concurring.
The Surface Mining Act mandates an extraordinarily intrusive program of federal regulation and control of land use and land reclamation, activities normally left to state and local governments. But the decisions of this Court over many years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to enact this legislation.
The Act could affect seriously the owners and lessees of the land and coal in the seven westernmost counties of Virginia. The Federal Government is required by the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation for any “taking” of private *306property for public use.1 See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).2 But whether there has been such a “taking” and, if so, the amount of just compensation, are questions to be decided in specific cases. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979). I agree with the Court therefore, that it is premature to consider in these cases questions under the Compensation Clause. Ante, at 293-297. Appellees have identified no specific property that is alleged to have been taken. The Court’s decision thus is confined to a holding that the Act in this respect is not facially unconstitutional. Ante, at 297, n. 40. The “taking” issue remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee whose property interest is adversely affected by the enforcement of the Act.3
I add a word about the area of Virginia that will be affected by this Act, as its location, topography, and geology are highly relevant to an understanding of the “taking” question. Bituminous coal, Virginia’s most valuable natural resource,4 is found in a region marked by steep mountain slopes, sharp ridges, massive outcrops of rock, and narrow valleys— conditions that severely limit alternative uses of the land. Because of thin soil and rugged terrain, the land in its natural state is not suited for agricultural use or the growing of merchantable timber. Its value lies, in most instances, *307solely in. its coal. Mining the coal is a major industrial activity in an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia.5
A number of the Act’s provisions appear to have been written with little comprehension of its potential effect on this rugged area. For example, the requirement in § 515 (d) that steep-slope areas be restored approximately to their original contours seems particularly unrealistic. As the District Court found, 95% of the strippable coal lands in Virginia are located on slopes in excess of 20 degrees. 483 F. Supp. 425, 434 (1980). The cost of restoration in some situations could exceed substantially the value of the coal. In any event restoring steep mountain slopes often would diminish rather than increase the land’s worth.
In sum, if the Act is implemented broadly in accordance with its terms, the consequences to individual lessees and owners, and to the area as a whole, could be far-reaching. But adjudication of claims arising from such implementation is for the future. I agree with the Court that we cannot say that the Act is facially invalid, and I therefore join its opinion.
We assume, of course, that Congress weighed this probable cost against the desirable environmental goals of the Act.
The “taking” question considered by Justice Brennan and the three Justices who joined him was not reached by a majority of the Court.
In Agins, 447 U. S., at 260, we observed that the “determination that government action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest.”
The District Court found that the mining of coal is a $2 billion per year industry in the Commonwealth.
It is said, perhaps frivolously now, that bootlegging was the second most remunerative activity in that part of the State.