delivered the opinion of the Court.*
Zoning ordinances adopted by the city of Detroit differentiate between motion picture theaters which exhibit sexually explicit “adult” movies and those which do not. The principal question presented by this case is whether that statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.1
Effective November 2, 1972, Detroit adopted the ordinances challenged in this litigation. Instead of concentrating “adult” theaters in limited zones, these ordinances require that such theaters be dispersed. Specifically, an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other “regulated uses” or within 500 feet of a residential area.2 The term “regulated uses” includes 10 different kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters.3
*53The classification of a theater as “adult” is expressly predicated on the character of the motion pictures which it exhibits. If the theater is used to present “material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities’ or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,’ ” 4 it is an adult establishment.5
*54The 1972 ordinances were amendments to an “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” which had been adopted 10 years earlier. At that time the Detroit Common Council made a finding that some uses of property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas.6 The decision to add adult motion picture theaters and adult book stores to the list of businesses which, apart from a special waiver,7 could not be located within 1,000 feet of two other “regulated uses,” was, in part, a response to the significant growth in the number *55of such establishments.8 In the opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who supported the ordinances, the location of several such businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere.
Respondents are the operators of two adult motion picture theaters. One, the Nortown, was an established theater which began to exhibit adult films in March 1973. The other, the Pussy Cat, was a corner gas station which was converted into a “mini theater,” but denied a certificate of occupancy because of its plan to exhibit adult films. Both theaters were located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses and the Pussy Cat was less than 500 feet from a residential area. The respondents brought two separate actions against appropriate city officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinances were unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement. Federal jurisdiction was properly invoked9 and the two cases were consolidated for decision.10
The District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On the basis of the reasons stated *56by the city for adopting the ordinances, the court concluded that they represented a rational attempt to preserve the city’s neighborhoods.11 The court analyzed and rejected respondents’ argument that the definition and waiver provisions in the ordinances were impermis-sibly vague; it held that the disparate treatment of adult theaters and other theaters was justified by a compelling state interest and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause;12 and finally it concluded that the regulation of the places where adult films could be shown did not violate the First Amendment.13
*57The Court of Appeals reversed. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F. 2d 1014 (CA6 1975). The majority opinion concluded that the ordinances imposed a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication and therefore “merely establishing that they were designed to serve a compelling public interest” provided an insufficient justification for a classification of motion picture theaters on the basis of the content of the materials they purvey to the public.14 Relying primarily on Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, the court held the ordinance invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. Judge Celebrezze, in dissent, ex*58pressed the opinion that the ordinance was a valid “ 'time, place and manner’ regulation,” rather than a regulation of speech on the basis of its content.15
Because of the importance of the decision, we granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 911.
As they did in the District Court, respondents contend (1) that the ordinances are so vague that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that they are invalid under the First Amendment as prior restraints on protected communication; and (3) that the classification of theaters on the basis of the content of their exhibitions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We consider their arguments in that order.
I
There are two parts to respondents’ claim that the ordinances are too vague. They do not attack the specificity of the definition of “Specified Sexual Activities” or “Specified Anatomical Areas.” They argue, however, that they cannot determine how much of the described activity may be permissible before the exhibition is “characterized by an emphasis” on such matter. In addition, they argue that the ordinances are vague because they do not specify adequate procedures or standards for obtaining a waiver of the 1,000-foot restriction.
We find it unnecessary to consider the validity of either of these arguments in the abstract. For even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the *59ordinances on other litigants, they are unquestionably applicable to these respondents. The record indicates that both theaters propose to offer adult fare on a regular basis.16 Neither respondent has alleged any basis for claiming or anticipating any waiver of the restriction as applied to its theater. It is clear, therefore, that any element of vagueness in these ordinances has not affected these respondents. To the extent that their challenge is predicated on inadequate notice resulting in a denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be rejected. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 754-757.
Because the ordinances affect communication protected by the First Amendment, respondents argue that they may raise the vagueness issue even though there is no uncertainty about the impact of the ordinances on their own rights. On several occasions we have determined that a defendant whose own speech was unprotected had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute which purported to prohibit protected speech, or even speech arguably protected.17 This ex*60ception from traditional rules of standing to raise constitutional issues has reflected the Court’s judgment that the very existence of some statutes may cause persons not before the Court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611-614. The exception is justified by the overriding importance of maintaining a free and open market for the interchange of ideas. Nevertheless, if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not “both real and substantial,” and if the statute is “readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts,” see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216, the litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third parties.
