dissenting.
The Court today holds, with a minimum of discussion, that petitioner, in a proceeding under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, may raise his claim that his induction into the Armed Forces was accelerated contrary to the principles of Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295 (1970). The Court reaches this result despite the fact that a United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit previously considered this contention in light of Gutknecht and concluded that petitioner’s in*351duction had not in fact been accelerated. As a justification for the decision this Court suggests that a § 2255 motion is both permissible and appropriate because a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has rendered a subsequent decision which adopts a new legal test for determining whether acceleration has occurred and which, if applied to petitioner, would probably change the outcome of his case. Since I believe the Court’s decision is justified neither by the language of § 2255 itself nor by any prior case decided by this Court, and since I believe the potential consequences of the decision are harmful to the administration of justice, I dissent.
I
The Court’s conclusion, discussed infra, that claims such as petitioner’s can be raised on a § 2255 motion, is actually unnecessary for the disposition of this case. The decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals rested entirely on application of a “law of the case” theory, a position that the Government now disavows and that the Court disposes of in a single paragraph. The petitioner in his petition for certiorari and in his brief on the merits principally addressed that issue and his sole rebuttal of the Government’s contention that nonconsti-tutional attacks on judgments of conviction are not cognizable in § 2255 proceedings is contained in his reply brief where he devotes one paragraph to arguing that his claim is constitutional. Thus the Court reaches out to decide a highly important issue without the benefit of lower court attention to the question, without full briefing and, in my view, without full examination of the issues involved. It would seem preferable to remand this case, as the Court does anyway, without deciding this issue, allowing further consideration of the question below and leaving our venture into this area for a more appropriate *352occasion. Since the Court declines to do so, however, I will also address the broader question to which the Court proceeds.
II
The facts of this case are set out in detail in the Court’s opinion. I review them here briefly only to emphasize the extent of both administrative and judicial consideration which petitioner has received. A mere recounting of the facts dispels the notion that there are any equities whatever in support of petitioner’s claim for relief.
Petitioner’s difficulties with the Selective Service System began in February of 1965 when he was classified I-A by his local draft board. At that time he was ordered to report for a pre-induction physical examination, but did not appear on the specified date. The board then attempted to schedule another physical but was frustrated by petitioner’s failure to advise the board of his whereabouts. At this point the board warned petitioner that he was in danger of being declared a delinquent, but this warning was also returned with the notation “addressee unknown.”
The board made one more unsuccessful attempt to communicate with petitioner and then declared him a delinquent according to the regulations then in effect.1 After a brief interval the board then mailed petitioner, not a third notice to report for a physical examination, but rather a notice to report for induction. This order having been returned stamped “addressee unknown,” the board followed up by sending petitioner a second notice to report for induction which he apparently received. He did not report, however, and was then prosecuted for this refusal.
*353All parties to this case concede that Selective Service registrants who are not declared delinquents are not mailed orders of induction before they have taken a physical examination. Without the delinquency classification, which allowed the board to issue an induction order without having given a physical examination, the board would have been faced with one of two alternatives. It could have prosecuted the petitioner for failure to take the physical examination or, alternatively, it could have continued the obviously futile mailing of additional notices concerning the physical. The delinquency procedure enabled the board to bypass those two undesirable options, and, in effect, provided for a temporary waiver of the examination until the time stated in the induction order. It should be noted that this procedure does not allow the board to induct anyone without a physical examination ; rather it simply allows the board to call persons for induction prior to the time an examination is given.2
Having been convicted in the District Court, petitioner took a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending in that court, however, this Court decided Gutknecht, and the Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration in light of our decision. On remand, the District Court decided that Gutknecht did not apply because petitioner’s induction had not in fact been accelerated.3 The court also found that “[defendant's substantial rights were not prejudiced by the Local Board’s ordering him to report for induction without first giving him a physical examination and sending *354him a Notice of Acceptability,” 4 because “[t]he failure to give such an examination and such Notice of Acceptability were [sic] caused by defendant’s own failure to report for physical examination on October 8, 1965, as ordered.” 5 The Court of Appeals agreed that Gutknecht did not control this case and affirmed.6 We denied certiorari.7
Although one might have supposed the proceedings to be closed at this point, our denial of certiorari marked only the end of phase one. For petitioner, having failed on his direct attack, then sought relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, presenting the same claims of acceleration which had previously been rejected. The principal basis for petitioner’s motion was that the law of the Ninth Circuit, unfavorable to him at the time of his conviction and appeal, had subsequently been changed in United States v. Fox, 454 F. 2d 593 (1971). The District Court denied relief without comment, and the Court of Appeals again affirmed.8 Stating that “[t]he decision on the direct appeal is the law of the case,”9 that court also noted specifically “that Fox does not even suggest overruling Davis,” 10 and further that “the new law, or change in law, rule is not applied in this circuit under circumstances such as here presented. Odom v. United States, supra.”11 Again one would suppose that the dispute had reached its end, but this Court today decrees otherwise, remanding it for yet more consideration by the courts below.
