with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
The Court holds today that an Attorney General's failure to object within 60 days to the implementation of a voting law that has been submitted to him under § 5 of the Voting *508Rights Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. Y), cannot be questioned in any court. Under the Court’s ruling, it matters not whether the Attorney General fails to object because he misunderstands his legal duty, as in this case; because he loses the submission; or because he seeks to subvert the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, the Court today grants unreviewable discretion to a future Attorney General to bargain acquiescence in a discriminatory change in a covered State’s voting laws in return for that State’s electoral votes.1 Cf. J. Randall & D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction 678-701 (2d ed. 1961) (settlement of the election of 1876).
Common sense proclaims the error of this result. It is simply implausible that Congress, which devoted unusual attention to this Act in recognition of its stringency and importance, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-309 (1966), intended to allow the Act’s primary enforce*509ment mechanism to be vitiated at the whim of an Attorney General. Legal analysis supports the conclusion that Congress did no such thing. But today, the majority puts aside both common sense and legal analysis, relying instead on fiat. I dissent.
I
A
1 agree with the majority that the dispositive issue in this case is whether Congress has precluded all judicial review of the Attorney General’s failure to enter an objection to implementation of a state statute submitted to him for review under § 5.2 And, as the majority notes, it is indeed “well settled that ‘judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.’ ” Ante, at 501, quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967). If the Court applied rather than merely acknowledged this standard, the judgment below would be reversed.
The Voting Rights Act does not explicitly preclude review of the Attorney General’s actions under § 5. The absence *510of such a provision places on appellees “the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of [the Attorney General’s] decision [s].” Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975). The normal “strong” presumption is strengthened still further in this case by the express prohibition, contained in § 4 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b), of judicial review of the Attorney General’s determinations under that section as to which States are covered by the Act.3 If the Congress that wrote § 4 had also intended to preclude review of the same officer’s actions under § 5, it would certainly have said so. The Court makes no effort to explain why the congressional silence in § 5 should be treated as the equivalent of the congressional statement in § 4.
Not only is there nothing in § 5 precluding review, there is also, as the Court admits, “no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewability of the Attorney General’s actions under § 5.” Ante, at 503. Thus, all the Court offers in support of its conclusion that the strengthened presumption of reviewability should be disregarded in this case is an inference that review must be foreclosed to serve the assertedly primary congressional purpose of limiting the time during which covered States are prevented from implementing new legislation. That inference is purportedly drawn from an inquiry into “the role played by the Attorney General within 'the context of the entire legislative scheme.’ ” Ante, at 501, quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 141. In fact, however, the Court completely ignores the Attorney General; the majority’s version of § 5 requires a covered State to submit its statutes to a mailing address at the Department of Justice and to wait for 60 days before implementing *511the submitted laws, but it does not impose any duties on the Attorney General. The time limit on the Attorney General’s action, and not any requirement that he review submitted laws for compliance with the Voting Rights Act is, according to the Court, the key aspect of the part of § 5 with which we are concerned.
We have previously taken a much different view of § 5. Just four years ago, in Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973), we were required to consider the Attorney General’s role in § 5. We recognized that in doing so,
“it is important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the Attorney General ‘merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.’ Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. [544,] 549.” 411 U. S., at 538 (emphasis added).
Because the provision for submission to the Attorney General was meant only to ameliorate and not to change the “essential” burden of § 5, we upheld regulations that deferred the beginning of the 60-day review period created by the Act until a submission satisfied certain criteria. We noted that “[t]he judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult and complex one,” 411 U. S., at 540 (emphasis added), and that if he could not await complete information, “his only plausible response to an inadequate or incomplete submission would be simply to object to it.” 4 Ibid. We also upheld *512the Attorney General’s placement of the burden of proof on States submitting legislation for approval, because
“[a]ny less stringent standard might well have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure a dead letter by making available to covered States a far smoother path to clearance.” Id., at 538.
In contrast to today’s ruling, we held that providing such a path was not the function of the proviso to § 5 which established clearance by the Attorney General as an alternative to the declaratory judgment action.
Our description in Georgia v. United States of the very limited function of the proviso supports the conclusion that the Attorney General should respond to a submitted statute as would the District Court for the District of Columbia if the State brought a declaratory judgment action seeking approval of that statute. The regulation approved by the Court in Georgia v. United States explicitly imposes that obligation on the Attorney General. 28 CFR § 51.19 (1976).5 Moreover, the regulation also specifies the actions the Attorney General must take:
“If the Attorney General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General *513determines that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of proof [on the State] applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting authority.” Ibid.
