with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, and with whom Mr. Justice Stevens joins as to Part I, dissenting.
The Court today disapproves enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board essentially on the theory that the order fails to accommodate properly the competing interests of the Union, individual employees, and the employer. We have formerly stressed, however, that “ ‘balancing . . . conflicting legitimate interests ... to effectuate na*321tional labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.’ ” Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 501 (1978), quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957). Because I perceive no warrant to disturb the balance the Board has struck in this case, I dissent.
I
As the Court holds, the relevance of the test questions and answer sheets to the performance of the Union’s statutory duties is established for present purposes by the Company’s failure to press the issue properly before the Board. The Court, moreover, does not explicitly upset the Board’s determination that the Company’s failure to release those materials to the Union amounted to an unfair labor practice. The only issue here regarding the test questions and answer sheets is “whether the Board abused its remedial discretion when it ordered the Company to deliver directly to the Union the copies of the test battery and answer sheets.” Ante, at 312-313 (emphasis added). If, however, the basic impropriety of the Company’s failure to divulge the materials to the Union is settled, the Board’s remedial authority to compel conditional disclosure is abundantly clear. The Court is quite wrong in holding that the Board’s order exceeded the agency’s “broad discretionary [remedial power].” Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 216 (1964). For it is too well established that a decree fashioned by the Board to remedy violations of the Act “will not be disturbed 'unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.’ ” Ibid., quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533, 540 (1943).
The Court nevertheless asserts that the Board erred in directing the Company to release the test questions and *322answer sheets directly to the Union with no more formal assurance that secrecy will be preserved than that afforded by the Board's protective order. Release to the Union, it is said, risks imminent general disclosure without any apparent justification. Presumably, the test questions and answer sheets ought to be divulged to a psychologist instead. In so concluding, the majority — in my view — unduly discounts the Board’s own appraisal of the jeopardy to the Company’s interests and of the substantiality of countervailing concerns.
A
The Board ordered release of the test questions and answer sheets only on condition that the Union preserve their secrecy. Specifically, the Union was admonished not to copy the materials or to make them available to potential test takers or to others who might advise the employees of their content. The Court scoffs at the order; however, on the ground that “there is substantial doubt whether the Union would be subject to a contempt citation were it to ignore the restrictions.” Ante, at 315.1 But the Board placed no reliance on contempt sanc*323tions when it directed release, and there is scant reason for rejecting the Board’s judgment that sanctions of that sort are unnecessary. The Board, in my view, had forceful and independent grounds for concluding that the Union would respect the confidentiality of the materials and take due precautions against inadvertent exposure.
The Union has enjoyed a long and extensive relationship with the employer2 that it would be loath to jeopardize by intentionally breaching the conditions of release. Cf. Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 N. L. R. B. 964, 974 (1973). Even if the Union had any incentive to publicize the examination questions, its ardor would be dampened by the likely long-term consequences of that course; the Board exercises continuing authority over the Union’s affairs, and it may well approve the Company’s future insistence on rigorous secrecy, thus delimiting the Union’s subsequent latitude in grievance processing.3 Moreover, dissemination of test materials to potential test takers might impair the interests of those employees who qualify fairly for a desired position, thus inviting their disapprobation.4
*324The Company acknowledges, in any event, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, and the Court agrees, see ante, at 316, that the real concern is with inadvertent disclosure. Yet there is no basis for assuming that the Union would handle the materials so cavalierly as to chance accidental disclosure, given the gravity with which the issue has been treated by all concerned. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, the Board had ample grounds to expect Union cooperation. And this Court is ill-equipped to fault the Board on a matter so plainly summoning the Board’s keen familiarity with industrial behavior.
B
Besides overrating the hazards of direct release to the Union of the test questions, the Court undervalues the interests vindicated by that procedure. The Court asserts simply that the “Board has cited no principle of national labor policy to warrant a remedy that would unnecessarily disserve '[the Company’s interest in maintaining secrecy], and we are unable to identify one.” Ante, at 315. The Board observed in its decision, however, that “[a]s the bargaining agent of the employees involved, it is the Union which is entitled to information which is necessary to its role as bargaining agent in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreement.” 218 N. L. R. B. 1024 (1975). The employer’s “accommodation” — releasing the test questions solely to a psychologist — which the Court tacitly endorses, is fundamentally at odds with the basic structure of the bargaining process. Congress has conferred paramount representational responsibilities and obligations on the employees’ freely chosen bargaining agent. Yet the Company’s alternative would install a third-party psychologist as a partner, if not primary actor, in promotion-related grievance proceedings.
