City of Rome v. United States

Mr. Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its applicability to electoral changes and annexations made by the city of Rome, Ga.

I

This is a declaratory judgment action brought by appellant city of Rome, a municipality in northwestern Georgia, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seg. In 1970 the city had a population of 30,759, the racial composition of which was 76.6% white and 23.4% Negro. The voting-age population in 1970 was 79.4% white and 20.6% Negro.

The governmental structure of the city is established by a charter enacted in 1918 by the General Assembly of Georgia. *160Before the amendments at issue in this case, Rome’s city charter provided for a nine-member City Commission and a five-member Board of Education to be elected concurrently on an at-large basis by a plurality of the vote. The city was divided into nine wards, with one city commissioner from each ward to be chosen in the citywide election. There was no residency requirement for Board of Education candidates.

In 1966, the General Assembly of Georgia passed several laws of local application that extensively amended the electoral provisions of the city’s charter. These enactments altered the Rome electoral scheme in the following ways:

(1) the number of wards was reduced from nine to three;

(2) each of the nine commissioners would henceforth be elected at-large to one of three numbered posts established within each ward;

(3) each commissioner would be elected by majority rather than plurality vote, and if no candidate for a particular position received a majority, a runoff election would be held between the two candidates who had received the largest number of votes;

(4) the terms of the three commissioners from each ward would be staggered ;

(5) the Board of Education was expanded from five to six members;

(6) each Board member would be elected at large, by majority vote, for one of two numbered posts created in each of the three wards, with runoff procedures identical to those applicable to City Commission elections;

(7) Board members would be required to reside in the wards from which they were elected;

(8) the terms of the two members from each ward would be staggered.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires pre-clearance by the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of any change in a *161“standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting,” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, made after November 1, 1964, by jurisdictions that fall within the coverage formula set forth in § 4 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b). In 1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under the Act, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, and the municipalities of that State must therefore comply with the preclearance procedure, United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110 (1978).

It is not disputed that the 1966 changes in Rome’s electoral system were within the purview of the Act. E. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). Nonetheless, the city failed to seek preclearance for them. In addition, the city did not seek preclearance for 60 annexations made between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975, even though required to do so because an annexation constitutes a change in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” under the Act, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971).

In June 1974, the city did submit one annexation to the Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General discovered that other annexations had occurred, and, in response to his inquiries, the city submitted all the annexations and the 1966 electoral changes for preclearance. The Attorney General declined to preclear the provisions for majority vote, numbered posts, and staggered terms for City Commission and Board of Education elections, as well as the residency requirement for Board elections. He concluded that in a city such as Rome, in which the population is predominately white and racial bloc voting has been common, these electoral changes would deprive Negro voters of the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The Attorney General also refused to preclear 13 of the 60 annexations in question. He found that the disapproved annexations either contained predominately white populations of significant size *162or were near predominately white areas and were zoned for residential subdivision development. Considering these factors in light of Rome’s at-large electoral scheme and history of racial bloc voting, he determined that the city had not carried its burden of proving that the annexations would not dilute the Negro vote.

In response to the city’s motion for reconsideration, the Attorney General agreed to clear the 13 annexations for School Board elections. He reasoned that his disapproval of the 1966 voting changes had resurrected the pre-existing electoral scheme and that the revivified scheme passed muster under the Act. At the same time, he refused to clear the annexations for City Commission elections because, in his view, the residency requirement for City Commission contained in the preexisting electoral procedures could have a discriminatory effect.

The city and two of its officials then filed this action, seeking relief from the Act based on a variety of claims. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (a) and 1973c, rejected the city’s arguments and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 472 F. Supp. 221 (DC, 1979). We noted probable jurisdiction, 443 U. S. 914 (1979), and now affirm.

II

We must first address the appellants’ assertion that, for two reasons, this Court may avoid reaching the merits of this action.

A

The appellants contend that the city may exempt itself from the coverage of the Act. To evaluate this argument, we must examine the provisions of the Act in some detail.

Section 5 of the Act requires that a covered jurisdiction that wishes to enact any “standard, practice,, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on *163November 1, 1964/’ must seek preclearance from the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c.1 *164Section 4 (a) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a),2 provides that the preclearance requirement of *165§ 5 is applicable to “any State” that the Attorney General has determined qualifies under the coverage formula of § 4 (b), 42 *166U. S. C. § 1973b (b),3 and to “any political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit.” As we have noted, the city of Rome comes within the preclearance requirement because it is a political unit in a covered jurisdiction, the State of Georgia. United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110 (1978).

