with whom Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
At common law a sentence could be amended during the term in which it was imposed subject to the limitation that “a punishment already partly suffered be not increased.”1 “The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it,” United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, *224307, has been recognized by this Court over and over again.2 Whether the well-settled rule prohibiting judges from increasing the severity of a sentence after it has become final is constitutionally mandated,3 it is unquestionably the sort of rule that judges may not disregard without express authorization from Congress.4
*225That rule requires a firm rejection of the argument that a second sentencing judge has power to convert an unexpired YCA sentence into an adult sentence. For there can be no question about the fact that an adult sentence is more severe than a YCA sentence.5 Nor can we “assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it.” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 441. It is undisputed that the Youth Corrections Act contains no such clear expression of congressional intent. Indeed, the Court’s opinion repeatedly confirms this proposition.6 The Court’s novel holding is *226supported by nothing more than inferences drawn from the “history and structure of the YCA.” See ante, at 214. Manifestly, such inferences are insufficient to justify a judicial rewriting of what “has been accurately described as the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing.” Dorszynski, supra, at 432.
The Court’s first argument rests on the premise that Congress did not intend either that corrigible youth offenders be housed with incorrigible youth offenders or that futile YCA treatment be continued. The Court reasons that continued YCA treatment is in derogation of such congressional intent whenever a youth offender, while serving his YCA sentence, commits another crime sufficiently serious to convince the second sentencing judge that the youth will no longer benefit from YCA treatment. Ante, at 214-215. All of this may *227well be true, but it does not follow that the second sentencing judge may impose a consecutive adult sentence and also confine the offender as an adult under the unexpired YCA sentence. A much less drastic solution will accomplish the objectives ascribed to Congress. The second judge simply may impose a concurrent adult sentence and thereby end the offender’s YCA treatment.7 Moreover, even if, as in this case, the second sentencing judge imposes a consecutive rather than a concurrent sentence, prison officials nonetheless can effectuate these objectives by exercising their authority to terminate the YCA confinement and allow the consecutive adult sentence to commence. See 18 U. S. C. § 5017. It is therefore clear that the Court’s premise does not support its conclusion that Congress must have intended that the second sentencing judge may modify the first sentence by increasing its severity.8
*228The Court’s second argument is no better. The Court notes that, “in several circumstances, the YCA permits a youth offender initially sentenced under the YCA to be treated as an adult for what would otherwise be the remainder of the YCA sentence.” Ante, at 215. The Court’s examples are set forth in the margin.9 I do not disagree with the Court that the imposition of a YCA sentence does not entitle an offender to YCA treatment for the full length of that sentence no matter what crimes he commits in the interim, or that respondent could have been subjected to immediate adult confinement in each of the Court’s examples. I do not agree, however, that a second judge may impose adult treatment on an offender who continues to be incarcerated not on the basis of a subsequent adult sentence but on the basis of the original YCA sentence. None of the Court’s examples *229poses that situation; hence there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended that any authority, even a court, may increase the severity of a sentence after that sentence has become final. In fact, as the Court points out in a footnote, the only statutory authorization for a judicial modification of a YCA sentence permits “a judge [to] reduce the severity of the terms of commitment in light of changed circumstances.” Ante, at 215, n. 7 (emphasis in original); see 18 U. S. C. §§5021, 5023.
There is, therefore, nothing in the text, history, or structure of the Youth Corrections Act that supports the Court’s holding that a judge may increase the severity of a YCA sentence after it has become final.10 Even apart from the constitutional problem with such a holding, see n. 3, supra, this absence of statutory support is fatal.11 Not only did Con*230gress not intend the result reached by the Court today, there is good reason to believe that Congress intended just the opposite.
