with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.
Purporting to construe the plain language of § 703(h) of Title VII, the Court today holds that seniority plans adopted after Title VII became effective are not subject to challenge under the disparate-impact standard of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). In failing to distinguish for purposes of § 703(h) between suits challenging the adoption of a seniority plan and those challenging its subsequent application — a distinction urged by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) — the Court turns a blind eye to both the language and legislative history of the statu*78tory provision. Section 703(h) is by its very terms of relevance only where the application of a seniority plan is challenged. The provision reflects Congress’ desire to protect vested seniority rights; Congress did not seek to ensure the vesting of new rights that are the byproduct of discrimination. Because the Court ignores this fundamental distinction between challenges to the adoption, and challenges to the application, of seniority plans, I dissent.
I—
Up until 1963, the American Tobacco Co. and the union serving as collective-bargaining agent for the hourly paid production workers at the company’s two Richmond plants openly discriminated on the basis of race with respect to every aspect of employment at the two plants — “job assignments, cafeterias, restrooms, lockers, and plant entrances.” Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 263 (CA4 1976). White employees were generally assigned to jobs in the fabrication departments; black employees were assigned to lower paying jobs in the prefabrication departments. See ibid.; App. 33-34. In 1963, under Government pressure, the company and union altered somewhat the manner of computing seniority and determining promotions. Nevertheless, for the next five years virtually all of the vacancies in the fabrication departments were filled by white employees. Thus, as of 1968, the fabrication departments were still staffed almost entirely by white employees; the prefabrication departments remained predominantly composed of black employees. See 535 F. 2d, at 263.
In 1968, with the assent of the union, the company established nine lines of job progression. Each line generally consisted of two jobs, and one could assume the “top” job only after having worked at least one day in a “bottom” job. Of the six lines of progression at issue here, four consisted of historically white “top” jobs from the fabrication departments linked with historically white “bottom” jobs from the fabrication departments. The remaining two lines involved *79“top” jobs from the prefabrication departments linked with historically black “bottom” jobs from the prefabrication departments. Not surprisingly, the District Court determined — and the Court of Appeals agreed — that the six lines of progression were unlawful under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, because they perpetuated past discrimination on the basis of race and were unsupported by any business justification. See App. 32; 535 F. 2d, at 264. But today this Court, relying on § 703(h) of Title VII, holds that in the event these lines are determined on remand to be part of a seniority system,1 they must be sustained unless respondents can prove that petitioners acted with discriminatory intent in formulating them.2
II
The Court properly treats this case as one of statutory construction. The language of § 703(h) is as follows:
“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h) (emphasis added).
Despite this language, the Court construes § 703(h) to embrace challenges to the adoption of seniority systems as well as to their application. But § 703(h) describes its own ambit *80solely in terms of application: The provision declares it not unlawful “for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system.” Even if one were able to enlarge the definition of “apply” to include “adopt,” it would require a much greater feat of legerdemain to explain how a decision to adopt a seniority system can be made “pursuant to” the same seniority system.
It is also significant that § 703(h) refers only to employers’ practices. Although the application of a seniority system is ordinarily the responsibility of the employer alone, the decision to adopt a particular plan is made by the employer and the union, both of whom may be liable for employment discrimination under Title VII. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2(a), (c). If Congress had intended § 703(h) to shield the adoption of a new seniority system, agreed upon by both the employer and union after Title VII became effective, Congress would have referred to unions as well as employers in the exempting provision.3
Ill
The Court’s construction of § 703(h) might be understandable if the legislative history clearly indicated that Congress did not intend to distinguish the adoption of a seniority plan from its subsequent application. But the Court finds no such indication: “The most which can be said for the legislative history of § 703(h) is that it is inconclusive with respect to the issue . . . .” Ante, at 71. Viewed in the full context of Title VII, the Court’s rejection of a narrow construction of the § 703(h) exemption is truly remarkable.
Through Title VII Congress sought in the broadest terms to prohibit and remedy discrimination. See, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); *81Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). In order to give this congressional intent its full and proper meaning, Title VII must “be given a liberal interpretation . . . [and] exemptions from its sweep ... be narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended.” Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U. S. 299, 311-312 (1932). See also Spokane & Inland R. Co. v. United States, 241 U. S. 344, 350 (1916); United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 165 (1841). Accordingly, § 703(h) should not be construed to further objectives beyond those which Congress expressly wished to serve. As demonstrated by the legislative history that follows, Congress’ basic purpose in adding the provision was to protect the expectations that employees acquire through the continued operation of a seniority system. A timely challenge to the adoption of a seniority plan may forestall discrimination before such legitimate employee expectations have arisen.4
Section 703(h) was not included in the early legislative versions of Title VII. It was added only after fears were expressed concerning the possible impact of Title VII on seniority rights and existing seniority systems. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, at 759.5 The oppo*82nents of Title VII charged that the Act would “seriously impair . . . [t]he seniority rights of employees in corporate and other employment. . . H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 64-65 (1963) (Minority Report). These opponents apparently believed that if Title VII were adopted, the “benefits which organized labor ha[d] attained through the years would no longer be matters of ‘right’. . . .” 110 Cong.Rec. 486 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hill).