*325The services of a professional psychologist, furthermore, may be totally unnecessary. Suspected difficulties with the test questions may necessitate consultation with a psychologist, but resort to such assistance is not so foreordained as to justify compulsory retention of a psychologist as a condition to availability of materials pertinent to the processing of a grievance. In fact, the attendant expense may well encourage the Union to forgo requesting the information, despite its potential utility. Confronted with these concerns, the Board reasonably undertook to ensure that primary responsibility for grievance evaluation and processing remains where Congress put it, and that the Union’s access to pertinent information remains unimpeded by cumbersome or prohibitive obstacles.
II
The Court further concludes that the Company properly declined to disclose the examinees’ test scores, associated with the employees’ names, absent consent by the examinees themselves.5 In the majority’s view, the Board accorded too little *326weight to the interests of individual employees in the confidentiality of their test results and too much significance to the “minimal” burden on the Union that would result from a consent requirement. In this respect, too, the Court inappropriately substitutes its judgment for the reasonable determination of the Board.
Preliminarily, it is notable that the confidentiality of the test results was significantly compromised by circumstances *327independent of the Board’s disclosure order at issue herein. The Union, and the employees generally, were aware that the 10 aggrieved job applicants received scores below 10.3 — the cutoff point. Moreover, in consequence of the arbitrator’s ruling, it became generally evident that 3 of the 10 applicants had earned scores falling between 9.3 and 10.3 and that the remaining 7 had scored below 9.3. See 218 N. L. R. B., at 1032. Thus, the real question here is whether the Board was unreasonable in concluding that the marginal intrusion on confidentiality accompanying full disclosure to the Union was so profound as to require the withholding of that information from the statutory bargaining representative.
Significantly, the employer has presented no evidence that the employees involved actually oppose disclosure. Nor has the Company demonstrated any palpable basis for believing that release will result in harassment or ridicule of the examinees. Cf. United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F. 2d 1198, 1207 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 993 (1971). The Court notes that "the Company presented evidence that disclosure of individual scores had in the past resulted in the harassment of some lower scoring examinees who had, as a result, left the Company.” Ante, at 319. But that evidence consisted of an isolated representation by a Company psychologist concerning events occurring “many, many years ago.” App. 84. And the Administrative Law Judge evidently dismissed the account in concluding that the Company had “produced no probative evidence that the employees’ sensitivities are likely to be abused by disclosure of the scores.” 218 N. L. R. B., at 1035.6 When an employer resists the *328divulgence of materials relevant to employee grievances, I would think that the employer has the burden of establishing any justification for nondisclosure. The Court, however, presumes what yet remains to be shown.
Moreover, there is no basis in the governing statute or regulations for attributing ascendant importance to the employees’ confidentiality interests. Whether confidentiality considerations should prevail in the circumstances of this case is, as the Company and majority agree, principally a matter of policy. But it cannot be gainsaid that the Board is the body charged in the first instance with the task of discerning and effectuating congressional policies in the labor-management area. Its judgments in that regard should not be lightly overturned. Yet the Court strikes its own balance according decisional weight to concerns having no asserted or apparent foundation in the statute it purports to construe or in other applicable legislation.
