dissenting.*
I join my Brother Stewart’s dissent on statutory grounds in Nos. 78-599 and 78-1006. Since that opinion does not command a Court, it is appropriate to express my view on the constitutional questions presented. I believe that the military regulations at issue are prohibited by the First Amendment; accordingly, I would hold them to be unconstitutional, and affirm the judgments of the two Courts of Appeals.
Two sets of military regulations are challenged. Respondents in Huff (No. 78-599), post, p. 453, attack Navy and Marine Corps regulations that require prior approval by commanding officers before the origination, distribution, or circulation of petitions or other written material on ships, aircraft, military installations, and “anywhere within a foreign country.” Fleet Marine Force Pacific Order 5370.3 (1974). Respondent in Glines (No. 78-1006) challenges parallel Air Force regulations that require command approval before the *362distribution or posting of nonofficial printed material and for the circulation of petitions for signature.1 Air Force Regs. 30-1 (9) (1971) and 35-15 (3) (a) (1970). Both the Navy and Marine Corps and the Air Force regulations authorize withholding of approval if the commander determines that distribution would pose a “clear danger” to loyalty, discipline, or morale of servicemen or if the distribution would “[m]ate-rially interfere” with military duties.2 The Air Force regulations explicitly declare, however, that “[distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the ground that the material is critical of Government policies or officials.” Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (4). (Emphasis added.)3
I
Respondents contend that the regulations impermissibly interfere with First Amendment rights to communicate and petition. That contention finds solid support in First Amendment doctrine as explicated in a variety of settings by decisions of this Court. These regulations plainly establish an essentially discretionary regime of censorship that arbitrarily deprives respondents of precious communicative rights.
The circulation of petitions is indisputably protected First Amendment activity. Petitioning involves a bundle of related First Amendment rights: the right to express ideas, see, e. g., *363Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 593 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943), the right to be exposed to ideas expressed by others, see, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); id., at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, at 143, the right to communicate with government, see, e. g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 513 (1939) (Roberts, J.), and the right to associate with others in the expression of opinion, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 15 (1976); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 181 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958).4 The petition is especially suited for the exercise of all of these rights: It serves as a vehicle of communication; as a classic means of individual affiliation with ideas or opinions; and as a peaceful yet effective method of amplifying the views of the individual signers. Indeed, the petition is a traditionally favored method of political expression and participation. See, e. g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552-553 (1876); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 619-620 (Cooley ed., 1873); cf. White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 289 (1845). Thus, petitioning of officials has been expressly held to be a right secured by the First Amendment.5 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 277 (1941).
This First Amendment shield for petitioning is impermis-sibly breached in at least three ways by the regulations before us.
*364First. By mandating that proposed petitions be subjected to command approval, the regulations impose a prior restraint.6 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 865 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 552-553 (1975); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 45-46 (1961). Although the First Amendment bar against prior restraints is not absolute, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 590 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment), the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prior censorship of expression can be justified only by the most compelling governmental interests, see, e. g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, at 558-559; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 715-716 (1931). Thus far, only the interest in averting a virtually certain prospect of imminent, severe injury to the Nation in time of war has been generally considered a sufficiently weighty ground for prior restraint of constitutionally protected speech.7 See, e. g., New York *365Times, 403 U. S., at 726-727 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). The instant regulations, however, explicitly require commanding officers to suppress petitioning for reasons far less urgent than imminent, serious, peril to the United States or its citizens. The maintenance of military discipline, morale, and efficiency are undeniably important, but they are not always, and in every situation, to be regarded as more compelling than a host of other governmental interests which we have found insufficient to warrant censorship. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, supra; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969); see also Buckley v. Valeo, supra. Moreover, terms as amorphous as “discipline” and “morale” invite lati-tudinous interpretation that intolerably disadvantages the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 415-416 (1974). As these very cases illustrate, the perceived threat to discipline and morale will often correlate with the commanding officer’s personal or political biases.8 See infra, at 372-373.
*366Second. The command-approval procedure implementing these regulations is seriously flawed. Time and again, the Court has underscored the principle that restraints upon communication must be hedged about by procedures that guarantee against infringement of protected expression and that eliminate the play of discretion that epitomizes arbitrary censorship. See, e. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, at 558-562; Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 416-417 (1971) ; Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 181 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, at 70-71; cf. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). We have identified specific safeguards that are indispensable if a system of prior approval is to avoid First Amendment pitfalls. These include (1) the requirement that the burden of justifying censorship fall upon the censor, see New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, at 714; Freedman v. Maryland, supra, at 58, (2) the condition that administrative suppression must be subject to speedy judicial review, see Blount v. Rizzi, supra, at 417, and (3) the rule that those whose First Amendment interests are at stake be given notice and an opportunity to be heard during suppression proceedings, see Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, supra, at 181-183; cf. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 417-419.