*355rH HH HH
For reasons that I frankly do not understand, the Court seems to believe that the question of whether claims such as petitioner’s may be raised in a motion under § 2255 is either largely settled by § 2255 itself and by earlier decisions of this Court or, perhaps, is too inconsequential to require extended treatment. Neither premise is sound. Both the language of § 2255 and the case law of this Court suggest that the issue is very much in doubt, and the potential consequences of the decision suggest that the matter calls for serious and careful consideration.
In deciding whether claims of this type may be raised in a § 2255 motion, the logical starting place is the statute itself. The Court’s opinion, however, gives the statute only a passing nod, apparently believing that ambiguity is best resolved by ignoring the source from which it arises. I believe the statute and the Court’s treatment of it require a closer look.
The Court begins its discussion of the statute by stating: “At the outset, we note that the Government’s position finds scant support in the text of § 2255, which permits a federal prisoner to assert a claim that his confinement is 'in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ ”12 (Emphasis in Court’s opinion.) The language quoted by the Court is taken from the first paragraph of § 2255 which reads:
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the *356sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
That paragraph, however, does not speak of an illegal “confinement,” as suggested by the Court, or even of an illegal conviction, but rather of illegal sentences. Furthermore, the paragraph is concerned only with motions for relief, not with the Court’s power to grant relief. The power to grant relief is instead governed by the more specific provisions of paragraph three of the statute.
The language of paragraph three differs quite strikingly from the language quoted above. After providing for notice and a hearing in appropriate cases, the paragraph continues:
“If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”
This language certainly makes less clear the intended scope of paragraph one, since, contrary to the emphasis on “sentence” in the earlier paragraph, the provisions of paragraph three mention “sentence” which may be set aside only twice, and then in connection with those “not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack . . . .”13 More importantly, the paragraph makes *357no mention of judgments rendered in violation of the laws of the United States. Rather the paragraph permits relief only where “there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack . . . (Emphasis added.) Thus a district court may grant relief under this section only where (1) the judgment rendered was without jurisdiction; (2) the sentence was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack; or (3) there has been such a denial of constitutional rights as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack. Petitioner’s case does not even arguably meet any one of these tests: the District Court clearly had jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction; the sentence was concededly within the limits authorized by law and not otherwise vulnerable; and the Court apparently accepts the fact that petitioner has not presented a constitutional claim against the judgment. Nothing in the more generalized reference to “laws of the United States” in the first paragraph of § 2255, therefore, can redeem petitioner’s complete failure to bring himself within the operative language of the third paragraph.14
*358The Court, however, strongly suggests that its opinion could rest upon the provision of paragraph three providing relief for “sentence [s] ... otherwise open to collateral attack.” This suggestion only compounds the confusion. To begin with, it seems odd that the Court chooses to bypass the language of that same sentence dealing with sentences (rather than judgments) “not authorized by law” since that language far more closely parallels the language from the first paragraph cited by the Court. But, in any event, reading words “otherwise open to collateral attack” as simply a catch-all phrase, including any recognizable ground for upsetting convictions on direct appeal makes it difficult to see why Congress then bothered to include the separate provision allowing relief when “there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack . . . .” The Court could not reasonably argue that this provision is intended to give additional protection to constitutional rights because the Court purports to find no distinction in the statute between constitutional and nonconstitutional attacks on judgments of conviction.
But assuming for the moment that the Court's approach is correct, I find a second obstacle to this decision in the definition, or lack of definition, of the word “laws.” For though the Court seems to accept that petitioner has stated a recognizable claim that his sentence was somehow imposed in violation of the laws of the United States, the Court only briefly mentions what law the sentence is thought to be in violation of. Certainly petitioner cannot contend that his sentence under 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) for refusing to report for induction is in violation *359of that section. Nor does he point to any other statutory provision which prohibits his incarceration for that offense. Therefore the basis for the claim, as the Court seems to believe, lies somewhere in the holdings of this Court in Gutknecht and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Fox. The inclusion of either of these decisions in the category of “laws of the United States” merits some additional attention.
