concurring in the judgment.
In order for there to be federal district court jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), two requirements must be met. First, the suit must be “authorized by law,” and, second, the suit must seek redress of a deprivation under color of state law of any right “secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights . ...”1 Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations under color of state law of any right “secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.2 I agree with the Court’s conclusion that, even assuming the claims in these cases — of inconsistency between state welfare practices and the Social Security Act — are “authorized by law” because they are within the reach of § 1983, the district courts do not have jurisdiction under § 1343 (3) because the claims do not involve deprivation of constitutional rights and the Social Security Act is not a law providing for equal rights.3
*647Yet I am not able to reach this conclusion without addressing the issue the Court does not resolve: whether §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) are coextensive. Both provisions were derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,4 which did not contain a jurisdictional provision separate from the cause of action. Rather, the 1871 Act stated that “such proceeding” as therein authorized would “be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States . ...”5 However, for over a century — since the general statutory revision in 1874 — the plain terms of the cause of action and the jurisdictional provision at issue here, § 1343 (3), have not been commensurate. In order to determine with confidence *648the scope of rights encompassed by either provision, it is necessary, I believe, to examine the evolution of and to construe both provisions.
Certainly the issue of the reach of the § 1983 cause of action has been properly preserved for review in this Court.6 Throughout the history of this litigation, the aid recipients have urged that §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) are necessarily congruent, and that their claims are encompassed by both provisions.7 My three dissenting Brethren are of this view. On the other hand, the State of New Jersey and my Brother *649Powell appear to be of the view that while the two provisions are necessarily of equal scope, neither reaches the claims in these cases. The Court, by not resolving the scope of § 1983, apparently rejects the view that the two sections are necessarily coextensive.8 However, it leaves open the possibility embraced by the State of New Jersey and my Brother Powell that the claims in these cases are encompassed by neither § 1983 nor § 1343 (3).
I would and do reject this possibility. The provisions are not of equal scope: Although the suits in these cases are authorized by § 1983, they are not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1343 (3). The legislative history supports this view when approached with readiness to believe that Congress meant what the plain words it used say, as we have been taught is the proper approach to civil rights legislation originating in the post-Civil War days. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 436-437 (1968); United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966). The conclusion that § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations under color of state law for federal statutory as well as constitutional rights not only reflects a straightforward and natural reading of its language, but also is supported by our cases that have assumed or indicated in dicta that this is the correct construction of the provision, as well as by our decisions giving the same construction to the post-Civil War statutes criminalizing invasions of federal rights in language almost identical to that found in § 1983. On the other hand, the conclusion that § 1343 (3) encompasses only rights granted under “equal rights” statutes, in addition to constitutional rights, is compelled because of the equally plain terms of that statute and the absence of any overriding indication in the *650legislative history that these plain terms should be ignored. The argument of my Brother Powell that § 1983 was intended to remedy only those rights within the “equal rights” ambit of § 1343 (3) is not at all convincing with respect to the meaning to be attached to its predecessor, § 1979 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, at the time it was adopted, much less with respect to the construction to be accorded it in the light of developments during the last century.
I
The first post-Civil War legislation relevant to ascertaining the meaning of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) is the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of that Act secured to all persons, with respect to specified rights, such as the right to contract, “the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Under § 2 of the 1866 Act, deprivation of these rights under color of state law was a misdemeanor.9 Section 3 of the Act provided concurrent district and circuit court jurisdiction “of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them” by § 1. Section 3 also provided for removal of certain criminal and civil cases from federal court. Unlike § 2, neither § 1 nor § 3 was limited to deprivations arising *651under color of state law.10 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 420-437.
Because of uncertainty as to its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact the foregoing provisions, Congress in §§16 and 17 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, substantially re-enacted §§ 1 and 2 of the 1866 Act pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had been ratified in the interim. Although § 8 of the 1870 Act provided for concurrent district and circuit court jurisdiction “of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under this act, except as herein otherwise provided,” § 18 re-enacted the 1866 Act by reference and provided that §§16 and 17 would be enforced according to the provisions of the 1866 Act. Further, § 6 of the 1870 Act made it a crime to conspire to deny any person “any right or privilege granted or secured ... by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” In contrast to § 17 (re-enacting § 2 of the 1866 Act), which criminalized only color-of-law deprivations of the specified rights of equality guaranteed by § 16, § 6 reached “all of the rights and privileges” secured by “all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States.” United States v. Price, supra, at 800 (emphasis in original).11
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, following the lead of the 1866 and 1870 Acts in opening the federal courts to remedy deprivations of federal rights, created a new civil remedy neither repetitive of nor entirely analogous to any of the provisions in the earlier Civil Rights Acts. Section 1 of the 1871 Act, like § 17 of the 1870 Act, provided redress only for deprivations of rights under color of state law. But whereas § 17 applied only where there was deprivation of the rights of equality secured or protected by § 16 (re-enacting § 1 *652of the 1866 Act), the new civil remedy in the 1871 Act encompassed deprivations of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.”12 In this respect it was similar to the criminal provision provided in § 6 of the 1870 Act, which, however, encompassed invasions of any federal statutory, as well as constitutional, right. Moreover, although the new civil remedy did not reach deprivations under color-of-law of statutory rights, neither did it modify or replace remedies under the 1866 and 1870 Acts for deprivations of rights of equality specified therein, which remedies were applicable to private deprivations as well as deprivations under color of state law,13 see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1326-1328 (1952).
