dissenting.
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas of using a com*1011mon carrier in interstate commerce for carriage of allegedly obscene matter in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Whoever . . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce [of]—
“(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . .
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, 479 F. 2d 577 (1973) (en banc), and this Court vacated the judgment of that court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 414 U. S. 969. On remand, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the conviction. 494 F. 2d 499 (1974).
I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, I expressed the view that “[wjhatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari, and since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the *1012other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.
Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.