The term “laws of the United States” was included in § 2255 presumably to continue its traditional place in federal habeas corpus statutes.15 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 385, gave federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty “in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . .” This language was carried forward in Rev. Stat. § 753 and now in 28 U. S. C. '§§ 2241 (c) (3) and 2254 where the word “law” has been changed to “laws.” The same phrasing has now been incorporated into § 2255. But the term’s longevity has not brought with it a corresponding judicial elucidation. Like many other issues in the field of habeas corpus, the question seems to have been left for decision on a case-by-case basis.
Certainly a creditable argument could be made that the term “laws” applies only to federal statutes, not to individual decisions of the federal courts. In 1842, for example, only 25 years before the Habeas Corpus Act *360was passed, this Court stated: “In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws.” Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18.16 But even if some allowance for judicial lawmaking is made, the question in this case is not settled. For, if the law be Gutknecht, then the Court’s “new law” argument immediately disappears. Petitioner had a full opportunity to argue the applicability of Gut-knecht on remand from his first appeal, and both the District Court and Court of Appeals found that it was not controlling. Since that time no decision of this Court has modified Gutknecht in any way which would now bring petitioner within its scope. Thus the real focus of petitioner’s argument must be that Fox is the governing law. But in that regard, I cannot see why a decision by a single panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be considered a “law” of the United States. In fact the Court of Appeals itself stated that its decision in Fox had not overruled Davis, pointing out that an en banc decision of the Court of Appeals would be necessary for such a result. Thus the Court today categorizes as a “law of the United States” a decision which is still open to question within the Court of Appeals’ own jurisdiction.
*361The Court gives no indication of where this loose process of definition will end. It would certainly be surprising if a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, were sufficient to give prisoners in the Ninth Circuit grounds for a § 2255 motion, but it is not clear to me why a decision of the Fourth Circuit is any less a law of the United States than a decision of the Ninth Circuit. Concededly, it need not be considered binding on the Ninth Circuit, but that is not the concern under § 2255. Nor is it obvious to me what the Court would require a court of appeals to do when intracircuit conflicts arise. The decision today would seem to compel the Court to give a defendant already convicted according to one statutory interpretation the benefit of any more liberal interpretation which might emerge. This erratic process of interpretation finds no warrant in § 2255.
IV
The Court’s lack of attention to the statutory language in this case is more than matched by the sparsity of the case law it cites. Although the Court seems to accept without question that both relief under § 2255 and habeas corpus relief have long been available to prisoners making nonconstitutional attacks on judgments of conviction, the Court cites not a single case from this Court that so holds.17 Certainly neither Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), nor Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969), the two most significant § 2255 decisions in recent years, is controlling on the important issue pre*362sented here, for both decisions involved completely different factual situations and considerations.18 Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424 (1962), a third important case under § 2255 and one cited by the Court in its opinion, would seem to cut against the Court’s position. In Hill the Court held that a failure to follow the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a), a rule promulgated under the auspices of a federal statute, was not the type of error which could be raised on a § 2255 motion. The Court stated:
“The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything *363to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present ‘exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.’ ” 368 U. S., at 428. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
The only other case mentioned by the Court which might be relevant to this issue is Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947), a case like Hill in which this Court denied relief for a claim with no constitutional foundation. The Court today suggests, by stress on a negative pregnant, that the decision to deny habeas corpus relief in that case was grounded solely on the petitioner’s failure to raise his claim on direct appeal and that if the issue had been properly raised, the Court would have reached a different conclusion. It is true, of course, that collateral relief is not to be employed as a substitute for an appeal, and Sunal is a leading case for that proposition. But a reading of Sunal which recognizes only the effect of failure to appeal is unnecessarily grudging. The Court in Hill, for example, although faced with a situation in which the noncompliance with Rule 32 (a) was not raised on appeal, did not imply that the error could have been raised in § 2255 proceedings if an appeal had been taken. Rather the Court stated flatly: “We hold that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack . . ..” 368 U. S., at 426.
