with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
I believe the dissenters in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966), correctly construed the civil rights removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1443. See New York v. Galamison, 342 F. 2d 255, 275 (CA2) (Marshall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 977 (1965). On that broader view of the statute, removal would plainly be proper here, and if the Federal District Court determined that the state proceedings were being used to deny federally protected rights, it would be required to dismiss the prosecution. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, at 840-848 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Even under Peacock and its companion case, Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780 (1966), however, I think that removal should have been available on the particular facts of this case.
As the Court today observes, Rachel and Peacock imposed sharp limitations on the scope of the removal statute. The statute was held to permit removal only in the rare case in which (1) the federal right at issue stemmed from a law providing expressly for equal civil rights; (2) the conduct with which the removal petitioners were charged was arguably protected by the federal law in question; and (3) the federal law granted the further right not only to engage in the conduct in question, but to be free from arrest and prosecution by state officials for that conduct. Focusing on the third requirement, the Court today holds that Title I of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 18 TJ. S. C. § 245, does not provide a right to be free from arrest and prosecution for engaging in specific federally protected conduct. In' my *230view, the three requirements from Peacock were satisfied to the extent necessary to call for a full hearing on the removal petition, and I would therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.1
I
The Court of Appeals based its ruling on the first of the three requirements, holding that § 245 was not a “law providing for . . . equal civil rights.” The court reasoned that the statute failed to meet this requirement because it did not “provide” any substantive rights but merely supplied a criminal sanction for the violation of rights that had been elsewhere created. This misses the point.2
Even if § 245 is regarded solely as creating criminal penalties for interference with previously established civil rights, it certainly “provid [es] for” those rights by facilitating their exercise. Congress plainly intended § 245 in part to render certain rights meaningful, even though the rights themselves had in some instances been *231created in prior legislation. See S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-6 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1967). If Congress had provided private legal or equitable remedies for the vindication of pre-existing rights, such a statute would certainly be deemed one “providing for” equal civil rights. The fact that Congress has invoked the criminal sanction to protect and enforce those rights rather than relying on private remedies should make no difference.
In any event, § 245 does more than enforce pre-existing rights: in several respects it creates rights that had no previous statutory recognition. First, the statute protects not only those participating in the exercise of equal civil rights, but also those, “encouraging other persons to participate” and those “participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participate,” §245 (b)(5). See S. Rep. No. 721, supra, at 4. Second, because it is based on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Commerce Clause, § 245 goes beyond the specific protections of prior civil rights laws in various particulars. As the House Report noted:
“[T]he scope of the activities described in section [245 (b)] is not limited to the scope of the ‘rights’ created by other Federal laws outlawing discrimination with respect to those activities. Accordingly, in appropriate cases, . . . the bill would reach forcible interference with employment, regardless of the size and regardless of the public or private character of the employer; with service in all of the described types of places of public accommodation, whether or not they happen to fall within the scope of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and with common carrier transportation whether interstate or intrastate.” H. R. Rep. No. 473, supra, at 5.
*232Finally, the statute goes beyond protecting against racially motivated misconduct by state officials and those acting in concert with them. It reaches racially motivated conduct by private individuals as well, thus extending both a right against, and a remedy for, certain private misconduct. The inclusion of private individuals within the reach of § 245 was a topic of intense dispute during the congressional debates over the statute. Both the advocates and opponents of the statute recognized that § 245 would criminalize a whole new sphere of conduct and thus significantly expand the scope of federal statutory protection for civil rights. See S. Rep. No. 721, supra, at 7-8, 21-26; 113 Cong. Rec. 22763-22764 (1967); 114 Cong. Rec. 319, 389-391, 539-544 (1968). In view of the statute’s broad remedial purposes and effects, only on the most grudging reading can it be said not to “pro vid [ej for equal civil rights.”
II
Although neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has discussed the second requirement for § 1443 removal, I believe that under Rachel and Peacock a sufficient showing has been made to require further proceedings below. The Court in Peacock established that where the state criminal charge includes allegations of conduct clearly unprotected by féderal law, removal is not available. In that case, the state charges included obstruction of the streets, assault, and interference with a police officer — all forms of conduct not even arguably protected under federal law. 384 U. S., at 826-827.3
*233In Rachel, by contrast, the Court observed that the defendants had been charged only with violating the state criminal trespass statute, which required that a person leave a place of business when requested to do so by the owner. The defendants alleged in their removal petitions that they had remained on the premises of the privately owned restaurants where they were arrested in the course of seeking service to which they were entitled by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Thus none of the conduct that the defendants were allegedly engaged in fell plainly outside the protection of federal law, as was the case in Peacock. Accordingly, the District Court was instructed to hold a hearing to determine whether the defendants were ordered to leave the restaurant facilities solely for racial reasons, and whether the conduct was in fact within the protection of federal law — in that case by determining whether the restaurants in question were within the coverage of the Civil Rights Act. 384 U. S., at 805 and n. 31.