None of these safeguards is present under the prior command-approval scheme. There is no indication that the burden of justifying censorship rests upon the authorities. Not only does the commanding officer make his own determination to suppress, but also no provision is made for prompt judi*367cial review.9 And we search the regulations in vain for any provision affording the right to appear before the censoring officer to argue for approval. Thus, the regulations utterly fail to meet even the minimum procedural dictates of the First Amendment; rather, as designed, they countenance the arbitrary and nonneutral suppression of communication by petition.10
Third. The regulations demonstrably do not serve the military interests offered as their compelling justification, and for that reason alone violate the First Amendment. If regulation of communicative rights is to be justified by a compelling governmental interest, the regulation must precisely further that interest; where constitutional rights are at stake, important ends do not sustain mismatched means. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 563-567, 569; Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 413. In this respect, the regulations here plainly founder. The most important purpose that can be posited for them is prevention of incitement to military disorder. But if the danger of incitement necessitates prior clearance of servicemen’s messages, it would be logical for the military to mandate preclearance of all messages, whether *368circulated by petition or disseminated orally. Since oral discussion is not subjected to preliminary censorship, doubt must be raised as to the urgency and the efficacy of such censorship when communication is by petition. In other words, inasmuch as the content of an oral communication may be identical to the content of a petition, there is no reason to single out petitions for a content-preclearance requirement.
The only rational basis for disparate treatment of petitioning and oral communication would be the presence of some danger peculiar to the process of petitioning. But petitioning differs from simple, oral expression only in that it involves an element of physical conduct. Insofar as that physical element of the petitioning process poses a greater threat of disruption than does simple verbal expression, recourse to content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of circulation is surely an appropriate and sufficient alternative to suppression. By ordering prior official review of the content of petitions, these regulations are an excessive response to any distinctive problems of petitioning. Even the most important governmental purpose cannot justify a regulation that unduly burdens First Amendment liberties. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488-490 (1960).
II
All that the Court offers to palliate these fatal constitutional infirmities is a series of platitudes about the special nature and overwhelming importance of military necessity.11 Ante, at 353-354.
*369Military (or national) security is a weighty interest, not least of all because national survival is an indispensable condition of national liberties. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 264 (1967). But the concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has a dangerous plasticity. Because they invariably have the visage of overriding importance, there is always a temptation to invoke security “necessities” to justify an encroachment upon civil liberties. For that reason, the military-security argument must be approached with a healthy skepticism: its very gravity counsels that courts be cautious when military necessity is invoked by the Government to justify a trespass on First Amendment rights.
Such skepticism lay at the heart of our decision in New York Times Co. v. United States. There, the Government urged that publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers would damage the Nation’s security during a period of armed conflict. We rejected that assertion. 403 U. S., at 714. Separate opinions scrutinized the security argument, and declined to rely merely upon the Government’s characterization of the interest at stake. Id., at 719-720 (Black, J.); id., at 722-724 (Douglas, J.); id., at 726-727 (Brennan, J.); id., at 730 (Stewart, J.); id., at 731, 733 (White, J.). Similarly, United States v. Robel, supra, at 263-264, spurned simple deference to “talismanic incantation[s]” of “‘war power.’” Analogously, we have stringently viewed the national-security argument when it has been proffered to support domestic warrantless surveillance. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 320 (1972).
*370To be sure, generals and admirals, not federal judges, are expert about military needs. But it is equally true that judges, not military officers, possess the competence and authority to interpret and apply the First Amendment. Moreover, in the context of this case, the expertise of military officials is, to a great degree, tainted by the natural self-interest that inevitably influences their exercise of the power to control expression. Partiality must be expected when government authorities censor the views of subordinates, especially if those views are critical of the censors. Larger, but vaguely defined, interests in discipline or military efficiency may all too easily become identified with officials’ personal or bureaucratic preferences. This Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard free expression when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military necessity. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 842-845 (1978).
A properly detached — rather than unduly acquiescent— approach to the military-necessity argument here would doubtless have led the Court to a different result. The military’s omission to regulate the content of oral communication suggests the pointlessness of controlling the identical message when embodied in a petition. It is further troubling that these regulations apply to all military bases, not merely to those that operate under combat or near-combat conditions. The “front line” and the rear echelon may be difficult to identify in the conditions of modern warfare, but there is a difference between an encampment that faces imminent conflict and a military installation that provides staging, support, or training services. It is simply impossible to credit the contention that national security is significantly promoted by the control of petitioning throughout all installations.
