delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this class action is whether a proportionate share of the fees awarded to lawyers who represented the successful class may be assessed against the unclaimed portion of the fund created by a judgment.
*474I
In March 1966, The Boeing Co. called for the redemption of certain convertible debentures. Boeing announced the call through newspaper notices and mailings to investors who had registered their debentures. The notices, given in accordance with the indenture agreement, recited that each $100 amount of principal could be redeemed for $103.25 or converted into two shares of the company’s common stock. They set March 29 as the deadline for the exercise of conversion rights. Two shares of the company’s common stock on that date were worth $316.25. When the deadline expired, the holders of debentures with a face value of $1,544,300 had not answered the call. These investors were left with the right to redeem their debentures for slightly more than face value.
Van Gemert and several other nonconverting debenture holders brought a class action against Boeing in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They claimed that Boeing had violated federal securities statutes as well as the law of New York by failing to give them reasonably adequate notice of the redemption. As damages, they sought the difference between the amount for which their debentures could be redeemed and the value of the shares into which the debentures could have been converted. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that Boeing had given its debenture holders the notice required by the indenture agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that, under the New York law of contracts, the indenture agreement contained an implied obligation to give debenture holders reasonable notice of a redemption. The court concluded that the notice actually given was inadequate. 520 F. 2d 1373, cert. denied, 423 U. S. 947 (1975).
On remand, the District Court awarded as damages the difference between the redemption price of the outstanding debentures and the price at which two shares of Boeing’s *475common stock traded on the last day for exercising conversion rights. The court, however, refused to assess prejudgment interest against Boeing. There followed a second appeal. The class claimed that the stock should have been valued as of a later date and that Boeing was liable for prejudgment interest. Class members who had filed individual claims also contended that they were entitled to receive pro rata shares of any unclaimed damages. At the least, they argued, they should receive enough of the unclaimed money to pay their legal expenses.
The Court of Appeals found the class entitled to prejudgment interest on the award, but it approved the valuation date. The court also concluded that class members who proved their individual claims should not share in the unclaimed portion of the judgment. Allowing these class members to receive a proportionate part of the unclaimed money, the court held, would create the sort of “fluid class” recovery rejected in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F. 2d 1005 (CA2 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U. S. 156 (1974). Such a recovery would expropriate funds belonging to class members who had not asserted their claims and give a windfall to those who had claimed. Finally, the court decided that claiming class members could not use the unclaimed portion of the judgment to defray their legal expenses. Since Boeing could have a right to money that never was claimed, the court thought that awarding attorney’s fees from the remaining funds might shift fees to the losing party in violation of the American rule reaffirmed in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975). 553 F. 2d 812 (1977).
On the second remand, the District Court entered the judgment now at issue. The court first established the amount of Boeing’s liability to the class as a whole. It provided that respondents, “in behalf of all members of the plaintiff class, . . . shall recover as their damages . . . the principal sum *476of $3,289,359 together with [prejudgment] interest. . . .” App. 40a.1 The court then fixed the amount that each member of the class could recover on a principal amount of $100 in debentures. Each individual recovery was to carry its proportionate share of the total amount allowed for attorney’s fees, expenses, and disbursements.2 That share, the court declared, “shall bear the same ratio to all such fees, expenses and disbursements as such class member’s recovery shall bear to the total recovery” awarded the class. Id., at 40ar41a. Finally, the court ordered Boeing to deposit the amount of the judgment into escrow at a commercial bank,3 and it appointed a Special Master to administer the judgment and pass on the validity of individual claims.4 The court retained jurisdiction pending implementation of its judgment.
*477Boeing appealed only one provision of the judgment. It claimed that attorney’s fees could not be awarded from the unclaimed portion of the judgment fund for at least two reasons. First, the equitable doctrine that allows the assessment of attorney’s fees against a common fund created by the lawyers’ efforts was inapposite because the money in the judgment fund would not benefit those class members who failed to claim it. Second, because Boeing had a colorable claim for the return of the unclaimed money, awarding attorney’s fees from those funds might violate the American rule against shifting fees to the losing party. Therefore, Boeing contended, the District Court should award attorney’s fees from only the portion of the fund actually claimed by class members. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with Boeing, 573 F. 2d 733 (1978), but the court en banc affirmed the District Court’s judgment, 590 F. 2d 433 (1978).