We are not persuaded that the Detroit zoning ordinances will have a significant deterrent effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment. *61As already noted, the only vagueness in the ordinances relates to the amount of sexually explicit activity that may be portrayed before the material can be said to be “characterized by an emphasis” on such matter. For most films the question will be readily answerable; to the extent that an area of doubt exists, we see no reason why the ordinances are not “readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.” Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance, and since the limited amount of uncertainty in the ordinances is easily susceptible of a narrowing construction, we think this is an inappropriate case in which to adjudicate the hypothetical claims of persons not before the Court.
The only area of protected communication that may be deterred by these ordinances comprises films containing material falling within the specific definitions of “Specified Sexual Activities” or “Specified Anatomical Areas.” The fact that the First Amendment protects some, though not necessarily all, of that material from total suppression does not warrant the further conclusion that an exhibitor’s doubts as to whether a borderline film may be shown in his theater, as well as in theaters licensed for adult presentations, involves the kind of threat to the free market in ideas and expression that justifies the exceptional approach to constitutional adjudication recognized in cases like Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479.
The application of the ordinances to respondents is plain; even if there is some area of uncertainty about their application in other situations, we agree with the District Court that respondents’ due process argument must be rejected.
*62II
Petitioners acknowledge that the ordinances prohibit theaters which are not licensed as “adult motion picture theaters” from exhibiting films which are protected by the First Amendment. Respondents argue that the ordinances are therefore invalid as prior restraints on free speech.
The ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they impose a limit on the total number of adult theaters which may operate in the city of Detroit. There is no claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, conversely, that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare. Viewed as an entity, the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained.
It is true, however, that adult films may only be exhibited commercially in licensed theaters. But that is also true of all motion pictures. The city's general zoning laws require all motion picture theaters to satisfy certain locational as well as other requirements; we have no doubt that the municipality may control the location of theaters as well as the location of other commercial establishments, either by confining them to certain specified commercial zones or by requiring that they be dispersed throughout the city. The mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.
Putting to one side for the moment the fact that adult motion picture theaters must satisfy a locational restriction not applicable to other theaters, we are also persuaded that the 1,000-foot restriction does not, in itself, create an impermissible restraint on protected communication. The city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property for commercial purposes *63is clearly adequate to support that kind of restriction applicable to all theaters within the city limits. In short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult theaters differently from other theaters and. the fact that the classification is predicated on the content of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place where such films may be exhibited does not offend the First Amendment.18 We turn, therefore, to the question whether the classification is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
Ill
A remark attributed to Voltaire characterizes our zealous adherence to the principle that the government may not tell the citizen what he may or may not say. Referring to a suggestion that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be legitimate, he said: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” 19 The essence of that comment has been repeated time after time in our decisions invalidating attempts by the government to impose selective controls upon the dissemination of ideas.
Thus, the use of streets and parks for the free expression of views on national affairs may not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to say.20 Nor may speech be curtailed because it *64invites dispute, creates dissatisfaction with conditions the way they are, or even stirs people to anger.21 The sovereign's agreement or disagreement with the content of what a speaker has to say may not affect the regulation of the time, place, or manner of presenting the speech.
If picketing in the vicinity of a school is to be allowed to express the point of view of labor, that means of expression in that place must be allowed for other points of view as well. As we said in Mosley:
“The central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign. But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269-270 (1964), and cases cited; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937). To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its con*65tent would completely undercut the ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 270.
“Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.” 408 U. S., at 95-96. (Footnote omitted.)
This statement, and others to the same effect, read literally and without regard for the facts of the case in which it was made, would absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive activity predicated in whole or in part on the content of the communication. But we learned long ago that broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in the context in which they are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated principle is reached.22 When we review this Court's actual adjudications in the First Amendment area, we find this to have been the case *66with the stated principle that there may be no restriction whatever on expressive activity because of its content.
The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech. Thus, the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say.23 Similarly, it is the content of the utterance that determines whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected “fighting comment.” 24 And in time of war “the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops” may unquestionably be restrained, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716, although publication of news stories with a different content would be protected.