*653As relevant for present purposes, this was the status of civil rights legislation when the Revised Statutes of 1874 were adopted. With respect to the matters at issue here, the 1874 revision of the federal statutory law did not appreciably alter the substantive rights guaranteed or secured by the federal law. Federal constitutional rights, of course, could not have been amended by the revision. Furthermore, insofar as material to these cases, there were no substantive statutory rights newly created, modified, or eliminated.14 Thus, § 16 of the 1870 Act, in essence a restatement of § 1 of the 1866 Act, survived but was split into two sections of the Revised Statutes, §§ 1977 and 1979.15 These two sections remained a declaration of rights that all citizens in the country were to have against each other, as well as against their Government. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968).
With respect to the remedial power of the federal courts, however, the 1874 revision effected substantial changes16 that are relevant to the present discussion.
*654First, in the area of crimes, while § 6 of the 1870 Act (criminalizing private as well as color-of-law conspiracies to deprive persons of their federal constitutional or statutory-rights) was retained essentially unchanged as § 5508 of the Revised Statutes, § 17 of the 1870 Act (the criminal provision originally enacted as § 2 of the 1866 Act and directed solely at deprivations under color of state law) was expanded to parallel § 5508. Section 17 had criminalized only the infringement of the specific rights of equality guaranteed by § 16 of the 1870 Act, but the new provision, § 5510 of the Revised Statutes, was “broadened to include as wide a range of rights as [§ 5508] already did: ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.’ ” United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 803.
Second, the civil remedy directed solely at deprivations under color of law was likewise expanded to encompass all statutory as well as constitutional rights. Thus, whereas § 1 of the 1871 Act had provided for redress of color-of-law deprivations of rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States,” § 1979 of the Revised Statutes provided a civil remedy for such deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws,” the substantive federal rights protected thus mirroring those covered by §§ 5508 and 5510.17 As noted with respect to the widened scope of § 5510: “The substantial change thus effected was made with the customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized without changing substance.” United States v. Price, supra, at 803 (footnote omitted).
Third, the jurisdictional provisions of the various Civil Rights Acts were split off and consolidated in the Revised Statutes. Section 3 of the 1866 Act (re-enacted under § 18 of the 1870 Act), which provided federal jurisdiction for “all causes . . . affecting persons . . . denied” the rights now *655stated in §§ 1977 and 1978, was entirely deleted. The jurisdictional provision of the 1871 Act, authorizing federal courts to entertain civil suits brought pursuant thereto, became the basis for the new jurisdictional provisions in the Revised Statutes, which were stated separately for the district and circuit courts. Thus, Rev. Stat. § 563 (12) invested the district courts with jurisdiction over all civil actions — without regard to the amount in controversy — for any deprivation under color of state law of any rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States, or ... by any law of the United States ... .” 18 This jurisdictional grant tracked the expanded remedy provided in § 1979.
With respect to the circuit courts, however, Rev. Stat. § 629 (16) provided jurisdiction over deprivation under color of state law of federal constitutional rights — without regard to the amount in controversy — but stopped short of encompassing suits involving violations of statutory rights, referring only to any right “secured by the Constitution of the United States, or ... by any law providing for equal rights . . . .”19 Nonetheless, the circuit courts as well as the district courts were separately provided with criminal jurisdiction over cases arising under §§ 5508 and 5510, both of which reached deprivation of rights secured not only by the Constitution but by any law of the Union.20
Thus, under the Revised Statutes of 1874 the federal circuit *656courts were not empowered to entertain certain categories of suits brought to vindicate federal statutory rights against state invasion. Of course, at this time neither the district nor circuit courts had been granted general federal-question jurisdiction; rather, they existed to deal with diversity cases and suits in specialized areas of federal law such as federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits by the United States, and civil rights cases. In 1875, however, Congress extended to the circuit courts original jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the several States, “of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made... Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.21 Thereafter, on the face of the statutes, the circuit courts had original jurisdiction, if the jurisdictional amount was satisfied, over any suit arising under the Constitution or any law of the United States, as well as jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, of any case involving a color-of-state-law deprivation of any constitutional right or any right secured by law pro*657viding for equal rights.22 The district courts had no general “arising under” jurisdiction but retained their original jurisdiction over suits alleging deprivation under color of state law of any.right secured either by the Constitution or by any law of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.
With the adoption of the 1911 Judicial Code, the circuit courts were abolished, and the district courts became the sole federal courts of first instance. The principal elements of the district court’s jurisdiction included diversity cases involving in excess of $3,000,23 all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States involving in excess of $3,000;24 all criminal offenses under the federal laws — including those arising under Rev. Stat. §§ 5508 and 551025 — and a series of specialized types of federal-law cases having no amount-in-controversy requirement.26 Included in this latter category was § 24 (14), which provided jurisdiction for all suits at law or in equity to redress deprivation under color of state law “of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” With minor changes in wording, this provision is now codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
The language of Rev. Stat. § 1979 (now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1983) remained unchanged, providing a federal *658cause of action for color-of-law deprivations of any right “secured by the Constitution and laws.” On the face of the jurisdictional statutes, then, it would appear that after 1911 § 1983 cases could be brought in federal court under general federal-question jurisdiction if they involved the necessary amount in controversy; otherwise, they could be entertained in federal court only if they sought redress for deprivation of a constitutional right or of a right under a federal statute providing for equal rights.
