with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
In Alabama only wives may be awarded alimony upon divorce. In Part I of its opinion, the Court holds that Alabama’s alimony statutes may be challenged in this Court by a divorced male who has never sought alimony, who is demonstrably not entitled to alimony even if he had, and who contractually bound himself to pay alimony to his former wife and did so without objection for over two years. I think the Court’s eagerness to invalidate Alabama’s statutes has led it to deal too casually with the “case and controversy” requirement of Art. Ill of the Constitution.
I
The architects of our constitutional form of government, to assure that courts exercising the “judicial power of the United States” would not trench upon the authority committed to the other branches of government, consciously limited the Judicial Branch’s “right of expounding the Constitution” to “cases of a Judiciary Nature” 1 — that is, to actual “cases” and “controversies” between genuinely adverse parties. Central to this Art. Ill limitation on federal judicial power is the concept of standing. The standing inquiry focuses on the party before the Court, asking whether he has “ 'such a per*291sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498-499 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Implicit in the concept of standing, are the requirements of injury in fact and causation. To demonstrate the “personal stake” in the litigation necessary to satisfy Art. Ill, the party must suffer “a distinct and palpable injury,” Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501, that bears a “ 'fairly traceable’ causal connection” to the challenged government action. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 261 (1977). When a party’s standing to raise an issue is questioned, therefore, “the relevant inquiry is whether . . . [he] has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38 (1976). Stated differently, a party who places a question before a federal court must “stand to profit in some personal interest” from its resolution, else the exercise of judicial power would be gratuitous. Id., at 39.
The sole claim before this Court is that Alabama’s alimony statutes, which provide that only husbands may be required to pay alimony upon divorce, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statutes alleged to create an impermissible gender-based classification are generally attacked on one of two theories. First, the challenged classification may confer on members of one sex a benefit not conferred on similarly situated members of the other sex. Clearly, members of the excluded class — those who but for their sex would be entitled to the statute’s benefits — have a sufficient “personal stake” in the outcome of an equal protection challenge to the statute to invoke the power of the federal judiciary. Thus, a widower has standing to question *292the constitutionality of a state statute granting a property tax exemption only to widows. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). Likewise, this Court has reached the merits of a retired male wage earner’s equal protection challenge to a federal statute granting higher monthly old-age benefits to similarly situated female wage earners. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 (1977). Standing to raise these constitutional claims was not destroyed by the fact that the State of Florida in Kahn, and Congress in Webster, were capable of frustrating a victory in this Court by merely withdrawing the challenged statute’s benefits from the favored class rather than extending them to the excluded class. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 17 (1975).
Second, the challenged statute may saddle members of one sex with a burden not borne by similarly situated members of the other sex. Standing to attack such a statute lies in those who labor under its burden. For example, in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), this Court sustained a widower’s equal protection challenge to a provision of the Social Security Act that burdened widowers but not widows with the task of proving dependency upon the deceased spouse in order to qualify for survivor’s benefits. A similar statute was invalidated in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), at the instance of a female member of the uniformed services who, unlike her male counterparts, was required to prove her spouse’s dependency in order to obtain increased quarters allowances and health benefits.
The statutes at issue here differ from those discussed above in that the benefit flowing to divorced wives derives from a burden imposed on divorced husbands. Thus, Alabama’s alimony statutes in effect create two gender classifications: that between needy wives, who can be awarded alimony under the statutes, and needy husbands, who cannot; and that between financially secure husbands, who can be required to pay alimony under the statutes, and financially secure wives, who *293cannot. Appellant Orr’s standing to raise his equal protection claim must therefore be analyzed in terms of both of these classifications.
