delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., on October 30, 1974, against appellees Juan and Maria Hernandez, alleging that they had fraudulently concealed assets while applying for and receiving public assistance. Such conduct is a crime under Illinois law, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, § 11-21 (1973). The IDPA, however, proceeded civilly and sought only return of the money alleged to have been wrongfully *436received. The IDPA simultaneously instituted an attachment proceeding against appellees’ property. Pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 11 (1973) (Act), the IDPA filed an affidavit setting forth the nature and amount of the underlying claim and alleging that the appellees had obtained money from the IDPA by fraud.1 The writ of attachment was issued automatically2 by the clerk of the court upon receipt of this affidavit.3 The writ *437was then given to the sheriff who executed it, on November 5, 1974, on money belonging to appellees in a credit union. Appellees received notice of the attachment, freezing their money in the credit union, on November 8, 1974, when they received the writ, the complaint, and the affidavit in support of the writ. The writ indicated a return date for the attachment proceeding of November 18, 1974.4 Appellees appeared in court on November 18, 1974, and were informed that the matter would be continued until December 19, 1974. Appellees never filed an answer either to the attachment or to the underlying complaint.5 They did not seek a prompt hear*438ing, nor did they attempt to quash the attachment on the ground that the procedures surrounding its issuance rendered it and the Act unconstitutional. Instead appellees filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 2, 1974, seeking, inter alia, return of the attached money. The federal complaint alleged that the appellees’ property had been attached pursuant to the Act and that the Act was unconstitutional in that it provided for the deprivation of debtors’ property without due process of law. Appellees as plaintiffs sought to represent a class of those “who have had or may have their property attached without notice or hearing upon the creditor’s mere allegation of fraudulent conduct pursuant to the Illinois Attachment Act.” App. 6-7. They named as defendants appellants Trainor and O’Malley, officials of the IDPA, and sought declaration of a' defendant class made up of all the court clerks in the Circuit Courts of Illinois, and of another defendant class of all sheriffs in Illinois. They sought an injunction against Trainor and O’Malley forbidding them to seek attachments under the Act and an injunction against the clerks and sheriffs forbidding them to issue or serve writs of attachment under the Act. Appellees also sought preliminary relief in the form of an order directing the Sheriff of Cook County to release the property which had been attached. Finally, appellees sought the convening of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284.
The District Court declined to rule on the request for preliminary relief because the parties had agreed that one-half of the money in the credit union would be returned. A three-judge court was convened. It certified the suit as a plaintiff and defendant class action as appellees had requested. App. 63. In an opinion dated December 19, 1975, almost one year after the return date of the attachment in state court, it *439declined to dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975), stating:
“In Huffman, the State of Ohio proceeded under a statute which gave an exclusive right of action to the state. By contrast, the Illinois Attachment Act provides a cause of action for any person, public or private. It is mere happenstance that the State of Illinois was the petitioner in this attachment proceeding. It is likewise coincidental that the pending state proceedings may arguably be quasi-criminal in nature; under the Illinois Attachment Act, they need not be. These major distinctions preclude this Court from extending the principles of Younger, based on considerations of equity, comity and federalism, beyond the quasi-criminal situation set forth in Huffman.” Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 760 (1975).
Proceeding to the merits, it held §§ 1, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, and 14 of the Act to be “on [their face] patently violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 405 F. Supp., at 762. It ordered the clerk of the court and the Sheriff of Cook County to return to appellees the rest of their attached property; it enjoined all clerks and all sheriffs from issuing or serving attachment writs pursuant to the Act and ordered them to release any currently held attached property to its owner; and it enjoined appellants Trainor and O’Malley from authorizing applications for attachment writs pursuant to the Act. App. 65-66. Appellants appealed to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, claiming that under Younger and Huffman principles the District Court should have dismissed the suit without passing on the constitionality of the Act and that the Act is in any event constitutional.6 Since we agree with appellants that Younger and *440Huffman principles do apply here, we do not reach their second claim.
