Codispoti v. Pennsylvania

Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.*

In December 1966, petitioners Dominick Codispoti and Herbert Langnes were codefendants with Richard May-berry in a criminal trial ending in a verdict of guilty. Each acted as his own counsel, although legal advice was available from appointed counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge pronounced Mayberry guilty of 11 contempts committed during trial and sentenced him to one to two years for each contempt. Codispoti was given like sentences for each of seven separate contempts. Langnes was sentenced to one to two years on each of six separate citations. Mayberry’s total sentence was thus 11 to 22 years, Codispoti’s seven to 14 years, and Langnes’ six to 12 years. The contempt convictions were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This Court granted Mayberry’s petition for certiorari, 397 U. S. 1020, and vacated the judgment of the Pennsylvania court, directing that “on remand another judge, not bearing the sting of these slanderous remarks and having the impersonal authority of the law, [sit] in judgment on the conduct of petitioner as shown by the record.” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 466 (1971).

The contempt charges against Mayberry and petitioners were then retried in separate proceedings before another trial judge.1 Codispoti’s demand for a jury was *508denied. He also moved to subpoena witnesses “to prove that my actions did not disrupt the proceedings, and I intend to prove that my actions [sic] was not contemptuous, that it was merely an answer to the provocation made by the presiding Judge.” App. 47. This motion was also denied, the court remarking that “this is an issue between the Court and you, and the record will speak for the Court, and you and counsel can speak for yourself.” Ibid. *509The trial then proceeded, the State offering into evidence the relevant portions of the transcript of the 1966 criminal proceedings in the course of which the alleged con-tempts occurred. The State then rested. Codispoti neither testified nor called witnesses. The court found that he had committed the seven contemptuous acts as charged and sentenced him to six months in prison for each of six contempts and a term of three months for another, all of these sentences to run consecutively.

Petitioner Langnes’ trial followed a very similar course.2 He was found guilty of six separate contempts *510and sentenced to five terms of six months each and one term of two months, all to be served consecutively.

The trial court filed an opinion stating that “the only points at issue are the validity of the sentences. The question of guilt of contemptuous conduct has been confirmed by both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania . . . and by the U. S. Supreme Court. . . , therefore testimony at this hearing was limited to the record.” App. 35. The court also held that petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial

“because the questions of guilt to which the juries’ decisions would be limited had already been adjudicated adversely to the Defendants by two appellate courts. Furthermore, in the instant cases no term of imprisonment in excess of six months was imposed for any one offense. The offenses for which sentences were imposed occurred at different times and on different dates.” Id., at 36 (footnote omitted).

*511The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, one justice dissenting on the ground that petitioners were entitled to a jury trial. 453 Pa. 619, 306 A. 2d 294. We granted certiorari limited to those questions raising the issue whether petitioners should have been afforded a jury trial. 414 U. S. 1063 (1973).3

I

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to defendants in state criminal trials the right to jury trial provided in the Sixth Amendment. In a companion case, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968), the Court held that while petty contempts, like other petty crimes, could be tried without a jury, serious criminal contempts had to be tried with a jury if the defendant insisted on this mode of trial. Although the judgment about the seriousness of the crime is normally heavily influenced by the penalty authorized by the legislature, the Court held that where no legislative penalty is specified and sentence is left to the discretion of the judge, as is often true in the case of criminal contempt, the pettiness or seriousness of the contempt will be judged by the penalty actually imposed. Finally, the Court recognized that sentences up to six months could be imposed for criminal *512contempt without guilt or innocence being determined by a jury, but a conviction for criminal contempt in a non-jury trial could not be sustained where the penalty imposed was 24 months in prison.

Since that time, our decisions have established a fixed dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty crimes. Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147, 149-150 (1969); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970).4 Under these cases, we plainly cannot accept petitioners’ argument that a contemnor is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong possibility exists that he will face a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction, regardless of the punishment actually imposed. See Taylor v. Hayes, ante, p. 488. Our cases, however, do not expressly address petitioners’ remaining argument that they were entitled to jury trials because the prison sentences imposed after posttrial convictions for contemptuous acts during trial were to be served con*513secutively and, although each was no more than six months, aggregated more than six months in jail.5

II

There are recurring situations where the trial judge, to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an “actual obstruction of justice,” In re McConnell, 370 U. S. 230, 236 (1962); see also In re Little, 404 U. S. 553, 555 (1972), convicts and sentences the accused or the attorneys for either side for various acts of contempt as they occur. *514Undoubtedly, where the necessity of circumstances warrants, a contemnor may be summarily tried for an act of contempt during trial and punished by a term of no more than six months. Nor does the judge exhaust his power to convict and punish summarily whenever the punishment imposed for separate contemptuous acts during trial exceeds six months. Cf. United States v. Seale, 461 F. 2d 345, 355 (CA7 1972).

Bloom v. Illinois, supra, recognized, as cases in this Court have consistently done, “the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere in the courtroom. The power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot attend upon the impaneling of a jury.” 391 U. S., at 210.

