concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree that the Maryland Motor Fuel Inspection Law1 does not offend substantive due process or federal anti*135trust policy, I dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion because it fails to condemn impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce in retail gasoline marketing. The divestiture provisions, Md. Code Ann., Art. 56, §§ 157E (b) and (c) (Supp. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as §§ (b) and (c)), preclude out-of-state competitors from retailing gasoline within Maryland. The effect is to protect in-state retail service station dealers from the competition of the out-of-state businesses. This protectionist discrimination is not justified by any legitimate state interest that cannot be vindicated by more evenhanded regulation. Sections (b) and (c), therefore, violate the Commerce Clause.2
I
In Maryland the retail marketing of gasoline is interstate commerce, for all petroleum products come from outside the State. Retailers serve interstate travelers. To the extent that particular retailers succeed or fail in their businesses, the interstate wholesale market for petroleum products is affected. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951).3 The *136regulation of retail gasoline sales is therefore within the scope of the Commerce Clause. See ibid.; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890).4
A
The Commerce Clause forbids discrimination against interstate commerce, which repeatedly has been held to mean that States and localities may not discriminate against the transactions of out-of-state actors in interstate markets. E. g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 350-352 (1977); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 69-73 (1963); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S., at 354; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455-456 (1940). The discrimination need not appear on the face of the state or local regulation. “The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The state or local authority need not intend to discriminate in order to offend the policy of maintaining a free-flowing national economy. As demonstrated in Hunt, a statute that on its face restricts both intrastate and interstate transactions may violate the Clause by having the “practical effect” of discriminating in its operation. 432 U. S., at 350-352.
If discrimination results from a statute, the burden falls upon the state or local government to demonstrate legitimate local benefits justifying the inequality and to show that less discriminatory alternatives cannot protect the local interests. *137Id., at 353; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S., at 354. This Court does not merely accept without analysis purported local interests. Instead, it independently identifies the character of the interests and judges for itself whether alternatives will be adequate. For example, in Dean Milk the city attempted to justify a milk pasteurization ordinance by claiming it to be a necessary health measure. The city’s assertion was not conclusive, however:
“A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.” Ibid.
In an independent assessment of the asserted purpose, the Court determined exactly how the ordinance protected public health and then concluded that other measures could accomplish the same ends. Id., at 354-356. The city’s public health purpose therefore did not justify the discrimination, and the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause.
B
With this background, the unconstitutional discrimination in the Maryland statute becomes apparent. No facial inequality exists; §§ (b) and (c) preclude all refiners and producers from marketing gasoline at the retail level. But given the structure of the retail gasoline market in Maryland, the effect of §§ (b) and (c) is to exclude a class of predominantly out-of-state gasoline retailers while providing protection from competition to a class of nonintegrated retailers that is overwhelmingly composed of local businessmen. In 1974, of the 3,780 gasoline service stations in the State, 3,547 were operated by nonintegrated local retail dealers. App. 191, 569, 755. Of the 233 company-operated stations, 197 belonged to out-of-*138state integrated producers or refiners. Id., at 190-191. Thirty-four were operated by nonintegrated companies that would not have been affected immediately by the Maryland statute.5 Ibid. The only in-state integrated petroleum firm, Crown Central Petroleum, Inc., operated just two service stations. Id., at 189. Of the class of stations statutorily insulated from the competition of the out-of-state integrated firms, then, more than 99% were operated by local business interests. Of the class of enterprises excluded entirely from participation in the retail gasoline market, 95% were out-of-state firms, operating 98% of the stations in the class. Ibid.
