concurring in the judgment.
Twelve years ago this Court decided Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). In the intervening years, we have struggled with the question of retroactivity when new constitutional rules affecting the administration of the criminal law have been adopted. See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1557, 1558-1596 (1975). The retroactivity doctrine that has emerged is far from satisfactory. Although on several occasions I have joined in its application, I am now persuaded that it would be wiser to adopt the view urged by Mr. Justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (separate opinion). See also Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256-269 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Williams *247v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 666-666 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
When the Court declines to hold a new constitutional rule retroactive, one chance beneficiary- — the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new principle — enjoys retroactive application, while others similarly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old doctrine. This hardly comports with the ideal of “administration of justice with an even hand.” Desist v. United States, supra, at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting).1
On the other hand, the holding that a new constitutional principle is fully retroactive also may result in serious costs. Convictions long regarded as final must be reconsidered on collateral attack; frequently they must be overturned for reasons unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and in spite of good-faith adherence on the part of police, prosecutors, and courts to what they understood to be acceptable procedures. Society suffers either the burden on judicial and prosecutorial resources entailed in retrial or the miscarriage of justice that occurs when a guilty offender is set free only because effective retrial is impossible years after the offense. Reopening a case also carries disadvantages for those who have been convicted:
“Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
*248See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
A different approach to the retroactivity question is available. Described in detail in Mr. Justice Harlan’s separate opinion in Mackey, supra, it contemplates, in rough outline, that courts apply a new rule retroactively in cases still pending on direct review, whereas cases on collateral review ordinarily would be considered in light of the rule as it stood when the conviction became final.2 Mr. Justice Harlan marshaled compellingly the reasoning supporting this view, 401 U. S., at 675-698, and for me to repeat the arguments here would be pointless. I note simply that this approach is closer to the ideal of principled, evenhanded judicial review than is the traditional retroactivity doctrine. At the same time it is more attuned to the historical limitations on habeas corpus, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), and to the importance of finality in a rational system of justice. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U. S. 63, 83 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
The case before us is here on direct review. I therefore agree with the Court that Hankerson is entitled to retroactive application of the Mullaney rule. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
In addition, as Mr. Justice Harlan noted, the typical nonretroactivity decision often places the Court in the role of a legislature rather than that of a judicial tribunal. Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S., at 677-681.
Mr. Justice Harlan described two exceptions under which a new rule occasionally would be applied retroactively even on collateral review. Id., at 692-695. The case he makes for these exceptions is persuasive, but I save for another day when the question is squarely presented a decision on when such exceptions are appropriate. See also Williams v. United States, 401 U. S., at 666 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).