“[A] criminal trial, in the constitutional sense, cannot take place where the courtroom is a bedlam .... A courtroom is a hallowed place where trials must proceed with dignity ....” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 351 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).

See also N. Dorsen & L. Friedman, Disorder in the Court: Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct 10-23 (1973); Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F. R. D. 211, 214-215 (1971).

“To allow the disruptive activities of a defendant ... to prevent his trial is to allow him to profit from his own wrong. The Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution itself prescribes.” Illinois v. Allen, supra, at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring).

More recently, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, we again noted that a judge, when faced with the kind of conduct there at issue, “could, with propriety, have *515instantly acted, holding petitioner in contempt . . . 400 U. S., at 463. That the total punishment meted out during trial exceeds six months in jail or prison would not invalidate any of the convictions or sentences, for each contempt has been dealt with as a discrete and separate matter at a different point during the trial.

Ill

When the trial judge, however, postpones until after trial the final conviction and punishment of the accused or his lawyer for several or many acts of contempt committed during the trial, there is no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary rudiments of due process. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 463-464; Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 499-507 (1972); Taylor v. Hayes, ante, at 497. Moreover, it is normally the trial judge who, in retrospect, determines which and how many acts of contempt the citation will cover. It is also he or, as is the case here, another judge who will determine guilt or innocence absent a jury, who will impose the sentences and who will determine whether they will run consecutively or concurrently. In the context of the post-verdict adjudication of various acts of contempt, it appears to us that there is posed the very likelihood of arbitrary action that the requirement of jury trial was intended to avoid or alleviate. Cf. ibid.

The jury-trial guarantee reflects “a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S., at 155 (footnote omitted). The Sixth Amendment represents a “deep commitment of the Nation to the right of *516jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement. ...” Id., at 156. Moreover,

“criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect .... [I]n terms of those considerations which make the right to jury trial fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference between serious contempts and other serious crimes. Indeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament. Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the duties of officers of the court.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S., at 201-202.

In the case before us, the original trial judge filed the contempt charges against these petitioners, while another judge tried them and imposed the sentences. Because the latter had the power to impose consecutive sentences, as he did here, guilt or innocence on the individual charges bore heavily on the ultimate sentence and was of critical importance. Here the contempts against each petitioner were tried seriatim in one proceeding, and the trial judge not only imposed a separate sentence for each contempt but also determined that the individual sentences were to run consecutively rather than concurrently, a ruling which necessarily extended the prison term to be served beyond that allowable for a petty criminal offense. As a result of this single proceeding, Codis-poti was sentenced to three years and three months for his seven contemptuous acts, Langnes to two years and eight *517months for his six contempts. In terms of the sentence imposed, which was obviously several times more than six months, each contemnor was tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial.

We find unavailing respondent's contrary argument that petitioners’ contempts were separate offenses and that, because no more than a six months’ sentence was imposed for any single offense, each contempt was necessarily a petty offense triable without a jury. Notwithstanding respondent’s characterization of the proceeding, the salient fact remains that the contempts arose from a single trial, were charged by a single judge, and were tried in a single proceeding. The individual sentences imposed were then aggregated, one sentence taking account of the others and not beginning until the immediately preceding sentence had expired.

Neither are we impressed with the contention that today’s decision will provoke trial judges to punish summarily during trial rather than awaiting a calmer, more studied proceeding after trial and deliberating “in the cool reflection of subsequent events.” Yates v. United States, 355 U. S. 66, 76 (1957) (footnote omitted). Summary convictions during trial that are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to appellate review. Cf. Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 9, 13 (1952).6

Nor can we accept the trial court’s view that the question of petitioners’ guilt on the contempt charges had already been conclusively adjudicated in this Court. Our decision in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, although expressing strong condemnation of Mayberry’s conduct, *518which we reaffirm, did not purport to affirm Mayberry’s contempt conviction. On the contrary, the judgment affirming the conviction was vacated and a new trial required before a different judge who was to sit “in judgment on the conduct of petitioner as shown by the record.” 400 U. S., at 466.

The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered

Part II of the opinion is joined only by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Powell.

The seven contempts charged against Codispoti were:

“1. That while being tried by a jury before Albert A. Piok, J. on November 18, 1966, he, the defendant, accused the court of *508trying to protect the prison authorities by saying, ‘Are you trying to protect the prison authorities, Your Honor? Is that your reason?’
“2. That while on trial as aforesaid on November 29, 1966, he, the defendant, accused the court of kowtowing and railroading the defendant into life imprisonment by saying ‘. . . it is only because the defendants in this case will not sit still and be kowtowed and be railroaded into a life imprisonment.’
“3. That while on trial as aforesaid on November 30, 1966, he, the defendant, called the judge ‘Caesar’ and accused the court of misconduct by saying, ‘You’re trying to railroad us.’ and ‘. . . I have never come across such a tyrannical display of corruption in my life.’
“4. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 1, 1966, he, the defendant, addressed the Court in an insolent and derogatory manner by saying, ‘Are you going to tell me my codefendant is not crazy? You must be crazy to try me with him.’
“5. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 2, 1966, he, the defendant, accused the Court of criminal conspiracy between it and prison officials by saying, ‘I further intend to prove there is a conspiracy between the prison authorities and this Court.’
“6. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 8, 1966, he, the defendant, created a despicable scene and refused to continue with the calling of his witnesses unless the Court ordered a mistrial, and in general creating an uproar, such an uproar as to cause the termination of the trial.
“7. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 9, 1966, he, the defendant, by constant and boisterous and insolent conduct interrupted the Court in its attempts to charge the jury, thereby creating an atmosphere of utter confusion and chaos.” App. 33-34.

