with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
The Court today holds that in a suit against a federal officer for allegedly wrongful actions under color of legal authority, the venue provisions of § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (e), are applicable only if the officer is simply a nominal defendant, and the plaintiff’s real grievance is against the Government. I disagree. It is my view that § 1391 (e) means what it says, and that it thus *546applies as well to a suit for damages against a federal officer for his own wrongdoing.
I
When Congress enacted § 1391 (e) in 1962, this Court had recognized two types of suits against federal officers acting under color of legal authority.1 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682. The first of these two types of suits was based on a legal fiction designed to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This fiction enabled an aggrieved party to obtain equitable relief in a case nominally directed against a federal officer if the officer had acted either unconstitutionally or in excess of his statutory authority. The theory underlying the fiction was that the relief sought was against the officer in his individual capacity, rather than against the Government. Id., at 689-690. But, since any sovereign can act only through its agents, the reality was that the relief sought was in fact against the Government itself. The second type of suit, by contrast, was a direct action against the federal officer in his individual capacity for actions taken under color of legal authority. Id., at 687. Such a suit typically sought to assess personal monetary liability against the officer.
The issue here is whether the venue and service of process provisions of § 1391 (e) were intended to apply to both of these kinds of suits. Section 1391 (e) provides in relevant part:
“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority ... , may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or *547(3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. . . .
“The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer ... as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.”
Since either of the two types of suits described above is properly characterized as “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States ... acting ... under color of legal authority,” it is quite clear that they both fall within the plain meaning of § 1391 (e).2 Thus, by its own terms, § 1391 (e) unambiguously extends to the second type of suit against a federal officer, that is, one in which, as here, money damages are sought directly from the federal officer himself.
II
Relying on legislative history and policy considerations, the Court turns its back on the words of the statute and holds that it does not cover a suit against a federal officer for money damages. The legislative history, according to the Court, indicates that the general purpose of Congress in enacting the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (Act) was to remove then *548existing jurisdictional and venue obstacles to suits against federal officers for mandamus-type relief outside the District of Columbia. The legislative history further indicates, in the Court’s view, that the specific, and exclusive, concern of Congress in adding to § 1391 (e) the phrase at issue here, “acting . . . under color of legal authority,” was to ensure that the provision would govern suits against federal officers for equitable relief. Thus the Court concludes that the proper construction of the phrase “acting . . . under color of legal authority” is coextensive with the sole concern to which it was purportedly addressed. This construction is said to find further support in the policies underlying the Act.8
The Court thus purports to rely on-the familiar rule that “ fin interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute ... and the objects and policy of the law.’ ” Ante, at 535, quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 201-202. This reliance is misplaced, however, since neither the legislative history nor public policy is inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 1391 (e).
A
The forerunner of the Act was introduced as H. R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). That bill provided:
“A civil action in which each defendant is an officer of the United States in his official capacity, a person acting under him, or an agency of the United States, may be brought in any judicial district where a plaintiff in the action resides.” (Emphasis added.)
*549Following hearings and the submission of written comments on H. R. 10089 to a House Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, a new bill was introduced that parallels closely the current language of the Act. The new bill, H. R. 12622, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), contained two sections: the first vested all district courts with jurisdiction to hear suits seeking mandamus-type relief; 4 the second broadened the venue alternatives for a suit against a federal officer “acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority.” (Emphasis added.) This bill passed the House in 1960, but the Senate adjourned without acting on it. The same bill was then reintroduced in the next Congress, H. R. 1960, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and, with only minor amendments, was enacted by both the House and the Senate.
The question here is why Congress expanded the ambit of the second section of the Act, now § 1391 (e), to include not only a suit against a federal officer “acting in his official capacity,” but also a suit against a federal officer “acting . . . under color of legal authority.” The Court says that the legislative history reveals that the phrase “acting . . . under color of legal authority” was added to § 1391 (e) for the sole purpose of including within its coverage suits against federal officers for equitable relief. This view is said to find support in the positions announced by members of the House Subcommittee during the hearings on H. R. 10089, and in the Committee Reports that accompanied the subsequent versions of the bill.
I would have to agree that a principal purpose of adding the phrase “acting .. . under color of legal authority” to § 1391 (e) was to ensure that the venue provisions would apply to suits against federal officers for equitable relief. At the Sub*550committee Hearings on H. R. 10089, the proponent of the bill, Representative Budge, explained the basic problem to which it was addressed- — that, in light of then existing venue and jurisdictional obstacles, “there is no opportunity for a judicial review of the action of any decision that is made by a Federal officer in charge out there [in the field], no matter how arbitrary or capricious, because it is too expensive to come back here [to Washington, D. C.] to litigate it.” Hearings on H. R. 10089 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1960).
The record of the testimony at the Subcommittee hearings, however, reveals substantial confusion both as to the scope of the problem and the manner in which it ought to be resolved. During the hearings, a representative of the Justice Department observed that since the bill, as drafted, applied only to a suit against a federal officer “in his official capacity,” there would remain unresolved the venue and jurisdictional problems in the context of a suit for equitable relief brought against a federal officer in his individual capacity to sidestep the problem of sovereign immunity. Id., at 32-33. In response, the Subcommittee’s counsel proposed the addition of the language at issue here: “Suppose in order to take care of a body of law which seems to say that when a government official does something wrong he is acting in his individual capacity, we added the following language — ‘acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority.’ ” Id., at 61 (emphasis added). That phrase was then incorporated in the redrafted bill, H. R. 12622, as well as subsequent bills. The Committee Reports accompanying those bills confirm that Congress intended § 1391 (e) to govern suits against federal officers for equitable relief.
