with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a class composed of “all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole.” App. 17. The District Court denied class certification and granted summary judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent’s personal claim was moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court’s analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says that mootness is a “flexible” doctrine which may be adapted as we see fit to “nontraditional” forms of litigation. Ante, at 400-402. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has a right “analogous to the private attorney general concept” to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 402-404. Both steps are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
As the Court observes, this case involves the “personal stake” aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 396. There *410is undoubtedly a “live” issue which an appropriate plaintiff could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may — through counsel — continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine of uncertain contours. Ante, at 402. But the constitutional minimum has been given definite content: “In order to satisfy Art. Ill, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject — or with the rights of third parties — for “the concrete injury required by Art. III.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976).2
*411As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 397; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation of an action in which the parties have invested substantial resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual case or controversy in the constitutional sense “ ‘must be extant at all stages of review.’ ” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer ‘“touc[h] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’ ” are moot because “federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 401, n. 9; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the *412necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So, too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 115 (1974); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court’s view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the outcome is not “flexible.” Indeed, the rule barring litigation by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied so rigorously that it has been termed the “one major proposition” in the law of standing to which “the federal courts have consistently adhered . . . without exception.” Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968) (emphasis deleted).5 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case-or-controversy limitation imposed by the Constitution, “founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 498. In this *413way we have, until today, “prevent[ed] the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 60 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972).
II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court has applied consistently. These principles were developed outside the class action context. But Art. Ill contains no exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury “may [npt] seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 23 can it “acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff].” Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 399. “Given a properly certified class,” the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. Ill when the named plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any personal stake in the litigation.6 In the words of his own *414lawyer, respondent “can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief” in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. Even the lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other persons presently incarcerated. Ibid.7 In these circumstances, Art. Ill and the precedents of this Court require dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time — and without attempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary — that there are two categories of “the Art. III mootness doctrine”: “flexible” and “less flexible.” Ante, at 400, and n. 7. The Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application of “flexible” mootness to class action litigation. The cases principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and today’s decision in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. 326. Each case is said to show that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative’s personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even though no class has been certified. Ante, at 400. Sosna itself is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. Ill may be met “through means other than the traditional requirement of a ‘personal stake in the outcome.’ ” Ante, at 404. In my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
*415A
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240.8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long established, outside the class action context, by cases that never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could con-tinué after the named plaintiffs’ convictions had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed the claim within “that *416narrow class of cases” that are “distinctly ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” 420 U. S., at 110, n. 11.9
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class representative’s claim on the merits. But neither case holds that Art. Ill may be satisfied in the absence of a personal stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative class member intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U. S., at 390.10 Because the Court found that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the intervenor’s claim for relief had not expired.11 At most, McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does not “die” in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the “refusal to certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs. . . .” 432 U. S., at 393. That gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, *417437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated by the Court’s opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In Roper the Court holds that the named plaintiffs, who have refused to accept proffered individual settlements, retain a personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the class. Ante, at 334, n. 6, 336. Finding that Art. III is satisfied by this alleged economic interest, Roper reasons that the rules of federal practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural, rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable judgment. See ante, at 333-334, 336. The Court concludes that the denial of class certification falls within this category, as long as the named plaintiffs “assert a continuing stake in the outcome of the appeal.” Ante, at 336.
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to support the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by The Chief Justice in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid. Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake or personal interest in the outcome of his appeal. See supra, at 413-414. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper is absent in this case. One can disagree with that analysis yet conclude that Roper affords no support for the Court’s ruling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as “less flexible” — and therefore less authoritative — apply established Art. III doctrine in cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 *418(1976). As they are about to become second-class precedents, these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 400-401, n. 7. But the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this Court. They applied long-settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested the distinction drawn today. The Court’s backhanded treatment of these “less flexible” cases ignores their controlling relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because the “class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court.” 420 U. S., at 130.12 Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palrni-giano, 425 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court held that the named plaintiff’s release from prison required the *419dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 423 U. S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route of appealing a denial of certification only because the District Court had granted — albeit defectively — class status. We chose not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in Jacobs because we recognized, that , the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise.13 The Court rejects that principle today.
III
While the Court’s new concept of “flexible” mootness is unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action into two separate “claims”: (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits is moot. Ante, at 404, 408. But respondent is said to *420have a personal stake in his “procedural claim” despite his lack of a stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the certification question.14 Instead, respondent’s “personal stake” is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a “right,” “analogous to the private attorney general concept,” to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the case retains the “imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution,” which are identified as (i) a sharply presented issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 403.15
*421The Court’s reliance on some new “right” inherent in Rule 23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not confer federal-court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a rule of procedure which “shall not be construed to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States district courts.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the “private attorney general concept” cannot supply the personal stake necessary to satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court’s new perception of Art. Ill requirements must rest entirely on its tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. Ill jurisprudence, they operate only in “ ‘cases confessedly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction.’ ” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and I am aware of none.16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is *422sure to be present in the typical “private attorney general” action brought by a public-spirited citizen.17 Although we have refused steadfastly to countenance the “public action,” the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice.18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in a “procedural claim,” particularly in “nontraditional forms of litigation.” Ante, at 402. But the Court has created a false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues are “ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.” Ante, *423at 332. Any attempt to identify a personal stake in such ancillary “claims” often must end in frustration, for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular context. Such procedural devices generally have no value apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 (1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to “adapt” Art. Ill is limited to the recognition of different “ 'means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.’” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19 But it *424cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation of Art. III.20
TV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative — respondent here — no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.21
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). Each of these cases rejects the view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparently espoused by the Court, that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional significance. Ante, at 404-407, n. 11; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view never had commanded a majority.