II
Having examined the context in which the foregoing statutory developments occurred, I agree with the Court that there is nothing in the relevant provisions or in their history that should lead us to conclude that Congress did not mean what it said in defining the jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts in 1874 or, much less, that in adopting the Judicial Code in 1911, Congress meant the language “any law of the United States providing for equal rights” to mean “any law of the United States.”
By the same token, I also conclude that nothing in the history and evolution of § 1983 leads to the conclusion that Congress did not mean what it said in 1874 in describing the rights protected as including those secured by federal “laws” as well as by the “Constitution.” I am, therefore, not disposed to repudiate the view repeatedly stated in previous cases that § 1983 encompasses federal statutory as well as constitutional entitlements. Although the Court has not previously given extended consideration to the scope of the rights protected by § 1983,27 our acceptance of the plain terms of that statute and *659analogous criminal proscriptions has been consistent, and for over a century Congress has not acted to rectify any purported error in our construction of these provisions.
Until today, we have expressly declined, most recently in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533-535, n. 5 (1974),28 to indicate whether Social Security Act claims based solely on alleged inconsistency between state and federal law might be *660within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1343. But we have not doubted the propriety of challenging under the “and laws” provision of § 1983 state action involving deprivation of federal statutory rights. On the very day the jurisdictional issue was reserved in Hagans, the Court stated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 675 (1974):
“It is, of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States.”
And in Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 829-830 (1966), the Court noted that “[u]nder 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1964 ed.) the [state] officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights covered by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well.” Other dicta recognizing that § 1983 encompasses statutory federal rights are found in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 700-701 (1978);29 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 239-240, n. 30 (1972); 30 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 543 n. 7 (1972);31 and Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525-526 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.).32
Under the holding in Hagans, supra, at 536, that a federal court has power to hear a pendent claim based on the Social *661Security Act when a substantial constitutional claim is also raised,33 a cause of action for the pendent statutory claim must still be “authorized by law” in order for the claim to be cognizable in federal court under § 1343. That cause of action in Hagans, as in previous decisions of this Court that have reviewed the statutory claim, was provided by § 1983.
Likewise, our previous cases construing Rev. Stat. § 5508 (now 18 U. S. C. § 241) and Rev. Stat. § 5510 (now 18 U. S. C. § 242) — each of which describes the rights protected in language nearly identical to that used in § 198334 — leave no doubt that federal statutory as well as constitutional entitlements are encompassed thereby.
One of the first cases35 construing what is now § 241 held that the rights “secured by the Constitution or laws” included homesteading rights granted in §§2289-2291 of the Revised Statutes. United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76 (1884).36 In *662Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 293-295 (1892), the Court was noticeably careful to hold that the right to be secure from unauthorized violence while in federal custody was secured “by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Accord, In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 537-538 (1895). Moreover, subsequent decisions on the scope of § § 241 and 242, examining issues not here relevant, have cited Waddell, Logan, and Quarles approvingly in the respect considered above. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 386-387 (1915); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 108-109 (1945) (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 124-126, and n. 22 (opinion of Rutledge, J.); United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70, 80 (1951) (Williams II) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S., at 771 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 759 n. 17; United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 805 n. 18.
As noted, §§ 242 and 1983 were both derived from post-Civil War legislation providing redress for invasions of rights under color of state law. In the Revised Statutes of 1874, § 242 was expanded to encompass all constitutional rights, and both provisions were expanded to encompass rights secured by federal “laws.” The color-of-law requirement in each is the same.37 Apart from differences relating to the nature of the remedy invoked,38 they are commensurate. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183-185 (1961). Accordingly, I would hold with respect to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, as had been impliedly held with respect to 18 U. S. C. § 242, that the term “laws” encompasses all federal statutes. Like §§ 241 and 242, § 1983 *663must be deemed to have “dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and [to have] protected them in the lump.” United States v. Mosley, supra, at 387. There can be “no basis whatsoever for a judgment of Solomon which would give to the statute less than its words command.” United States v. Price, supra, at 803.
Ill
It is earnestly argued, however, that 42 U. S. C. § 1983, formerly Rev. Stat. § 1979, and 18 U. S. C. § 242, formerly Rev. Stat. § 5510, should be read as protecting against deprivation under color of state law only constitutional rights and rights granted under federal “equal rights” statutes. A corollary of this argument is that, although in 1874 Congress expressly invested the district courts with jurisdiction over all civil cases involving state interference with any right secured by the Constitution or by any federal law, see Rev. Stat. § 563 (12), Congress actually meant to refer, in addition to the Constitution, only to equal rights laws.
