Ellis v. Dyson

Mb. Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, and add these few words only to indicate why I believe the Court is quite correct in leaving to the District Court on remand the issues treated in the dissenting opinion of my Brother Powell and the concurring and dissenting opinion of my Brother White.

*436The District Court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss petitioners’ complaint because it regarded a prior decision of the Court of Appeals, Becker v. Thompson, 459 F. 2d 919 (CA5 1972), as controlling. While it would have been more in keeping with conventional adjudication had that court first inquired as to the existence of a case or controversy, as suggested in the opinion of my Brother Powell, I cannot fault the District Court for disposing of the case on what it quite properly regarded at that time as an authoritative ground of decision. Indeed, this Court has on occasion followed essentially the same practice. Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676 (1974); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348 (1969). The Court of Appeals confirmed the District Court’s understanding of the law when it affirmed by order, 475 F. 2d 1402 (CA5 1973).

Later this Court, in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals which that court and the District Court had regarded as dispositive of this case. In Steffel, we held that Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), did not bar access to the District Court when the plaintiff sought only declaratory relief and no state proceeding was pending, but the Court also emphasized that petitioner must present “an ‘actual controversy,’ a requirement imposed by Art. Ill of the Constitution.” 415 U. S., at 458. Properly viewed, therefore, a remand for reconsideration in light of Steffel directs the District Court to consider whether the requisite case or controversy was and is presented, as well as to determine the appropriateness of declaratory relief.

I believe the Court’s remand to the District Court, which will give that court an opportunity to reconsider the jurisdictional issues within the framework of Steffel and to pass in the first instance on the other issues that *437my Brothers Powell and White would have us decide today, is entirely appropriate. Since I read the opinion of the Court as intimating no views on either of these questions that are contrary to those suggested by my dissenting Brethren, I am quite content to leave them for the consideration of the District Court in the first instance.