The discrimination suffered by the out-of-state integrated producers and refiners is significant. Five of the excluded enterprises, Ashland Oil, Inc., BP Oil, Inc., Kayo Oil Co., Petroleum Marketing Corp., and Southern States Cooperative, Inc., market nonbranded gasoline through price competition rather than through brand recognition. Of the 98 stations marketing gasoline in this manner, all but 6 are company operated. The company operations result from the dominant fact of price competition marketing. According to repeated testimony from petroleum economics experts and officers of price marketers — testimony that the trial court did not discredit — such nonbranded stations can compete successfully only if they have day-to-day control of the retail price of their products, the hours of operation of their stations, and related business details. App. 320, 357, 370-371, 449-451, 503-504, *139517, 529-530; Joint App. to Jurisdictional Statements 102a et seq. Only with such control can sufficient sales volume be achieved to produce satisfactory profits at prices two to three cents a gallon below those of the major branded stations. Dealer operation of stations precludes such control because of the illegality of vertical price fixing. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1976 ed.); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963). Therefore, because §§ (b) and (c) forbid company operations, these out-of-state competitors will have to abandon the Maryland retail market altogether. App. 100, 357-358, 455, 519; Joint App. to Jurisdictional Statements 103a et seq.6 For the same reason 32 other out-of-state national nonbranded integrated marketers, who operate their own stations without dealers, will be precluded from entering the Maryland retail gasoline market.
The record also contains testimony that the discrimination will burden the operations of major branded companies, such as appellants Exxon, Phillips, Shell, and Gulf, all of which are out-of-state firms. Most importantly, §§ (b) and (c) will preclude these companies, as well as those mentioned in the previous paragraph, from competing directly for the profits of retail marketing. According to Richard T. Harvin, retail sales manager for Exxon’s eastern marketing region, Exxon’s company-operated stations in Maryland annually return 15% of the company’s investment — a profit of $700,000 in 1974. App. 316. Sections (b) and (c) will force this return to be shared with the local dealers. In addition, the ban of the sections will preclude the majors from enhancing brand recognition and consumer acceptance through retail outlets with company-controlled standards. Id., at 316, 320, 647, 668-669. Their ability directly to monitor consumer preferences and *140reactions will be diminished. Id., at 315, 649, 669. And their opportunity for experimentation with retail marketing techniques will be curtailed. Id., at 316-317, 647-649, 669. In short, the divestiture provisions, which will require the appellant majors to cease operation of property valued at more than $10 million, will inflict significant economic hardship on Maryland’s major brand companies, all of which are out-of-state firms.
Similar hardship is not imposed upon the local service station dealers by the divestiture provisions. Indeed, rather than restricting their ability to compete, the Maryland Act effectively and perhaps intentionally improves their competitive position by insulating them from competition by out-of-state integrated producers and refiners. In its answers to the various complaints in this case, the State repeatedly conceded that the Act was intended to protect “the retail dealer as an independent businessman [by] reducing the control and dominance of the vertically integrated petroleum producer and refiner in the retail market.” Id., at 33; see id., at 51, 54, 104, 128, 132, 145, 147. At trial the State’s expert said that the legislation would have the effect of protecting the local dealers against the out-of-state competition. Id., at 613. In short, the foundation of the discrimination in this case is that the local dealers may continue to enter retail transactions and to compete for retail profits while the statute will deny similar opportunities to the class composed almost entirely of out-of-state businesses.7
*141With discrimination proved against interstate commerce, the burden falls upon the State to justify the distinction with legitimate state interests that cannot be vindicated with more evenhanded regulation. On the record before the Court, the State fails to carry its burden. It asserts only in general terms a desire to maintain competition in gasoline retailing. Although this is a laudable goal, it cannot be accepted without further analysis, just as the Court could not accept the mere assertion of a public health justification in Dean Milk. Here, the State ignores the second half of its responsibility; it does not even attempt to demonstrate why competition cannot be preserved without banning the out-of-state interests from the retail market.
The State’s showing may be so meager because any legitimate interest in competition can be vindicated with more evenhanded regulation. First, to the extent that the State’s interest in competition is nothing more than a desire to protect particular competitors — less efficient local businessmen — from the legal competition of more efficient out-of-state firms, the interest is illegitimate under the Commerce Clause. A national economy would hardly flourish if each State could effectively insist that local nonintegrated dealers handle product retailing to the exclusion of out-of-state integrated firms that would not have sufficient local political clout to challenge the influence of local businessmen with their local government leaders.8 Each State would be encouraged to “legislate accord*142ing to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial view.” J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 259 (4th ed. 1873), quoted in H. P. Hood Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 533 (1949). See also, e. g., The Federalist, Nos. 7, 11, 12 (Hamilton), No. 42 (Madison). The Commerce Clause simply does not countenance such parochialism.