In enacting the Youth Corrections Act, Congress recognized that a YCA sentence of a given number of years is qualitatively less severe than an adult sentence of equal length.12 Indeed, § 5010(b) authorizes a district court to impose a longer YCA sentence (up to six years) than would be authorized if the offender were sentenced as an adult. The federal courts unanimously have upheld § 5010(b) against constitutional challenges on the reasoning early expressed by The Chief Justice when a Circuit Judge and often quoted thereafter:
“[T]he basic theory of that Act is rehabilitative and in a sense this rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the quid pro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison. . . . [T]he Youth Corrections Act ‘provides for and affords youthful offenders, in the discretion of the judge, not heavier penalties and punishment than are imposed upon adult offenders, but the opportunity to escape from the physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serving an ordinary penal sentence while obtaining the benefits of corrective treatment, looking to rehabilitation and social redemption and restoration.’” Carter v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 125, 306 F. 2d 283, 285 (1962) (quoting Cunningham v. United States, 256 F. 2d 467, 472 (CA5 1958)).13
*231It is of no consequence that respondent was sentenced not under § 5010(b), but under § 5010(c), for the same quid pro quo theory that justifies longer YCA terms than maximum adult terms for a given offense also justifies YCA terms within the statutory adult maximum but longer than an adult would generally receive. See Watts v. Hadden, 651 F. 2d 1354, 1365 (CA10 1981); United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F. 2d 107, 111 (CA3 1978). It is no coincidence that the Youth Corrections Act vests broad authority in the district judge to impose lengthy YCA sentences and also vests broad authority in prison officials to order early releases of youth offenders from their YCA sentences.14 The proponents of the Youth Corrections Act repeatedly emphasized that prison officials must be given sufficient time to rehabilitate youth offenders and sufficient authority to release rehabilitated offenders from their custodial sentences.15 As the then Director of the Bureau of Prisons explained before the Senate Subcommittee studying the proposed Youth Corrections Act in 1949, the imposition of ordinary adult-length sentences on youth offenders was completely unrelated to the *232rehabilitative effort; the sentences were either far too long or far too short.16 The promises of treatment and of early release justified the imposition of longer YCA sentences.
If a second sentencing judge is able to convert an unexpired YCA sentence into an adult sentence, the quid pro quo vanishes. The youth offender who is sentenced to a longer term of confinement when sentenced under the YCA than if he were sentenced as an adult may end up, as respondent will under the Court’s holding, serving that lengthier sentence under the adult conditions he paid a price to avoid. Furthermore, he is not entitled for the duration of that sentence to the good-time allowances available to offenders sentenced as adults.17 The humanitarian objectives of *233the Youth Corrections Act do not justify fundamental unfairness.18
If the original sentencing judge had known that a subsequent adult sentence could result in expiration of YCA treatment but not of the YCA sentence, he might well have discounted the length of the YCA sentence to reflect this possibility.19 Moreover, if respondent had known of this possibility, he might have elected to stand trial rather than to plead guilty.20 Speculation of this kind21 would be unnecessary if the Court declined to enlarge upon the statute that Congress has written. If an amendment to the statute is needed to deal with a problem that Congress did not foresee, it is Congress — not this Court — that must perform that task.
I do not purport to know whether YCA treatment is effective for youthful offenders in general, or would serve any *234useful purpose for this particular offender.22 No such question is relevant to the legal issue raised by this case. The only question presented is whether a federal judge confronted with the task of sentencing an inmate for an offense committed while he is serving a sentence for an earlier crime may not only impose the punishment authorized by law for the later offense but may also take it upon himself to enhance the earlier sentence as well. The answer to that question seems so obvious to me that I shall not further belabor it.
I respectfully dissent.
‘As a general practice, the sentence, when imposed by a court of record, is within the power of the court during the session in which it is entered, and may be amended at any time during such session, provided a punishment already partly suffered be not increased." F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice §913, p. 641 (9th ed. 1889) (emphasis added) (quoted in United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307).
See, e. g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 730-731 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 747 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 37, n. 68; Roberts v. United States, 320 U. S. 264, 265-266.
“If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence.” Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168.