Because our federal and state legal systems have overlapping jurisdiction and responsibilities, we have frequently inquired into the proper role of a federal court, in a case pending before it and otherwise within its jurisdiction, when litigation between the same parties and raising the same issues is or apparently soon will be pending in a state court. • More precisely, when a suit is filed in a federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state law under the Federal Constitution and seeking to have state officers enjoined from enforcing it, should the federal court proceed to judgment when it appears that the State has already instituted proceedings in the state court to enforce the challenged statute against the federal plaintiff and the latter could tender and have his federal claims decided in the state court?
Younger v. Harris, supra, and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), addressed, these questions where the already pending state proceeding was a criminal prosecution and the federal plaintiff sought to invalidate the statute under which the state prosecution was brought. In these circumstances, the Court ruled that the Federal District Court should issue neither a declaratory judgment nor an injunction but should dismiss the case. The first justification the Court gave for this rule was simply the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not *441suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Younger v. Harris, supra, at 43-44.
Beyond the accepted rule that equity will ordinarily not enjoin the prosecution of a crime, however, the Court voiced a “more vital consideration,” 401 U. S., at 44, namely, that in a Union where both the States and the Federal Government are sovereign entities, there are basic concerns of federalism which counsel against interference by federal courts, through injunctions or otherwise, with legitimate state functions, particularly with the operation of state courts. Relying on cases that declared that courts of equity should give “scrupulous regard [to] the rightful independence of state governments,” Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45, 50 (1941), the Court held, that in this intergovernmental context, the two classic preconditions for the exercise of equity jurisdiction assumed new dimensions. Although the existence of an adequate remedy at law barring equitable relief normally would be determined by inquiring into the remedies available in the federal rather than in the state courts, Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297 (1943), here the inquiry was to be broadened to focus on the remedies available in the pending state proceeding. “ 'The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.’ ” Younger v. Harris, supra, at 45, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 243-244 (1926). Dismissal of the federal suit “naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577 (1973). “The policy of equitable restraint ... is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 124 (1975).
*442The Court also concluded that the other precondition for equitable relief — irreparable injury — would not be satisfied unless the threatened injury was both great and immediate. The burden of conducting a defense in the criminal prosecution was not sufficient to warrant interference by the federal courts with legitimate state efforts to enforce state laws; only extraordinary circumstances would suffice.7 As the *443Court later explained, to restrain a state proceeding that afforded an adequate vehicle for vindicating the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights “would entail an unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the federal courts” to safeguard constitutional rights and would “reflec[t] negatively upon the state court’s ability” to do so. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 460-461, 462 (1974). The State would be prevented not only from “effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 604.
Huffman involved the propriety of a federal injunction against the execution of a judgment entered in a pending state-court suit brought by the State to enforce a nuisance statute. Although the state suit was a civil rather than a criminal proceeding, Younger principles were held to require dismissal of the federal suit. Noting that the State was a party to the nuisance proceeding and that the nuisance statute was “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes,” the Court concluded that a federal injunction would be “an offense to the State’s interest in the nuisance litigation [which] is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.” 420 U. S.,“ at 604. Thus, while the traditional maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution strictly speaking did not apply to the nuisance proceeding in Huffman, the “ 'more vital consideration’ ” of comity, id., at 601, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 44, counseled restraint as strongly in the context of the pending state civil enforcement action as in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. In these circumstances, it was proper that the federal court stay its hand.
We have recently applied the analysis of Huffman to proceedings similar to state civil enforcement actions — judicial *444contempt proceedings. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977). The Court again stressed the “more vital consideration” of comity underlying the Younger doctrine and held that the state interest in vindicating the regular operation of its judicial system through the contempt process — whether that process was labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal — was sufficiently important to preclude federal injunctive relief unless Younger standards were met.