Second, a legitimate concern of the State could be to limit the economic power of vertical integration. But nothing in the record suggests that the vertical integration that has *143already occurred in the Maryland petroleum market has inhibited competition. Indeed, the trial court found that the retail market, dominated by 3,547 dealer outlets constituting more than 90% of the State’s service stations, is highly competitive.9 Therefore, the State has shown no need for the divestiture of existing company-owned stations required by § (c). The legitimacy of any concern about future integration, which could support the discrimination of § (b), is suspect because of the exemption granted wholesalers, which, not surprisingly, are local businesses able to influence the state legislature.10 See n. 7, supra.
*144Third, the State appears to be concerned about unfair competitive behavior such as predatory pricing or inequitable allocation of petroleum products by the integrated firms. These are the only examples of specific misconduct asserted in the State’s answers. App. 33-34, 54-55, 81-83, 109-111, 133-134, 148-149. But none of the concerns support the discrimination in §§ (b) and (c). There is no proof in the record that any significant portion of the class of out-of-state firms burdened by the divestiture sections has engaged in such misconduct. Furthermore, predatory pricing and unfair allocation already have been prohibited by both state and federal law. See, e. g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 628, 15 U. S. C. §751 et seq. (1976 ed.); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 461, 89 Stat. 955, 15 U. S. C. § 760g (1976 ed.); Maryland Motor Fuel Inspection Law, Md. Code Ann., Art. 56, § 157E (f) (Supp. 1977); Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-201 et seq. (1975); Maryland Unfair Sales Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-401 et seq. (1975). Less discriminatory legislation, which would regulate the leasing of all service stations, not just those owned by the out-of-state integrated producers and refiners, could prevent whatever evils arise from short-*145term leases. Cf. Maryland Gasoline Products Marketing Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-304 (g) (Supp, 1977).11
In sum, the State has asserted before this Court only a vague interest in preserving competition in its retail gasoline market. It has not shown why its interest cannot be vindicated by legislation less discriminatory toward out-of-state retailers. It therefore has not met its burden to justify the discrimination inherent in §§ (b) and (c), and they violate the Commerce Clause.
II
The arguments of the Court’s opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals decision,12 and appellees do not remove the unconstitutional taint from the discrimination inherent in §§ (b) and (c).
A
The Court offers essentially three responses to the discrimination in the retail gasoline market imposed by the divestiture provisions.13 First, the Court says that the discrimination *146against the class of out-of-state producers and refiners does not violate the Commerce Clause because the State has not imposed similar discrimination against other out-of-state retailers. Ante, at 125-126. This is said to distinguish the present case from Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n. In fact, however, the unconstitutional discrimination in Hunt was not against all out-of-state interests. North Carolina had enacted a statute requiring that apples marketed in closed containers within the State bear “ ‘no grade other than the applicable U. S. grade or standard.’ ” 432 U. S., at 335. The Commission contended that the provision discriminated against interstate commerce because it prohibited the display of superior Washington State apple grading marks. The Court did not strike down the provision because it discriminated against the marketing techniques of all out-of-state growers. The provision imposed no discrimination on growers from States that employed only the United States Department of Agriculture grading system.14 Despite this *147lack of universal discrimination, the Court declared the provision unconstitutional because it discriminated against a single segment of out-of-state marketers of apples, namely, the Washington State growers who employed the superior grading system. In this regard, the Maryland divestiture provisions are identical to, not distinguishable from, the North Carolina statute in Hunt. Here, the discrimination has been imposed against a segment of the out-of-state retailers of gasoline, namely, those who also refine or produce petroleum.
To accept the argument of the Court, that is, that discrimination must be universal to offend the Commerce Clause, naively will foster protectionist discrimination against interstate commerce. In the future, States will be able to insulate in-state interests from competition by identifying the most potent segments of out-of-state business, banning them, and permitting less effective out-of-state actors to remain. The record shows that the Court permits Maryland to effect just such discrimination in this case. The State bans the most powerful out-of-state firms from retailing gasoline within its boundaries. It then insulates the forced divestiture of 199 service stations from constitutional attack by permitting out-of-state firms such as Pantry Pride, Pisca, Hi-Way, and Midway to continue to operate 34 gasoline stations. Effective out-of-state competition is thereby emasculated — no doubt, an ingenious discrimination. But as stated at the outset, “the commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S., at 455.