To the extent that these arguments are rooted in the notion that the 1866 Civil Rights Act provided the outer limits of the federal civil rights effort in the post-Civil War years, and thus implicitly limits the reach and scope of the relevant portions of the 1870 and 1871 Acts, they are quite unpersuasive. The 1870 Act, it is true, re-enacted the 1866 Act, but it also provided its own unique approaches, such as that adopted in § 6, proscribing private or public conspiracies interfering not merely with the specific rights of equality cataloged in § 1 of the 1866 Act, but with any right secured by federal constitutional or statutory law. Similarly, it cannot be supposed that in § 1 of the 1871 Act, Congress was merely granting a private cause of action for vindicating rights of equality with respect to enumerated activities within state legislative power, secured by § 1 of the 1866 Act, re-enacted as § 16 of the 1870 Act. The 1871 provision granted a remedy and jurisdiction in the federal courts to protect against state invasions of any and all constitutional rights; and whereas *664this cause of action applied only to invasions under color of state law, the earlier provisions applied as against private persons as well, with federal jurisdiction to hear “all causes ... affecting persons” denied the specific, enumerated rights. Thus, the very limiting construction urged of the term “and laws” as used in the Revised Statutes of 1874 cannot withstand scrutiny if predicated upon the proposition that the sole concern of the post-Civil War enactments was with vindicating particular rights of equality.
The more specific basis for the argument that the scope of § 1983 should be narrowed to less than its plain terms relates to the grant of civil rights jurisdiction to the circuit courts in the Revised Statutes. It is asserted that just as Congress limited the jurisdiction of those courts to suits involving constitutional rights or statutory rights secured in “equal rights” statutes, it intended likewise to confine the jurisdiction of the district courts under § 563 (12), the remedy provided by § 1979, and the criminal proscriptions in § 5510. However, the marginal notes and cross-references in the Revised Statutes for each of these provisions are as broad as the plain terms of the statutes themselves,39 and at least as to the civil cause of action and criminal proscription against deprivation under color of state law, we know that the alteration in *665terms was noted on the floor of the Congress that enacted the Revised Statutes.40 In fact, the marginal notations, as well as the entire statutory scheme, indicate that if an error was made at some point, it was not in the drafting of § 563 (12), § 1979, or § 5510, all of which employed broad terminology reaching federal statutes, but in the drafting of the circuit court provision. The marginal notation in the Revised Statutes for § 629 (16), like that for the district court provision, refers to “Suits to redress deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws ...” 41 (emphasis added), the language of §§ 1979 and 5510.
Nor do I find as unambiguous and as persuasive as does my Brother Powell the commentary of the revisers published in 1872 in connection with the anticipated definition of the circuit court’s jurisdiction. 1 Revision of the United States Statutes as Drafted by the Commissioners Appointed for that Purpose 359-363 (1872) (hereinafter Draft). The revisers went to some length to explain their deletion of the jurisdictional language used in § 3 of the 1866 Act (re-enacted by ref*666erence in § 18 of the 1870 Act). The provision, in granting jurisdiction for “all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons” denied rights, appeared, according to the revisers, to “allow every person who is denied any civil right in the courts of his own State to invoke the judicial power of the United States in every kind of controversy . . . 1 Draft 362. The revisers explained that a literal interpretation of such language “would involve consequences which Congress cannot be supposed to have intended . . .,” id., at 361, and further questioned whether such a broad grant of jurisdiction was even within the limitations of Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution, which, they noted, extended federal judicial power only to cases “arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties . .. .” 1 Draft 362 (emphasis in original). Thus, instead of using the jurisdictional language in § 3 of the 1866 Act, the revisers decided to track the language in § 1 of the 1871 Act, which provided jurisdiction only for suits involving “deprivation” of rights, rather than for all suits involving persons denied rights.
However, the revisers drafting the circuit court provision were not working from the new, and expanded, cause of action provided in § 1979, but from § 1 of the 1871 Act, which, they pointed out, referred to deprivation of rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States.” 1 Draft 362 (emphasis in original). If this language were transferred verbatim to the new circuit court jurisdictional provision, “it might perhaps be held that only such rights as are specifically secured by the Constitution, and not every right secured by a law authorized by the Constitution, were here intended . . . .” Ibid. Thus, the revisers thought it advisable — “deemed safer” — to include “a reference to the civil-rights act.” My Brother Powell is able to conclude from the foregoing 42 that *667the only statutory rights the revisers had in mind — in §§ 1979 and 5510, as well as in the district and circuit court jurisdictional provisions — were those catalogued in § 16 of the 1870 Act, essentially a re-enactment of § 1 of the 1866 Act.
Beyond the most obvious and overriding difficulty with this approach to statutory construction — whereby the plain terms of three statutes are ignored on the basis of the revisers’ commentary to a fourth and apparently inconsistent provision — there are several more technical problems with my Brother Powell’s approach. First, the reference ultimately included in the circuit court provision was not to § 16 of the 1870 Act, but to “any law providing for equal rights . . . ,” a far broader reference than necessary to achieve what those writing the commentary apparently intended to achieve.