The Court lightly dismisses the Union’s interest in receipt of the examinees’ identified scores, with or without consent, by declaring the burdens involved as “minimal.” Ante, at 319. The Administrative Law Judge noted, however, that the “Union’s obligation is to represent the unit of employees as a whole[; the Company] may not frustrate this by requiring the Union to secure the consent of individuals in the unit in order to secure information relevant and reasonably necessary to the enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement which exists for the benefit of all.” 218 N. L. R. B., at 1036.7 *329Were individual examinees to withhold consent, and thus prevent the Union from scrutinizing their scores in light of their demographic and occupational characteristics, the Union might be inhibited in its efforts to discern patterns or anomalies indicating bias in the operation of the tests.8 Thus, the Board directed divulgence of the scores to the employees’ statutory bargaining representative to enable it effectively to fulfill its vital statutory functions. Such a limited intrusion, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 602 (1977), for the purpose of vindicating grave statutory policies, hardly signals an occasion for judicial intervention.9
*330Ill
In sum, I think the Board’s resolution is sound and that the Sixth Circuit’s judgment enforcing it should be sustained. I do not mean to suggest that the considerations advanced by the Company are without substance or that this case does not present a “difficult and delicate” task of balancing competing claims. Cf. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S., at 501. But, by virtue of that, this is precisely the kind of case in which “considerable deference” is owed the Board. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978); see NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 499 (1960); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S., at 96. Importantly, “[h]ere, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board’s special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life, . . . and of '[appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases’ from *331its special understanding of 'the actualities of industrial relations.' ” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963), quoting NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). I think it unjustified to depart from our accustomed mode of review. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court suggests that the Court of Appeals’ order cannot reach the Union because the order as it affects the Union is not literally within the compass of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65 (d). But the policy underlying Rule 65 (d) is that of not having “ 'order[s] or injunctionfs] so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law.’ ” Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 180 (1973), quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 9, 13 (1945); see United States v. Hall, 472 F. 2d 261 (CA5 1972). Cf. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U. S. 159, 171-178 (1977). Here, the Union was a party to the administrative proceedings, the Union’s rights were adjudicated therein, it had the opportunity to secure judicial review of the terms subsequently enforced, it had notice that enforcement would be requested, it doubtless has notice of the terms of the enforcement order itself, and extension of the order to reach the Union is urged to ensure that the Court of Appeals’ determination of the cogniz-ability and scope of the Union’s right of access will be fully respected. Thus, the Union is in practical effect as much a party as any typical de*323fendant who has been given an opportunity to be heard but who has declined to avail itself of that opportunity.
The Court speculates, however, that the Board would not initiate contempt proceedings in the event of Union disclosure. That observation assumes without basis that the Board would acquiesce in the Union’s disregard of the Board’s own directives.
The Union has been the certified representative of the Company’s employees since about 1943, in approximately 28 different bargaining units. The Union was first certified by the Board in 1971 as the representative of operating and maintenance employees of the production department of the Monroe Power Plant, wherefrom this controversy arose.
The Union’s disregard of the conditions of release may also violate the Union’s duty to bargain in good faith under § 8 (b) (3) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(3), Comment, Psychological Aptitude Tests and the Duty to Supply Information: NLRB v. Detroit Edison Co., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 876 n. 49 (1978), subjecting the Union to appropriate sanctions.
By prejudicing the interests of such employees and by eroding its bargaining relationship with the employer, the Union may provoke its own *324ouster by disgruntled members of the bargaining unit. In certain circumstances, the Union’s action might also invite unfair-representation suits by employees who are clearly disadvantaged by the disclosure.
The Court assumes for the sake of discussion that the identified test scores are relevant to the performance of the Union’s statutory duties. I think that assumption is well founded. The test of relevance for purposes of the duty to disclose is a liberal “discovery-type standard.” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, 437 (1967). The scores unquestionably satisfy that standard, as they possess a substantial bearing on the issue whether the employer’s reliance on test performance denied the aggrieved employees their contractual right to be appointed as Instrument Man unless outshone by less senior applicants with significantly superior qualifications.
As the Administrative Law Judge noted, the Union needs access to the test scores, identified by the 'examinees’ names, in order to police the contract, 218 N. L. R. B. 1024, 1034 (1975). The information would enable the Union to detect abuses in the administration of the tests and, because the examination papers — eliciting multiple-choice responses — were graded manually, grading errors are not improbable and are susceptible of detection by a Union representative. See id., at 1027, 1034.
Moreover, inspection of the examinees’ results might disclose unacceptable biases in the tests themselves. Inspection of test scores and the *326personal characteristics of the employees tested might reveal that certain employees are encountering difficulties with the tests for reasons unrelated to job aptitude. Put another way, the margin of error inhering in the examination may be assignable to test biases identifiable with the aid of the examinees’ answer sheets. See Comment, 91 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 3, at 873-874.
The utility of such information in determining whether the test battery fairly measures job aptitude in particular instances is illustrated by the following colloquy between the arbitrator and an expert witness in the Company’s employ:
“The Arbitratok: I guess what I am wondering about in this kind of a test is when you grade these, you are just . . . taking the raw score and not looking at what might be the elements in the test. Is that right?
