with whom Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
The regulation under review in this case, 45 CFR § 233.100 (a)(1) (1976), provides that for purposes of the AFDC-UF program, the definition of unemployment need not include, “at the option of the State,” a father whose unemployment results from a labor dispute or some conduct that would disqualify him under the State’s unemployment compensation law. (Emphasis added.) The Court today sustains this regulation notwithstanding its recognition that “a major purpose of the 1968 amendment was to retract some of the authority previously delegated to the States under §407 (a).” Ante, at 430. The Court reasons, without citation to legislative authority, that “the goal of greater uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each State.” Ante, at 431. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the legislative history reflects a congressional intent to achieve merely “greater uniformity” in the definition of unemployment; the legislative record plainly reveals that Congress contemplated a federal definition of unemployment applicable to all States that adopt the AFDC-UF program. Since I do not believe that the subject regulation conforms to this *433congressional mandate, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court acknowledges that the legislative history is “at some variance” with its position. Ante, at 430. This understates the case; literally all of the relevant legislative history repeatedly and unequivocally affirms the strong congressional objective of creating a federal definition of unemployment. It is common ground that Congress changed the wording of § 407 (a) from “unemployment (as defined by the State)” to “unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary)” for the express purpose of “eliminat[ing] the variations in state definitions of unemployment.” Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 719 (1975). But the Court would have us believe that the statute nevertheless contemplates a regulation leaving it completely within state discretion whether to cover those not working by reason of labor disputes or because of discharge for cause.* In my view, this is flatly contrary to the *434thrust of the legislative history, which bears some recitation.
In the Senate, most of the work on the 1968 amendments was done by the Finance Committee. That Committee reported that the bill would:
“(e) modify the optional unemployed fathers program to provide for a uniform definition of unemployment throughout the United States.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967) (emphasis added).
“A major characteristic of the existing law is the authority left to the States to define ‘unemployment.’ The committee believes that this has worked to the detriment of the program because of the wide variation in the definitions used by the States. In some instances, the definitions have been very narrow so that only a few people have been helped. In other States, the definitions have been relatively broad. The committee bill is designed to correct this situation and to make other improvements in the program.
“The amendments proposed by the committee would authorize a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary . . . .” Id., at 160 (emphasis added).
The Ways and Means Committee, which carried the legislation in the House, adopted the same view:
“Under present law . . . [t]he definition of unemployment is left up to the individual States. Under the bill. .. the definition of unemployment would be made by the Federal Government.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1967) (emphasis added).
See also id., at 3, 108 (using language almost identical to that adopted by the Senate Finance Committee, S. Rep. No. 744, supra, at 3-4, 160).
The Undersecretary of HEW, Wilbur J. Cohen, expressed his Department’s view that the new legislation would require a uniform national standard:
“Today, 22 States have programs to assist [children *435who are needy because their fathers are unemployed]. But the differences between State programs are great. States may define unemployment as narrowly or broadly as they wish, requiring substantial previous work experience or no work experience. This variation in definition of unemployment is shown clearly by three adjacent Southwestern States, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado. Each of these States has a population of between 1 and 2 million, yet in Arizona only 19 families of unemployed parents received AFDC in May, while during the same month there were 880 in Utah and 1,600 in Colorado. Arizona’s narrow definition of unemployment has kept its program to a token level.
“The House bill continues to allow States to choose whether they will include dependent children of unemployed parents under AFDC. But for the first time the House will set a Federal definition of unemployment. We are in complete agreement that there should be a Federal definition of unemployment established by the Congress and the Secretary.” Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 268 (1967) (emphasis added).
The members of the Senate Finance Committee expressed no doubt as to the meaning of the Undersecretary’s remarks: “Senator Williams: I notice you say you are in complete agreement that there should be a Federal definition of unemployment.” Id., at 269 (emphasis added).
Finally, after the enactment of the 1968 amendments, the Senate Finance Committee was unequivocal in summing up the amendments to the unemployed fathers provisions: “The amendments provide for a Federal definition of unemployment for States which have AFDC-UF programs.” Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Social Security Amendments of 1967 — Pub. L. 248, Brief Summary of Major Provisions and Detailed Comparison with *436Prior Law 3 (July 15, 1968) (emphasis added). See also id., at 63 (“Unemployment will be defined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare”); 113 Cong. Rec. 23054 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Mills) (“[W]e found . . . that the fact that the definition of unemployment is left to the States has had unfortunate results. . . . The Bill would correct this situation”); id., at 32592 (remarks of Sen. Long) (“[T]here would be a Federal definition of 'unemployment’ ”); id., at 36373-36374 (“[T]he Secretary will prescribe standards for the determination of what constitutes unemployment. The term is defined by the States under present law”); Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Summary of Social Security Amendments of 1967, p. 17 (Comm. Print 1967) (“[T]he Secretary will prescribe standards for the determination of what constitutes unemployment”).
Unlike the majority, I have no doubt that the legislative history means what it says and confines the regulatory authority of the Secretary; by amending §407 (a) to place the responsibility for defining unemployment on the Secretary, Congress intended to establish “a uniform definition of unemployment throughout the United States.” S. Rep. No. 744, supra, at 4; H. R. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 3. While I agree with the majority that this Court should defer to any reasonable definition given by the Secretary to the term “unemployment,” I cannot agree, in light of the legislative history, that the Secretary may simply delegate the responsibility for defining that term to the States, for in important respects this would simply return the law to the situation existing prior to the amendment defining that term to the States. Here, the Secretary has promulgated a regulation describing a rather broad category of individuals who may be eligible for AFDC-UF benefits but has then permitted the States to include or exclude those individuals from eligibility “at the option of the State.” *437Contrary to the obvious intent of Congress, this leaves to state discretion the coverage of important categories of claimants and invites the very diversity in coverage that the 1968 amendment -was designed to prevent. I cannot believe that this regulation conforms to the statutory purpose. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court appears to believe that the statutory language supports its view that the States are still free to define the eligibility criteria for AFDC-UF benefits; but the statute provides that “unemployment” will be “determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,” not the States. (Emphasis added.) The Court concludes that the statutory language contemplates that unemployment will be “determined” by the States and that only the “standards” will be determined by the Secretary. The majority suggests that if Congress had intended for the Secretary to define unemployment, it would have used the words “unemployment (as defined by the Secretary).” The Court’s paper-thin distinction between “determining” unemployment and prescribing “standards” totally escapes me. Moreover, according to the Court’s logic, if Congress had intended the meaning suggested by the majority, it would have provided that unemployment would be “determined by the States in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Secretary”; instead, Congress eliminated all references to the States. The commonsense meaning of the statutory language is that “unemployment” is to be defined by the Secretary, and as we shall see, the statute is susceptible of no other interpretation when read in the context of the legislative history.