Second, if the revisers’ comment is to be taken at face value, they must be held to have assumed that “every right secured by a law authorized by the Constitution” was secured by an “equal rights” statute, or even more incredibly, by § 16 of the 1870 Act. But surely my Brother Powell cannot be suggesting that the Constitution is so limited, and such a narrow view of the constitutional rights protected by § 1983 has been firmly rejected by this Court.43
*668Third, if the revisers likewise intended only to accommodate the 1866 and 1870 Acts in the district court jurisdictional provision, § 563 (12), referring to rights secured by “any law of the United States” was a most peculiar and clumsy way of doing so.44
Fourth, if, as does indeed appear from the comment relied upon, it was the revisers’ objective at least to provide jurisdiction for all suits alleging deprivation of the specific rights guaranteed in the 1866 and 1870 Acts, they failed in that attempt. Whereas § 3 of the 1866 Act had provided jurisdiction for suits alleging private, as well as color-of-law, deprivation of the rights enumerated, both § 629 (16) and § 563 (12), like § 1979, were limited to deprivations under color of state law.45
*669In view of the foregoing ambiguities, contradictions, and uncertainties, there is no satisfactory basis for overriding the clear terms of the Revised Statutes. The “customary stout assertions” of the revisers notwithstanding, it is abundantly obvious that the 1874 revision did change the terms of certain remedial and jurisdictional provisions. Congress was well aware of the broadened scope of § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act as redrafted in the Revised Statutes. And, for whatever reason, the limiting words in the circuit court jurisdictional provision were accepted and enacted by Congress; if there was a slip of the pen, it is more arguable that the mistake occurred here.46
Almost immediately, however, the circuit courts were given general federal-question jurisdiction, and in “codifying, revising, and amending” the laws relating to the judiciary in 1911,47 there is no indication whatsoever that Congress acted in less than a knowing and deliberate way in confining the jursdiction of the district courts — where the amount-in-*670controversy requirement was not met — to those color-of-law deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal equal rights statutes.48 The result is that since 1911, there have been some § 1983 suits not cognizable under § 1343 (3) and not cognizable in district court at all unless they involve the requisite jurisdictional amount under general federal-question jurisdiction. The effect of this amount-in-controversy prerequisite was and is to bar from the lower federal courts not only certain claims against state officers but also many private causes of actions not involving injury under color of law. Whatever the wisdom of precluding resolution of all federal-question cases in the federal courts — rather than leaving some of them to decision in the state courts (a course of action possibly in the process of being reversed by Congress) 49 — the uneven effect of this policy does not warrant refusal to recognize and apply the clear limiting language of § 1343 (3). Cf. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418 (1973).
IY
The foregoing examination of the evolution of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) demonstrates to my satisfaction that the two provisions cannot be read as though they were but one statute.50 *671The manifest object of the Reconstruction Congress to provide a private remedy for deprivation under color of state law of federal rights is one reason I am disposed to give no less than full credit to the language of § 1983. However, this conclusion that federal statutory claims are appropriately brought under § 1983 does not proceed to any extent from the notion that this statute, by its terms or as perceived when enacted, “secure[s]” rights or “provide[s] for equal rights,” in the language of § 1343 (3). Title 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1982, derived from § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and codified at §§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes, enunciate certain rights and state that they are to be enjoyed on the same basis by all persons. Thus, these statutes both secure rights and provide for equal rights, whereas § 1983, derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides only a cause of action — a remedy — for violations of federally protected rights.
Perhaps it could be said that the very process of judicial redress for deprivation of rights “secures” such rights and *672“provides” that they shall be “equal” in the sense that they shall be enjoyed by all persons. I agree that without processes for their enforcement, the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and in federal statutes may not be fully realized. Further, provision of remedies for denial of rights to some persons is essential to realization of these rights for all persons. However, a remedy — a cause of action without more — guarantees neither equality nor underlying rights. It is, rather, a process for enforcing rights elsewhere guaranteed. The substantive scope of the rights which may be the basis for a cause of action within § 1343 (3) jurisdiction is limited to the Constitution and those federal statutes that guarantee equality of rights. The substantive scope of the rights which may be protected and vindicated under § 1983 against contrary state action, on the other hand, includes not only federal constitutional rights but also all rights secured by federal statutes unless there is clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various other reasons a § 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional intention.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
My three dissenting Brethren conclude that § 1983 is the “equal rights” law referred to in § 1343 (3). But this construction makes superfluous *647§ 1343 (3)’s reference to constitutional claims, and renders unnecessary the nearly precise repetition in § 1343 (3) of the recital in § 1983 specifying suits brought against action “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” Further, the legislative evolution of § 1343 (3) cannot support the construction urged by the dissent. See n. 44, infra.
This provision read:
“[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication’; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.” 17 Stat. 13.
Nor can the significance of this controversy be gainsaid. If § 1983 does not encompass the claims in these cases, then not only is § 1343 jurisdiction defeated, but, unless some other authority for bringing suit were ascertained, general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 also would not be available — even were the requisite amount in controversy — because a claim under § 1983 would not be stated. Persons alleging inconsistency between state welfare practices and federal statutory requirements, or asserting state infringement of any federal statutory entitlement unrelated to equal or civil rights, would be precluded from having such claims heard in federal court unless authorized to do so by the statute granting the entitlement.