*167Section 4 (a) also provides, however, a procedure for exemption from the Act. This so-called “bailout” provision allows a covered jurisdiction to escape the preclearance requirement of § 5 by bringing a declaratory judgment action before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and proving that no “test or device”4 has been used in the jurisdiction “during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” The District Court refused to allow the city to “bail out” of the Act’s coverage, holding that the political units of a covered jurisdiction cannot independently bring a § 4 (a) bailout action. We agree.

In the terms of § 4 (a), the issue turns on whether the city is, for bailout purposes, either a “State with respect to which the determinations have been made under the third sentence of subsection (b) of this section” or a “political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit,” the “determinations” in each instance being the Attorney General’s decision whether the jurisdiction falls within the coverage formula of § 4 (b). On the face of the statute, the city fails to meet the definition for either term, since the coverage formula of § 4 (b) has never been applied to it. Rather, the city comes within the Act because it is part of a covered State. Under the plain language of the statute, then, it appears that any bailout action to exempt the city must be filed by, and seek to exempt all of, the State of Georgia.

*168The appellants seek to avoid this conclusion by relying on our decision in United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., supra. That decision, however, did not even discuss the bailout process. In Sheffield, the Court held that when the Attorney General determines that a State falls within the coverage formula of § 4 (b), any political unit of the State must preclear new voting procedures under § 5 regardless of whether the unit registers voters and therefore would otherwise come within the Act as a “political subdivision.” 5 In so holding, the Court necessarily determined that the scope of §§ 4 (a) and 5 is “geographic” or “territorial,” 435 U. S., at 120, 126, and thus that, when an entire State is covered, it is irrelevant whether political units of it might otherwise come under § 5 as “political subdivisions.” 435 U. S., at 126-129.

Sheffield, then, did not hold that cities such as Rome are “political subdivisions” under §§ 4 and 5. Thus, our decision in that case is in no way inconsistent with our conclusion that, under the express statutory language, the city is not a “political subdivision” for purposes of § 4 (a) “bailout.”

Nor did Sheffield suggest that a municipality in a covered State is itself a “State” for purposes of the § 4 (a) exemption procedure. Sheffield held that, based on the structure and purposes of the Act, the legislative history, and the contemporaneous interpretation of the Attorney General, the ambiguities of §§ 4 (a) and 5 should be resolved by holding that § 5’s preclearance requirement for electoral changes by a covered “State” reached all such changes made by political units in that State. See 435 U. S., at 117-118. By contrast, in this *169ease the legislative history precludes any argument that § 4 (a)’s bailout procedure, made available to a covered “State,” was also implicitly made available to political units in the State. The House Commitee Report stated:

“This opportunity to obtain exemption is afforded only to those States or to those subdivisions as to which the formula has been determined to apply as a separate unit; subdivisions within a State which is covered by the formula are not afforded the opportunity for separate exemption.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965).

The Senate Committee's majority Report is to the same effect:

“We are also of the view that an entire State covered by the test and device prohibition of section 4 must be able to lift the prohibition if any part of it is to be relieved from the requirements of section 4.” S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 16 (1965).

See also id., at 21. Bound by this unambiguous congressional intent, we hold that the city of Rome may not use the bailout procedure of § 4 (a).6

*170B

The appellants next argue that its electoral changes have been precleared because of allegedly tardy action by the Attorney General. On May 21, 1976, the city asked the Attorney General to reconsider his refusal to preclear the electoral changes and the 13 annexations. On July 13, 1976, upon its own accord, the city submitted two additional affidavits. The Attorney General denied the motion to reconsider on August 12, 1976.

Section 5 of the Act provides that the Attorney General must interpose objections to original submissions within 60 days of their filing.7 If the Attorney General fails to make a timely objection, the voting practices submitted become fully enforceable. By regulation, the Attorney General has provided that requests for reconsideration shall also be decided within 60 days of their receipt. 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) (1979).8 If in the present case the 60-day period for reconsideration is computed as running continuously from May 24, the date of the initial submission of the reconsideration motion, the period expired before the Attorney General made his August 12 response. In contrast, if the period is measured from July 14, *171the date the city supplemented its. request, the Attorney General’s response was timely.