Even within the area of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different governmental response. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 264, we recognized that the First Amendment places limitations on the States’ power to enforce their libel laws. We held that a public official may not recover damages from a critic of his official conduct without proof of “malice” as specially defined in that opinion.25 Implicit in the opinion is the assumption that if the content of the newspaper article had been different — that is, if its subject matter had not been a public official — a lesser standard of proof would have been adequate.
*67In a series of later cases, in which separate individual views were frequently stated, the Court addressed the broad problem of when the New York Times standard of malice was required by the First Amendment. Despite diversity of opinion on whether it was required only in cases involving public figures, or also in cases involving public issues, and on whether the character of the damages claim mattered, a common thread which ran through all the opinions was the assumption that the rule to be applied depended on the content of the communication.26 But that assumption did not contradict the underlying reason for the rule which is generally described as a prohibition of regulation based on the content of protected communication. The essence of that rule is the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the communicator.27 Thus, although *68the content of a story must be examined to decide whether it involves a public figure or a public issue, the Court’s application of the relevant rule may not depend on its favorable or unfavorable appraisal of that figure or that issue.
We have recently held that the First Amendment affords some protection to commercial speech.28 We have also made it clear, however, that the content of a particular advertisement may determine the extent of its protection. A public rapid transit system may accept some advertisements and reject others.29 A state statute may permit highway billboards to advertise businesses located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere,30 and regulatory commissions may prohibit businessmen from making statements which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive.31 The measure of constitutional pro*69tection to be afforded commercial speech will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication.32
More directly in point are opinions dealing with the question whether the First Amendment prohibits the State and Federal Governments from wholly suppressing sexually oriented materials on the basis of their “obscene character.” In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, the Court upheld a conviction for selling to a minor magazines which were concededly not “obscene” if shown to adults. Indeed, the Members of the Court who would accord the greatest protection to such materials have repeatedly indicated that the State could prohibit the distribution or exhibition of such materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults.33 Surely the First Amendment does *70not foreclose such a prohibition; yet it is equally clear that any such prohibition must rest squarely on an appraisal of the content of material otherwise within a constitutionally protected area.
Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication. For the regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see “Specified Sexual Activities” exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis *71for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
The remaining question is whether the line drawn by these ordinances is justified by the city’s interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods. On this question we agree with the views expressed by District Judges Kennedy and Gubow. The record discloses a factual basis for the Common Council’s conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect.34 It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of its decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas. In either event, the city’s interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited,35 even though the determination of whether a *72particular film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content, we conclude that the city's interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion pictures. We hold that the zoning ordinances requiring that adult *73motion picture theaters not be located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Part III of this opinion is joined by only The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice RehNQüist.
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” This Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229.
The District Court held that the original form of the 500-foot restriction was invalid because it was measured from “any building containing a residential, dwelling or rooming unit.” The city did not appeal from that ruling, but adopted an amendment prohibiting the operation of an adult theater within 500 feet of any area zoned for residential use. The amended restriction is not directly challenged in this litigation.
In addition to adult motion picture theaters and “mini” theaters, which contain less than 50 seats, the regulated uses include adult bookstores; cabarets (group “D”); establishments for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises; hotels or motels; pawnshops; pool or billiard halls; public lodging houses; secondhand stores; shoeshine parlors; and taxi dance halls.
These terms are defined as follows:
“For the purpose of this Section, 'Specified Sexual Activities’ is defined as:
“1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
“2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
“3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breast.
“And ‘Specified Anatomical Areas’ is defined as:
“1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock, and (e) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola; and
“2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered.”
There are three types of adult establishments — bookstores, motion picture theaters, and mini motion picture theaters — defined respectively as follows:
“Adult Book Store
“An establishment having as a substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade, books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ or ‘Specified Anatomical Areas,’ (as defined below), or an establishment with a segment or section devoted to the sale or display of such material.
“Adult Motion Picture Theater
“An enclosed building with a capacity of 50 or more persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ or ‘Specified Anatomical Areas,’ (as defined below) for observation by patrons therein.
“Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater
“An enclosed building with a capacity for less than 50 persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an *54emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities’ or ‘Specified Anatomical Areas,’ (as defined below) , for observation by patrons therein.”
Section 66.000 of the Official Zoning Ordinance (1972) recited:
“In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized that there are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood. These special regulations are itemized in this section. The primary control or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a concentration of these uses in any one area (i. e. not more than two such uses within one thousand feet of each other which would create such adverse effects).”