Although the scope of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding remains largely undefined, probably out of concern *364that definition would introduce unwanted limitation, the judicial expansion of the federal courts’ habeas power had not previously reached the type of claim asserted here. Certainly Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s catalogue in Sunal, supra, at 185-186 (dissenting opinion), makes no mention of such grounds. And there is no dearth of authority to the effect that federal habeas corpus is not available merely to correct errors of law.19 Many decisions of lower federal courts have at least implicitly limited collateral relief to claims of constitutional stature.20
The lack of foundation from which the Court now proceeds to fashion a new, expansive collateral-relief doctrine unfortunately suggests that the Court is prepared to extend or retract relief on the basis of whether a majority of the Court believes that a particular set of factual circumstances is “exceptional” or that a particular litigant has raised an appealing point. Thus, the petitioner in Hill is barred from raising his claim at all in a § 2255 proceeding because failure to comply with an explicit federal rule is “not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus.” The petitioner in Sunal is also barred, despite a “far more compelling” claim than the one raised in Hill, see 368 U. S., at 428, apparently because he did not receive a previous rejection of his claim on direct appeal. But petitioner in this case succeeds. According to the Court, this case is different, for petitioner has already had his precise claim decided against him once, curiously enough a circumstance considered favorable for him, and because “[t]here can be no room for doubt that such a circumstance [conviction for failure to obey a possibly invalid order] ‘inherently re-*365suits in a complete miscarriage of justice’ and ‘present[s] exceptional circumstances’ that justify collateral relief under § 2255.” It is difficult to see that this process of selection rests upon any reasoned distinctions which may be derived from either the statute or the cases.
V
The Court’s rather brief dismissal of the Government’s arguments in this case might be understandable were the issues of less importance, or the result less likely to produce severe repercussions. After all, the scope of § 2255 relief has been undefined for almost 25 years and it might be supposed that continuation of this state of affairs would cause no unusual difficulties. But the potential consequences of the Court’s decision today make a laissez-faire attitude inappropriate. For, “[assuming that there ‘exists,’ in an ultimate sense, a ‘correct’ decision of a question of law, we can never be assured that any particular tribunal has in the past made it: we can always continue to ask whether the right rule was applied, whether a new rule should not have been fashioned.” Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 447 (1963). Two examples will suffice as illustrations.
(1) This Court occasionally, though not with great frequency, is called upon to resolve conflicts among the courts of appeals on nonconstitutional criminal questions. For example, in January of 1974, the Court decided United States v. Maze, 414 U. S. 395, a case in which we were asked to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals concerning the circumstances under which fraudulent use of a credit card might violate the federal mail fraud statute. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits had construed the scope of the statute somewhat more narrowly than five other *366courts of appeals. In Maze we approved the minority approach, agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that the respondent's conviction under the mail fraud statute should be reversed.
The Court’s decision today seems to provide full opportunity for all defendants convicted under the Mail Fraud Act in the circuits whose view was not accepted to relitigate those convictions in a § 2255 proceeding. Most of those convictions have received full appellate review, and many defendants had unsuccessfully sought certiorari in this Court. The district courts, faced with this influx of motions, will be faced with the difficult task of sifting through various factual claims to determine if the principles of Maze should be applied. I suspect that the burden will not be inconsiderable.
(2) The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s § 2255 motion, cited its own decision in Odom v. United States, 455 F. 2d 159 (1972). That case involved the question of whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Wade v. United States, 426 F. 2d 64 (1970), a case which had established newlaw on insanity for the Ninth Circuit. At the time Wade was decided the Court of Appeals specifically held that the decision should apply only to “convictions [which] have not become final as of the date of this decision.” 21 Under my reading of the Court’s opinion in this case, however, petitioner Odom and anyone else who had raised an insanity defense in the Ninth Circuit may now proceed to file § 2255 motions in the District Court. For Davis’ conviction was as final as Odom’s conviction, and no basis is evident for saying that one decision is less a “law of the United States” than the other.
*367The effect will be twofold. First, federal courts which are already overburdened with cases will find that burden increased. As Mr. Justice Jackson noted in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 537 (1953) (concurring in result): “It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.” Second, there will be substantial disincentive for federal courts to overthrow settled doctrines, no matter how salutary new ones might seem. Although enlightened jurisprudence may call for adopting new policies or correcting errors of interpretation, any court considering such changes must be constantly aware that numerous final convictions will thereupon be placed in jeopardy. The possible, and often undeserved, advantage to a particular litigant is thus obtained at a cost to the entire judicial system.
These examples unfortunately may be multiplied. Admittedly, the Court does attempt to set a minimum threshold for such claims, requiring “ ‘a fundamental defect... inherently resulting] in a complete miscarriage of justice,’ ” and “ ‘exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.’ ” (Ante, at 346.) This dictum, it is hoped will partially offset the effect of the holding in this case, though if this petitioner’s case represents a miscarriage of justice it is hard to imagine one that does not. But one must be concerned that the Court, having taken this giant step so casually, may find the next step equally easy to take, allowing perhaps challenges to evidentiary rulings and other trial matters heretofore considered inappropriate for federal habeas corpus.