In 1978, the House of Representatives passed legislation that would remove the amount-in-controversy requirement in all federal-question suits under § 1331. H. R. 9622, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
Plaintiff recipients in both cases alleged a cause of action under § 1983, and in each case the District Court refused the state officials’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Both District Courts further held that there was jurisdiction over the § 1983 cause of action under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. Houston Welfare Rights Organization v. Vowell, 391 F. Supp. 223 (SD Tex. 1975); 418 F. Supp. 566 (NJ 1976). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in No. 77-719, affirmed both these findings below, as well as the holding for recipients on the merits of the claim under the Social Security Act. Houston Welfare Rights Organization v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219 (1977). In No. 77-5324, the Third Circuit assumed for purposes of addressing the § 1343 issue that a cause of action was stated under § 1983, and went on to direct dismissal for want of jurisdiction. 560 F. 2d 160 (1977). Respondents in No. 77-5324 continue to press the position that recipients have not stated a § 1983 cause of action.
See ante, at 616 (§ 1983 and § 1343 (3) “coverage is, or at least originally was, coextensive”). Previous cases have occasionally referred to § 1343 (3) as the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, see Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 583 (1976); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 540 (1972).
Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:
“[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is proscribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.” 14 Stat. 27.
See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (No. 14,247) (CC Md. 1867); United States y. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (CC Ky. 1866).
See, e. g., United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (No. 15,282) (CC SD Ala. 1871) (right of peaceable assembly and free speech within § 6 of Civil Rights Act of 1870). See generally United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 387-388 (1915).
During the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Representative Shellabarger explained that the “model” for the provision was § 2 of the 1866 Act, which “provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy,” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). However, Representative Shellabarger also stressed the broadened scope of § 1 of the 1871 Act:
“[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their national citizenship.” Ibid.
See also id., at App. 216-217 (Sen. Thurman):
“This section relates wholly to civil suits. ... Its whole effect is to give to the Federal Judiciary that which does not now belong to it ... . It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an action against the wrong-doer in the Federal courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy.”
The remaining portions of the 1871 Act were directed to suppressing the terror of the Ku Klux Klan. Section 2, which did not have a color-of-law requirement, defined the crimes, inter alia, of conspiracy to prevent federal oficiáis from enforcing the laws of the United States, and of conspiracy to deprive “any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.” Jurisdiction was to be in federal district or circuit courts. In addition, §2 provided that persons injured in violation of *653such conspiracies “or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States . . . may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages . . . , such action to be prosecuted in the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts under the provisions of” § 3 of the 1866 Act.
The recodification was not generally undertaken for the purpose of altering the substantive provisions of federal law. See Revision of Statutes Act of 1874, §2, 18 Stat. 113; Revision of Statutes Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 74.
The former guaranteed to all persons “the same right” to contract, to sue, etc., “as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and to be subject to like penalties and taxes. This provision, with minor word changes, is now 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Revised Statutes § 1978 guaranteed to all citizens “the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens” to inherit, hold, and convey real and personal property. This section was the precursor of 42 U. S. C. § 1982.
See 1 C. Bates, Federal Procedure at Law 473 (1908) (“The original judiciary act, and many other federal statutes, were badly mutilated in the revision . . .”).
Revised Statutes § 1979 read precisely as does 42 U. S. C. § 1983, see n. 2, supra.
Section 563 (12) of the Revised Statutes provided jurisdiction for actions alleging deprivation under color of state law of “any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States to persons within the jurisdiction thereof.”
Section 629 (16) of the Revised Statutes provided jurisdiction for suits to redress the deprivation under color of state law of “any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”
See Revised Statutes of 1874, §§ 563 (1), 629 (20).
There is remarkably little contemporaneous legislative comment concerning the grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 1875. As originally passed by the House of Representatives, the legislation conformed to its title, "An act regulating the removal of causes from State courts to the circuit courts of the United States,” and dealt only with cases involving diversity of citizenship. 2 Cong. Rec. 4301-4304 (1874). However, as it emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill provided both for removal and for original jurisdiction of the circuit courts of federal-question cases. See id., at 4979. After heated debate concerning primarily the broad venue provisions in the legislation, the Senate enacted the bill, and directed that its title be amended to read:
“An act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other purposes.” Id., at 4979-4988.
In conference, the House agreed to the Senate’s changes in the original legislation. See also F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65-68, and n. 34 (1928).
The grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, with its $500 amount-in-controversy requirement, did not diminish the grants of jurisdiction not subject to this requirement. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S., at 547-549.
§ 24 (1), Judiciary Act of 1911,36 Stat. 1091.
Ibid.
§24 (2).
See, e. g., §24(3) (admiralty jurisdiction); §24(16) (jurisdiction over certain suits involving national banks); § 24 (22) (jurisdiction over suits involving, inter alia, labor laws).