Although United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, purports to confine Ex parte Lange and United States v. Benz, supra, to their specific contexts, see 449 U. S., at 139, the Court’s holding in DiFrancesco is limited to the situation in which Congress has expressly authorized an increase of sentence after the initial sentence has been set aside on direct appeal. It is conceded in this case that Congress did not expressly authorize the second sentencing judge to increase the severity of the unexpired YCA sentence.
It is perplexing, but noteworthy, that the Court’s opinion, ante, at 220-221, n. 14, leaves the Court of Appeals free on remand to declare unconstitutional the Court’s construction of the Youth Corrections Act.
This case closely parallels Roberts v. United States, supra. After pleading guilty to a federal offense, Roberts was sentenced to pay a $250 fine and to serve two years in prison. Pursuant to authority under the federal probation statute, the District Court suspended execution of the sentence conditioned upon payment of the fine and ordered Roberts’ release on probation for a 5-year period. Four years later, the court after a hearing revoked the probation, set aside the original sentence of two years, and imposed a new sentence of three years. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for certiorari, Roberts argued that the probation statute did not authorize imposition of an increased sentence after revocation of a suspended original sentence and, if not so construed, the statute was unconstitutional. The Court granted certiorari and reversed on statutory grounds, not reaching the constitutional question.
“If the authority exists in federal courts to suspend or to increase a sen*225tence fixed by a valid judgment, it must be derived from the Probation Act. The government concedes that federal courts'had no such power prior to passage of that Act. See Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27; United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304.” 320 U. S., at 265-266.
The Court concluded that, despite language in the statute that “the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence, and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed,” the Probation Act did not authorize such an increased sentence. The Court held that “having exercised its discretion by sentencing an offender to a definite term of imprisonment in advance of probation, a court may not later upon revocation of probation set aside that sentence and increase the term of imprisonment.” Id., at 272-273.
Thus, Roberts recognizes the critical distinction between changing a sentence after it has been imposed and postponing imposition of a sentence. The Court today not only ignores this distinction, see ante, at 217-218, n. 10, 220-221, n. 14, but does not even cite Roberts.
The Court does not deny that an adult sentence of a given number of years is more severe than a YCA sentence for the same number of years. As The Chief Justice, then a Circuit Judge, stated for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, YCA “confinement cannot be equated with incarceration in an ordinary prison.” Carter v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 125, 306 F. 2d 283, 285 (1962). See United States v. McDonald, 611 F. 2d 1291, 1294-1295 (CA9 1980); Rogers v. United States, 326 F. 2d 56, 57 (CA10 1963); 18 U. S. C. § 5011; H. R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950).
The Court admits that “[n]o provision of the YCA explicitly governs the issue before us,” ante, at 213; that “ftjhe statute describes the sentenc*226ing options available to a judge after conviction but does not elucidate what options would be available after the defendant has been convicted of a second crime while serving his initial sentence,” ibid.; that “§ 5010 (d) does not expressly authorize a second judge to make a ‘no benefit’ finding with respect to the remainder of an unexpired YCA sentence,” ibid.; and that “the legislative history reveals no explicit discussion of the trial court’s options in sentencing a youth who commits a crime while serving a YCA sentence; Congress apparently did not consider this specific problem,” ante, at 214. Petitioner agrees:
“Nothing in the language of the YCA is specifically directed to the problem of an offender who, while serving a YCA sentence, commits a crime and receives a consecutive term of imprisonment as an adult, thus acquiring a dual status as both an adult offender and a YCA offender. The legislative history reveals that Congress, in its optimism about the new approach, did not consider or provide for the situation in which a youth offender would commit a serious crime while rehabilitation was underway.” Brief for Petitioner 12-13.
Indeed, petitioner urges the Court to defer to the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation of the Youth Corrections Act, see Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 5215.2 (Dec. 12, 1978), an argument the Court soundly rejects. Ante, at 212-213. I agree with the Court that the Bureau of Prisons does not have power under the Youth Corrections Act to terminate YCA treatment.