The timing provisions of both the Act and the regulations are silent on the effect of supplements to requests for reconsideration. We agree with the Attorney General that the purposes of the Act and its implementing regulations would be furthered if the 60-day period provided by 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) were interpreted to commence anew when additional information is supplied by the submitting jurisdiction on its own accord.

The logic of Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973), indicates that the Government’s approach fully comports with the Act and regulations. In that case, the Court examined a regulation of the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 51.18 (a), that provided that § 5’s mandatory 60-day period for consideration of original submissions is tolled whenever the Attorney General finds it necessary to request additional information from the submitting jurisdiction. Under the regulation, the 60-day period commences anew when the jurisdiction in question furnishes the requested information to the Attorney General. The Court upheld the regulation, holding that it was “wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act.” 411 U. S., at 541.

Georgia v. United States stands for the proposition that the purposes of the Act are furthered if, once all information relevant to a submission is placed before the Attorney General, the Attorney General is accorded the full 60-day period provided by law in which to make his “difficult and complex” decision, id., at 540. It follows, then, that when the submitting jurisdiction deems its initial submission on a reconsideration motion to be inadequate and decides to supplement it, as the city of Rome did in the present case, the 60-day period under 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) is commenced anew. A contrary ruling would mean that the Attorney General would, in some cases, be unable to give adequate consideration to materials submitted in piecemeal fashion. In such circumstances, the *172Attorney General might be able to respond only by denying the reconsideration motion. Such a result would run counter to the purposes of the Act and regulations, since it would penalize submitting jurisdictions that have legitimate reasons to file supplementary materials.9

Ill

The appellants raise five issues of law in support of their contention that the Act may not properly be applied to the electoral changes and annexations disapproved by the Attorney General.

A

The District Court found that the disapproved electoral changes and annexations had not been made for any discriminatory purpose, but did have a discriminatory effect. The appellants argue that § 5 of the Act may not be read as prohibiting voting practices that have only a discriminatory effect. The appellants do not dispute that the plain language of § 5 commands that the Attorney General may clear a practice only if it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (emphasis added). By describing the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive, Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent. Our decisions have consistently interpreted § 5 in this fashion. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 372 (1975); Georgia v. United States, supra, at 538; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 387, 388 (1971). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the Act prohibited both discriminatory purpose and effect when, in 1975, it extended *173the Act for another seven years. S. Rep. No. 94 — 295, pp. 15-16 (1975) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 94^196, pp. 8-9 (1975) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).

The appellants urge that we abandon this settled interpretation because in their view § 5, to the extent that it prohibits voting changes that have only a discriminatory effect, is unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and congressional intent are plain, however, we are required to reject the appellants’ suggestion that we engage in a saving construction and avoid the constitutional issues they raise. See, e. g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 499-501 (1979); id., at 508-511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, we now turn to their constitutional contentions.

B

Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by the Fifteenth Amendment.10 The appellants contend that the Act is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ power to enforce that Amendment. They claim that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination in voting, and that in- enforcing that provision pursuant to § 2, Congress may not prohibit voting practices lacking discriminatory intent even if they are discriminatory in effect. We hold that, even if § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination,11 the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.

*174The appellants are asking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The Court in that case observed that, after making an extensive investigation, Congress had determined that its earlier attempts to remedy the “insidious and pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting had failed because of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution” in some parts of this country. Id., at 309. Case-by-case adjudication had proved too ponderous a method to remedy voting discrimination, and, when it had produced favorable results, affected jurisdictions often “merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees.” Id., at 314. In response to its determination that “sterner and more elaborate measures” were necessary, id., at 309, Congress adopted the Act, a “complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,” id., at 315.

The Court then turned to the question whether the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress to impose the rigors of the Act upon the covered jurisdictions. The Court examined the interplay between the judicial remedy created by § 1 of the Amendment and the legislative authority conferred by §2:

“By adding this authorization [in §2], the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in § 1. 'It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress, is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War]. amendments fully effective.’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.” 383 U. S., at 325-326 (emphasis in original).

*175Congress' authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, we held, was no less broad than its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). This authority, as applied by longstanding precedent to congressional enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, is defined in these terms:

'Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the [Civil War] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. [339,] 345-346.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 327.