This validly adopted regulation, which clearly requires the Attorney General to enter an objection unless he determines the submitted legislation has neither the proscribed purpose nor the forbidden effect, is binding on the Attorney General. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 695-696 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954).
Thus, both the statute and the regulation impose on the Attorney General a duty to review submitted statutes and disapprove them unless he is satisfied that they meet the standards established by the Act. It is undisputed in this case that the Attorney General, after reviewing the reapportionment legislation submitted by South Carolina, was unable to make that determination.6 It was, therefore, his duty to *514object to implementation of that legislation. He did not perform that duty,7 deferring instead to a District Court judgment that the majority concedes should not have been entered.8
The majority holds that this failure is insulated from judicial review under the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act expressly designed for such defaults, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (l),9 for one reason only: The statute contains a deadline within which the Attorney General must act. This holding that the existence of a deadline for the performance of an administrative duty is a “persuasive reason” to believe that failure to perform that duty cannot be reviewed is unique among our decisions.10 I trust it will remain unique. Nothing *515in the existence of a deadline for the performance of an administrative duty provides persuasive reason — or indeed any reason at all — to believe that failure to perform that duty cannot be reviewed.11 The illogic of the Court’s argument transmogrifies a deadline for action into an impenetrable shield for inaction.
B
The Court’s conclusion is not only inconsistent with our description of § 5 in Georgia v. United States, it is also flatly inconsistent with our holding in that case. For in Georgia v. United States, we reviewed the standard by which the Attorney General determined to object to implementation of a submitted statute. The majority approved of the standard, and the dissenters objected to it,12 but the Court unanimously *516rejected the Government's argument that the propriety of the objection was “outside the permissible scope of judicial inquiry.” Brief for United States in Georgia v. United States, O. T. 1972, No. 72-75, p. 38.
The Court simply ignores this glaring contradiction between our action in Georgia v. United States and its holding today. Since the Court does not overrule Georgia v. United States, I can only conclude that the law now allows review of the Attorney General's decision to object to implementation of a statute, but it does not allow review of his failure to object.13 I can find no support for such a bizarre rule. I am sure that others, especially members of the Congress whose intent the Court is supposedly following, will be equally baffled.
II
Perhaps out of justifiable embarrassment, the majority never mentions the effect of its ruling. That effect is easy to describe: The Court today upholds a system of choosing members of the South Carolina Senate that has prevented the election of any black senators, despite the fact that 25% of South Carolina's population is black.14 Thus, South Caro*517lina, which was a leader of the movement to deprive the former slaves of their federally guaranteed right to vote, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310-311, and n. 9, 333-334, is allowed to remain as one of the last successful members of that movement. It would take much more evidence than the Court can muster to convince me that this result is consistent with “Congress’ firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” Id., at 315. Certainly the Court has failed to identify “ ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ ” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 141, that this result is compelled by the Act Congress passed to implement that intention.
It is true that today’s decision does not quite spell the end of all hope that the South Carolina Senate will someday be representative of the entire citizenry of South Carolina. If the Decennial Census in 1980 requires substantial reapportionment, and if the Voting Rights Act is still in effect when that reapportionment takes place, and if the then Attorney General is conscientious, the devices approved today will be rejected under the strict standards of § 5. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S., at 531. But see Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). This highly contingent possibility that the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment will be realized in South Carolina, some 110 years after that Amendment was ratified, is apparently sufficient in the eyes of the majority. It is not sufficient for me, as it was not for Congress, which wrote the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to put an end to what was then “nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 337.
"QUESTION: I thought it was your position that even if he [the Attorney General] had said, we’re interposing no objection because South Carolina voted Republican at the last election, that even that wouldn’t be reviewable.
“[Counsel]: We think—
“QUESTION: Isn’t that your position in its ultimate effect?
“[Counsel]: If that were his objection, we would be quite confident in coming to the District Court of the District of Columbia ourselves, if he had objected on that basis.
“QUESTION: No, I said, he didn’t object; he says, we’re interposing no objection because your state voted right at the last election. Now what if he did that? Would that be reviewable? In your submission, it would not be; isn’t that correct?
“ [Counsel]: It would not — it would not fall within the kind of review being sought here.
“QUESTION: Exactly.
“[Counsel]: I don’t think we want to go so far as to say that what the Attorney General—
“QUESTION: Well, your argument does go, and necessarily goes that far, as I understand it; and I don’t find that shocking.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53.
