concurring in the judgment.
In California v. Texas, 437 U. S. 601 (1978), I joined in the judgment of the Court denying California’s motion for leave to file an original complaint. I was of the view that California’s motion should be denied, “at least until such time as it is shown that... a statutory interpleader action cannot or will not be brought.” Id., at 602. I also stated that I was “not *92so sure as” Justice Stewart and Justice Powell that Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939), had been wrongly decided. 437 U. S., at 601. See id., at 606 (Stewart, J., concurring); id., at 615 (Powell, J., concurring).
Substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court, it is now clear to me that so long as Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937), remains good law, an interpleader suit in the district court is not a practical solution to the problem of potential double taxation presented in cases such as these. As Justice Powell persuasively argues in Part III of his dissenting opinion, later cases, construing the Due Process Clause, have undermined Worcester County's holding that the unfairness of double taxation on the basis of conflicting determinations of domicile does not rise to constitutional dimensions. And Justice Powell is surely correct in observing that “[t]he threat of multiple taxation based solely on domicile simply is incompatible with the structural principles of a federal system recognizing as ‘fundamental’ a constitutional right to travel.” Post, at 101.
But if Worcester County is not to be overruled, and inter-pleader is not available to provide relief from the possibility of duplicative taxation of this estate, I think it appropriate under Texas v. Florida, supra, to exercise our original jurisdiction to decide the present controversy. I agree with Professor Chafee, quoted post, at 101, that “[s]omewhere within [the] federal system we should be able to find remedies for the frictions which that system creates.” Where such a remedy exists — even if only in the narrow class of cases falling within the holding of Texas v. Florida — it should be employed. The exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction in circumstances such as this is both just and prudent, and very likely in accordance with the Framer’s original intent.