Applying this standard, the Court held that the coverage formula of § 4 (b), the ban on the use of literacy tests and related devices, the requirement that new voting rules must be precleared and must lack both discriminatory purpose and effect, and the use of federal examiners were all appropriate methods for Congress to use to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 383 U. S., at 329-337.

The Court’s treatment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of the Act’s ban on literacy tests demonstrates that, under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices that have only a discriminatory effect. The Court had earlier held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959), that the use of a literacy test that was fair on its face and was not employed in a discriminatory fashion did not violate § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In upholding the Act’s per se ban on such tests in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court found no reason to overrule Lassiter. Instead, the Court recognized that the prohibition was an appropriate method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment *176because for many years most of the covered jurisdictions had imposed such tests to effect voting discrimination and the continued use of even nondiscriminatory, fairly administered literacy tests would “freeze the effect” of past discrimination by allowing white illiterates to remain on the voting rolls while excluding illiterate Negroes. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 334. This holding makes clear that Congress may, under the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.

Other decisions of this Court also recognize Congress’ broad power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court held that legislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment12 would be upheld so long as the Court could find that the enactment “ ‘is plainly adapted to [the] end’ ” of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and “is not prohibited by but is consistent with ‘the letter and spirit of the constitution,’ ” regardless of whether the practices outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S., at 651 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, at 421). The Court stated that, “[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 651. Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), the Court unanimously upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, imposing a 5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar requirements for registering to vote in state and federal elections. The Court concluded that Congress could rationally have *177determined that these provisions were appropriate methods of attacking the perpetuation of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless of whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only in effect. See 400 U. S., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 144^147 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216-217 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 231-236 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); id., at 282-284 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.).13

It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are “appropriate,” as that term is defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880). In the present case, we hold that the Act’s ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination,14 it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335; Oregon v. Mitchell, *178supra, at 216 (opinion of Harlan,- J.). We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress’ considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing States from “‘undo[ing] or defeating] the rights recently won’ by Negroes.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S., at 140 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, p. 8 (1969)).

C

The appellants next assert that, even if the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act, that legislation violates principles of federalism articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). This contention necessarily supposes that National League of Cities signifies a retreat from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, where we rejected the argument that the Act “exceed [s] the powers of Congress and encroach [es] on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution,” 383 U. S., at 323, and determined that, “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting,” id., at 324. To the contrary, we find no inconsistency between these decisions.

In National League of Cities, the Court held that federal legislation regulating minimum wages and hours could not constitutionally be extended to employees of state and local governments. The Court determined that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress the authority to enact legislation “directly displacing] the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,” 426 U. S., at 852, which, it held, included employer-employee relationships in programs traditionally conducted by States, id., at 851-852.

The decision in National League of Cities was based solely on an assessment of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and we explicitly reserved the question “whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect inte*179gral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 852, n. 17. The answer to this question came four days later in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). That case presented the issue whether, in spite of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress had the authority to bring the States as employers within the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg., and to provide that successful plaintiffs could recover retroactive monetary relief. The Court held that this extension of Title VII was an appropriate method of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment:

“[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 'by appropriate legislation’ the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, at 456.

We agree with the court below that Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments “by appropriate legislation.” Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights *180Act.15 National League of Cities, then, provides no reason to depart from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that “the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power,” 383 U. S., at 325, and that the Act is “an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities,” id., at 308.16

D

The appellants contend in the alternative that, even if the Act and its preclearance requirement were appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in 1965, they had outlived their usefulness by 1975, when Congress extended the Act for another seven years. We decline this invitation to overrule Congress’ judgment that the 1975 extension was warranted.

In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged that, largely as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration had improved dramatically since 1965. H. R. Rep., at 6; S. Rep., at 13. Congress determined, however, that “a bleaker side of the picture yet exists.” H. R. Rep., at 7; S. Rep., at 13. Significant disparity persisted between the percentages of whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro elected officials had increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held statewide office, and *181their number in the state legislatures fell far short of being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority political progress under the Act, though “undeniable,” had been “modest and spotty,” extension of the Act was warranted. H. R. Rep., at 7-11; S. Rep., at 11-19.

