Lefkowitz v. Newsome

Mr. Justice Powell, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250 (1973). This case is even more inappropriate for federal collateral review of a state prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner here, with advice of counsel, *303pleaded guilty in open court. He does not question the voluntariness of his plea nor does he assert innocence. Rather, he argues that his conviction is reviewable in federal habeas corpus because of an uncommon New York statute which allows appeal from an adverse suppression ruling notwithstanding the guilty plea.

Yet the Court today holds that respondent is entitled to seek federal habeas corpus relief. This ruling distorts beyond recognition the writ of habeas corpus. The historic and honored purpose of habeas corpus, and indeed its only justification, is to provide the added assurance to a free society that no innocent person will suffer an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. The great writ was not designed as a means for freeing persons who have voluntarily confessed guilt under procedures comporting with due process of law.

Apart from my views as to the inappropriateness of federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims duly adjudicated by state courts, Bustamonte, supra, I also agree with Mr. Justice White’s dissent, ante, p. 294. As federal law is invoked by respondent, his guilty plea is determinative under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).