On this point, the instant case is controlled by Rachel rather than Peacock. The arrest affidavits charged merely that the petitioners had conspired to promote a boycott of merchants and businessmen and that they had engaged in and promoted acts “injurious to trade or commerce among the public.” App. 3-17. In their removal papers, the petitioners alleged that the conduct underlying their arrests on these charges was wholly within *234the protection of federal law.4 There is nothing in the arrest affidavits or the statute under which the petitioners were charged that rebuts this claim. The line between Rachel and Peacock is that between “prosecutions in which the conduct necessary to constitute the state offense is specifically protected by a federal equal rights statute under the circumstances alleged by the petitioner, and prosecutions where the only grounds for removal are that the charge is false and motivated by a desire to discourage the petitioner from exercising or to penalize him for having exercised a federal right.” New York v. Davis, 411 F. 2d 750, 754 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 856 (1969). Like Rachel, this case falls into the former category. Accordingly, the courts below should determine whether the petitioners’ conduct was in fact protected. If it was, the prosecutions should be dismissed.5
*235III
Finally, the Rachel-Peacock test requires that the federal law invoked by the petitioners must do more than merely provide a defense to conviction: it must immunize them from arrest and prosecution for the conduct in question. In Rachel, the Court held that this test was met, since § 203 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided: “No person shall . . . (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.” 42 U. S. C. §2000a-2 (c). The rights protected by §201 included the right to “full and equal enjoyment of the... facilities ... of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination ... on the ground of race.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (a). Viewing this language in light of a subsequent construction in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 311 (1964), the Court in Rachel concluded that if the facts in the removal petition were found to be true, the defendants would not only be immune from conviction under the Georgia trespass statute, but they would also have a right under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “not even to be brought to trial on these charges in the Georgia courts.” 384 U. S., at 794.
The Court today distinguishes the language of 18 U. S. C. § 245 from that of § 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-2 (c), holding that the former does not grant the same immunity from prosecution that was implied in the latter. To me, the language of the two statutes is not sufficiently different to support such a distinction. While the statute in Rachel provided that no person should “punish or attempt to punish” a person engaged in conduct protected under the Act, the statute at issue here provides sanc*236tions against anyone who, “whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with” any person who is engaged in protected civil rights activity or is “lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate” in various protected activities. The use of force or the threat of force to intimidate or interfere with persons engaged in protected activity fairly describes an “attempt to punish” the same persons, and it would seem plainly to include pretextual arrests such as are alleged to have occurred in this case.6
Besides the difference in language between § 203 (c) and § 245, the Court points to two other factors that it contends provide a further basis for denying removal here. I do not find either to be dispositive.
First, the Court relies on § 245 (a)(1), in which Congress emphasized that § 245 was not intended to prevent *237“any State . . . from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section . . . The Court argues that this “non-preemption” provision indicates that § 245 “appears to disavow any intent to interrupt . . . state prosecutions [for offenses such as boycotting and conspiracy].” Ante, at 224. I cannot agree that §245 (a)(1) means to do that much. The legislative history of this subsection indicates that it was intended to avoid the risk that § 245 would be read to bar or interfere with state prosecutions of those who violated § 245 as well as parallel state laws. The fear was that § 245, because of its potential breadth, might appear to give pre-emptive authority to federal law officers in prosecuting a broad spectrum of offenses that were traditionally subject to local criminal jurisdiction.7 There is no indication in the legislative history *238that § 245 (a)(1) was intended to defeat removal of state prosecutions by those protected under the Act, nor is there any suggestion that it was meant to reduce the protection for the beneficiaries of § 245 in any other way.
Second, the Court relies heavily on the main purpose of § 245: to penalize violent interference with the exercise of specific rights. Certainly, violent interference with the exercise of civil rights was a primary target of the statute. But curbing private violence was not the drafters’ sole aim. The Act was intended to reach law enforcement officers as well as private citizens, and the process of arrest and prosecution in state courts is precisely the means by which state officials, acting under color of state law, can most plausibly exert force or the threat of force to interfere with federally protected rights. See Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F. 2d 7, 11, 39-41 (CA5 1972) (Brown, C. J., dissenting).
The Court is correct, of course, in noting that Congress did not expressly indicate that § 245 should be available as a means of removing prosecutions to federal courts. But the Court in Rachel did not require any showing that Congress had specifically intended the statute in issue to be used as a vehicle for removal. All that was necessary was that the statute protect against the institution of criminal actions against those engaged in protected federal rights, and in my view that standard is met here.8
*239IV
If the facts of this case are as alleged in the removal petition, then the protest effort of the petitioners and their group, although well within the protection of federal law, has been muffled, if not altogether stilled, by discriminatory and cynical misuse of the state criminal process. The Court makes reference to the possibility of federal injunctive relief, which would be available in this case if the petitioners can show that the arrests and prosecutions were instituted in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 482, 490 (1965); Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 47-50 (1971). I only hope that the recent instances in which this Court has emphasized the values of comity and federalism in restricting the issuance of federal injunctions against state- criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings will not mislead the district courts into forgetting that at times these values must give way to the need to protect federal rights from being irremediably trampled. The possibility that the petitioners might be vindicated in state-court criminal actions or through subsequent habeas corpus relief will do little to restore what has been lost: the right to engage in legitimate, if unpopular, protest without being subjected to the inconvenience, the expense, and the ignominy of arrest and prosecution. If the federal courts abandon persons like the petitioners in this case without a fair hearing on the merits of their claims, then in my view comity will have been bought at too great a cost.