These cases control here. An action against appellees was pending in state court when they filed their federal suit. The state action was a suit by the State to recover from appellees welfare payments that allegedly had been fraudulently obtained. The writ of attachment issued as part of that action. The District Court thought that Younger policies were irrelevant because suits to recover money and writs of attachment were available to private parties as well as the State; it was only because of the coincidence that the State was a party that the suit was “arguably” in aid of the criminal law. But the fact remains that the State was a party to the suit in its role of administering its public-assistance programs. Both the suit and the accompanying writ of attachment were brought to vindicate important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those programs. The state authorities also had the option of vindicating these policies through criminal prosecutions. See supra, at 435. Although, as in Juidice, the State’s interest here is “[pjerhaps . . . not quite as important as is the State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws ... or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding 430 U. S., at 335, the principles of Younger and Huffman are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity.8
*445For a federal court to proceed with its case rather than to remit appellees to their remedies in a pending state enforcement suit would confront the State with a choice of engaging in duplicative litigation, thereby risking a temporary federal injunction, or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court at some unknown time in the future. It would also foreclose the opportunity of the state court to construe the challenged statute in the face of the actual federal constitutional challenges that would also be pending for decision before it, a privilege not wholly shared by the federal courts. Of course, in the case before us the *446state statute was invalidated and a federal injunction prohibited state officers from using or enforcing the attachment statute for any purpose. The eviscerating impact on many state enforcement actions is readily apparent.9 This disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign capacity, when combined with the negative reflection' on the State’s ability to adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, leads us to the conclusion that the interests of comity and federalism on which Younger and Samuels v. Mackell primarily rest apply in full force here. The pendency of the state-court action called for restraint by the federal court and for the dismissal of appellees’ complaint unless extraordinary circumstances-were present warranting federal interference or unless their state remedies were inadequate to litigate their federal due process claim.
No extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable relief were present here. There is no suggestion that the pending state action was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing appellees. It is urged that this case comes within the exception that we said in Younger might exist where a *447state statute is “ ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.’ ” 401 U. S., at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 402 (1941). Even if such a finding was made below, which'we doubt (see supra, at 439), it would not have been warranted in light of our cases. Compare North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975), with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974).
As for whether appellees could have presented their federal due process challenge to the attachment statute in the pending state proceeding, that question, if presented below, was not addressed by the District Court, which placed its rejection of Younger and Huffman on broader grounds. The issue is heavily laden with local law, and we do not rule on it here in the first instance.10
The grounds on which the District Court refused to apply the principles of Younger and Huffman were infirm; it was therefore error, on those grounds, to entertain the action on behalf of either the named or the unnamed plaintiffs and to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the Illinois attachment statute.11
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded *448to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart substantially agrees with the views expressed in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens. Accordingly, he respectfully dissents from the opinion and judgment of the Court.Under § 1 of the Act, a writ will issue only upon allegation in the affidavit of one of the following nine grounds:
“First: Where the debtor is not a resident of this State.
“Second: When the debtor conceals himself or stands in defiance of an officer, so that process cannot be served upon him.
“Third: Where the debtor has departed from this State with the intention of having his effects removed from this State.
“Fourth: Where the debtor is about to depart from this State with the intention of having his effects removed from this State.
“Fifth: Where the debtor is about to remove his property from this State to the injury of such creditor.
“Sixth: Where the debtor has within 2 years preceding the filing of the affidavit required, fraudulently conveyed or assigned his effects, or a part thereof, so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Seventh: Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the filing of such affidavit, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his property so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Eighth: Where the debtor is about fraudulently to conceal, assign, or otherwise dispose of his property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
“Ninth: Where the debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on the part of the debtor: Provided, the statements of the debtor, his agent or attorney, which constitute the fraud, shall have been reduced to writing, and his signature attached thereto, by himself, agent or attorney.”
Under § 2 of the Act, in eases sounding in tort the writ is. not issued until a judge has examined the plaintiff under oath and determined that the damages suffered exceed the amount of the attachment.
Section 2 of the Act provides in part:
“2. Affidavit — Statement—Examination under oath. § 2. To entitle a creditor to such a writ of attachment, he or his agent or attorney shall make and file with the clerk of the circuit court, an affidavit setting forth *437the nature and amount of the claim, so far as practicable, after allowing all just credits and set-offs, and any one or more of the causes mentioned in section 1, and also stating the place of residence of the defendants, if known, and if not known, that upon diligent inquiry the affiant has not been able to ascertain the same together with a written statement, either embodied in such affidavit or separately in writing, executed by the attorney or attorneys representing the creditor, to the effect that the attachment action invoked by such affidavit does or does not sound in tort, also a designation of the return day for the summons to be issued in said action.”
Since the State was a party, the normal requirement that the plaintiff post a bond in an amount equal to twice the amount sued for, did not apply and no bond was posted. See § 4a of the Act.
