comport with due process by providing a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests.6
Nú property interest would be conferred, for exam’ )le, where the applicable statutory or contractual terms, either exprtssly or by implication, did not provide for continued employment, absent “cause.” See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 578 (1972).
In Goldberg, for example, the statutes and regulations defined both eligibility for welfare benefits and the procedures for termination of those benefits. The Court held that such benefits constituted a statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applied to termination of benefits. 397 U. S., at 261-263.
My Brother Marshall rejects the Government’s interest in efficiency as insignificant, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 266 (1970), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 90-91, n. 22 (1972). He also notes that nine federal agencies presently accord prior evidentiary hearings. Post, at 223, 224.
Neither Goldberg nor Fuentes involved the Government’s substantial interest in maintaining the efficiency and discipline of its *169own employees.' Moreover, the ' fact that some federal agencies may have decided to hold prior evidentiary hearings cannot mean that such a procedure is constitutionally mandated. The Federal Government’s general practice to the contrary argues that efficiency is in fact thought to be adversely affected by -prior evidentiary hearings.
Nor do I agree with my Brother White’s argument that suspension with pay would obviate, any problem posed by prolonged retention of a disruptive or unsatisfactory employee. Aside from the additional financial burden which would be imposed on the Government, this procedure would undoubtedly inhibit warranted discharges and weaken significantly the deterrent effect of immediate removal. In addition, it would create a strong incentive for the suspended employee to attempt to delay final resolution of the issues surrounding his discharge.
My Brother White argues that affirmance is required because the supervisory official who would have conducted the preremoyal hearing was the “object of slander that was the básis for the employee’s proposed discharge.” Post, at -199. He would conclude that this violated the statutory requirement of an “impartial decisionmaker.” I find no such requirement anywhere in the statute or the regulations. Nor do I believe that due process so mandates at the preremoval stage. In my view, the relevant fact is that an impartial decisionmaker is provided at the post-removal hearing where the employee’s claims are finally resolved.
There are also .significant practical considerations that argue against such a requirement. In most cases, the employee’s supervisor is the official best informed about the “cause” for termination. If disqualification is required on the ground that the responsible supervisor could not be wholly impartial, the removal procedure *171would become increasingly complex. In effect, a “mini-trial” would be necessary to educate the impartial decisionmaker as to the basis for termination.
Appellee also argues that the failure to provide a prior evidentiary hearing deprived him of his “liberty” interest in violation of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons stated above, I find- that the present statute comports with due process even with respect to appellee’s liberty interest.