Second, the Court contends, as a subpart of its primary argument, that the discrimination in Hunt “raised the cost of doing business for out-of-state dealers, and, in various other ways, favored the in-state dealer in the local market. 432 U. S., at 351-352. No comparable claim can be made here.” Ante, at 126. Once it is seen that the discrimination in Hunt raised the cost of doing business for only one group of the out-of-state marketers of apples, the fallacy of the Court’s *148argument appears. In fact, here the burden imposed upon the class of out-of-state retailers subject to the discrimination of §§ (b) and (c) far exceeds the burdens in Hunt. In Hunt the statute merely increased costs and deprived the Washington growers of the competitive advantages of the use of then-grading system. Here, the statute bans the refiners and producers from the retail market altogether — a burden that lacks comparability with the effects in Hunt only because it is more severe.
Third, the Court asserts without citation: "The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Ante, at 126. This proposition is correct only to the extent that it is incomplete; it does not apply to the facts present here. It is true that merely demonstrating a burden on some out-of-state actors does not prove unconstitutional discrimination. But when the burden is significant, when it falls on the most numerous and effective group of out-of-state competitors, when a similar burden does not fall on the class of protected in-state businessmen, and when the State cannot justify the'resulting disparity by showing that its legislative interests cannot be vindicated by more evenhanded regulation, unconstitutional discrimination exists. The facts of this litigation demonstrate such discrimination, and the Court does not argue persuasively to the contrary.
B
The contentions of the Maryland Court of Appeals, which also found no violation of the Commerce Clause, are no more convincing than the arguments of the Court’s opinion. First, the Court of Appeals reasoned that §§ (b) and (c) did not discriminate against the class of out-of-state refiners and producers because the wholesale flow of petroleum products into the State was not restricted. 279 Md. 410, 431, 370 A. 2d 1102, 1114 (1977). This supposedly distinguished the present *149facts from those of Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, which involved unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. To begin with, however, the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals is basically irrelevant. The Maryland statute has not effected discrimination with regard to the wholesaling or interstate transport of petroleum. The discrimination exists with regard to retailing. The fact that gasoline will continue to flow into the State does not permit the State to deny out-of-state firms the opportunity to retail it once it arrives.
Furthermore, Dean Milk cannot be distinguished on the ground asserted by the Court of Appeals. There, this Court invalidated § 7.21 of the General Ordinances of the city of Madison (1949), which outlawed the local sale of milk not pasteurized within five miles of the city. The section did not legally or effectively block the flow of out-of-state milk into Madison to any greater extent than the restrictions on sales of gasoline by out-of-state companies block the flow of gasoline here. In Dean Milk out-of-state producers could bring their milk to Madison, have it pasteurized in Madison, and sell it in Madison without violating § 7.21. If the flow of milk were at all restricted, it was merely because the out-of-state producers chose not to deal with the Madison pasteurizers. Similarly, the flow of gasoline into Maryland may be restricted if the out-of-state producers and refiners choose not to supply the dealers who replace the company-owned operations.15
Second, the Court of Appeals said the Maryland legislation did not offend the Commerce Clause because the legislature intended to preserve competition, not to discriminate against interstate commerce. 279 Md., at 431, 370 A. 2d, at 1114. *150With this argument, the court fell into the same trap that confines the State’s proffered justifications for the discrimination of §§ (b) and (c). To begin with, the fact that no discrimination was intended is irrelevant where, as here, discriminatory effects result from the statutory scheme. Furthermore, the fact that the legislature might have had a laudable intent when it passed the law cannot by itself justify the divestiture provisions. The State must also show that its interests cannot be vindicated by less discriminatory alternatives. The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to require such a showing from the appellees.
Third, the Court of Appeals resurrected the outdated notion that retailing is merely local activity not subject to the strictures of the Commerce Clause. 279 Md., at 432, 370 A. 2d, at 1114-1115, citing Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129 (1921). In Crescent Oil the Court said that the operation of cotton gins was local manufacturing rather than interstate commerce. As explained at the beginning of Part I of this opinion, however, the interstate character of the retail gasoline market and 57 years of intervening constitutional and economic development prevent the application of Crescent Oil to the facts of this litigation. See nn. 3 and 4, and accompanying text, supra.
