with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
The jury in this case found that the shipowner, the stevedore, and the longshoreman were each partially responsible *274for the latter’s (petitioner Stanley Edmonds) injury. A member of the ship’s crew instructed Edmonds to remove a jack from the rear wheel of a large cargo container. As Edmonds went behind the container to remove the jack, another longshoreman backed a truck into the container, causing it to roll backwards and pin Edmonds against the bulkhead. The jury concluded that the shipowner, as the employer of the crewman, was 20% responsible for the accident; the stevedore, as the employer of the longshoreman driving the truck, was 70% responsible; and Edmonds himself was 10% responsible.
The Court holds that the shipowner, who was 20% negligent, must pay 90% of Edmonds’ damages. Edmonds, because of his comparative negligence, must absorb 10% of the damages himself. But the stevedore, who, the jury determined, was 70% at fault, will recoup its statutory compensation payments out of the damages payable to Edmonds, and thus will go scot-free.1
The Court does not, and indeed could not, defend this result on grounds of reason or fairness. Today’s ruling means that concurrently negligent stevedores will be insulated from the obligation to pay statutory workmen’s compensation benefits, and thus will have inadequate incentives to provide a safe working environment for their employees. It also means that shipowners in effect will be held vicariously liable for the negligence of stevedores, and will have to pay damages far out of proportion to their degree of fault. Nor does the Court suggest that its holding is compelled by the language or legis*275lative history of § 5 (b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U. S. C. § 905 (b). The Court appears to advance two justifications for its decision: first, that principles of comparative negligence did not apply under the traditional law of admiralty, and Congress intended to preclude judicial modification of that law when it passed the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA; and second, that a rule of comparative negligence would be unfair to injured longshoremen. Since I find both purported justifications wholly inadequate to support the Court’s decision, I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court begins with the proposition that, under the law maritime as it existed in 1972, the shipowner could not reduce its liability because of the comparative negligence of the stevedore: I am not entirely convinced. None of the decisions cited by the Court, ante, at 260 n. 7, stands for this proposition ; the cases relied upon all concern the conceptually distinct problem — to which the Court has given varying answers — of whether there is a right of contribution among joint tort-feasors.2 I am willing to assume, however, for purposes of argument, that the Court has correctly stated the “traditional” admiralty rule.
The Court next states that Congress itself did not impose a rule of comparative negligence when it adopted § 905 (b) in 1972. Again, I am not altogether sure. As Chief Judge Haynsworth demonstrated in his opinion for the en banc court *276below, there is some tension between the first and second sentences of § 905 (b).3 These sentences are most easily reconciled if one assumes that Congress was thinking in terms of comparative negligence. The Court points out that there are other, less plausible, ways of reconciling the two sentences. Although I feel there is room for debate on this question, I am again willing to assume, for purposes of argument, that Congress did not impose a rule of comparative negligence in third-party suits under the LHWCA.
I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s third proposition: that Congress intended to prohibit this Court from fashioning a rule of comparative negligence in suits for damages by a longshoreman against the shipowner. It is well established that courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have broad powers of interstitial rulemaking. As the Court stated in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975), “the Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime, and 'Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.’ Fitzgerald *277v. United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 20.” I find nothing in the language or legislative history of § 905 (b) that indicates Congress intended to reverse this presumption with respect to third-party actions under the LHWCA.
The Court suggests that Congress, in enacting § 905 (b), “aligned the rights and liabilities of stevedores, shipowners, and longshoremen” on the specific assumption that the shipowner would not be allowed to reduce its liability because of the stevedore’s comparative negligence. Ante, at 272. The legislative history belies this notion. Congress had two narrow objectives in mind in enacting § 905 (b) in 1972: to overcome this Court’s decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946), and its decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956). See S. Rep. No. 92-1125, pp. 8-11 (1972). These decisions had created a form of circuitous liability whereby the longshoreman, under Seas Shipping, sued the shipowner under a theory of unseaworthiness; the shipowner, under Ryan Stevedoring, obtained full indemnity from the stevedore; and the stevedore ended up paying actual damages rather than statutory compensation. Congress overruled the strict-liability theory of Seas Shipping to ensure that “[t]he vessel will not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, supra, at 11. It eliminated the Ryan Stevedoring action for indemnification because if “the vessel’s liability is to be based on its own negligence, and the vessel will no longer be liable under the unseaworthiness doctrine for injuries which are really the fault of the stevedore, there is no longer any necessity for permitting the vessel to recover the damages for which it is liable to the injured worker from the stevedore . . . .” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, supra, at 11. These statements of legislative purpose are as consistent, or more consistent, with a system of comparative negligence, than with a congressional assumption that the shipowner would be fully liable for the concurrent negligence of the stevedore.
*278The legislative history indicates that, if anything, Congress intended to preserve the role of the federal courts in filling in the contours of § 905 (b). The House and Senate Reports state that the liability of a shipowner in an action brought by a longshoreman should be analogous to that which “would render a land-based third party in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, supra, at 11. The Report emphasizes, however, that this does not mean state tort law is to govern third-party negligence suits against the vessel.
“[T]he Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy authorized in the bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the State in which the port may be located. The Committee intends that legal questions which may arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined as a matter of Federal law. In that connection, the Committee intends that the admiralty concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases where the injured employee’s own negligence may have contributed to causing the injury. Also, the Committee intends that the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of 'assumption of risk’ in an action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.” Id., at 12.