A
This Court has long held that in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Art. Ill standing, a party claiming that a statute unconstitutionally withholds a particular benefit must be in line to receive the benefit if the suit is successful. In Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305 (1882), shareholders of a national bank attacked the validity of a state property tax statute that did not, contrary to federal law, permit deduction of personal debts from the assessed value of their bank stock. With respect to the constitutional claim of shareholders who had failed to allege the existence of personal debts that could be deducted under a valid statute, the Court reasoned:
“What is there to render the [state statute] void as to a shareholder in a national bank, who owes no debts which he can deduct from the assessed value of his shares? The denial of this right does not affect him. He pays the same amount of tax that he would if the law gave him the right of deduction. He would be in no better condition if the law expressly authorized him to make the deduction. What legal interest has he in a question which only affects others? Why should he invoke the protection of the act of Congress in a case where he has no rights to protect? Is a court to sit and decide abstract questions of law in which the parties before it show no interest, and which, if decided either way, affect no right of theirs?
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“. . . If no such right exists, the delicate duty of declaring by this court that an act of State legislation is void, is an assumption of authority uncalled for by the merits *294of the case, and unnecessary to the assertion of the rights of any party to the suit.” Id., at 311-312.
It is undisputed that the parties now before us are “a needy wife who qualifies for alimony and a husband who has the property and earnings from which alimony can be paid.” 351 So. 2d 906, 907 (1977) (Jones, J., dissenting). Under the statute pertinent to the Orrs’ divorce, alimony may be awarded against the husband only “[i]f the wife has no separate estate or if it be insufficient for her maintenance.” Ala. Code § 30-2-51 (1975). At the time of their divorce, Mr. Orr made no claim that he was not in a position to contribute to his needy wife's support, much less that she should be required to pay alimony to him.2 On the contrary, the amount of alimony awarded by the Alabama trial court was agreed to by the parties, and appellant has never sought a reduction in his ali*295mony obligation on the ground of changed financial circumstances. See Davis v. Davis, 274 Ala. 277, 147 So. 2d 828 (1962); Garlington v. Garlington, 246 Ala. 665, 22 So. 2d 89 (1945). On these facts, it is clear that appellant is not in a position to benefit from a sex-neutral alimony statute.3 His standing to raise the constitutional question in this case, therefore, cannot be founded on a claim that he would, but for his sex, be entitled to an award of alimony from his wife under the Alabama statutes.
B
The Court holds that Mr. Orr’s standing to raise his equal protection claim lies in the burden he bears under the Alabama statutes. He is required to pay alimony to his needy former spouse while similarly situated women are not. That *296the State may render Mr. Orr’s victory in this Court a hollow one by neutrally extending alimony rights to needy husbands does not, according to the Court, destroy his standing, for the State may elect instead to do away with alimony altogether. The possibility that Alabama will turn its back on the thousands of women currently dependent on alimony checks for their support4 is, as a practical matter, nonexistent. But my conclusion that appellant lacks standing in this Court does not rest on the strong likelihood that Alabama will respond to today’s decision by passing a sex-neutral statute. Appellant has simply not demonstrated that either alternative open to the State — even the entire abrogation of alimony — will free him of his burden.
The alimony obligation at issue in this case was fixed by an agreement between the parties, and appellant makes no claim that the contract is unenforceable under state law. Indeed, the Court itself concedes that “despite the unconstitutionality of the alimony statutes, Mr. Orr may have a continuing obligation to his former wife based upon [their] agreement” Ante, at 275. The Court casually dismisses the matter, how-ever, as one “which we cannot, and would not, predict.” Ante, at 276 n. 5.
I cannot accede to the Court’s offhand dismissal of so serious an obstacle to the exercise of our jurisdiction. It is not our duty to establish Orr’s standing to have his claim decided on the merits. On the contrary, the burden is on him “to meet the minimum requirement of Art. Ill: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the [uncon*297stitutional statute], or that prospective relief will remove the harm.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 505; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Croup, Inc., 438 U. S., at 72; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S., at 260-261; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 38; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). That appellant has not carried this burden is clearly demonstrated by the Court’s acknowledgment that his alimony obligation may well be enforced under state contract law.
