dissenting.
I do not disagree with the legal principles pronounced by the Court in its per curiam opinion to the effect that 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (c) is not an obstacle to the awarding of judgment against the Government on an implied contract, ante, at 462; or that, in exempting from the Tort Claims Act those claims described in §2680 (c), Congress did not also intend to disturb other existing statutory remedies, ante, at 463; or that Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977), does not control this case, ante, at 464-466; or that the absence of governmental tort liability does *467not bar contractual remedies on implied-in-faet contracts, ante, at 465; or that there is no inconsistency between a contractual remedy against the Government and a tort remedy against customs officers, ante, at 466. But I dissent from the Court’s vacating the judgment of the Court of Claims and its remanding the case to that court for further proceedings.
I dissent because I am persuaded that an implied-in-fact contract is not to be found on the record in this case, and because I believe the remand is, or should be, a useless exercise leading to an inevitable result.
It is clear that jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extends to contracts implied in fact but not to those implied in law, See United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212, 217-218 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925). Here, the Customs Service seized the goods and declared them forfeited for customs violations. There is no question as to the legality of that seizure. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 234 (1972). Indeed, petitioner has admitted that the customs declaration was improper. 217 Ct. Cl. 423, 425, 579 F. 2d 617, 618 (1978); App. 11a, 18a. The Government’s action, thus, was a claim of forfeiture and an assertion of ownership. There was no uninterrupted title in petitioner, recognized by the parties, as would constitute the basis of a contract implied in fact to return the goods. See Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 592, 597 (1923). If the forfeiture is not upheld, the duty to return the goods is one implied, not in fact, but in law, and is so implied from the duty imposed upon the Customs Service by statute. See 28 U. S. C. § 2465. Any recovery for failure on the part of the Service to fulfill that duty would be founded in tort, or perhaps in equity, but not in contract.
It therefore seems to me inevitably to follow that there is no jurisdiction over this case in the Court of Claims. See Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, supra; Russell *468Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 596, 609, 537 F. 2d 474, 482 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977). Any remedy for petitioner lies elsewhere. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims, albeit on a different ground from the one advanced by that court.