VI
The decision in this case cannot reasonably be explained by the maxim “Hard cases make bad law,” for although the law made is bad the case is not hard. *368Whatever reason there might be to strain the contours of § 2255 to permit relief to someone visited with obvious injustice, the fact is that this petitioner has had full opportunity to make his case at every stage of the way. He has alleged no deprivation of his rights to a full and fair hearing at trial, no deprivation of his right to appeal, no inability to get adequate consideration on appellate review. He simply alleges that had his case been appealed at a different time he would have won it. I cannot find that those circumstances are so exceptional as to warrant the result reached today.
I therefore dissent from the Court’s opinion. Were I persuaded otherwise, on that score, however, I would nonetheless agree for the reasons stated by Me. Justice Powell in his concurring and dissenting opinion, ante, p. 347, that the judgment should be affirmed.
The particular regulation relied upon by the board was 32 CFR §1642.4 (a) (1967), which was rescinded after the Court's decision in Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295 (1970).
The District Court specifically found that petitioner “would have received a complete physical examination prior to induction had he reported on July 11, 1967, as ordered.” Pet. for Cert. 10a.
Id., at 9a.
Ibid.
Id., at 9a-10a.
447 F. 2d 1376.
405 U. S. 933.
472 F. 2d 596.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ante, at 342-343.
The statute seems, at times, to use the terms “sentence” and "judgment” interchangeably, for paragraph three allows relief from *357judgments in specified instances while paragraph one would seem to allow attacks only on sentences. But the fact that no distinction is made between the terms in paragraph one does not mean that their contrasting use in paragraph three can automatically be deemed without significance. The Court should attempt to reach a reasonable interpretation based upon the particular context of the statute and the historical background of collateral relief, rather than simply abandoning the statute to study its legislative history. See, e. g., United States v. Sobell, 314 F. 2d 314 (CA2), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 857 (1963).
It might be argued, of course, that the first paragraph of § 2255 was for some reason designed to permit the filing of motions for relief even in some cases where relief could not be granted under paragraph three. But the Court offers no reason, and I can think of none, why Congress would encourage such a futile exercise. What *358the Court has done is simply to read most of paragraph three out of the statute, apparently assuming that its more specific provisions have no function in a proper interpretation of § 2255.
Section 2255 was enacted to provide the same relief available under the federal habeas corpus statute without the logistical problems encountered in the latter remedy. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 (1952). The Court makes much of this fact in its opinion but then drops the issue without examining what constituted a “law” for purposes of habeas corpus or what the scope of habeas corpus relief has proved to be under the decisions of this Court.
The Court in Swift v. Tyson, supra, was considering a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, which stated, in part: “[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.” The Court, in explaining its doubt that court decisions constituted “laws” observed: “They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.” 16 Pet., at 18.
The Court, in fact, avoids the necessity for a closer look at the statutory language of §2255 by turning instead to the provisions of the federal habeas statute as a guide. This reliance makes all the more curious the fact that the Court does not support its view of the scope of federal habeas by any convincing citation of authority.
The Sanders Court’s statement of the issue before it clearly demonstrates how different that case was from the one now under consideration. In Sanders the Court said: “We consider here the standards which should guide a federal court in deciding whether to grant a hearing on a motion of a federal prisoner under 28 U. S. C. § 2265.” 373 U. S., at 2. That issue arises, not under paragraph one of § 2255, setting forth the claims which a prisoner might make, or under that part of paragraph three setting forth the grounds on which relief might be granted, but under the language found earlier in paragraph three dealing with when a hearing must be held. Thus, the Court in Sanders was faced with the question, not of whether a particular tjqoe of claim is cognizable at all in a §2255 proceeding, but simply whether a hearing is required on a claim eon-cededly within the reach of that section.
The petitioner in Kaufman, in contrast to the petitioner here, sought relief on the ground that he had been subjected to an unconstitutional search and seizure. The Court’s recognition of the constitutional tenor of his claim is evident throughout the opinion. For example, the Court clearly stated that “the availability of collateral remedies is necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights are at stake,” 394 U. S., at 225 (emphasis added), and that “[t]he provision of federal collateral remedies rests more fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief.” ' Id., at 226 (emphasis added).
See, e. g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 179 (1947).
See, e. g., DeMarco v. Willingham, 401 F. 2d 105, 106 (CA7 1968); Lothridge v. United States, 441 F. 2d 919 (CA6 1971).
426 F. 2d, at 74.