dissenting.
Two years ago this Court held that the term “State” in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those sub*194divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term “State” when it comes to an action to “bail out” from the preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.
I
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, the need to examine closely the Court’s treatment of the Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of the registered voters are black. This case involves two types of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for numbered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome’s electorate.2
*195There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed a “literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter registration during the past seventeen years,” and that “in recent years there have been no other direct barriers to black voting in Rome.” 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45 %• of the vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the “white elected officials of Rome . . . are responsive to the needs and interests of the black community,” and actively seek black political support.3 Id., at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome “the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests.” Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The court held that the city had not proved that the annexations and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of Rome’s blacks. Id., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a black candidate running under the challenged election rules commanded *196three times the share of votes that the black community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider whether the District Court’s ruling on the evidence is clearly erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies of the holding below because they highlight how far the courts, including this Court, have departed from the original understanding of the Act’s purpose and meaning.4 Against this background, I address the substantive questions posed by this case.
II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations through a declaratory judgment action (or “bailout”) in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court finds that in that jurisdiction no “test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Ibid. The District Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome’s political life. See supra, at 195. These findings demonstrate that the city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of federal authorities.5
*197The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout available to “such State or subdivision,” language that refers back to the provision’s ban on the use of literacy tests (i) “in any State” reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) “in any political subdivision” which is covered “as a separate unit.” 6 Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), this case concerns the first category in that definition.7 Thus the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)’s prohibition of tests or devices “in any State” covered under § 4 (b). *198The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices “in” a State, Congress extended the ban on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the Act. 435 U. S., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the rights of localities like Rome that are in States covered by § 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are located in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-clearance obligation in six separate actions.8 Yet the only *199difference between those governments and the city of Rome is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does not deny, the “abstract force” of this argument. The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court’s opinion, for two reasons: (i) Sheffield “did not hold that cities such as Rome are 'political subdivisions’ ” or “States,” but merely subjected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5; and (ii) congressional Reports accompanying the Voting Rights Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at 168-169. Neither reason supports the Court’s decision. That Sheffield did not identify cities like Rome as “States” or “political subdivisions” as defined by the Act does not answer the point that the construction of “State” in Sheffield should control the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. *200Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1949); United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although “committee reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.” Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning of “State” as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections.9 Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court’s reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If § 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same section must also relieve that burden when the city can demonstrate its compliance with the Act’s quite strict requirements for bailout.
Ill
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court’s interpretation of § 4 (a) renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered under the Act. Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 327-328 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the *201Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies the bailout standards of § 4 (a).10
When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it conceded that the legislation was “an uncommon exercise of congressional power.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 383 U. S., at 324-327. As Mr. Justice Stevens noted in Sheffield, the statute’s “encroachment on state sovereignty is significant and undeniable.” 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).11 That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity.12 Unless the federal structure pro*202vides some protection for a community’s ordering of its own democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress approved the Act, the Court observed, there was “reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the States and political subdivisions affected by the new remedies of the Act.” 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified “at least in the absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years.” 383 Ü. S., at 330.13
*203The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
“Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act provides for termination of special statutory coverage at the behest of States and political subdivisions in which the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period].” Id., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term “overbreadth” in an unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not have direct control over their city’s voting practices until the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act’s restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word “State” in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub*204division.14 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has succeeded in bailing out — Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.15 That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 1966 for Alaska’s 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, or in 1971 for that State’s 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia’s approximately 5 million people and 877 local governments.16 *205Today’s ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally necessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments meeting § 4 (b)’s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.17
*206IV
If there were reason to believe that today’s decision would protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, perhaps this case could be viewed as one where the Court’s ends justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the Act’s requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights Act could have intended that result.
As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 221, 224 (DC 1979).
The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 *195voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city’s voters were black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 white voters and 9 black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 1978. See Brief for Appellees 38, n. 26.
The District Court also noted that the city has “made an effort to upgrade some black neighborhoods,” has subsidized the transit system which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal government. 472 F. Supp., at 225.
The Court’s opinion simply ignores the most relevant facts. In so doing, the Court averts its eyes from the central paradox of this case: Even though Rome has met every criterion established by the Voting Rights Act for protecting the political rights of minorities, the Court holds that the city must remain subject to preclearance.
Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government may ask the District Court for the District of Columbia for a ruling that *197the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The administrative procedure is used almost exclusively, since it takes less time.
Section 4(a), as set forth in 42 U. S. G. § 1973b (a), provides in relevant part:
“To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to which the determinations have been made under the first two sentences of subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subject to the Act if the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last Presidential election, and the Attorney General determines that a discriminatory “test or device” was maintained in the jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (b), 1973c.
Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Okla. v. United States, C. A. No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations”); Wake County, N. C. v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Ariz. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) (three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972, New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby *199violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Jan. 18, 1974) (referring to Torres v. Sachs, C. A. No. 73-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)), summarily aff’d, 419 U. S. 888 (1974).
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston County, N. C. v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners, El Paso County, Colo. v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC No. 8, 1977); Yuba County, Cal. v. United States, C. A. No. 75-2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, N. C. v. United States, C. A. No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969).
This construction applies to political subdivisions defined by § 14 (c) (2) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Z (c) (2), as well as to governments like Rome that do not fall within that statutory definition. Thus, under Sheffield’s statutory interpretation, all subdivisions in States covered by the Act should be entitled to bail out. The constitutional analysis of Part III, infra, reaches the same conclusion.
In view of the narrower focus of my approach to the statutory and constitutional issues raised in this case, I do not reach the broad analysis offered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent.
Other Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) ; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), the Court noted that because political subdivisions “derive their authority and power from their respective States,” their integrity, like that of the States, is protected by the principles of federalism.
The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 201 (opinion of Harlan, J.); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959).
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools “would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives”) ; James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum on public housing project “ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures . . . and to lower tax revenues”). Preservation of local control, naturally *202enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments. See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, at 855; Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).
The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of “recent racial discrimination involving tests and devices” in States or subdivisions exempted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black’s view that *203the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race.” 400 U. S., at 132. See id., at 146 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216, and n. 94 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (opinion of BRENnan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); id., at 284 (opinion of Stewart, J.). That history supported temporary suspension of those few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (opinion of Douglas, J.), without providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclearance involves a broad restraint on all state and local voting practices, regardless of whether they have been, or even could be, used to discriminate.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court’s position dictates this eccentric result by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre-clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would cast serious doubt on the Act’s constitutionality as applied to any State which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A rational approach would treat the state and local governments independently for purposes of bailout. If subdivisions in Georgia were free to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could properly focus on the State’s voting policies. Then, if Georgia were entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to subdivisions that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of §4(b). Of course, the situation would be different if the State had contributed, overtly or covertly, to the subdivision’s failure to comply.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-71 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska’s 1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in the 1970 extension. The 1976 extension of the Act also re-established coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 10, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action).
One other State — Virginia—has attempted to bail out under § 4 (a). Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 1974), summarily aff’d, 420 U. S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not satisfy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test administered in some localities between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that period.
The Solicitor General states that Georgia has 159 counties, 530 municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every voting change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimination in voting. App. to Brief for Appellees la.
On a practical level, the District Court argued that since more than 7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes, bailout suits by a small percentage of those subdivisions would swamp that court. 472 F. Supp., at 231-232. In view of the acknowledged difficulties that confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District of Columbia, it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgates” perceived by the court would ever open. Such suits, involving substantial expense as well as uncertainty, would not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial likelihood of success. Moreover, the court’s argument ignores the procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to contest bailout if he finds that the state or local government has not used a discriminatory test or device over the preceding 17 years. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General consented to bailout in the nine actions under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout suits have gone to trial. See nn. 8 and 15, supra. Thus the Department of Justice, not the courts, would shoulder much of the added burden that might arise from recognizing a bailout right for governments like the city of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than the Attorney General’s present responsibility for preelearing all voting changes in 7,000 subdivisions. In the first six months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25 per working day. Letter to Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in App. to Brief for Appellants lc.
These astonishing figures compare unfavorably with those cited by Mr. Justice Stevens in his Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of *206the Attorney General’s review of preelearance requests that then were arriving at the rate of only four a day. United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110, 147-148, and nn. 8, 10, (1978). See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200-201 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). It hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Justice Department — much less the Attorney General — could make, a thoughtful, personal judgment on an average of 25 preclearance petitions per day. Thus, important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing.