dissenting.
The question whether a trial judge has properly exercised his discretion in releasing copies of trial exhibits arises infrequently. It is essentially a quéstion to be answered by refer*614ence to the circumstances of a particular case. Only an egregious abuse of discretion should merit reversal; and when the District Court1 and the Court of Appeals2 have concurred, *615the burden of justifying review by this Court should be virtually insurmountable. Today’s decision represents a dramatic departure from the practice appellate courts should observe with respect to a trial court’s exercise of discretion concerning its own housekeeping practices.
There is, of course, an important and legitimate public interest in protecting the dignity of the Presidency, and petitioner has a real interest in avoiding the harm associated with further publication of his taped conversations. These interests are largely eviscerated, however, by the fact that these trial exhibits are already entirely in the public domain. Moreover, the normal presumption in favor of access is *616strongly reinforced by the special characteristics of this litigation. The conduct of the trial itself, as well as the conduct disclosed by the evidence, is a subject of great historical interest. Full understanding of this matter may affect the future operation of our institutions. The distinguished trial judge, who was intimately familiar with the ramifications of this case and its place in history, surely struck the correct balance.
Today the Court overturns the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals by giving conclusive weight to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 88 Stat. 1695.3 That Act, far from requiring the District Court to suppress these tapes, manifests Congress’ settled resolve “to provide as much public access to the materials as is physically possible as quickly as possible.” 4 It is therefore not surprising that petitioner responded to the Court’s post-argument request for supplemental briefs by expressly disavowing any reliance on the Presidential Recordings Act. Nor is there any reason to require the District Court to defer to the expertise of the Administrator of General Services, for the Administrator gained congressional approval of his regulations only by deferring to the expertise displayed by the District Court in this case.5 For this Court now to rely on the Act as a basis for *617reversing the trial judge’s considered judgment is ironic, to put it mildly.
I respectfully dissent.
District Judge Gesell explained the normal practice in the trial court:
“As a matter of practice in this court, if requested, a copy of any document or photograph received in evidence is made by the Clerk and furnished at cost of duplicating to any applicant, subject only to contrary instructions that may be given by the trial judge at the time of trial. This privilege of the public to inspect and obtain copies of all court records, including exhibits while in the custody of the Clerk, is of long standing in this jurisdiction and reaches far back into our common law and traditions. Absent special circumstances, any member of the public has a right to inspect and obtain copies of such judicial records. Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D. C. 404, 407 (1894). . . '.
“The Court stated in Drawbaugh,
“[A]ny attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records of the court, .would seem to be inconsistent with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all persons have the right of access and to its records, according to long-established usage and practice.
“The Court has carefully reviewed transcripts of the tapes in issue. From this review it is apparent that Judge Sirica has assiduously removed extraneous material, including topics relating to national security and considerable irrelevant comment relating to persons not on trial. Only portions of the tapes strictly germane to the criminal proceeding have been played to the jury. Moreover, the portions of the tapes here in issue are now of public record. Although former President Nixon has been pardoned, he has standing to protest release by the Court but he has no right to prevent normal access to these public documents which have already been released in full text after affording the greatest protection to presidential confidentiality ‘consistent with the fair administration of justice.’ United States v. Nixon, [418 U. S. 683, 715 (1974)]. His words cannot be retrieved; they are public property and his opposition is accordingly rejected.” United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 641-642 (DC 1974). Like the Court of Appeals, see n. 2, infra, and unlike the majority, ante, at 606-608, n. 17, I read this passage as a discretionary rejection of petitioner’s claim that the tapes should be suppressed.
Explaining its concurrence in Judge Gesell’s views, the Court of Appeals stated:
“Beyond this, there are a number of factors unique to this case that *615militate in favor of Judge Gesell’s decision. First, the conversations at issue relate to the conduct of the Presidency and thus they are both impressed with the ‘public trust,’ and of prime national interest. Second, the fact that the transcripts of the conversations already have received wide circulation makes this unlike a hypothetical case in which evidence previously accessible only to a few spectators will suddenly become available to the entire public. Finally, it seems likely that as a result of the Presidential [Recordings and Materials] Preservation Act, the words and sounds at issue here will find a further entry way into the public domain. For all these reasons we are unable to conclude that Judge Gesell abused his discretion in rejecting the claim of privacy.