C
Finally, nothing in the argument of the appellees saves the distinctions in §§ (b) and (c) from the taint of unconstitutionality. First, the State argues that discrimination against interstate commerce has not occurred because “[n]o nexus between interstate as opposed to local interests inheres in the production or refining of petroleum.” Brief for Appellees 23. Although this statement might be correct in the abstract, it is incorrect in reality, given the structure of the Maryland petroleum market. Due to geological formation as so far known, no petroleum is produced in Maryland; due to the economics of production and refining, as well as to the geology, *151no petroleum is refined in Maryland. As a matter of actual fact, then, an inherent nexus does exist between the out-of-state status of producers and refiners and the distribution and retailing of gasoline in Maryland. The Commerce Clause does not forbid only legislation that discriminates under all factual circumstances. It forbids discrimination in effect against interstate commerce on the specific facts of each case. If production or refining of gasoline occurred in Maryland, §§ (b) and (c) might not be unconstitutional. Under those different circumstances, however, the producers and refiners would have a fair opportunity to influence their local legislators and thereby to prevent the enactment of economically disruptive legislation. Under those circumstances, the economic disruption would be felt directly in Maryland, which would tend to malee the local political processes responsive to the problems thereby created. Under those circumstances, §§ (b) and (c) might never have been passed. In this case, however, the economic disruption of the sections is visited upon out-of-state economic interests and not upon in-state businesses. One of the basic assumptions of the Commerce Clause is that local political systems will tend to be unresponsive to problems not felt by local constituents; instead, local political units are expected to act in their constituents’ interests.16 One of the basic purposes of the Clause, therefore, is to prevent the vindication of such self-interest from unfairly burdening out-of-state concerns and thereby disrupting the national economy.
*152Second, appellees argue, as did the Court of Appeals, that §§ (b) and (c) do not discriminate impermissibly because the Maryland Legislature passed them with the intent to preserve competition. As explained above, however, the mere assertion of a laudable purpose does not carry the State’s burden to justify the discriminatory effects of the statute. See Parts I-B and II-B, supra.
Third, appellees rely upon the Court of Appeals’ contention that unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce can be found only where the flow of interstate goods is curtailed. Appellees’ assertion fares no better than did the court’s because the appellees fail to show how the effect on the flow of interstate goods varies in kind between this case and Dean Milk. See Part II-B, supra.
Ill
The Court’s decision brings to mind the well-known words of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
“To give entrance to [protectionism] would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935).
Today, the Court fails to heed the Justice’s admonition. The parochial political philosophy of the Maryland Legislature thereby prevails. I would reverse the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The presently challenged portions of the law were enacted four years ago and amended once since then. 1974 Md. Laws, eh. 854; 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 608. The statute is now codified as Md. Code Ann., Art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1977), and reads:
“(a) For the purpose of this law all gasoline and special fuels sold or offered or exposed for sale shall be subject to inspection and analysis as hereinafter provided. . . .
“(b) After July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of petroleum producís shall open a major brand, secondary brand or unbranded retail service station in the State of Maryland, and operate it with company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or corporation, managing a service station on a fee arrangement with the producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station dealer.
“(c) After July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall operate a major brand, secondary brand, or unbranded retail service station in the State of Maryland, with company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or corporation managing a service station on a fee arrangement with the producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station dealer.
“(d) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service station dealers shall extend all voluntary allowances uniformly to all retail service station dealers supplied.
“(e) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service station dealers shall *135apply all equipment rentals uniformly to all retail service station dealers supplied.
“(f) Every producer, refiner or wholesaler of petroleum products shall apportion uniformly all gasoline and special fuels to all retail service station dealers during periods of shortages on an equitable basis, and shall not discriminate among the dealers in their allotments.”
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3:
“The Congress shall have Power . . .