Petitioner objects to that alternative solution because, with consecutive sentences, the judge can impose a harsher sentence. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 48. I am confident, however, that the maximum sentences authorized for serious crimes (or even less serious crimes) are sufficiently high to satisfy this objection. Title 18 U. S. C. § 111, under which respondent in 1975 was eonvicted and sentenced to 5!4 years’ imprisonment, authorizes as a penalty a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or both. Even if these statutory máximums were inadequate, as this Court stated in response to a youth offender’s claim that his sentence was too harsh, “ ‘the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation under the guise of construction,’ [Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 305], since ‘[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment. . . [t]hese are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’ [Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 393].” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 442.
Indeed, the Court concedes the practicality point:
“We see no relevant difference in the fact that concurrent sentences traditionally take effect immediately. As we hold today, a judge imposing a consecutive adult sentence may find that continued YCA treatment during the unexpired term would be futile, and his finding may take effect immediately. In either case, the YCA permits a judge to effectuate his finding with respect to whether future YCA treatment would be beneficial. Of *228course, a concurrent sentence of a given length will result in a shorter ultimate sentence than a consecutive sentence of that length; but a judge wishing to impose a longer ultimate sentence may simply increase the length of the concurrent sentence accordingly.” Ante, at 216-217, n. 9 (emphasis in original).
“For example, the statute permits a court to sentence a defendant to an adult term if he commits an adult offense after receiving a suspended sentence and probation under § 5010(a). If respondent had been sentenced initially to probation under § 5010(a) and had been subsequently convicted of criminal assault, the court could have imposed an adult sentence for the original crime, for the assault, or for both, to begin immediately. . . .
“Moreover, respondent concedes that the statute permits a judge to impose a concurrent adult sentence on an offender who is serving a YCA term. Such an adult sentence would commence at the time that it was imposed and would modify the YCA treatment that the offender would otherwise receive for the remainder of his term. Finally, every offender sentenced under the YCA must be released conditionally two years prior to the termination of his sentence. 18 U. S. C. § 5017. However, if the offender violates the terms of this conditional release by committing a crime, the conditional release may be revoked and an adult sentence may immediately be imposed, notwithstanding the fact that the youth sentence has not yet expired.” Ante, at 215-217 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original).
Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Swygert made the point in this way:
“The Warden asks us to read into this Act which has as its ultimate purpose rehabilitation, a highly unusual sentencing option that would permit one judge to reevaluate another judge’s YCA sentence and impose in its place a traditional adult sentence. There is ‘not a word’ in the statute or its legislative history ‘about augmenting sentences or about having a second judge in any way change them.’ [Thompson v. Carlson,] 624 F. 2d 415, 426 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., dissenting). Such a reading is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the act, and the cited provisions do not convince us otherwise.” 642 F. 2d 1077, 1081 (CA7 1981).
The Court asserts that the common-law rule that a sentence may not be increased after it has become final “simply does not apply when Congress has provided a court with the power to modify a sentence in light of changed circumstances. . . . Here, the statute permits a judge to modify the conditions of a YCA sentence if the offender is convicted of a subsequent adult crime and if further YCA treatment would be futile.” Ante, at 218, n. 10. Of course, whether Congress expressed an intent to depart from the common-law rule is the critical question. The Court and petitioner concede that neither the statute nor the legislative history evinces such an intent because Congress did not contemplate the situation. See n. 6, supra. Nor do the Court’s historical and structural arguments support the result the Court reaches. See discussion supra, at 226-228 and this page. The Court simply imposes the result it thinks makes the most *230sense. While such interstitial lawmaking may be appropriate in some circumstances, it surely is not warranted when the Court is bound to follow the common-law rule absent affirmative evidence that Congress intended to depart from that rule.
See n. 5, supra.