The ordinance authorizes the Zoning Commission to waive the 1,000-foot restriction if it finds:
“a) That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or injurious to nearby properties, and that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be observed,
“b) That the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage the development of a ‘skid row’ area.
“c) That the establishment of an additional regulated use in the area will not be contrary to any program of neigh[bof]hood conservation nor will it interfere with any program of urban renewal.
“d) That all applicable regulations of this Ordinance will be observed.”
A police department memorandum addressed to the assistant corporation counsel stated that since 1967 there had been an increase in the number of adult theaters in Detroit from 2 to 25, and a comparable increase in the number of adult book stores and other “adult-type businesses.”
Respondents alleged a claim for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court under 28 U. S. C. §1343 (3).
Both cases were decided in a single opinion filed jointly by Judge Kennedy and Judge Gubow. Nortown Theatre v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (ED Mich. 1974).
“When, as here, the City has stated a reason for adopting an ordinance which is a subject of legitimate concern, that statement of purpose is not subject to attack.
“Nor may the Court substitute its judgment for that of the Common Council of the City of Detroit as to the methods adopted to deal with the City’s legitimate concern to preserve neighborhoods, so long as there is some rational relationship between the objective of the Ordinance and the methods adopted.” Id., at 367.
“Because the Ordinances distinguish adult theatres and bookstores from ordinary theatres and bookstores on the basis of the content of their respective wares, the classification is one which restrains conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676 . . . (1968). The appropriate standard for reviewing the classification, therefore, is a test of close scrutiny. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 670 .. . (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 .. . (1963). Under this test, the validity of the classification depends on whether it is necessary to further a compelling State interest.
“The compelling State interest which the Defendants point to as justifying the restrictions on locations of adult theatres and bookstores is the preservation of neighborhoods, upon which adult establishments have been found to have a destructive impact. The affidavit of Dr. Mel Ravitz clearly establishes that the prohibition of more than one regulated use within 1000 feet is necessary to promote that interest. This provision therefore does not offend the equal protection clause.” Id., at 369.
“Applying those standards to the instant case, the power to license and zone businesses and prohibit their location in certain *57areas is clearly within the constitutional power of the City. The government interest, i. e. the preservation and stabilization of neighborhoods in the City of Detroit, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. First Amendment rights are indirectly related, but only in the sense that they cannot be freely exercised in specific locations. Plaintiffs would not contend that they are entitled to operate a theatre or bookstore, which are commercial businesses, in a residentially zoned area; nor could they claim the right to put on a performance for profit in a public street. Admittedly the regulation here is more restrictive, but it is of the same character.” Id., at 371.
“The City did not discharge its heavy burden of justifying the prior restraint which these ordinances undoubtedly impose by merely establishing that they were designed to serve a compelling public interest. Since fundamental rights are involved, the City had the further burden of showing that the method which it chose to deal with the problem at hand was necessary and that its effect on protected rights was only incidental. The City could legally regulate movie theatres and bookstores under its police powers by providing that such establishments be operated only in particular areas. . . . However, this ordinance selects for special treatment particular business enterprises which fall within the general business classifications permissible under zoning laws and classifies them as regulated uses solely by reference to the content of the constitutionally protected materials which they purvey to the public.” 518 F. 2d, at 1019-1020.
He stated in part:
“I do not view the 1000-foot provision as a regulation of speech on the basis of its content. Rather, it is a regulation of the right to locate a business based on the side-effects of its location. The interest in preserving neighborhoods is not a subterfuge for censorship.” Id., at 1023.
Both complaints allege that only adults are admitted to these theaters. Nortown expressly alleges that it “desires to continue exhibiting adulMype motion picture films at said theater.” Neither respondent has indicated any plan to exhibit pictures even arguably outside the coverage of the ordinances.
“Such claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words.’ Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972). See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969); Chaplinskij v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). In such cases, it has been the judgment of this Court that the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. Over-*60breadth attacks have also been allowed where the Court thought rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result in burdening innocent associations. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U. S. 479 (1960)]. Facial overbreadth claims have also been entertained where statutes, by their terms, purport to regulate the time, place, and manner of expressive or communicative conduct, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 114-121; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S., at 617-619; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 249-250 (1967) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), and where such conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated stand-ardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 553-558 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612-613.