Finally, and fundamentally, the Court has been deluded into unquestioning acceptance of the very flawed assumption that discipline and morale are enhanced by restricting peaceful communication of various viewpoints. Properly regulated as *371to time, place, and manner, petitioning provides a useful outlet for airing complaints and opinions that are held as strongly by citizens in uniform as by the rest of society. The forced absence of peaceful expression only creates the illusion of good order; underlying dissension remains to flow into the more dangerous channels of incitement and disobedience. In that sense, military efficiency is only disserved when First Amendment rights are devalued.
Ill
The Court egregiously errs in holding that Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), compels the validation of these regulations. I dissented in Greer, and continue to disagree with the decision in that case. But, in any event, Greer is not dispositive here; indeed, if it governs at all in these cases, Greer is' authority that the regulations are constitutionally indefensible.
Greer arose because of the rejection by military authorities of Dr. Benjamin Spock’s request to hold a Presidential campaign meeting and distribute campaign literature at Fort Dix. Although the case involved a number of Army regulations restricting various expressive activities — including regulations parallel to those before us now — the actual issue in Greer was the exclusion of a politically partisan campaign effort. And there were three critical elements in Greer that prompted the Court to sustain that exclusion:
First, the Court relied upon the proposition that civilians lack expressive rights on military reservations from which they can be excluded. Significantly, the previous decision in Flower v. United States, 407 U. S. 197 (1972) (per curiam), was distinguished on the ground that leafletting in Flower had taken place on a portion of Fort Sam Houston that had been effectively dedicated to public use.
Second, the Court noted that servicemen stationed at Fort Dix had easy access to off-base public fora where they could be exposed to communications by Dr. Spock and others. By the *372same token, although not discussed in Greer, these off-base fora provided Dr. Spock with ample opportunity for expressive activity. Thus, from the standpoint of speaker and listeners, the Fort Dix regulations only effected a partial cutoff of communicative rights because other equivalent avenues of interchange remained open.
Finally, Greer repeatedly emphasized the lack of any claim that the Fort Dix regulations had been applied in biased fashion. It explicitly noted the complete absence of any question of “irrationa[l], invidiou[s], or arbitrary]” application of the Army regulations. 424 U. S., at 840. Accordingly, the Court did not confront the problem of official discrimination among political viewpoints. Indeed, Greer placed weight upon a perceived “American constitutional tradition” that the military be institutionally free of political entanglement, and that it avoid “the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or candidates.” Id., at 839.
These three predicates to Greer are wholly absent in the setting in which we review the regulations before us. On their face, and as applied in these cases, the regulations restrict the expressive activities of individuals who are man-datorily, not permissively, present on military reservations. For soldiers and sailors, as opposed to civilians, military installations must be the place for “free . . . communication of thoughts,” Greer v. Spock, supra, at 838. Further, when service personnel are stationed abroad or at sea, the base or warship is very likely the only place for free communication of thoughts.12 Thus, in contrast to Greer, the regulations here permit complete foreclosure of a distinctive mode of expression by servicemen, who lack the civilian’s option to depart the sphere of military authority.
These cases also differ from Greer because they exemplify *373pervasive official partiality in the regulation of messages.13 The orders refusing command approval for respondents’ petitioning or leafletting flowed from the obviously biased official judgment that the content was “erroneous and misleading commentary,” App. in No. 78-599, p. 34, or that it “impugn [ed] by innuendo the motives and conduct” of the President, id., at 46. Far from being evenhanded regulation, this sort of command judgment is quintessentially political; in suppressing communication that “impugns” Presidential conduct “by innuendo,” military authorities entangle themselves in national politics. Since these cases involve discriminatory regulation of communication, Greer’s, assumption of military neutrality — and, consequently, Greer’s result — cannot govern here. Actually, the “tradition of a politically neutral military,” Greer, supra, at 839, strongly counsels invalidation of these regulations, which demonstrably encourage commanding officers to exercise personal political judgment in deciding whether to permit petitioning.14
Today’s decisions, then, clash, rather than comport, with the underlying premises of Greer v. Spock. The Court unnecessarily trammels important First Amendment rights by uncritically accepting the dubious proposition that military security requires — or is furthered by — the discretionary sup*374pression of a classic form of peaceful group expression. Service men and women deserve better than this. I respectfully dissent.
[This opinion applies also to No. 78-599, Secretary of Navy et al. v. Huff et al., post, p. 453.]
The Air Force regulations exempt from prior command approval the distribution of published material “through the United States mail or through official outlets, such as military libraries and exchanges. . . .” Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a)(1) (1970). Department of Defense guidelines are to the same effect. DOD Directive 1325.6 (1969).
In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps regulations bar circulation of material that advocates insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or desertion, that discloses classified information, that contains obscene matter, or that involves the planning of unlawful acts.