The defenders of Title VII responded in strong terms to the charge that “[T]itle VII would undermine the vested rights of seniority.” Id., at 7206 (statement of Sen. Clark, quoting Sen. Hill). According to the Act’s proponents, this charge was a “cruel hoax . . . generating] unwarranted fear among those individuals who must rely upon their job or union membership to maintain their existence.” Id., at 9113 (statement of Sen. Keating). The Act’s supporters replied that it was simply untrue that under Title VII “seniority systems would be abrogated and . . . white men’s jobs would be taken and turned over to Negroes.” Id., at 11471 (statement of Sen. Javits).6 Thus, with some exaggeration, the proponents of Title VII suggested that Title VII would not affect employees’ expectations that arose from the operation of seniority systems.7
*83The interpretive memorandum introduced during the Senate debate by Senator Clark, to which the Court makes reference, ante, at 73, only reinforces my view that Congress saw § 703(h) as focusing on the protection of employee expectations that develop during the pendency of a seniority plan. The memorandum stated: “Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).8 The other two memoranda submitted by Senator Clark, also quoted by the Court, ante, at 73, speak in similar terms of protecting vested seniority rights.9
While this legislative history does not contain any explicit reference to the distinction between adoption and application urged by the EEOC, it surely contains no suggestion that Congress intended to treat the decision to adopt a seniority plan any differently from the decision to adopt a discrimina*84tory employment practice unrelated to seniority. Rather, the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned only about protecting the good-faith expectations of employees who rely on the continued application of established, bona fide seniority systems.10
IV
The Court ultimately rejects the EEOC’s interpretation of § 703(h) because, in the Court’s view, that interpretation is “untenable” and will bring about “unreasonable results.” Ante, at 71. The reasons underlying the Court’s view, unrelated to the language and legislative history of § 703(h), are to my mind without force.
First, the Court suggests that a challenge concerning a seniority system cannot be brought before the application of that system, because “[a] discriminatory effect would arise only when the system is put into operation and the employer ‘applies’ the system.” Ante, at 69-70. This reasoning is superficial at best. The Court has recently rejected such reasoning in determining when Title VII’s statute of limitations begins to run: “ ‘The proper focus is upon the . . . discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the act [become] painful.’” Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 258 (1980), quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F. 2d 202, 209 (CA9 1979). See also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981).11 In any event, the Court’s analysis overlooks the immediate impact resulting from the *85adoption of a particular seniority system in a collective-bargaining agreement: The employees in the bargaining unit are bound by the agreement. See generally Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U. S. 50 (1975).
The Court also notes that “[a]n adequate remedy for adopting a discriminatory seniority system would very likely include an injunction against the future application of the system and backpay awards for those harmed by its application.” Ante, at 70. From this premise the Court concludes that § 703(h) must necessarily cover the adoption of seniority systems. The apparent basis for the Court’s leap from this premise to its conclusion is the assumption that “[s]uch an injunction . . . would lie only if the requirements] of § 703(h) . . . were satisfied.” Ante, at 70. But the Court’s assumption is undercut by Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. In that case the Court rejected the theory that § 703(h) served “to qualify or proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g).” 424 U. S., at 758. Section 703(h) merely “delineates which employment practices are illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not.” Ibid. Ignoring the difference between violation and remedy, the Court today adopts the very theory rejected in Bowman; it holds that § 703(h)' bars a challenge to the adoption of a seniority system because the remedy for a successful challenge to such adoption might resemble the remedy for a challenge to the application of a seniority system.
Finally, the Court offers a policy reason for not distinguishing between adoption and application: that if adoption were not covered by § 703(h), unions and employers would be reluctant to modify “pre-Act seniority systems or post-Act systems whose adoption was not timely challenged.” Ante, at 71. The Court’s foray into the field of policy seems to me to stand as an excellent example of the propriety of deference to agency expertise. For it is obvious that while the modifi*86cation of a pre-existing seniority plan would permit a challenge under the Griggs standard to the modified provision, the other provisions of the seniority system would continue to receive the protection of § 703(h). Furthermore, to the extent that a pre-existing seniority system is modified to allow protected minorities to overcome .prior discrimination, the protection of § 703(h) would not even be necessary; under Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), such affirmative steps taken to assist minorities do not run afoul of any provision of Title VII. And with respect to those modifications not protected under Weber, yet violating the Griggs standard, adoption should surely be discouraged — not encouraged.