Reasonable regulations of the time, place, and manner of protected speech, where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests, are permitted by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (limitation on use of sound trucks); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (ban on demonstrations in or near a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (ban on willful making, on grounds adjacent to a school, of any noise which disturbs the good order of the school session).
S. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire 199 (1907).
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4.
See, e. g., Kastigar v. United, States, 406 U. S. 441, 454-455; United Gas Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U. S. 392, 404.
See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 133-134; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 592; Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 99-101.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 574, we held that a statute punishing the use of “damned racketeers] ” and “damned Facist[s]” did not unduly impair liberty of expression.
“Actual malice” is shown by proof that a statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U. S., at 280.
See, for example, the discussion of the " 'public or general interest’ test” for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 346, and the reference, id., at 348, to a factual misstatement "whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential.” The mere fact that an alleged defamatory statement is false does not, of course, place it completely beyond the protection of the First Amendment. “The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Id., at 341.
Thus, Professor Kalven wrote in The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 29:
“[The Equal Protection Clause] is likely to provide a second line of defense for vigorous users of the public forum. If some groups are exempted from a prohibition on parades and pickets, the rationale for regulation is fatally impeached. The objection can then no longer be keyed to interferences with other uses of the public places, but would appear to implicate the kind of message that the groups were transmitting. The regulation would thus slip from the neu*68trality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content. The result is that equal-protection analysis in the area of speech issues would merge with considerations of censorship. And this is precisely what Mr. Justice Black argued in Cox:
“ ‘But by specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It is thus trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form . . .’ [379 IT. S., at 581].”
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (product advertising accepted, while political cards rejected).
Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P. 2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 393 U. S. 316.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 617, the Court upheld a federal statute which balanced an employer’s free speech right to communicate with his employees against the employees’ rights to associate freely by providing that the expres*69sion of “ 'any views, argument, or opinion’ ” should not be “ 'evidence of an unfair labor practice,’ ” so long as such expression contains " 'no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit’ ” which would involve interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
The power of the Federal Trade Commission to restrain misleading, as well as false, statements in labels and advertisements has long been recognized. See, e. g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608; FTC v. National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F. 2d 485 (CA7 1975); E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F. 2d 735, 740 (CA2 1956).
As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, at 779 (concurring opinion), the ''differences between commercial price and product advertising . . . and ideological communication” permits regulation of the former that the First Amendment would not tolerate with respect to the latter.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 73, Mr. Justice BreNNAN, in a dissent joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall, explained his approach to the difficult problem of obscenity under the First Amendment:
“I would hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal *70Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents. Nothing in this approach precludes those governments from taking action to serve what may be strong and legitimate interests through regulation of the manner of distribution of sexually oriented material.” Id., at 113.
The Common Council's determination was that a concentration of “adult” movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of “offensive” speech. In contrast, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, the justifications offered by the city rested primarily on the city’s interest in protecting its citizens from exposure to unwanted, “offensive” speech. The only secondary effect relied on to support that ordinance was the impact on traffic— an effect which might be caused by a distracting open-air movie even if it did not exhibit nudity.
The situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech. Here, however, the District Court specifically found that “[t]he Ordinances do not affect the operation of existing establishments but only the location of new ones. There are myriad locations in *72the City of Detroit which must be over 1000 feet from existing regulated establishments. This burden on First Amendment rights is slight.” 373 F. Supp., at 370.
It should also be noted that the definitions of “Specified Sexual Activities” and “Specified Anatomical Areas” in the zoning ordinances, which require an emphasis on such matter and primarily concern conduct, are much more limited than the terms of the public nuisance ordinance involved in Erznoznik, supra, which broadly prohibited scenes which could not be deemed inappropriate even for juveniles.
“The ordinance is not directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it otherwise limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a film containing a picture of a baby’s buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any other governmental interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” 422 U. S., at 213-214.
Moreover, unlike the ordinances in this case, the Erznoznik ordinance singled out movies “containing even the most fleeting and innocent glimpses of nudity . . . .” Id., at 214.
The Court’s opinion in Erznoznik presaged our holding today by noting that the presumption of statutory validity “has less force when a classification turns on the subject matter of expression.” Id., at 215. Respondents’ position is that the presumption has no force, or more precisely, that any classification based on subject matter is absolutely prohibited.