dissenting in part.
Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion prompts me to explain that by joining Part II of the Court’s opinion I do not necessarily indicate that I would have rejected the arguments set forth in Mr. Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298, if I had been a Member of the Court when the issue was first addressed. But there is surely enough force to Mr. Justice Blackmun’s reasoning to require adherence *594to a course of decision that has been consistently followed by this Court since 1880.
The doctrine of stare decisis is not a straitjacket that forecloses re-examination of outmoded rules. The doctrine does, however, provide busy judges with a valid reason for refusing to remeasure a delicate balance that has tipped in the same direction every time the conflicting interests have been weighed.
The stare decisis considerations that weigh heavily in my decision to join Part II of the Court’s opinion also support Mr. Justice White’s opinion dissenting from Parts III and IV. Accordingly, I join his dissent.