The Court’s analysis of Mr. Orr’s standing is not aided by its attempt to transform the instant case into one involving race discrimination. See ante, at 273. Of course, a state law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but not whites could be challenged by a black required, by operation of the statute, to pay alimony. Invalidation of the discriminatory alimony statute would relieve him of his burden. If, however, his alimony obligation was enforceable under state contract law independent of the challenged alimony statute, he could hardly argue that his injury was caused by the challenged statute. Invalidation of the statute would bring him no relief. Accordingly, the exercise of federal judicial power on his behalf “would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. Ill limitation.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 38.
Nor is the Court’s conclusion supported by Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra. At issue in Linda R. S. was a state statute subjecting to criminal prosecution any “parent” failing to support his “children.” State courts had consistently construed the statute to apply solely to the parents of legitimate children and to impose no duty of support on the parents of illegitimate children. The mother of an illegitimate child, claiming that the “discriminatory application” of the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, sought an injunction directing the local district attorney to prosecute the father of her child for violating the statute. This Court held that she lacked stand*298ing to raise her claim. While she “no doubt suffered an injury stemming from the failure of her child’s father to contribute support payments,” she had made “no showing that her failure to secure support payments result [ed] from the nonen-forcement, as to her child’s father, of [the child-support statute].” 410 U. S., at 618.
“Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child’s father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the 'direct’ relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of standing, is absent in this case.” Ibid.
Like appellant in Linda R. S., Mr. Orr has failed to show a “substantial likelihood” 5 that the requested relief will result in termination of his alimony obligation. Thus, far from supporting the Court’s finding of standing in appellant Orr, Linda R. S. leads inescapably to the opposite conclusion.6
*299II
Nor is appellant’s lack of standing somehow cured by the fact that the state courts reached and decided the merits of his constitutional claim. Article III is a jurisdictional limitation on federal courts, and a state court cannot transform an abstract or hypothetical question into a “case or controversy” merely by ruling on its merits. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), this Court held that a taxpayer lacked the requisite financial interest in the outcome of a,. First Amendment challenge to a state statute requiring Bible reading in public schools. In dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal from an adverse ruling in the State’s highest court, this Court held:
“We do not undertake to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory. But, because our own jurisdiction is cast in terms of ‘case or controversy’ we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure which does not constitute such.” Id., at 434.
Appellant’s case, having come to us on appeal rather than on writ of certiorari, is much like Marbury’s case in that Congress conferred upon each litigant the right to have his claim heard in this Court. But here, as in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and Doremus, supra, we are, in my opinion, prevented by Art. Ill of the Constitution from exercising the jurisdiction which Congress has sought to confer upon us.
III
Article III courts are not commissioned to roam at large, gratuitously righting perceived wrongs and vindicating claimed rights. They must await the suit of one whose advocacy is inspired by a “personal stake” in victory. The Fram*300ers’ wise insistence that those who invoke the power of a federal court personally stand to profit from its exercise ensures that constitutional issues are not decided in advance of necessity and that the complaining party stand in the shoes of those whose rights he champions. Obedience to- the rules of standing — the “threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention” 7 — is of crucial importance to constitutional adjudication in this Court, for when the parties leave these halls, what is done cannot be undone except by constitutional amendment.
Much as “Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell,” Congress and the States have this Court to ensure that their legislative Acts do not run afoul of the limitations imposed by the United States Constitution. But this Court has neither a Brutus nor a Cromwell to impose a similar discipline on it. While our “right of expounding the Constitution” is confined to “cases of a Judiciary Nature,” we are empowered to determine for ourselves when the requirements of Art. Ill are satisfied. Thus, “the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.” United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). I do not think the Court, in deciding the merits of appellant's constitutional claim, has exercised the self-restraint that Art. Ill requires in this case. I would therefore dismiss Mr. Orr’s appeal on the authority of Doremus v. Board of Education, supra.
2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (1911). Indeed, on four different occasions the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal, contained in the “Virginia Plan,” to associate Justices of the Supreme Court in a counsel of revision designed to render advice on pending legislation. 1 id., at 21. Suggestions that the Chief Justice be a member of the Privy Council to assist the President, and that the President or either House of Congress be able to request advisory opinions of the Supreme Court were likewise rejected. 2 id., at 328-329, 340-344.