Congress gave careful consideration to the propriety of readopting § 5’s preclearance requirement. It first noted that “[i]n recent years the importance of this provision has become widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving minority political gains in covered jurisdictions.” H. R. Rep., at 8; S. Rep., at 15. After examining information on the number and types of submissions made by covered jurisdictions and the number and nature of objections interposed by the Attorney General, Congress not only determined that § 5 should be extended for another seven years, it gave that provision this ringing endorsement:

“The recent objections entered by the Attorney General ... to Section 5 submissions clearly bespeak the continuing need for this preclearance mechanism. As registration and voting of minority citizens increases [sic], other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength.
“The Committee is convinced that it is largely Section 5 which has contributed to the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation, and it is likewise Sect[i] on 5 which serves to insure that that progress not be destroyed through new procedures and techniques. Now is not the time to remove those preclearance protections from such limited and fragile success.” H. R. Rep., at 10-11.

See also S. Rep., at 15-19.

It must not be forgotten that in 1965, 95 years after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote *182to all citizens regardless of race or color, Congress found that racial discrimination in voting was an “insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” South Carolina v. Katsenbach, 383 U. S., at 309. In adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to remedy this century of obstruction by shifting “the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” Id., at 328. Ten years later, Congress found that a 7-year extension of the Act was necessary to preserve the “limited and fragile” achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of voting discrimination. When viewed in this light, Congress’ considered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable. The extension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.

E

As their final constitutional challenge to the Act,17 the individual appellants argue that, because no elections have been held in Rome since 1974, their First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment rights as private citizens of the city have been abridged. In blaming the Act for this result, these appellants identify the wrong culprit. The Act does not restrict private political expression or prevent a covered jurisdiction from holding elections; rather, it simply provides that elections may be held either under electoral rules in effect on November 1, 1964, or under rules adopted since that time that have been properly precleared. When the Attorney General refused to preclear the city’s electoral changes, the city had the authority to conduct elections under its electoral scheme in effect on *183November 1, 1964. Indeed, the Attorney General offered to preclear any technical amendments to the city charter necessary to permit elections under the pre-existing scheme or a modification of that scheme consistent with the Act. In these circumstances, the city’s failure to hold elections can only be attributed to its own officials, and not to the operation of the Act.

IV

Now that we have reaffirmed our holdings in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that the Act is “an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities” and is “consonant with all . . . provisions of the Constitution,” 383 U. S., at 308, we must address the appellants’ contentions that the 1966 electoral changes and the annexations disapproved by the Attorney General do not, in fact, have a discriminatory effect. We are mindful that the District Court’s findings of fact must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.

A

We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the city had failed to prove that the 1966 electoral changes would not dilute the effectiveness of the Negro vote in Rome.18 The District Court determined that racial bloc voting existed in Rome. It found that the electoral changes from plurality-win to majority-win elections, numbered posts, and staggered terms, when combined with the presence of racial bloc voting and Rome’s majority white population and at-large electoral system, would dilute Negro voting strength. The District Court recognized that, under the pre-existing plurality-win system, a Negro candidate would have a fair opportunity to be elected by a plurality of the vote *184if white citizens split their votes among several white candidates and Negroes engage in “single-shot voting” in his favor.19 The 1966 change to the majority vote/runoff election scheme significantly decreased the opportunity for such a Negro candidate since, “even if he gained a plurality of votes in the general election, [he] would still have to face the runner-up white candidate in a head-to-head runoff election in which, given bloc voting by race and a white majority, [he] would be at a severe disadvantage.” 472 F. Supp., at 244 (footnotes omitted).20

*185The District Court's further conclusion that the city had failed to prove that the numbered posts, staggered terms, and Board of Education residency provisions would not have the effect of forcing head-to-head contests between Negroes and whites and depriving Negroes of the opportunity to elect a candidate by single-shot voting, id., at 245, is likewise not clearly erroneous.21 The District Court’s holdings regarding all of the 1966 electoral changes are consistent with our statement in Beer v. United States, 425 U. S., at 141, that “the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral [process].”

B

The District Court also found that the city had failed to meet its burden of proving that the 13 disapproved annexations did not dilute the Negro vote in Rome. The *186city’s argument that this finding is clearly erroneous is severely undermined by the fact that it failed to present any evidence shedding meaningful light on how the annexations affected the vote of Rome’s Negro community.

