concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. In so doing, I want to make plain that I read the opinion as signaling no retreat from a cardinal principle of double jeopardy law: A criminal defendant possesses a “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 689 (1949), and the trial judge is obligated to take reasonable action in protection of this right, United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 485-486 (1971) (plurality opinion). In the present case I agree with the Court that the conduct of the prosecutor *35did not constitute unfair overreaching, and the conduct of the District Court was “entirely reasonable” in proceeding with the trial and ruling on petitioner’s motion after further study. Although jeopardy had not officially attached, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the information appeared so late in the day — during the opening statements — as virtually to guarantee that the trial judge would act as he did. This is especially true in the case of a challenge to an information charging an assimilated crime, for prudence might well counsel a federal judge’s delaying any ruling pending further study. Certainly in this case the District Court cannot be faulted for failing to foresee that defendant’s legal contention would be so easily resolved. While a continuance of the trial would have been a possibility if sought by petitioner or even on the court’s own motion, I agree that the trial judge performed reasonably in not sua sponte stopping a trial in the middle of the opening statements and before any evidence was taken.
I emphasize, however, that an entirely different case would be presented if the petitioner had afforded the trial judge ample opportunity to rule on his motion prior to trial, and the court, in failing to take advantage of this opportunity, permitted the attachment of jeopardy before ordering the dismissal of the information. In such a circumstance, the court’s action or inaction would effectively deprive petitioner of his “valued right” to receive a factual determination from the first empaneled factfinder and would subject a defendant to the “embarrassment, expense and ordeal” of a needless trial, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187 (1957). Even if the defendant renews his motion at trial, it would not be accurate in such a situation to argue that the defense has made the choice to forgo the right of presenting its case to the first factfinder in order to attain a beneficial legal ruling. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600 (1976); United States v. Jorn, supra, at 485. On the contrary, the defendant placed in this predicament by the trial judge would have done *36everything in his power to receive a fair adjudication of his legal claims without compromising his right to proceed with the first factfinder. Honoring his double jeopardy claim thus not only is in keeping with the policies and interests served by the Clause, but also would further the cause of efficient judicial administration by encouraging defendants to present, and judges to rule, on legal claims prior to the clamor and heat of trial.