V
In sum, I find no basis in either the language or legislative history of § 703(h) for protecting the decision to adopt a particular seniority system from timely challenge under Griggs. In the instant case, respondents have successfully demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the District Court and Court of Appeals, that the six lines of progression under challenge violate the Griggs standard. Because there is some question as to whether the respondent employees timely filed their charges,12 I would remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Court of Appeals assumed, but did not hold, that the lines of progression were part of a “seniority . . . system” within the meaning of § 703(h). See 634 F. 2d 744, 749, and n. 3 (1980).
The District Court, applying Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 346, n. 28 (1977), apparently made such a finding of discriminatory intent after the petitioners moved to vacate, in light of Teamsters, the decree that the court had entered earlier. See App. 110. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, did not review this finding, but held instead that § 703(h) is inapplicable to seniority systems adopted after Title VII became effective.
It is true, of course, that despite this lack of reference, § 703(h) may in practice afford unions some protection. Section 703(c)(3) of Title VII makes it unlawful for a union “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.” 78 Stat. 256, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(c)(3). To the extent that an employer’s practice *81does not violate Title VII by virtue of § 703(h), the union’s involvement in that practice would not likely be viewed as giving rise to liability under § 703(c)(3).
Currently, a charge of discrimination in violation of Title YII must generally “be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). At the time the present action arose, charges had to be filed within 90 days of the occurrence of the unlawful employment practice. § 706(d), 78 Stat. 260.
Expectations may arise, of course, before a timely charge is filed, but such expectations are hardly substantial. And the notice provided by the filing of charges serves to reduce the likelihood of employees acquiring unjustified expectations concerning seniority rights during any ensuing investigation and litigation of the charges.
As the Court correctly notes, because § 703(h) was merely intended to clarify, not alter, the effect of Title VII, the “statements made prior to the introduction of § 703(h) by proponents of Title VII are evidence of the meaning of § 703(h).” Ante, at 73, n. 11.
See also 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“It has been asserted also that the bill would destroy worker seniority systems and employee rights vis-a-vis the union and employer. This again is wrong”); id., at 6549 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (“The full rights and privileges of union membership . . . will in no way be impaired”); id., at 11486 (newsletter from Sen. Humphrey) (“The bill does not permit the Federal Government to destroy the job seniority rights of either union or nonunion employees”).
In at least two situations, employee expectations are clearly subject to adjustment and perhaps impairment. First, a violation of Title VII may merit an award of retroactive seniority relief although “such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees . . . .” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 774 (1976). Second, where a seniority system is not bona fide within the meaning of § 703(h), both the adoption and application of the system can be challenged.
In quoting the interpretive memorandum, the Court omits the italicized sentence, for obvious reasons. The statement that the effect of Title VII on seniority rights would be “prospective and not retrospective” can be read in two different ways: (1) that, unlike seniority systems adopted prior to the effective date of Title VII, those created after Title VII became effective would be open to challenge on the same grounds as all other employment practices, or (2) that before substantial expectations have arisen through the application of a seniority system, the adoption of the system can be challenged. Both of these readings are inconsistent with the Court’s holding in the instant case. Because the language of § 703(h) does not expressly distinguish between seniority systems adopted prior to the effective date, and those adopted after, I am inclined to reject the first interpretation, as is the Court. The second interpretation, however, is consistent with both the language and purposes of § 703(h).
The Justice Department memorandum stated:
“First, it has been asserted that title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964).
The memorandum containing Senator Clark’s response to Senator Dirk-sen’s memorandum noted:
“Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. . . . The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change existing seniority lists.” Id., at 7217.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, the Court reviewed this same legislative history, and similarly concluded that “the thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.” 424 U. S., at 761 (emphasis added).
It is therefore not surprising that lower courts have held that active employees may challenge a discriminatory retirement plan. See, e. g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U. S. A., Inc., 444 F. 2d 1186, 1188 (CA7 1971).
The majority opinion for the Court of Appeals stated that the lines of progression were instituted in January 1968, 634 F. 2d, at 749, some one year before the charges of racial discrimination were filed with the EEOC. But as the opinion for this Court indicates, the facts in the record suggest that the lines of progression were not even proposed until November 1968. Ante, at 66. Because it was immaterial to the Court of Appeals whether the lines were adopted in either January 1968 or sometime after November 1968, the court should be given the opportunity to redetermine when they *87were adopted. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court, ante, at 76, n. 16, such a determination is not difficult; courts routinely determine, for purposes of Title VIPs time limitations, when a discriminatory practice was adopted.