The Court of Appeals en banc found that each class member had a “present vested interest in the class recovery” and that each could collect his share of the judgment upon request. *478Thus, the court held, absentee class members had received a benefit within the meaning of the common-fund doctrine. Id., at 439. The court also found its holding consistent with the American rule. It noted that lawyers for the class would receive their fees “from the amount for which Boeing has already been held liable. There is no 'surcharge’ on the defeated litigant.” Id., at 441-442. We granted certiorari, 441 U. S. 942 (1979), and we now affirm.
II
Since the decisions in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1882), and Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116 (1885), this Court has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161 (1939); cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 (1973). The common-fund doctrine reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity, Trustees v. Green-ough, supra, at 532-537, and it stands as a well-recognized exception to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney’s fees, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 257-258. The doctrine rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense. See, e. g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S., at 392. Jurisdiction over the fund involved in the litigation allows a court to prevent this inequity by assessing attorney’s fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately, among those benefited by the suit. See id., at 394.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra, we noted the features that distinguished our common-fund cases from cases where the shifting of fees was inappropriate. First, the classes of persons benefited by the lawsuits “were *479small in number and easily identifiable.” 421 U. S., at 265, n. 39. Second, “[t]he benefits could be traced with some accuracy. . . .” Ibid. Finally, “there was reason for confidence that the costs [of litigation] could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting.” Ibid. Those characteristics are not present where litigants simply vindicate a general social grievance. Id., at 263-267, and n. 39. On the other hand, the criteria are satisfied when each member of a certified class has an undisputed and mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment recovered on his behalf. Once the class representatives have established the defendant’s liability and the total amount of damages, members of the class can obtain their share of the recovery simply by proving their individual claims against the judgment fund. This benefit devolves with certainty upon the identifiable persons whom the court has certified as members of the class. Although the full value of the benefit to each absentee member cannot be determined until he presents his claim, a fee awarded against the entire judgment fund will shift the costs of litigation to each absentee in the exact proportion that the value of his claim bears to the total recovery. See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 916-922 (1975).
In this case, the named respondents have recovered a determinate fund for the benefit of every member of the class whom they represent. Boeing did not appeal the judgment awarding the class a sum certain.5 Nor does Boeing contend *480that any class member was uninjured by the company’s failure adequately to inform him of his conversion rights. Thus, the damage to each class member is simply the difference between the redemption price of his debentures and the value of the common stock into which they could have been converted. To claim their logically ascertainable shares of the judgment fund, absentee class members need prove only their membership in the injured class. Their right to share the harvest of the lawsuit upon proof of their identity, whether or not they exercise it, is a benefit in the fund created by the efforts of the class representatives and their counsel. Unless absentees contribute to the payment of attorney’s fees incurred on their behalves, they will pay nothing for the creation of the fund and their representatives may bear additional costs. The judgment entered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals rectifies this inequity by requiring every member of the class to share attorney’s fees to the same extent that he can share the recovery.6 Since the benefits of the class *481recovery have been “traced with some accuracy” and the costs of recovery have been “shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting,” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra, at 265, n. 39, we conclude that the attorney’s fee award in this case is a proper application of the common-fund doctrine.
Ill
The common-fund doctrine, as applied in this case, is entirely consistent with the American rule against taxing the losing party with the victor’s attorney’s fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra, at 247. The District Court’s judgment assesses attorney’s fees against a fund awarded to the prevailing class. Since there was no appeal from the judgment that quantified Boeing’s liability, Boeing presently has no interest in any part of the fund.7 The members of the class, whether or not they assert their *482rights, are at least the equitable owners of their respective shares in the recovery. Any right that Boeing may establish to the return of money eventually unclaimed is contingent on the failure of absentee class members to exercise their present rights of possession.8 Although Boeing itself cannot be obliged to pay fees awarded to the class lawyers, its latent claim against unclaimed money in the judgment fund may not defeat each class member’s equitable obligation to share the expenses of litigation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The relevant paragraph of the District Court’s judgment declares in full:
“ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs in behalf of all members of the plaintiff class, which consists of all holders on March 29, 1966 of 4%% Convertible Subordinated Debentures of the Boeing Company who failed to exercise their conversion right before it terminated on March 29, 1966, shall recover as their damages herein from the defendants the principal sum of $3,289,359 together with interest thereon at the legal rates fixed by the State of New York, N. Y. C. P. L. R. § 5001 (a) from March 9, 1966 to the date of this judgment, with costs to be taxed. . . .” App. 40a.