The court below, in addition to finding that Congress had barred review, held that the Attorney General’s actions under § 5 are not reviewable because they are not “adjudicatory” and because objecting voters have an adequate remedy in their right to challenge the constitutionality of state laws to which the Attorney General has failed to object. The court also concluded that the possibility of bringing a constitutional action prevents voters from attaining the status of persons “adversely affected or aggrieved,” 5 U. S. C. § 702, by the Attorney General’s failure to object. 425 F. Supp. 331, 337-339.
I take the majority to have rejected these holdings, since the Court would not need to consider whether Congress had precluded review if it agreed with the District Court that appellants did not have standing or that the failure to object is not a reviewable agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 704. Since the majority rejects these holdings, I merely note that in my view, these alternative holdings of the District Court are patently erroneous.
This explicit statutory preclusion was decisive in Briscoe v. Bell, ante, p. 404. The conclusion in that case that review is precluded when Congress says so obviously does not support the conclusion that review is also precluded when Congress has not said so.
Under today’s holding, of course, the Attorney General is now granted license to make the entirely “implausible” response of failing to enter an objection no matter how incomplete or inadequate the State’s submission may be.
Curiously, the Court never mentions this regulation. The portion of the regulation not quoted in text reads as follows:
“Section 5, in providing for submission to the Attorney General as an alternative to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General what is essentially a judicial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General shall base his decision on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant information provided by individuals or groups, and the results of any investigation conducted by the Department of Justice.”
As the majority notes, the Attorney General objected to Act 932 because of the combination of multimember districts, numbered posts, and a majority-runoff requirement. Ante, at 495, and n. 4. The same objectionable features are contained in the senate reapportionment plan of Act 1205. The Attorney General did not object to that plan solely because he felt “constrained to defer” to the holding in Twiggs v. West, Civ. No. 71-1106 (SC, Apr. 7, 1972), that the aspects of the reapportionment plan to which he had objected did not establish a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment because they were not racially motivated. Ante, at 496-497. That the Attorney General nevertheless maintained his belief that these features are inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act is shown by his simultaneous action in objecting to their extension to all other multimember *514districts in the State. App. 47. The Attorney General felt himself free to enter that objection because the Twiggs court had approved only the legislation relating to the Senate. See also App. to Brief for Appellants 4a (memorandum submitted by Attorney General to court in Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (DC 1973), reiterating that Act 1205 would be objectionable but for the holding in Twiggs v. West, supra); App. 51 (letter from Assistant Attorney General indicating that on behalf of the Attorney General he would have objected to Act 1205 but for the decision in Twiggs).
The majority halfheartedly argues that the Attorney General did not relinquish his responsibility because it is clear that he reviewed Act 1205 and decided not to enter an objection to its implementation. Ante, at 507 n. 24. But it is clear, see n. 6, supra, that the only decision made by the Attorney General was the decision to defer to the views of the District Court in Twiggs v. West, supra. The Attorney General did not perform the duty imposed on him by the statute and his own regulations, which was to evaluate Act 1205 and enter an objection to it unless he was satisfied that it met the criteria of the Voting Rights Act.
See ante, at 495-496. See also United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U. S. 642 (1977); Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975).
“The reviewing court shall—
“(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), we held reviewable the Secretary of Labor’s decision not to challenge the validity of a union *515election under 29 U. S. C. § 482. Section 482, like § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, contains a 60-day deadline.
The majority’s argument appears to be that review would defeat the congressional purpose of providing a speedier way than the declaratory judgment action for States to gain permission to implement new voting laws. Of course, this concern would only be relevant if it were necessarily true that the State could not implement the new law between the expiration of the 60-day period and the final judicial determination requiring the Attorney General to re-examine the statute. As this case illustrates, allowing review is not the same as requiring suspension of the challenged law until the review of the Attorney General’s action has been completed.
My Brother White protested:
“Surely, objections by the Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that he had not been persuaded that a proposed change in election procedures would not have the forbidden discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good-faith consideration to § 5 submissions and, within 60 days after receiving all information he deemed necessary, to make up his mind as to *516whether the 'proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect, and if it did, to object thereto.” 411 U. S., at 543 (emphasis added).
Under the majority's holding today, of course, failure to object for any of the reasons my Brother considered clearly invalid would not be subject to judicial correction.
But cf. ante, at 505 n. 21 and 507 n. 24.
The majority argues that preclusion of review is consistent with the congressional purpose because even if one or two bad laws slip by the Attorney General, the requirement that the laws be submitted to him will result in the interception of most discriminatory legislation. Ante, at 506-507. The effect of today’s ruling, which allows South Carolina to keep its senate closed to blacks, demonstrates the fatuousness of this quantitative argument. Moreover, the Voting Rights Act, as restructured by the Court, now imposes no enforceable restraint on an Attorney General’s decision not to object to any discriminatory laws.