concurring.
In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979), I stated in dissent:
“Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a non-petty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).
“This resolution, I feel, would provide the ‘bright line’ *230that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger.” Id., at 389-390.
I still am of the view that this “bright line” approach would best preserve constitutional values and do so with a measure of clarity for all concerned. Had the Court in Scott v. Illinois adopted that approach, the present litigation, in all probability, would not have reached us. Petitioner Baldasar was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, and, under my test, was entitled to counsel at the prior misdemeanor proceeding. Since he was not represented by an attorney, that conviction, in my view, is invalid and may not be used to support enhancement.
I therefore join the Court’s per curiam opinion and its judgment.