Because Rome’s failure to preclear any of these annexations caused a delay in federal review and placed the annexations before the District Court as a group, the court was correct in concluding that the cumulative effect of the 13 annexations must be examined from the perspective of the most current available population data. Unfortunately, the population data offered by the city was quite uninformative. The city did not present evidence on the current general population and voting-age population of Rome, much less a breakdown of each population category by race.22 Nor does the record reflect current information regarding the city’s registered voters. The record does indicate the number of Negro and white registered voters in the city as of 1975, but it is unclear whether these figures included persons residing in the annexed areas in dispute.

Certain facts are clear, however. In February 1978, the most recent date for which any population data were compiled, 2,582 whites and only 52 Negroes resided in the disapproved annexed areas. Of these persons, 1,797 whites and only 24 *187Negroes were of voting age, and 823 whites and only 9 Negroes were registered voters. We must assume that these persons moved to the annexed areas from outside the city, rather than from within the preannexation boundaries of the city, since the city, which bore the burden of proof, presented no evidence to the contrary.

The District Court properly concluded that these annexations must be scrutinized under the Voting Rights Act. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S., at 388-390. By substantially enlarging the city’s number of white eligible voters without creating a corresponding increase in the number of Negroes, the annexations reduced the importance of the votes of Negro citizens who resided within the preannexation boundaries of the city. In these circumstances, the city bore the burden of proving that its electoral system “fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation [s].” City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S., at 371. The District Court’s determination that the city failed to meet this burden of proof for City Commission elections was based on the presence of three vote-dilutive factors: the at-large electoral system, the residency requirement for officeholders, and the high degree of racial bloc voting. Particularly in light of the inadequate evidence introduced by the city, this determination cannot be considered to be clearly erroneous.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

In its entirety, § 5, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides:

“Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objec*164tion will be made, nor the Attorney General’s failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to re-examine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.”

In its entirety, §4 (a), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a), provides:

“To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to which the determinations have been made under the first two sentences of subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color: Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of seventeen years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after August 6, 1965, determining that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account of race or color through the use of such tests or devices have occurred anywhere in the territory of such plaintiff. No citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to which the determinations have been made under the third sentence of subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless *165the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or device has been used during the ten years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in subsection (f)(2) of this section: Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of ten years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment of this paragraph, determining that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this section through the use of tests or devices have occurred anywhere in the territory of such plaintiff.

“An action pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The court shall retain jurisdiction of any action pursuant to this subsection for five years after judgment and shall reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney General alleging that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this section.

“If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe that any such test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of an action under the first sentence of this subsection for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this section, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment.

“If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe that any such test or device has been used during the ten years preceding the filing of an action under the second sentence of this subsection for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this section, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment.”

In its entirety, §4(b), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b), provides:

“The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any political subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964. On and after August 6, 1970, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous sentence, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1968, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1968, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous two sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the Presidential election of November 1972.

“A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of the Census under this section or under section 1973d or 1973k of this title shall not be reviewable in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.”

Section 4(c) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (c), provides:

“The phrase 'test or device’ shall mean any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.”

Section 14 (c) (2) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973Z (c) (2), provides:

“The term 'political subdivision’ shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”

We also reject the appellants’ argument that the majority vote, runoff election, and numbered posts provisions of the city’s charter have already been precleared by the Attorney General because in 1968 the State of Georgia submitted, and the Attorney General precleared, a comprehensive Municipal Election Code that is now Title 34A of the Code of Georgia. Both the relevant regulation, 28 CFR §51.10 (1979), and the decisions of this Court require that the jurisdiction “in some unambiguous and recordable manner submit any legislation or regulation in question directly to the Attorney General with a request for his consideration pursuant to the Act,” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 571 (1969), and that the Attorney General be afforded an adequate opportunity to determine the purpose of the electoral changes and whether they will adversely affect minority voting in that jurisdiction, see United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110, 137-138 (1978). Under this standard, the State’s 1968 submission cannot be viewed as a submission of the city’s 1966 electoral changes, for, as the District *170Court noted, the State’s submission informed the Attorney General only of “its decision to defer to local charters and ordinances regarding majority voting, runoff elections, and numbered posts,” and “did not . . . submit in an ‘unambiguous and recordable manner’ all municipal charter provisions, as written in 1968 or as amended thereafter, regarding these issues.” 472 F. Supp. 221, 233 (DC 1979).

See n. 1, supra.