A counterpart to this declaration is the statement in DOD Directive 1325.6, ¶ III (A) (3) (1969), that “[t]he fact that a publication is critical of Government policies or officials is not, in itself, a ground upon which distribution may be prohibited.”
It may be that the Petition Clause, in some contexts, enhances the protections of the Speech Clause. There is no need, however, to explore the distinctive attributes of the Petition Clause in these cases, for conventional First Amendment analysis amply suffices to dispose of the constitutional issues presented here.
Because the petition so effectively promotes a number of First Amendment interests — especially those that are associational in nature — petitioning is not merely fungible with other expressive activities.
The command-approval requirement is not simply a “time, place, and manner” regulation valid under the First Amendment. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98 (1972). The constitutional touchstone of permissible time, place, and manner regulation is that it focus upon the circumstances — not the content of expression. Id., at 99. The military regulations in these cases — facially and as applied — look to the content of petitions, as well as to the manner in which they are circulated.
To be sure, we have upheld restraints directed against obscenity, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 47-48 (1961), or against so-called “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). Such restraints have been permitted on the theory that the censored expression does not enjoy First Amendment protection. We have always been careful to insist, however, that restrictions aimed at unprotected speech be carefully crafted and applied to avoid trenching upon *365communication that comes within the ambit of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965).
It has also been speculated that the direct, immediate threat of interference with the trial process might warrant a restraint upon constitutionally protected expression. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 569-570 (1976) (dictum). But see id., at 588, 594-595 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Significantly, however, this Court has repeatedly rejected efforts to wield the judicial contempt power against expression that assertedly jeopardized the administration of justice. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 844-845 (1978); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
Among the suppressed communications were a petition to a Congressman supporting amnesty for Vietnam War resisters and a leaflet outlining certain respondents’ views about the constitutional rights of servicemen. Both were censored, the former because it “contain[ed] gross misstatements and implications of law and fact [and] impugnfed] by innuendo the *366motives and conduct of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces”; the latter because it was “by transparent implication, disrespectful and contemptuous of all of your superiors. . . App. in No. 78-599, pp. 46-47, 50. The petitioners conceded below that suppression of the leaflet was improper under military regulations. Brief for Petitioners in No. 78-599, p. 8, n. 3.
It is unnecessary to consider whether servicemen might challenge censorship decisions by bringing suits against their commanding officers. See Huff, post, at 457-458, n. 5. The lack of provision for immediate judicial review is not cured by the possibility that an individual might assume the burden of commencing a collateral action. Cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 418 (1971). Moreover, it is unlikely as a practical matter that persons serving at sea or on foreign soil will have ready access to domestic federal courts.
Again, the factual background of these cases is instructive. Two respondents individually submitted a single leaflet for approval. The commanding general denied one respondent permission to distribute the leaflet on base, because of its disrespectful and “contemptuous” tone. The same officer permitted the other respondent to circulate the identical leaflet outside the main gate. App. in No. 78-599, pp. 36, 50. Since the on-post/off-post distinction had not been considered dispositive with respect to other requests, see id., at 44, 46-47, it is difficult to identify the principle underlying the differing decisions about the leaflet.
The Court, ante, at 356, n. 13, also suggests that curtailment of First Amendment freedoms might be warranted inasmuch as service personnel are Government employees, citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973). That doctrine is inapposite. The predicate for upholding liberty restrictions as a condition of public employment must, at least in part, be the voluntariness of the decision to accept Government employment. At various times, however, this country has inducted citizens into military service as a matter of compulsion. Moreover, unlike other employees, *369servicemen may not freely resign their posts should they decide to unburden themselves of restraints upon their freedom of expression.
It is also noteworthy that the statutory scheme considered in Letter Carriers permitted employees to “[s]ign a political petition as an individual,” 413 U. S., at 577, n. 21, and evidently further allowed the full panoply of petitioning rights with respect to petitions addressed to the Federal Government, id., at 572-574, 587-588 (appendix).
The regulations permit commanding officers to restrain petitioning activities off-base in foreign countries.
While the respondents in these cases mount a facial challenge to the military regulations, an appreciation of the theoretical dangers posed by the regulations is best gained by considering their operation in practice.
Indeed, inasmuch as the regulations state that distribution or posting of petitions or other writings “may not be prohibited solely on the ground that the material is critical of Government policies or officials,” Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (4) (1970) (emphasis added), the implication is that prohibition may be partly based upon the fact that the material in question challenges Government policy or officials.
Further, at least one command response to a petitioning request indicates that the officer in charge considered his censoring function to include the duty to “afford proper guidance to the men under my command,” App. in No. 78-599, pp. 46-47.