“The WitNess: No. We would look at the elements of the test. We always look at the parts of the test because sometimes a performance on a particular kind of segment of any test might indicate that we have a bad testing situation; this person really didn’t have an opportunity to do what he is capable of doing, and you then can find out that, for example, a person’s native language might not be English and that might account for the peculiar thing and you would then not even perhaps score the test.
“The Arbitrator: How would you see that? How would you find that data?
“The WitNess : Well, you would see it because this particular test has, .for example, several different elements tapping different kinds of abilities, some based on verbal use of language and some not so heavily weighted in that direction, and you would see a pronounced difference which is completely out of character. It just doesn’t fit.
“This is what normally happens when given the test. A test is an overall look at engineering and physical science aptitudes. That is a rather closely-knit set, and if one of the tests were way off, one might then legitimately ask whether or not you had a good test overall.” App. 324r-325.
There is no reason to believe, moreover, that release of the scores to the Union will result in dissemination to the employees generally. The Union has no incentive, and indeed would be foolish, to publicize test information against the wishes of an actual or potential member of the bargaining unit. Furthermore, the Board’s order may reasonably be read to restrict the divulgence and use of the test scores as well as the test questions.
Even an individual employee cannot press his own grievance in such a way as to frustrate the Union’s responsibility to ensure fairness to all members of the bargaining unit. Although an individual employee has the statutory right to present a grievance at any time to his employer, “the bargaining representative [must be] given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.” § 9 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). The Company’s policy to have its psychologist explain an examinee’s score to him when the examinee has failed to make the cutoff, see ante, at 307, but *329not to disclose the same information to the Union, is directly inconsistent with the mandate of § 9 (a). As the Administrative Law Judge observed:
“In essence, [the employer] here contends that, having voluntarily chosen a particular form or mechanism to determine the right of bargaining unit employees to be promoted, [the employer] is now precluded by the very devices which it adopted from dealing with the employees’ bargaining representative about critical elements of the promotion process, and will deal only with the individual. Such a program, which freezes out the bargaining representative from participation in significant elements of the promotion process, and seeks to substitute individual bargaining therefor constitutes a complete negation of the bargaining process . . . .” 218 N. L. R. B., at 1035.
Release of the information to a psychologist alone would be unsatisfactory. See supra, at 324-325. The Union would be relegated “ ‘to play[ing] a game of blind man’s bluff.’ ” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S., at 438 n. 8, quoting Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 E. 2d 716, 721 (CA2 1966).
In other contexts, the courts have generally rejected claims of confidentiality as a basis for withholding relevant information. See General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F. 2d 1177 (CA6 1972) (wage data); NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F. 2d 974 (CA8 1967) (selling-price lists) ; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F. 2d 61 (CA3 1965) (job evaluation and wage data); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F. 2d 956 (CA5) (wage data), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 836 (1955); cf. United Aircraft Corp., 192 N. L. R. B. 382, 390 (1971) (company physician’s records not disclosable without employee’s permission unless needed for a particular grievance), modified on other issues sub nom. Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 825 (1976); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, *330457 F. 2d 615, 619 (CA9 1972) (refusal to furnish employees' names without consent was proper when it was “establish[ed] beyond cavil that there was a clear and present danger of harassment and violence”). See also Cowles Communications, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 1909 (1968) (employees' salaries and other particularized data about employees); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 89 N. L. R. B. 1192 (1950) (wage data); R. Gorman, Labor Law 417-418 (1976); Comment, 91 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 3, at 873-874, and n. 35. In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969), in another setting, a plurality of this Court observed:
“The disclosure requirement [imposed by the Board and concerning employees’ names and addresses] furthers [statutory objectives] by encouraging an informed employee electorate and by allowing unions the right of access to employees that management already possesses. It is for the Board and not for this Court to weigh against this interest the asserted interest of employees in avoiding the problems that union solicitation may present.” Id., at 767.
American Federation of Govt. Employees v. Defense General Supply Center, 573 F. 2d 184 (CA4 1978), from which the majority seeks support, ante, at 319 n. 16, involved a federal employer not subject to the National Labor Relations Act and a construction of the federal Privacy Act.