I respectfully dissent.
Although the District Court initially held a hearing on the removal petition and made various factual findings adverse to the petitioners, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case without reviewing the findings of the District Court. I would therefore remand the case to the Court of Appeals to review the findings relevant to the availability of removal and to order further proceedings if necessary.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that § 245 met the requirement that the statute under which removal is claimed be a law dealing with “specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality,” Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 792 (1966). See 488 F. 2d 284, 286 (CA5 1974). The statute was plainly addressed to problems associated with the exercise and advocacy of minority rights. Like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and unlike the more general constitutional and statutory provisions that were rejected as bases for removal in Rachel and Peacock, § 245 (b) (2) refers throughout to conduct premised on racial discrimination.
The Court rejected the argument made in dissent that it was the allegations in the removal petition that should be looked to in determining whether the conduct was arguably protected by federal law, not the charges filed in the state proceeding. As has been suggested elsewhere, relying on the charges to determine whether the *233conduct is protected would immunize from removal any case in which the state charges included allegations of conduct plainly outside the scope of federal protection. See H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1228 (2d ed. 1973); Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F. 2d 7, 11, 31-33 (CA5 1972) (Brown, C. J., dissenting); Comment, Civil Rights Removal after Rachel and Peacock: A Limited Federal Remedy, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 351, 368 (1972).
Specifically, the petitioners alleged that in order to protest various forms of private and public racial discrimination they “began to peacefully and lawfully picket the business establishment of [offending] merchants in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and began to urge the citizens of Vicksburg to boycott these business establishments. All of this picketing by the petitioners and other members of their class was done in a lawful and peaceful manner and without infringing upon the rights of any other citizen of Vicksburg ...” App. 22.
The respondents contend in their brief that the petitioners were arrested for acts ranging from engaging in a secondary boycott to physically interfering with and intimidating a customer who was trading with a white merchant. The petitioners respond that both the arrest affidavits and the testimony at the remand hearing before the District Court were to .the effect that they were all arrested pursuant to the general state conspiracy statute, and specifically for entering into “a conspiracy harmful to trade or commerce.” Id., at 30. Since the remand order was the only judgment before the Court of Appeals, it is not clear what effect subsequent actions taken by state officials would have on the removal suit on appeal. In any event, because of the continuing dispute over what state statute was used as the basis for the charges in state court, and correspondingly, what conduct was alleged, the question whether the conduct *235was protected under federal law is one that should be left to the courts below to determine on remand.
The Court notes “the similarity between the language of § 1971 (b) . . . and the comparable language of § 245 (b),” ante, at 221 n. 10. The statutes do, indeed, have similar language, but the conduct protected under § 1971 (b) is voting, and there was no allegation in Peacock that the defendants were engaged in voting. It was unnecessary for the Court to determine whether § 1971 (b), or a statute with similar prohibitory language, would provide a means for removal because (1) the conduct with which the defendants were charged was not protected under any federal law; and (2) their conduct, as alleged in their own removal petition, was .not within the scope of § 1971 (b).
Another statute, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Í (b), which was enacted after the removal in Peacock, protected those urging others to exercise their rights to vote, and thus would have reached the conduct in which the Peacock defendants claimed to have been engaged. See Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F. 2d 521 (CA5 1968). Even under that statute, however, removal would not have been available in Peacock because the conduct with which the defendants were charged in the state-court proceeding was unprotected by that or any other federal law.
Section 245 (a)(1) had its origin in an amendment offered to the House bill by Representative Whitener. In his words, the amendment was intended to ensure:
“[NJothing contained in this act shall indicate an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any provision of the act operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this act or any provision thereof. . . . Without the amendment, there would be an unwarranted deprivation of criminal jurisdiction now exercised by the several States in most of the fields of criminal law touched by this bill.” 113 Cong. Rec. 22745. (1967).
See also id., at 22683 (Rep. Whitener).
In the Senate, the final language of §245 (a)(1) was adopted as part of Senator Dirksen’s amendment to the bill. The explanation of the provision given to the Senate was as follows:
“Section (a) of the bill expresses the intent of Congress not to supersede state and local law enforcement except where required by the public interest in order to obtain substantial justice. In all cases state and local law would continue to apply, and would not be preempted by federal law. However, in those situations when *238state and local law enforcement is unable or unwilling to prosecute effectively, federal prosecution may be undertaken. To assure that decisions relating to exercise of this dual jurisdiction are carefully made, the bill requires advance certification of prosecutorial authority by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney. General.” 114 Cong. Rec. 4907 (1968).
In its analysis, the Court relies in part on a statement by Senator Kennedy to the effect that a state law enforcement officer reasonably believing that he is doing his duty, would not violate §245, which requires at least knowing interference with civil rights. The *239interference alleged in the removal petition, however, is intentional interference, which would fall within the literal terms of the statute.