See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 *411(1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Oilman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam).
See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, p. 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-377 (1974).
See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306, n. 3 (1964).
The Court states that “the erosion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well before today’s decision,” and that the Art. Ill personal stake requirement is “riddled with exceptions.” Ante, at 404-405, 406, n. 11. It fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either statement. To the extent that the decision in Flast v. Cohen, supra, supports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, 392 U. S., at 117-120, it does not survive the long line of express holdings that began with Warth v. Seldin, supra, and were reaffirmed only last Term. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1 and 2, supra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis observed that the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. 35 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 616, 617.
No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake — “in the traditional sense” — in obtaining certification. Ante, at 402.
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a motion to intervene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his *414petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes too late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977).
Respondent’s lawyer opened his argument by saying that “[t]he mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very significant.” If the action is dismissed as moot he plans simply to “file a new case” on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in a class action that will not moot out.
Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. ' After certification, class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Precertification Stage: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L. Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire class. If the named plaintiff’s own claim becomes moot after certification, the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class members. Should it be found wanting, the court may seek a substitute representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1), 23 (d); see 1 Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
The Court’s Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that “[p] retrial detention is by nature temporary” and that “[t]he individual could . . . suffer repeated deprivations” with no access to redress, falls squarely within the rule of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend “‘especially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.’” Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations are inconsistent with the concept of “flexible” mootness and the redefinition of “personal stake” adopted today.
The individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification issue itself. Since the present respondent’s claim long since has “expired,” he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whose claim has “expired” by reason of the statute of limitations.
The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the .repeated dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness once the named plaintiff’s claim becomes moot. East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 754, n. 6, 755-756 (1976); see Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff’s individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, n. 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402, 403; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 526, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978).
In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 U. S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953). In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accompanying text.
In a footnote, ante, at 406, n. 11, the Court states:
“This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic personal-stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500.”
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our cases have required. Yet, again, the Court fails to identify the injury. The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no damages — only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for respondent frankly conceded that his client “can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief” in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court seriously is claiming concrete injury “at all stages of review,” see supra, at 411, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that was not apparent to respondent’s counsel. Absent such identification, the claim of injury is indeed an empty one.
The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 421-422, and n. 18, by asserting that “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts” on the basis of “practicalities and prudential considerations.” Ante, at 406, n. 11. The Court long has recognized a difference between the prudential and constitutional aspects of the standing and mootness doctrines. See supra, at 410. I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged these considerations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a *421personal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view. Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. Ill analysis, cannot justify today’s holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness. See n. 18, infra. Nor does the Court’s reliance upon a “ ‘relation back’ principle,” ante, at 407, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction may provide a shorthand label for the Court’s conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly not a limiting one.
The Court often has rejected the contention that a “spirited dispute” alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S., at 35-36; Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per curiam).
The Court’s assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever in his new-found “right to have a class certified.” Ante, at 403. In fact, the record shows that respondent’s interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might terminate the action. App. 17; Brief for Respondent 23, 33. The record does not reveal whether respondent — as distinguished from his lawyer — now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that his interest has nothing to do with the. procedural protections described by the Court as the “primary benefits of class suits.” Ante, at 403. It is neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with parole procedures. But respondent’s actual interest is indistinguishable from the generalized interest of a “private attorney general” who might bring a “public action” to improve the operation of a parole system.
The Court’s view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an Art. III matter, there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action and one filed promptly after the named plaintiff’s release from prison. In the present case, this Court has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must begin anew — this time without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations in favor of a finding of mootness could scarcely be more , compelling.
I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any way to the continued vitality of the class action device. On the contrary, the practical impact of mootness in this case, would be slight indeed. See n. 18, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers that “buy off” each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, at 339. Nor will substitute plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class under Rule 23 (b) (3).
The Court’s efforts to “save” this action from mootness lead it to depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing is said about the District Court’s ruling on the merits or its refusal to certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the District Court erred in failing to consider the possibility of subclasses sita, sponte. Nevertheless, respondent — or his lawyer — is given the opportunity to raise the subclass question on remand. That résult cannot be squared with the rule that a litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus making a motion for subclasses a “futile act.” Ante, at 408. But nothing in the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only to avoid'mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the merits provides no excuse for his subsequent failure to present a subclass proposal to the District Court.
I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the case was brought to this Court by the United States.