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
The inherent effect of local regulation of retail sales on interstate commerce is well illustrated by Dean Mük. The city of Madison forbade the sale of pasteurized milk unless pasteurization occurred at a plant located within five miles of the center of the city. General Ordinances of the City of Madison §7.21 (1949). Even though only local sale was prohibited, the Court considered the ordinance to be a regulation of interstate commerce.
Cf. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940) (holding that taxation of local retailing was within the reach of the Commerce Clause); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945) (holding that retailing was interstate commerce within the scope of the Sherman Act). See generally Note, Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes: A Preliminary Constitutional and Economic Assessment, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 1277, 1303 (1975).
In 1974 Fisca Oil Co., Giant Food, Inc., Hi-Way Oil, Inc., Homes Oil Co., Hudson Oil Co., Midway Petroleum, National Oil Co., Pantry Pride, Savon Gas Stations, and Sears, Roebuck & Co. operated gasoline stations in Maryland. Because none of these organizations produced or refined petroleum at that time, the statute would not have restricted their operations. It should be noted, however, that the statute will reach any of these firms deciding to integrate backwards from retailing to refining or producing. After this suit was filed, Hudson Oil Co. acquired a refinery and thus became another out-of-state business subject to the ban of §§ (b) and (c). App. 518-519.
The sections will force Ashland to divest 17 stations in which it has invested $2,381,385. Id., at 257, 258-259. Petroleum Marketing has 21 stations valued at $2,043,710. Id., at 656.
Another indication of the discrimination against out-of-state business was the amendment of the original legislative proposal to exempt wholesalers of gasoline from the divestiture requirements. The author of the proposal intended to ban retailing by wholesalers and “not to discriminate against one class as to another.” Id., at 568. On cross-examination he was asked why the exemption was enacted. He replied:
“It was up to the General Assembly to malee that decision. Apparently the wholesalers were represented at the testimony in the hearings. ... I did hear at a later date that they wanted to be exempt from it because *141some of the wholesalers being local jobbers had no investment or financial activity or engagement with the producer-refiner so they wanted to plea upon the mercy of the committee so to speak ....
“Q. You have no information then as to why the Legislature of Maryland chose to make that discrimination? A. Not other than hearsay as to the general data that these men were local businessmen, had no definite tie in with the refinery . . . .” Id., at 568-569.
There is support in the record for the inference that the Maryland Legislature passed the divestiture provisions in response to the pleas of local *142gasoline dealers for protection against the competition of both the price marketers and the major oil companies. For example, the executive director of the Greater Washington/Maryland Service Station Association, which represents almost 700 local Maryland dealers, testified before the Economic Matters Committee of the Maryland Senate:
"I would like to begin by telling you gentlemen that these are desperate days for service station dealers. . . .
“Now beset by the critical gasoline supply situation, the squeeze by his landlord-supplier and the shrinking service and tire, battery and accessory market, the dealer is now faced with an even more serious problem.
“That is the sinister threat of the major oil companies to complete their takeover of the retail-marketing of gasoline, not just to be in competition with their own branded dealers, but to squeeze them out and convert their stations to company operation.
“Our oil industry has grown beyond the borders of our country to where its American character has been replaced by a multinational one.
“Are the legislators of Maryland now about to let this octopus loose and unrestricted in the state of Maryland, among our small businessmen to devour them? We sincerely hope not.
“The men that you see here today are the back-bone of American small business. . . .
“We are here today asking you, our own legislators to protect us from an economic giant who would take away our very livelihood and our children’s future in its greed for greater profits. Please give us the protection we need to save our stations.” Id., at 755, 756, 761.
From the facts stipulated by the parties, the trial court found:
“Retail petroleum marketing in the State of Maryland is and has been a highly competitive industry. This is a result of the number and location of available facilities, the comparatively small capital costs for entering the business, the mobility of the purchaser at the time of purchasing the products, the relative interchangeability of one competitor’s products with another in the mind of the consumer, the visibility of price information, and the many choices the consumer has in terms of prices, brands, and services offered.” Joint App. to Jurisdictional Statements 99a.
The continuing competitive nature of the Maryland gasoline market provided one basis for the trial court’s holding that the State had not “demonstrated a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained by the means selectedf;] the evidence presented before it indicates that the statute is inversely related to the public welfare.” Id., at 131a-132a. The trial court therefore considered the statute unconstitutional.