Although a principal purpose of adding the phrase “acting... under color of legal authority” to § 1391 (e) thus undoubtedly was to ensure that the venue provision would apply to suits against federal officers for equitable relief, it is not at all clear *551from the legislative history that Congress sought only to include such suits within the broadened ambit of the provision. Whatever may have been the intent of the Subcommittee members who conducted the hearings on the original bill, the Committee Reports accompanying subsequent bills — all of which included the phrase “acting . . . under color of legal authority” — indicated an intent to reach suits against federal officers not only for equitable relief, but also for money damages. In describing the scope of the problem addressed by the Act, the Committee Reports indicated that “[t]he venue problem also arises in an action against a Government official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty.” H. R. Rep. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960); H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961); S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1961) (emphasis added).
It is also significant that at least one of these Committee Reports, that of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was issued after the then Deputy Attorney General had recommended that the venue reform be tied in directly to the Administrative Procedure Act. Letter from Deputy Attorney General White to Senator Eastland (Feb. 28, 1962), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 6. “This,” he observed, “[would] unquestionably eliminate] suits for money judgments against officers.” Ibid. Although the Committee acted upon other suggestions in that letter, it took no steps whatsoever to narrow the ambit of § 1391 (e) to exclude suits for money damages. Rather, as stated above, the Committee Report indicated that the venue problem to which the bill was addressed applied to such suits.
B
It is also instructive that shortly after the Act was signed into law, then Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach circulated a memorandum to all United States Attorneys to assist *552them in defending suits brought under the newly enacted legislation. In that memorandum, he noted:
“The venue provision [§ 1391 (e)] is applicable to suits against Government officials and agencies for injunctions and damages as well as suits for mandatory relief. . . . As an example, suits for damages for alleged libel or slander by Government officials (which the Department defends on the ground that statements made by a Government official within the scope of his authority are absolutely privileged . . .) fall within the venue provision of this statute.”
It is thus clear that the Justice Department regarded § 1391 (e) as applicable to suits against federal officers for money damages for actions taken under color of legal authority.
The significance of this memorandum is twofold. First, it represents a contemporaneous interpretation of § 1391 (e) that is wholly at odds with that adopted by the Court. Second, it indicates that the Justice Department has long assumed a special responsibility for representing federal officers sued for money damages for actions taken under color of legal authority. This longstanding responsibility is carried forth in current regulations. See 28 CFR §§ 50.15, 50.16 (1979).
The fact that the Justice Department, in most circumstances, will provide such representation substantially undercuts the Court’s policy argument that to construe § 1391 (e) to govern suits for money damages would undermine the “sound and equitable administration of justice,” see H. R. Rep. No. 536, supra, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 3, by “plae[ing] federal officers, solely by reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since under 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), suits against private persons for money damages must be brought fin the judicial district where all the defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.’ ” Ante, at 544. The Court’s argument overlooks the fact that since the Government *553is willing to provide representation in a suit against a federal officer for money damages, the federal officer is relieved of the greatest burden involved in defending himself.
Ill
The petitioners also argue that principles of due process militate against construing § 1391 (e) to govern suits against federal officers for money damages. This argument turns on the fact that § 1391 (e) provides not only for expanded venue, but also for nationwide service of process. It is the petitioners’ position that a serious due process problem arises when the provisions of § 1391 (e) are taken to mean what they say, so as to permit a federal district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a federal officer who lacks sufficient “minimum contacts” with the State or district in which the federal court sits.5
The petitioners concede that previous cases in this area have involved the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a state court may acquire personal jurisdiction only if there exist “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State. Reasoning by analogy, however, the petitioners *554argue that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment similarly limit the exercise of congressional power to provide for nationwide in personam jurisdiction.
The short answer to this argument is that due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310. The issue is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United States. No due process problem exists.
This is not to say that a federal officer in a suit for money damages is without recourse in the event he is sued in an inconvenient place. A federal district court is vested with broad authority “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, [to] . . . transfer any civil action to any other district . . . where it might have been brought.” 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a). It is not unreasonable to expect that district courts would look sympathetically upon a motion for a change of venue in any case where a federal officer could show that he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit were not transferred to a more convenient forum.
For the reasons stated, I think that § 1391 (e) means exactly what it says, and that its provisions present no constitutional problem whatever. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments in both of these cases.
For purposes of brevity, I hereafter refer to “suits against federal officers acting under color of legal authority” simply as “suits against federal officers.”
The Court argues that since § 1391 (e) is written in the present tense (“[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States . . . acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority” (emphasis added)), the phrase “acting . . . under color of legal authority” is properly construed as applying only to a nominal suit against a federal officer for equitable relief. Such a suit, the Court notes, is necessarily brought against a defendant who is presently serving as a federal officer. Ante, at 535-536. This argument falls short of the mark, however, for many suits against federal officers for money damages, such as those at issue here, are brought against the officers while they are still in Government service.
The Court also finds support for its construction of § 1391 (e) in our holding in Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U. S. 487, 490, n. 4, that § 1391 (e) does not apply to habeas corpus actions. This reliance is misplaced, because the Schlanger decision turned on the sui generis nature of habeas corpus actions which, though “technically 'civil/ . . . [are] not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions.” Ibid.
This section of the bill, with minor modifications, was later enacted as § 1 of the Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, which provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”
The petitioners also argue, on statutory grounds, that § 1391 (e) does not confer personal jurisdiction. It is the petitioners’ position that § 1391 (e) was designed only to govern venue and service of process, not to confer personal jurisdiction. The flaw in this argument is that, as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and in the cases before us the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means by which service of process was effected.
It cannot seriously be argued that § 1391 (e) does not authorize extraterritorial service of process, for it provides that in civil actions governed by § 1391 (e) “the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.” The legislative history, moreover, confirms that Congress intended extraterritorial service of process for all cases governed by § 1391 (e). See H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961).