Section 6 of the Act provides:
“The writ of attachment required in the preceding section shall be directed to the sheriff (and, for purpose only of service of summons, to any person authorized to serve writs of summons), or in case the sheriff is interested, or otherwise disqualified or prevented from acting, to the coroner of the county in which the suit is commenced, and shall be made returnable on a return day designated by the plaintiff, which day shall not be less than ten days or more than sixty days after its date.”
Section 27 of the Act provides:
“The defendant may answer, traversing the facts stated in the affidavit upon which the attachment issued, which answer shall be verified by affidavit; and if, upon the trial thereon, the issue shall be found for the plaintiff, the defendant may answer the complaint or file a motion directed thereto as in other cases, but if found for the defendant, the attachment shall be quashed, and the costs of the attachment shall be adjudged against *438the plaintiff, but the suit shall proceed to final judgment as though commenced by summons.”
Appellees argue that the sheriffs and clerks have .not perfected their appeals and that the IDPA officials cannot litigate in connection with *440their appeals the validity of the injunction directing the clerk of the court to return appellees’ property in the credit union. The argument is merit-less. The IDPA officials were parties below; the order directing the clerk to return the property attached for the benefit of IDPA affects their interests in a vital way; and their ability to obtain review of such an order cannot depend on whether the clerk — over whom IDPA has no control— chooses to perfect his appeal.
See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 124-125 (1975):
“Although the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution alone do not constitute ‘irreparable injury’ in the ‘special legal sense of that term,’ [Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.,] at 46, the Court in Younger left room for federal equitable intervention in a state criminal trial where there is a showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘harassment’ by state officials responsible for the prosecution, id., at 54, where the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is ' “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,”’ id., at 53, or where there exist other ‘extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.’ Ibid. In the companion case of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, the Court explained that ‘[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.’ Id., at 85. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 230-231.
“The policy of equitable restraint expressed in Younger v. Harris, in short, is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 460. Only if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ render the state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process. The very nature of ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings. [Footnote omitted.] But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an 'extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation.”
Title 28 U. S. C. §2283 provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as *445expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The section is not applicable here because this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action is an express statutory exception to its application, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972); but it is significant for present purposes that the section does not discriminate between civil and criminal proceedings pending in state courts. Furthermore, 28 U. S. C. § 1341 provides that district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the levy or collection of any tax under state law where there are adequate remedies available in state tribunals.
Prior cases in this Court that at the time counseled restraint in actions seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing state statutes or implementing public policies, did not necessarily distinguish between the type of proceedings — civil or criminal- — pending or contemplated by state officers. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U. S. 381, 384-385 (1961); Allegheny County v. Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 189-190 (1959); Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 349-350 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 317-318 (1943); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-298 (1943); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 494-495 (1942); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 400-401 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45, 49-50 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95-97 (1935); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 (1935); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 60-61 (1933); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525-526 (1932); Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525, 527 (1926); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 243 (1926).
As in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 336 n. 13 (1977), we have no occasion to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation.
Appellees argue that the injunction issued below in no way interfered with a pending state case. They point to the fact that only the attachment proceeding was interfered with — the underlying fraud action may continue unimpeded — and claim that the attachment proceeding is not a court proceeding within the doctrine of Younger and Huffman. In this regard they rely on Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). None of these cases control here.
In this case the attachment was issued by a court clerk and is very much a part of the underlying action for fraud. Moreover, the attachment in this case contained- a return date on which the parties were to appear in court and at which time the appellees would have had an opportunity to contest the validity of the attachment. Thus the attachment proceeding was “pending” in the state courts within the Younger and Huffman doctrine at the time of the federal suit.
The parties are in disagreement on this issue, the State squarely asserting, and the appellees denying, that the federal due process claim could have been presented and decided in the pending attachment proceeding. Mr. Justice Stevens, in dissent, offers additional reasons — not relied on by appellees and not addressed by the State — for concluding that the state suit did not offer an adequate forum for litigating the federal claim. We do not resolve these conflicting views.
Appellees have argued here that the relief granted in favor of other class members is not barred by Younger and Huffman because state cases were not pending against some of them. Since the class should never have been certified, we need not address this argument.