The class lawyers have requested fees totaling about $2 million. 573 F. 2d 733, 735, n. 3 (1978) (panel opinion).
Interest on the principal sum of $3,289,359 from the conversion deadline to the date of judgment amounted to $2,459,647, bringing the judgment to $5,749,006. With income earned on investments and other additions, the fund now totals over $7 million. Brief for Special Master as Amicus Curiae 4^6.
The District Court gave the Special Master a broad mandate to “direct the parties in the necessary ministerial steps to effectuate the Judgment, receive all proofs of claim to participate in the Fund established by the Judgment, pass on the validity of same, direct the giving of notices to interested persons of hearings on disputed claims, conduct the *477necessary hearings, submit reports thereon and- in general supervise the administration of the Judgment and decide all disputed questions of law and fact connected therewith subject to confirmation by the Court. . . .” App. 42a.
In the year following his appointment, the Special Master mailed notices to debenture holders who could be identified and published notices in two national newspapers. By July 15, 1978, the Special Master had received claims accounting for $290,000 worth of the $1,544,300 in unconverted debentures. Brief for Special Master as Amicus Curiae 11. The District Court then extended the time for filing proofs of claims, and the Master renewed his efforts to locate holders of the remaining debentures. Further research in files kept by the trustee under the indenture agreement revealed the identity of additional debenture holders. A professional search firm endeavored to trace holders who had relocated. Banks and brokerage houses also were furnished' with information that might help them to locate clients who had invested in the debentures. As of July 18, 1979, shortly before he filed his brief with this Court, the Master had received claims accounting for $706,600 worth of debentures or about 47% of the unconverted securities. Id., at 14.
Boeing contends that the judgment in this case was simply a procedural device ordering Boeing to pay into escrow its maximum potential liability to the class. The judgment will not be final, Boeing argues, until absentee class members have presented their individual claims. Thus, Boeing concludes, the judgment fund confers no benefit on class members who fail to claim against it. Brief for Petitioner 25-26, and n. *.
We think that Boeing misreads the judgment. The District Court explicitly ordered that “plaintiffs in behalf of all members of the plaintiff *480class . . . shall recover as their damages herein from the defendants the principal sum of $3,289,359 together with interest. . . .” See n. 1, supra. Nothing in the court’s order made Boeing’s liability for this amount contingent upon the presentation of individual claims. Thus, we need not decide whether a class-action judgment that simply requires the defendant to give security against all potential claims would support a recovery of attorney’s fees under the common-fund doctrine.
We also think that Boeing’s arguments come too late. Although the District Court did not fix the amount of attorney’s fees to be assessed against absentee class members, its judgment terminated the litigation between Boeing and the class concerning the extent of Boeing’s liability. See Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., 517 F. 2d 555, 559— 561 (CA7 1975). This is not a case, like Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737 (1976), where a prayer for attorney’s fees against an opposing party remains unanswered. See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F. 2d 918, 921-922 (CA3 1977). Thus, the judgment awarding the class a fixed recovery was final and appealable. Since Boeing did not appeal it, we cannot now consider whether the judgment was in error.
Since an award of attorney’s fees under the common-fund doctrine simply relieves claiming class members of costs incurred for the benefit *481of others, we see no merit in Boeing’s contention that the award amounts to a “fluid class” recovery. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Here, as in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 172, n. 10 (1974), we express no opinion on the validity of judgments permitting such recoveries.
Although we recognize that this 14-year-old case has had a fractured career in the courts, we do not agree with Mr. Justice RehNQUist’s dissenting view that the judgment before us lacks finality. Post, at 482. The District Court’s judgment first ordered Boeing to pay a specified sum to the entire class and then assessed undetermined attorney’s fees against the entire fund created by the judgment. The judgment on the merits stripped Boeing of any present interest in the fund. Thus, Boeing had no cognizable interest in further litigation between the class and its lawyers over the amount of the fees ultimately awarded from money belonging to the class. But Boeing did have an interest, arising from its colorable claim for the return of excess money, in whether attorney’s fees could be assessed against the entire fund rather than against the portion actually claimed. Since the District Court’s order assessed attorney’s fees against the entire fund, it was a final judgment on the only issue in which Boeing still had an interest. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, Boeing could secure review of the allocation of fees only by appealing from this adverse judgment.
The Court of Appeals did not consider the ultimate disposition of whatever money may remain in the fund after the District Court enforces a deadline for the presentation of individual claims. 590 F. 2d 433, 440, n. 17 (1978). We likewise express no opinion on that question.