Accord, e. g., Abernathy v. United States, 418 F. 2d 288, 290 (CA5 1969); Johnson v. United States, 374 F. 2d 966, 967 (CA4 1967); Brisco v. United States, 368 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA3 1966); Kotz v. United States, 353 F. *2312d 312, 314 (CA8 1965); Eller v. United States, 327 F. 2d 639 (CA9 1964); Rogers v. United States, 326 F. 2d 56, 56-57 (CA10 1963). Cf. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F. 2d 1115, 1123-1124 (CA2 1974) (New York law), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 921; United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F. 2d 100, 102-103 (CA7 1973) (Illinois law).
See 18 U. S. C. §§5010, 5017.
See, e. g., Correctional System for Youthful Offenders: Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 22, 24,27 (statement of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons), 33 (statement of Curtis Shears, Chairman, Youth Participation Committee, D. C. Department of American Legion), 53-55 (statement of Carroll Hincks, U. S. District Judge), 62, 66 (statement of Orie L. Phillips, U. S. Circuit Judge) (1949); Federal Corrections Act and Improvement in Parole: Hearings on H. R. 2139 and H. R. 2140 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 74r-75 (extension of statement of Carroll C. Hincks), 138-139 (Reference Notes on Federal Corrections Act, submitted by James V. Bennett) (1943).
“From the hundreds of cases of this type which have come across my desk I have formed the conclusion that in the task of correcting the offender the crucial element is that of time. Attitudes, habits, interests, standards cannot be changed overnight. Training in work habits and skills requires time. Once the individual has received the maximum benefit from the institutional program, however, it is just as important that his release to the community be effected promptly. In the case of each person confined there comes a period when he has his best prospects of making good in the community. His release should occur at that time. If he is released earlier he will not be ready for the task of establishing himself; if later, he may have become bitter, unsure of himself, or jittery like the athlete who is overtrained.
“Rarely does a day go by in one of our institutions for younger offenders without a youth being received whose sentence is either far too long or far too short, if the institution is to carry out its objective of correctional treatment.
“I have seen thousands of men rightly sent to prison but wrongly for periods so short that their imprisonment was only an expense to the Government and accomplished little so far as the rehabilitation of the man or the protection of the community was concerned. I have seen men sent to prison for so long that all efforts in their behalf were frustrated.” Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra n. 16, at 27 (statement of James V. Bennett).
See Staudmier v. United States, 496 F. 2d 1191, 1192 (CA10 1974); Hale v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 346, 346 (WD Okla. 1970); Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627, 628-629 (Nev. 1969).
1 had thought that Justice Fortas, writing so eloquently for the Court in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 12-31, with specific reference to the juvenile justice system, had settled that point.
Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 5215.2 (Dec. 12, 1978), which purports to exclude from YCA treatment YCA-sentenced offenders who are also sentenced to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, was promulgated four and one-half years after respondent was sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act.
Respondent pleaded guilty to the offense for which he was sentenced to 10 years’ confinement under the Youth Corrections Act. Ante, at 203. For challenges against such guilty pleas on the ground that the defendant was not fully apprised of the consequences of being sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act, see, e. g., Marvel v. United States, 380 U. S. 262; Caldwell v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1079 (CA10 1970); James v. United States, 388 F. 2d 453 (CA5 1968); Freeman v. United States, 350 F. 2d 940 (CA9 1965); Chapin v. United States, 341 F. 2d 900 (CA10 1965); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F. 2d 204 (CA4 1963); Carter v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 306 F. 2d 283 (1962).
Indeed, the Court of Appeals suggested that even the second and third sentencing judges might have imposed different sentences had they known that a no-benefit finding would take .effect immediately rather than when the consecutive adult sentence commenced. See 642 F. 2d, at 1082; see also ante, at 219 (noting the “interpretive difficulties” of the subsequent sentencing judges’ intent with respect to treatment during the remainder of the YCA term).
In his concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals, Judge Pell succinctly put these considerations to one side:
“While I see, on this record, no indication to think that either Robinson or society will benefit by continuing the YCA treatment, Congress, by the statute applicable in this case, has mandated the continuance.” 642 F. 2d, at 1083.