In other words, Congress specifically reaffirmed the admiralty law tradition in the 1972 Amendments, and intended that this Court would continue to resolve “legal questions which may arise in actions brought under these provisions” in accordance with that tradition.
In short, in this case, as in Reliable Transfer, 421 U. S., at 409, “[n]o statutory or judicial precept precludes a change in the rule [that the shipowner is fully liable for the concurrent negligence of the stevedore], and indeed a proportional fault rule would simply bring recovery [as between the steve*279dore and shipowner] into line with the rule of admiralty law long since established [as between the longshoreman and the shipowner]
II
I am also convinced that no injustice to injured longshoremen would result from a rule of comparative negligence. A rule of comparative negligence in no case would reduce the longshoreman’s total award below his statutory workmen’s compensation benefits.4 The rule of comparative negligence would affect only the relative proportion of statutory benefits and damages in the longshoreman’s total compensation package. In the present case, for example, a rule of comparative negligence would mean the longshoreman would receive 20% damages and 80% statutory benefits, as opposed to 90% damages and 10% statutory benefits.
At first blush, it might appear that there is something unfair about reducing the total potential award of the longshoreman in this manner. But when the different purposes of the statutory compensation scheme and the third-party action for negligence are considered, it can be seen that this result is fully consistent with the policies of the statute. The LHWCA statutory compensation scheme, like other workmen’s compensation plans, is based on a compromise. The longshoreman accepts less than full damages for work-related injuries. In exchange, he is guaranteed that these statutory benefits will be paid for every work-related injury without regard to fault. The third-party tort action, in contrast, embodies an element of risk. The longshoreman faces the prospect of an increased award, but also the possibility of receiving nothing if the shipowner is found not to have been negligent.
*280The problem of perceiving the equities arises because of the interaction of the compensation scheme and the tort scheme. If a longshoreman is injured while working on a vessel, and the stevedore is 100% at fault, no one considers it unjust that the longshoreman receives only statutory benefits. The award of less than full damages is the quid pro quo for the guarantee of recovery without regard to the employer’s fault. Similarly, if a longshoreman is injured and the shipowner is 100% to blame, everyone agrees that it is fitting and proper for the shipowner to pay full damages. The Court, however, perceives “some inequity” in not allowing the longshoreman to obtain full damages when the shipowner has been determined to be only 20% negligent. Presumably, this same “inequity” would result if the longshoreman did not obtain full damages when the shipowner was 10% or 5% or even 1% negligent. This is not equity, however, but a windfall. Under the Court’s rule, the longshoreman is guaranteed statutory compensation without regard to fault and is given a risk-free chance to obtain full damages if the shipowner is found negligent in even the slightest degree. A more evenhanded equity, in my view, would be for the longshoreman to recover damages for that portion of the injury for which the shipowner’s negligence is responsible, and to recover the balance in statutory compensation, representing that portion of the injury for which the longshoreman is guaranteed an award regardless of fault.5
Ill
In sum, this case presents the relatively common situation where a statute is open to two interpretations, and the legislative history, although instructive as to the overriding purposes of Congress, provides no specific guidance as to which *281interpretation Congress would have adopted if it had addressed the precise issue. Our duty, in such a case, is to adopt the interpretation most consonant with reason, equity, and the underlying purposes Congress sought to achieve. If we are wrong, Congress can, as it has in the past, step in and adopt some other solution. But the problem should not be resolved by complacently accepting an unfair and unjust result, on the assumption the choice between the two interpretations ideally should be made by Congress. Under that approach, the Court and the country at large may end up with nothing more than an unfair and unjust result.
As of December 18, 1978, the stevedore’s insurance company had paid Edmonds a total of $49,152 in statutory benefits. Brief for Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. as Amiaus Curiae 2. Under the judicially created lien sanctioned by the Court’s opinion, ante, at 269-270, the stevedore’s insurer will recover this entire sum out of the $90,000 damages awarded to Edmonds.
Technically, there is no issue of “joint and several” liability here, for the stevedore has statutory immunity from tort liability. 33 U. S. C. § 905 (a). Nor are the policies behind the common-law rule of joint and several liability applicable. The common-law rule serves largely to protect plaintiffs from defendants who are unable to pay judgments entered against them. The LHWCA, however, provides safeguards to ensure the payment of compensation benefits. 33 U. S. C. § 932. There is little need, therefore, to make the shipowner liable for full damages to protect the longshoreman from impecunious stevedores.
The first sentence reads: “In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person . . . may bring an action against such vessel as a third party . . . The second sentence reads: “If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing steve-doring services to the vessel.” (Emphasis added.) If the phrase “caused by the negligence” in both sentences is given the same meaning, and interpreted to mean “caused by any negligence whatsoever,” then an employee of an independent stevedoring company could recover full damages under the first sentence if the shipowner was 1% negligent and the stevedore 99% negligent. A longshoreman hired directly by the shipowner, however, would be denied any recovery at all under the second sentence if persons involved in doing stevedoring work committed as little as 1% of the negligence, even if the shipowner was otherwise 99% negligent. If the statutory phrase “caused by the negligence” is interpreted to import the notion of comparative negligence, this anomaly does not arise.
Those benefits, after the 1972 Amendments, are relatively generous. The LHWCA claimant receives two-thirds of his lost wages, free of income taxes, and adjusted periodically for inflation, 33 U. S. C. §§906, 908; his medical and rehabilitation expenses are paid, § 907; and his attorney’s fees are paid. § 928.
See Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment of Damages According to Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 35 Md. L. Rev. 351 (1976).