Respondent’s complaint presented claims under both the Social Security Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. Follow*134ing a settlement between the parties, the District Court ruled that respondent is a “prevailing party” under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, and that she alleged “substantial” constitutional claims as defined in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974).
In this situation, the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit both found, the award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 does not require an adjudication on the merits of the constitutional claims. I agree with this conclusion. Consequently, I see no reason to reach out, as the Court does in Part I of its opinion, to apply today’s ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot, ante, p. 1. See ante, at 128-129. That decision holds that plaintiffs may win attorney’s fees under § 1988 when they bring an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 without any constitutional claim whatever. For the reasons given in my dissenting opinion in Thiboutot, I believe that decision seriously misconceives the congressional purpose behind § 1983. In this case, however, the complaint included a substantial constitutional claim which “remained in the case until the entire dispute was settled by the entry of a consent decree.” Ante, at 131. Since Congress has made plain its intent that fees be awarded to “prevailing” parties in these circumstances, see ante, at 132-133, n. 15, we have no occasion to look behind the settlement agreement to evaluate further the constitutional cause of action.
In contrast, Part II of the Court’s opinion resolves the Eleventh Amendment question on the' narrow ground that respondent alleged “substantial” Fourteenth Amendment claims. Ante, at 131. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), held that since Congress may qualify the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1988 authorizes fee awards against States in these circumstances. I believe that Congress should not be deemed to have qualified the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of explicit evidence of that intent. See Hutto, supra, at 704 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent*135ing in part). Nevertheless, I accept Hutto as binding precedent for this case and note only that the Court has reserved the question “whether a federal court could award attorney's fees against a State based on a statutory, non-civil-rights claim.” Ante, at 130.