Until Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), there were few cases in this Court explicitly dealing with the scope of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and those decisions did not raise the issue of the meaning of the “and laws” term in the statute. Some of the early eases were dismissed for failure to allege a deprivation under “color of law.” See, e. g., Huntington v. City *659of New York, 193 U. S. 441 (1904); Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430 (1904). The concept of state action relied upon in these opinions was rejected in Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913). See also Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313 (1906); Chrystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 177 U. S. 169 (1900) (claim that city is taking water in violation of treaty with Mexico and federal statute; held: no federal question is raised because the issue involves right under state or general law). Other cases were dismissed because the right alleged to have been denied was not directly “secured” by the Constitution. See, e. g., Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317 (1885), holding that an action for damages against a state tax collector did not state a cause of action under Rev. Stat. § 1979 because the right to pay taxes in coupons arose under state, rather than federal, law; and Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern B. Co., 115 U. S. 611 (1885), dismissing an appeal because the claim that a railroad had unlawfully refused to carry goods alleged denial of a right secured not by the Constitution, but if at all by a “principle of general law” governing the obligations of common carriers, id., at 615. In Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68, 72 (1900), the Court held that a claim alleging that a tax on federal patent rights violated the Contracts, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses was not encompassed by Rev. Stat. §§ 1979 and 629 (16), or §563 (12), because those provisions dealt only with “civil rights” claims, whether asserted under the Federal Constitution or federal statutes. Of course, this limited view of the nature of the constitutional rights encompassed by §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) has not been accepted in later cases, see n. 43, infra. Finally, Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 (1903), although holding that a federal court had no equitable power under Rev. Stat. § 1979 to order enrollment of blacks on a state voting list because, inter alia, voting involved “political rights,” 189 U. S., at 487, did state that the claim that the right to vote had been denied was within § 1979, 189 U. S., at 485-486.
See also Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575, 577 n. 1 (1975); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 404 n. 4 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 3 (1968).
"[T]here can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.”
“[Section 1983] in the Revised Statutes of 1874 was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as well [as those secured by the Constitution].”
“[T]he provision in the Revised Statutes was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as well [as those secured by the Constitution].”
“The right of action given by [§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871] was later . . . extended to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution.”
The Court does not question the continuing validity of Hagans. Indeed, the Court’s remand in No. 77-719 leaves open the opportunity for respondents to seek to amend their complaint to allege, if they can, a nonfrivolous constitutional claim. Their statutory claim, on which suit is authorized by § 1983, would then qualify as a pendent claim within the jurisdiction of the District Court, as both Rosado and Hagans recognize.
Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 241 and 242 encompass the same rights. See United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 797 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S., at 753; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 119 (1945) (“There are, however, no differences in the basic rights guarded [by §§241 and 242]”) (opinion of Rutledge, J.).
Another early case, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876), concerned convictions under what is now § 241 of persons accused of disrupting a meeting of blacks, and proceeding to lynch two of those who had been at the meeting. The Court held that because the right of peaceable assembly was an attribute of national citizenship, 92 U. S., at 551, rather than a right granted initially by the Constitution, deprivation of this right was not proscribed by the “Constitution or laws” language of § 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.
Three years later, the Court concluded that discrimination against Chinese in contravention of a treaty between the United States and China would be within the proscription of §241 but for the language in that *662statute limiting its application to denials of the rights of “citizens.” Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 690-692 (1887); see also id., at 694 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Monroe v. Paye, 365 U. S. 167, 185 (1961).
Specific intent is required for conviction under either § 241 or § 242. United States v. Guest, supra, at 753-754; Screws v. United States, supra. The word “willfully” was added to § 242 in 1909, 35 Stat. 1092, but such language has never been in § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 206 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
The marginal notation for §663 (12) states: “Suits to redress the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws to persons within jurisdiction of United States.” Cross-cites are to § 1 of the 1871 Act, §§ 16, 18 of the 1870 Act, and §3 of the 1866 Act; § 1 of the 1871 Act had referred to § 3 of the 1866 Act for the rules governing appeal and other matters, see n. 5, supra. In addition, there is a bracketed citation after the text of §563 (12) — and after §629 (16) — as follows: “[See §§ 1977, 1979].” Rev. Stat. 95, 111 (1874).
The marginal notation for § 1979 states: “Civil action for deprivation of rights.” Section 1 of the 1871 Act is cross-cited, and there is a bracketed citation to §563 and §629. Rev. Stat. 348 (1874).
The marginal notation for §5510 states: “Depriving citizens of civil rights under color of State laws.” The cross-cite is to § 17 of the 1870 Act, and there is a bracketed citation to § 1979. Rev. Stat. 1074 (1874).
During the discussion of the Revised Statutes in Congress, Representative Lawrence read the relevant provisions of the post-Civil War Acts and then read § 1979. 2 Cong. Rec. 828-829 (1874). He went on to point out that whereas the version of § 5510 eventually enacted by Congress referred to rights secured by the “Constitution and laws,” the revisers' initial version (that in the 1872 Draft) had referred only “to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by section-of the title ‘civil rights.’ ” Representative Lawrence explained that this initial version “certainly is not sufficiently comprehensive to include all covered by the first section of the ‘Ku-Klux act’ of April 20, 1871, and the omission is not elsewhere supplied The foregoing demonstrates that the commensurate scope of §§ 1979 and 5510 was purposeful; further, apparently believing that § 1 of the 1871 Act, as well as § 2 of the 1866 Act and § 17 of the 1870 Act, defined crimes, Representative Lawrence noted: “[I]t is possible that the new consolidated section [§ 5510] may operate differently from the three original sections in a very few cases. But the change, if any, cannot be objectionable, but is valuable as securing uniformity.” 2 Cong. Rec. 828 (1874).
See Rev. Stat. 111 (1874).