The trial court entered several findings about the integration of the oil companies and the need for divestiture:
“Apart from restraining free competition, it was shown that divestiture would be harmful to competition in the industry, and would primarily serve to protect the independent dealers rather than the public at large. There was no proven detrimental effect upon the retail market caused by company-owned-and-operated stations which could not be curbed by federal and state anti-trust laws.
“The court also finds from the preponderance of the evidence that the law will preclude all of some thirty-two producer-refiners not now in the State from ever entering the competitive market in Maryland, and vertical *144integration will be prohibited. Neither effect is in the public interest since competition is essentially for consumer benefit.
“Noteworthy also is the fact that the original draft of the law included wholesalers in the prohibition against retail selling. The final draft of the law eliminated wholesalers, for the sole reason, according to Mr. Coleman, that the wholesalers requested their elimination from the act. There is no evidence whatsoever relative to why wholesalers should have been included initially, nor how the general public benefited from their exemption.
“In all the more than one hundred eighty-five pounds of pleadings, motions, briefs, exhibits and depositions before this court, there is no concrete evidence that the act was justified as to the classes of operators singled out to be affected in order to promote the general welfare of the citizens of the State. Rather, it is apparent that the entire bill is designed to benefit one class of merchants to the detriment of another.” Id., at 130a-131a (emphasis supplied).
This statute states:
“(g) Distributor may not unreasonably withhold certain consents . . . The distributor may not unreasonably withhold his consent to any assignment, transfer, sale, or renewal of a marketing agreement. . . .”
279 Md. 410, 370 A. 2d 1102 and 372 A. 2d 237 (1977). The trial court, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Md., did not address the question whether §§ (b) and (c) unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. It held that the statute offended substantive due process, in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 23.
The Court also notes that §§ (b) and (c) do not discriminate against interstate goods and do not favor local producers and refiners. While true, the observation is irrelevant because it does not address the discrimination inflicted upon retail marketing in the State. Cf. Part II-B, infra.
Footnote 16 of the Court's opinion, ante, at 126-127, suggests that unconstitutional discrimination does not exist unless there is an effect on the quantity of out-of-state goods entering a State. This is too narrow a view of the Commerce Clause. First, interstate commerce consists of far more than mere production of goods. It also consists of transactions — of repeated buying and selling of both goods and services. By focusing exclu*146sively on the quantity of goods, the Court limits the protection of the Clause to producers and handlers of goods before they enter a discriminating State. In our complex national economy, commercial transactions continue after the goods enter a State. The Court today permits a State to impose protectionist discrimination upon these later transactions to the detriment of out-of-state participants. Second, the Court cites no case in which this Court has held that a burden on the flow of goods is a prerequisite to establishing a case of unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. Neither Hunt nor Dean Milk contains such a holding. In both of those cases the Court upheld the claims of discrimination; in neither did it say that a burden on the wholesale flow of goods was a necessary part of its holding. Regarding Hunt, the Court cites to 432 U. S., at 347, which discusses only whether the appellants had met the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1331. As explained in Part II-B, infra, this case presents a threat to the flow of gasoline in Maryland identical to the threat to the flow of milk in Dean MUk.
Growers from 13 States marketed apples in North Carolina. Six of the States did not have state grading systems apart from the USDA regulations. 432 U. S., at 349.
In fact, the disruption of the flow of gasoline in this case could be greater than the disruption of the flow of milk in Madison. The record supports the proposition that the ban on company operations may so unsettle the wholesale and refining enterprises of the independent price marketers that they will not be able profitably to supply gasoline to the stations of nonintegrated retailers in Maryland. App. 504-505, 509, 531.
Given the Nation’s experience under the Articles of Confederation, the assumption is not an unreasonable one. At that time authority to regulate commerce rested with the States rather than with Congress. The pursuit by each State of the particular interests of its economy and constituents nearly wrecked the national economy. “The almost catastrophic results from this sort of situation were harmful commercial wars and reprisals at home among the States . . . .” P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce 2 (1953), citing, e. g., The Federalist, Nos. 7, 11, 22 (Hamilton), No. 42 (Madison).