Dixon v. Love

Mr. Justice Stevens,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I believe it is important to point out that the Court has not rejected the constitutional analysis of the District Court. The District Court held that a driver’s license may not be revoked on the basis of an ex parte determination that certain facts “indicate . . . disrespect for the traffic laws.” This Court does not disagree. It merely holds that the District Court erred in its assumption that appellee’s license was revoked on the authority of the first sentence of Rule 6-206 (a)3 (1975),1 which the District Court construed to require such a determination.2

*117The Court interprets the Secretary’s action as resting on the second sentence of Rule 6-206 (a)3 which provides that a person’s license must be revoked if it has been suspended three times in 10 years. Appellee’s license had already been suspended twice. A third suspension would have been required under a different rule because appellee had three convictions in one year.3 Consequently, appellee’s license was subject to mandatory revocation, see ante, at 111 n. 8, and no prior hearing was necessary.

Rule 6-206 (a)3 provides:

“A person repeatedly involved in collisions or convictions to a degree which indicates the lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle, or whose record indicates disrespect for traffic laws and the safety of other persons on the highway, and who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant a second suspension within a 5 year period, may either be suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State, based upon the number of points in his record. A person who has been suspended thrice within a 10 year period shall be revoked.”

The District Court construed Rule 6-206 (a)3 as follows:

“The statute makes suspension or revocation' dependent on a determination of whether the driver’s repeated involvement in collisions or conviction of offenses indicates lack of ability to use due care or disrespect for the' traffic laws and the safety of others. The regulation makes suspension or revocation dependent both on such a determination and the accumulation of a given number of points, and even then the Secretary 'may’ but *117is not required to suspend or revoke the driver’s license. Only when a driver has been suspended thrice in a ten-year period is the Secretary’s action made mandatory.” App. 20.

Rule 6-206 (a)2 (1975) provides in pertinent part:

“A person who has been convicted of three (3) or more offenses against traffic regulations, governing the movement of vehicles, with the exception of those offenses excluded under provisions of Section 6-204 (2) and whose violations have occurred within a twelve (12) month period may be suspended as follows:
“Number of Points Action
20 to 44 Suspension up to 2 months
45 to 74 Suspension up to 3 months
75 to 89 Suspension up to 6 months
90 to 99 Suspension up to 9 months
100 to 109 Suspension up to 12 months
Over 110 Revocation for not less than 12 months.”

This rule can be fairly construed to leave the Secretary substantial discretion concerning only the length of the suspension. Moreover, this rule implements 111. Rev. Stat. c. 95%, §6-206 (a)(2) (1975), but the complaint does not challenge the constitutionality of that subsection; only § 206 (a) (3) is attacked.

The District Court noted that appellee had previously been “notified by letter that a further conviction would result in loss of his driving privileges.” App. 17.