The six contempts charged against Langnes were:

“1. That while being tried by a jury before Albert A. Fiok, J. on November 28, 1966, he, the defendant, accused the court of conspiracy by saying, 'For the record, before he begins again, I want the record to show this is another proof of conspiracy between this Court and institution.’
“2. That while on trial as aforesaid on November 29, 1966, he, the defendant, threatened to blow the trial judge’s head off, by saying, Tf I have to blow your head off, that’s exactly what I’ll do. I don’t give a damn if its on the record or not. If I got to use force, I will. That’s what the hell I’m going to do.’
“3. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 1, 1966, he, the defendant, accused and threatened the court by saying, ‘Like I told you, you force this trial on me — you going to give me an illegal trial, I told you before what I was going to do to you, and I mean it. Now I refuse to go on with this trial if you are going to railroad me and badger my witnesses, force me to an unfair trial, that is exactly what I am going to do, punk. I’m going to blow your head off. You understand that?’
“4. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 5, 1966, he, the defendant, told the court to ‘Go to hell.’ and accused the court of misconduct by saying, ‘One reason, you obviously have gotten in contact with the local papers to sharpen the hatchet over the heads of the defendants accusing them of causing the taxpayers fifty grand which as a result gave this hearing a prejudicial atmosphere. I would like to state here for the record, and for the papers, if need be, it is not us that is costing the taxpayers money. It is you, Mr. *510Maroney, and the Commonwealth that is costing the taxpayers money.’
“5. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 5, 1966, he, the defendant, made scurrilous remarks to the court by saying, ‘For the record, I would like to state that as far as my personal opinion is concerned, communist Russia, communist China, and Cuba need men like you. I think wherever you came from you infiltrated the courts and the whole place might as well be communist Russia.’
“6. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 9, 1966, he, the defendant, threatened the life of the court by saying, ‘I object to what you did to my two codefendants and I swear on my mother’s name that I will keep my promise to you, the two threats I made. Don’t worry about me interrupting during your summation. I won’t even dignify these stinking proceedings, punk, go to hell, and I will shake hands in hell with you. I will be damned to you.’ Also, he, the defendant, said, 'You are a dead man, stone dead. Your Honor.’ ” App. 30-31.

The questions on which certiorari was granted were stated in the petition, as follows:

“1. Should petitioners receive cumulative sentences for contempt of court imposed at the end of a trial where the total effective sentence received must be used rather than the individual sentences in order to determine the seriousness of the contempt and thereby determine whether the accused should be afforded the right to a jury trial?
“2. Should the strong possibility of a substantial term of imprisonment require that an accused be afforded the right to a jury trial?”

In tracing the lineage of the six-month dividing line for purposes of ascertaining whether a jury trial is required under the Sixth Amendment, MR. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent implicitly questions the authenticity of this rule. Putting aside whether the “constitutional rule of Bloom” ever “evolved” into the present rule, it is sufficient to note that although only three Members of the Court explicitly embraced the six-month demarcation point in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment. While reading the Sixth Amendment to require a jury trial for "all crimes,” they expressed the view that imprisonment for more than six months would certainly necessitate a jury trial. Five Members of the Court out of the eight participating therefore agreed that, at the very least, the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions where the term of imprisonment authorized by statute exceeds six months.

My Brother Rehnquist submits that petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial because they were originally tried and convicted of contempt in 1966, two years before this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 TJ. S. 145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968), which we held in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968), should receive only prospective application. His dissent finds further support for its conclusion in Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213 (1969), where the Court held that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), did not apply to persons whose retrials had commenced after the date of the Miranda decision if their original trials had begun before that date. This view, however, represents a fundamental misreading of the reach of these decisions and their applicability to the peculiar circumstances of this case. DeStefano unmistakably stated that “we will not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.” 392 U. S., at 635 (emphasis added). DeStefano did not exempt from the jury-trial requirement trials beginning after that date, and here petitioners’ convictions occurred in a trial that began over three and one-half years after the Duncan and Bloom decisions. The boundaries for the retroactive impact of Duncan and Bloom were advisedly established, for the jury-trial requirement, by definition, relates to trials, not to uncorrectable police conduct which occurred prior to trial and which, if illegal, would preclude the use of perhaps critical evidence gathered in reliance on then-existing law. Jenkins v. Delaware involved the latter considerations and has little bearing here.

“When constitutional rights turn on the resolution of a factual dispute we are duty bound to make an independent examination of the evidence in the record. See, e. g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 205, n. 5.” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 4 n. 4 (1966).