dissenting.
I frankly find the Court’s opinion in this case a perplexing three-legged stool. The holding is clearly founded in notions of equal protection, see ante, at 637, and the Court speaks specifically of improper “discrimination.” Yet the opinion has strong due process overtones as well, at times appearing to pay homage to the still novel, and I think unsupportable, theory that “irrebuttable presumptions” violate due process. At other times the opinion seems to suggest that the real problem in this case is the Government’s failure to build an adequate evidentiary record in support of the challenged legislation. The result is a rather impressionistic determination that Congress’ efforts to cope with spurious claims of entitlement, while preserving maximum benefits for those persons most likely to be deserving, are simply not satisfactory to the members of this Court. I agree with neither the Court’s approach nor its decision.
The Court’s equal protection analysis is perhaps most difficult to understand. The Court apparently finds no need to resolve the question of whether illegitimacy constitutes a “suspect classification,” noting instead that “ 'the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.’ [Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 176 (1972).]” Ante, at 632. (Emphasis added.) This statement might be thought to set the stage for a decision striking down the legislation on the basis of discrimination between legitimates and illegitimates. But the Court then leaves that *639issue, finding instead that the statute is unconstitutional because it “discriminate [s] between the two subclasses of afterborn illegitimates without any basis for the distinction . . . Ante, at 636. (Emphasis added.) Whatever may be the rationale for giving some form of stricter scrutiny to classifications between legitimates and illegiti-mates, that rationale simply vanishes when the alleged discrimination is between classes of illegitimates. Such classifications should instead be evaluated according to the traditional principle set forth in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970): “If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Id., at 485. (Citation omitted.)
The Court’s rejection of this principle strongly smacks of due process rather than equal protection concepts. The Court states that “[a]ssuming . . . appellants are in fact dependent on the claimant, it would not serve the purpose of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits,” ante, at 636 (emphasis added), and indicates that the real problem with the legislation is that it is both “overinclusive” and “underinclusive.” According to the Court, the legislation cannot stand because “some children” entitled to benefits “are not dependent on their disabled parent” and because “some illegitimates” who do not get benefits “are, in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent.” Ante, at 637. In my view this is simply an attack on “irrebuttable presumptions” in another guise. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974). The very process of making legislative decisions to govern society as a whole means that some individuals will be treated less favorably than other individuals who fall within a different legislative classification. *640As The Chief Justice stated only last Term in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 462 (1973) (dissenting opinion): “[Laterally thousands of state statutes create classifications permanent in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legislative classifications are, and might be improved on by individualized determinations . . . This Court should not invalidate such classifications simply out of a preference for different classifications or because an unworkable system of individualized consideration would theoretically be more perfect.
There are also hints in the opinion that the Government failed to build an adequate evidentiary record in support of the challenged classifications. Thus the Court distinguishes Dandridge v. Williams, supra, a case in which the Court respected the State's allocation of limited resources, by saying: “Here, by contrast, there is no evidence supporting the contention that to allow illegiti-mates in the classification of appellants to receive benefits would significantly impair the federal Social Security trust fund and necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefited by the Act.” Ante, at 633. (Emphasis added.) I should think it obvious that any increase in the number of eligible recipients would serve to additionally deplete a fixed fund, but I find even stranger the notion that the Government must present evidence to justify each and every classification that a legislature chooses to make. If I read the Court’s opinion correctly, it would seem to require, for example, that the Government compile evidence to support Congress’ determination that Social Security benefits begin at a specified age, perhaps even requiring statistics to show that need is greater (in all cases?) at that age than at lesser ages. This proposition is certainly far removed from traditional principles of deference to legislative judgment. As we stated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 *641(1961): “A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” There is nothing in that language that suggests to me that courtrooms should become forums for a second round of legislative hearings whenever a legislative determination is later challenged.
Since I believe that the District Court correctly concluded that the classifications at issue rest upon a rational basis, I dissent.