This regulation provides:

“When the Attorney General objects to a submitted change affecting voting, and the submitting authority seeking reconsideration of the objection brings additional information to the attention of the Attorney General, the Attorney General shall decide within 60 days of receipt of a request for reconsideration (provided that he shall have at least 15 days following a conference held at the submitting authority’s request) whether to withdraw or to continue his objection.”

Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the Government’s contention that the 60-day period provided by 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) is permissive rather than mandatory.

The Amendment provides:

“Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

“Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

For purposes of this case it is unnecessary to examine the various approaches expressed by the Members of the Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden, ante, p. 55, decided this day.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

There was no opinion for the Court in this case. Mr. Justice Douglas expressed the view that the legislation in question was authorized under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 400 U. S., at 144H47. The other eight Members of the Court believed that the Congress had permissibly acted within the authority provided it by §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 400 U. S., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 216 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 232-234 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); id., at 283 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.).

See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 335, and n. 47 (1966) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1965) ; S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 8, 12 (1965)).

Indeed, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), strongly suggested this result by citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), as one of several cases sanctioning “intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded on the expansion of Congress’ powers — with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty — found to be intended by the Framers and made part of the Constitution upon the States’ ratification of those Amendments, a phenomenon aptly described as a 'carv[ing] out’, in Ex parte Virginia, [100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880)].” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, at 455-456.

See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 646-647 (1966).

We do not reach the merits of the appellants' argument that the Act violates the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justi-ciable. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962).

Under § 5, the city bears the burden of proving lack of discriminatory purpose and effect. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140-141 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335.

Single-shot voting has been described as follows:

“Consider [a] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election to choose four council members. Each voter is able to cast four votes. Suppose there are eight white candidates, with the votes of the whites split among them approximately equally, and one black candidate, with all the blacks voting for him and no one else. The result is that each white candidate receives about 300 votes and the black candidate receives 400 votes. The black has probably won a seat. This technique is called single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a minority group to win some at-large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a limited number of candidates and if the vote of the majority is divided among a number of candidates.” TJ. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, pp. 206-207 (1975).

The District Court found that Rome’s Negro citizens believed that a Negro will never be elected as long as the city’s present electoral system remains in effect. 472 F. Supp., at 226. Only four Negroes have ever sought elective office in Rome, and none of them was elected. The campaign of the Reverend Clyde Hill, who made the strongest showing of the four, indicates both the presence of racial bloc voting in the city and the dilutive effect of the majority vote/runoff election scheme adopted in 1966. The city’s elections were operated under that scheme when Rev. Hill ran for the Board of Education in 1970. With strong support from the Negro community, Rev. Hill ran against three white opponents and received 921 votes in the general election, while his opponents received 909, 407, and 143 votes, respectively. Rev. Hill, then, would have been elected under the pre-1966 plurality-win voting scheme. Under the majority-win/runoff election provisions adopted in 1966, however, a runoff election was held, and the white candidate who was the runner-up in the general election defeated Rev. Hill by a vote of 1409-1142.

In so holding, the District Court relied on this analysis by the United States Commission on Civil Rights:

“ 'There are a number of voting rules which have the effect of frustrating single-shot voting. . . . [I]nstead of having one race for four positions, there could be four races, each for only one position. Thus for post no. 1 there might be one black candidate and one white, with the white winning. The situation would be the same for each post, or seat— a black candidate would always face a white in a head-to-head contest and would not be able to win. There would be no opportunity for single-shot voting. A black still might win if there were more than one white candidate for a post, but this possibility would be eliminated if there was also a majority requirement.

“ ‘[Second,] each council member might be required to live in a separate district but with voting still at large. This — just like numbered posts— separates one contest into a number of individual contests.

“ ‘[Third,] the terms of council members might be staggered. If each member has a 4-year term and one member is elected each year, then the opportunity for single-shot voting will never arise.’ ” 472 F. Supp., at 244, n. 95 (quoting U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra n. 19, at 207-208).

In City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975), and City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972), summarily aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), evidence of the racial composition of the general population was used to assess the impact of annexations on the importance of the Negro vote in the community. This information, when coupled with data on the racial composition of the community’s voting-age population, provides more probative evidence in such cases than does voter registration data, which may perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination in the registration of voters, Ely v. Klahr, 403 U. S. 108, 115, n. 7 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 92-93 (1966), or reflect a belief among the Negro population that it cannot elect a candidate of its choice, cf. n. 20, supra. Current voting-age population data are probative because they indicate the electoral potential of the minority community.