“In any event, in light of the strong interests underlying the common law right to inspect judicial records — interests especially important here given the national concern over Watergate — we cannot say that Judge Gesell abused his discretion in refusing to permit considerations of deference to impede the public’s exercise of their common law rights.” United States v. Mitchell, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 305-306, 551 F. 2d 1252, 1264-1265 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
It is true that Judge Sirica refused to order release of the tapes before the appeals were concluded, but he expressed no disagreement with any aspect of Judge Gesell’s opinion.
It should also be noted that although Circuit Judge MacKinnon dissented from the Court of Appeals decision that the tapes should be released forthwith, he also expressed no disagreement with Judge Gesell’s views. Id., at 306-307, 551 F. 2d, at 1265-1266.
It is, of course, true that the Act’s effect on this litigation “was neither advanced by the parties nor given appropriate consideration by the courts below.” Ante, at 603. But this is a reason for rejecting, not embracing, petitioner’s claim.
S. Rep. No. 94-368, p. 13 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94^560, p. 16 (1975).
The Administrator of General Services first planned to forbid private copying of the tapes in his control, but the Senate emphatically rejected this initial proposal. S. Res. 244, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 121 Cong. Rec. 28609-28614 (1975). The Senate’s Committee Report condemned the Administrator’s proposed regulation as “at best, unnecessary, and at worst, inconsistent with the spirit if not the letter of the act.” S. Rep. No. 94-368,, supra, at 13. The Report elaborated:
“In evaluating this regulation, it is also necessary to consider the basic intent of the Act. This legislation was designed, within certain limitations, to provide as much public access to the materials as is physically possible *617as quickly as possible. To that end, GSA recognizes that legitimate research requires the reproduction of printed materials; reproduction is no less necessary when the material is a tape recording.” Ibid.
A House Report also disapproved the proposal, rejecting the Administrator’s fears of undue commercialization:
“There is of course a risk that some people will reproduce the recordings and exploit them for commercial purposes. That is the risk of a free society. Moreover, it is a risk the Founding Fathers accepted in adopting the free speech protections of the first amendment, any researcher can announce to the world the findings of his research.” H. R. Rep. No. 94r-560, supra, at 16.
The Administrator then revised his regulations, proposing that private reproduction of the tapes be prohibited for two years and that the ban be reviewed at the end of that period. This proposal was rejected twice. S. Res. 428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 Cong. Rec. 10159-10160 (1976); H. R. Res. 1505, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 Cong. Rec. 30251 (1976). See also S. Rep. No. 94-748, pp. 23-24 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1485, p. 26 (1976).
The Administrator finally obtained congressional approval only by adopting the approach of the District Court in this case. His latest regulation, as approved, states:
“Researchers may obtain copies of the reference tapes only in accordance with procedures comparable to those approved by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United States v. Mitchell . . . .” 42 Fed. Reg. 63629 (1977).
Congress and the Administrator expected that the District Court would soon approve private copying of the tapes. The first congressional Reports on the Administrator’s proposed regulations, after noting that reproduction of the court’s tapes had been forbidden pending the appeals in United States v. Mitchell, expressed the belief that copying might begin when the prosecutions were completed. H. R. Rep. No. 94-560, supra, at 16 n. 4; S. Rep. No. 94-368, supra, at 13 n. 1. The Administrator, in explaining his latest regulations, said that “once the Court approves a plan for reproduction of the Nixon tape recordings,” the Administrator would adopt “similar procedures.” General Services Administration, Legal Explanation of Public Access Regulations — Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, P. L. 93-526, p. G-54 (1977).