The entire paragraph which for Mr. Justice Powell provides the key to the revisers’ view of the cause of action in § 1979 reads:
“It may have been the intention of Congress to provide, by [§ 1 of the 1871 Act], for all the cases of deprivations mentioned in the previous act *667of 1870, and thus actually to supersede the indefinite provision contained in that act. But as it might perhaps be held that only such rights as are specifically secured by the Constitution, and not every right secured by a law authorized by the Constitution, were here intended, it is deemed safer to add a reference to the civil-rights act.” 1 Draft 362.
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972).
Unless he is also prepared to limit the reach of constitutional claims brought under § 1983, my Brother Powell’s construction of that statute would not allow claims based on federal statutory law to be heard unless they involved a right of equality, but claims based on the Constitution could involve alleged violations of not only the Equal Protection Clause, or even other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also any provision of the Constitution. It is hard to believe that Congress intended such asymmetry.
My three dissenting Brethren, concluding that § 1983 is the "equal rights” law referred to in § 1343 (3), do not attempt to explain the broader provision in § 563 (12) of the Revised Statutes. Moreover, the revisers who added the equal rights language to the circuit court jurisdictional provision did not have the expanded version of the cause of action, with its “and laws” language, before them. Thus, even if it might be considered that the term “providing for equal rights” was intended to be a reference to § 1 of the 1871 Act, that section encompassed only constitutional claims. Given this legislative history, the approach of the dissent, requires, at bottom, that the word “Constitution” as used in the 1871 Act encompass federal statutory claims. But if this were so, there would be no need to resort to the circuitous construction whereby § 1983 is the “equal rights” law of § 1343 (3).
In addition, the Revised Statutes added a precondition to civil rights jurisdiction that was not included in other jurisdictional provisions: that the suit must be “authorized by law.” See §§ 563 (12), 629 (16). See also §§563 (11), 629 (17), providing jurisdiction for civil suits “authorized by law” against conspiracies in violation of § 2 of the 1871 Act, see n. 13, supra, which section became, with modification, § 1980 of the Revised Statutes, and is the precursor of 42 U. S. C. § 1985. The “authorized by law” requirement, which remains in 28 U. S. C. § 1343, appears to be another effort to preclude suits merely “affecting” persons denied rights, because no cause of action was provided for such suits.
Clearly, §§ 1979 and 1980 were statutes “authorizing” suits. In addi*669tion, it is evident that the revisers considered § 1 of the 1866 Act (and § 16 of the 1870 Act) directly to authorize suits redressing the deprivation of rights guaranteed thereunder, for the bracketed citations after the jurisdictional provisions, §§ 563 (12) and 629 (16), are to § 1977 as well as to § 1979, see n. 39, supra. This further supports the proposition that § 1 of the 1871 Act did not merely authorize civil suits to enforce the guarantees of the earlier Civil Rights Acts, see supra, at 663-664.
It should also be noted that this was not the only instance in which the Revised Statutes of 1874 provided different circuit and district court jurisdiction for causes which, prior to the revision, could be heard in either court. The removal provision, § 641 of the Revised Statutes, provided for removal from a state court only to a circuit court even though the provision upon which § 641 was based, § 3 of the 1866 Act, provided for both district and circuit court jurisdiction. Congress also failed to provide for postjudgment removal in § 641, although such removal had been authorized under § 3 of the 1866 Act. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 795 (1966).
The legislation enacting the 1911 recodification provided that “the laws relating to the judiciary be, and they hereby are, codified, revised, and amended ... to read as follows . . . .” 36 Stat. 1087.
See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1423 (1972) (“Although the drafters of the 1911 Judicial Code may not have been particularly troubled by the substantive difference between sections 563 and 629, it seems unlikely that their choice of the circuit court language was inadvertent or arbitrary”).
See n. 6, supra.
I also agree with the Court that 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (4) does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over the claims in these cases. Recognizing significant Court of Appeals authorrfy to the contrary, see, e. g., Andrews v. Maher, 525 F. 2d 113 (CA2 1975); Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F. 2d 356 (CA1 1974); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 1090 (CA2 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974), recipients have not contended that the welfare rights here at stake are “civil rights” within the meaning of that statute. However, they urge that even if § 1983 can*671not be said to “provide” for equal rights within the meaning of § 1343 (3), this cause of action does operate to “protect” civil rights — by authorizing redress for their deprivation — within the meaning of § 1343 (4). Assuming, arguendo, the validity of this distinction, the cognizance of these claims under § 1983 is nonetheless insufficient to confer § 1343 (4) jurisdiction. To be sure, § 1983 actions are often brought to vindicate civil rights, and thus that section may loosely be characterized as a civil rights statute. However, under the view of that statute expressed in this opinion, the § 1983 cause of action is not always a civil rights cause of action, for it is appropriately invoked to vindicate any federal right against deprivation under color of state law. Indeed, as noted, recipients recognize that in the cases at hand, § 1983 is not being used to vindicate civil rights within the meaning of § 1343 (4). Therefore, in essence, recipients would have the Court transform statutory claims for welfare assistance into claims seeking “protection of civil rights” on the theory that such claims are encompassed by a statutory cause of action that in other cases is invoked to protect civil rights. Such logic is hardly compelling. The clear import of § 1343 (4) is to provide federal jurisdiction for civil rights claims, and no amount of bootstrapping can transform these claims for welfare assistance into civil rights claims.