The Court suggests that “[i]t may be that appellant’s Circuit Court motion challenging the constitutionality of the statutes could be construed as constituting a claim for alimony.” Ante, at 271-272, n. 2. The Court further notes that in any event, “the state courts did not challenge appellant’s standing on this or any other ground.” Ibid.
Appellant’s motion, made in response to the court’s order to show cause why he should not be judged in contempt, provides in pertinent part: “WHEREFORE, your Respondent moves the Court for an order decreeing that:
“1. Code of Alabama, Title 34, §§ 31-33 arbitrarily discriminate against male spouses and thus are in violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and thereby are unconstitutional.
“2. A permanent injunction be issued against the continued enforcement of these statutes.
“3. The decree ordering your Respondent to pay the Complainant alimony be rendered null and void.” App. to Juris. Statement 24a. How this can be construed as constituting a claim for alimony is beyond me. That the state courts did not challenge appellant’s standing on his failure to claim entitlement to alimony is wholly irrelevant. We are not here concerned with the question whether Mr. Orr lacked standing under state law to bring this suit in an Alabama court. The Case and Controversy Clause of Art. Ill is a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts. See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952).
The Court states that appellant’s standing is rendered “unassailable” by his allegations (1) that under Alabama law a man must maintain his wife in a manner to which she has been accustomed, and (2) that alimony stipulations are reviewed as to their fairness to the wife before being incorporated into court decrees. Ante, at 273-274, n. 3. The Court interprets these allegations as an argument by appellant “that a gender-neutral statute would result in lower payments on his part.” Ibid.
First, appellant nowhere argues that his alimony obligation would have been less under a sex-neutral statute. The allegations cited by the Court are made in support of appellant’s contention that the Alabama alimony statutes were inspired by “archaic notions” about the proper role of women — a contention going to the merit-s of his equal protection claim rather than his standing to raise it. Second, since his alimony obligation was fixed by an agreement between the parties, appellant could not have seriously made such an argument in any event. Third, even if he had made the argument attributed to him by the Court, it is patently meritless. A gender-neutral alimony statute, by definition, treats husbands and wives the same. Presumably, therefore, a husband claiming under such a statute would be entitled to an amount sufficient to support him in the manner to which he had been accustomed and would be entitled to judicial review of the fairness of any alimony stipulation before its incorporation into the court decree. Far from rendering Mr. Orr’s standing “unassailable,” the allegations seized upon by the Court are utterly beside the point.
The Court suggests that because the Alabama courts are free to hold that the constitutionality of a divorce decree entered without constitutional objection cannot be challenged in contempt proceedings, there is no reason for concern that today’s decision will nullify existing alimony obligations. Alabama males currently under court order to pay alimony, however, need not wait until contempt proceedings are lodged against them to raise their constitutional challenge. Rather, they may simply petition the court for relief from the unconstitutional divorce decree.
"Our recent cases have required no more than a showing that there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed to satisfy the second prong of the constitutional standing requirement.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 75 n. 20 (1978).
The Court seizes on our gratuitous observation in Linda R. S. that “ 'the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of [the child-support statute] would be a parent of a legitimate child who has been prosecuted under the statute. Such a challenge would allege that because the parents of illegitimate children may not be prosecuted, the statute unfairly discriminates against the parents of legitimate children.' 335 F. Supp., at 806.” 410 U. S., at 619 n. 5. As a statement on standing to challenge a discriminatory criminal statute, the quoted passage cannot be faulted. Clearly, a parent prosecuted under such a statute would satisfy both the injury-in-fact and the causation requirements of standing — invalidation of the statute would totally remove the prosecuted parent’s harm. In the instant ease, however, the Court itself admits that today’s decision may well be gratuitous insofar as appellant Orr is concerned.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 518 (1975).