dissenting.
Despite rather broad dicta regarding the conditions under which federal power over immigration will pre-empt state statutes that adversely affect aliens, the Court’s holding is narrow. Purporting to rely on a collection of treaties and statutes that concern the tax liability of certain nonimmigrant aliens, it concludes that no room is left for the State of Maryland to charge such aliens nonresident tuition for attending the State’s university. The Court’s dicta seems to me inconsistent with our prior cases, and its conclusion about the effect of the statutes and treaties is strained at best. In short, the Court reaches a result that I find quite out of step with our normal approach to federal pre-emption of state law.
Its holding has the additional vice of foreclosing governmental autonomy in an area plainly within the State’s traditional responsibilities — education. And it acts, not on behalf of a disadvantaged minority, but at the behest of a group of individuals who have been accorded a status by the Federal Government superior to that of the average citizen, and in a case where the State has demonstrated, by virtue of its favorable treatment of resident aliens, that its policy is not the result of an invidious or irrational motive. I find the Court’s *26actions unjustified and unnecessary and, accordingly, I dissent. Because I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I also address other grounds relied on by the lower courts and argued by respondents in support of their judgments.
I
Our prior decisions indicate that “when a State’s exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978). State laws will survive such a challenge unless there is “such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, [or] evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 141 (1963).
Unquestionably, federal power over immigration and naturalization is plenary and exclusive. Our decision in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), however, unambiguously forecloses any argument that this power, either unexercised or as manifested in the Immigration and Nationality Act, preempts the field of regulations affecting aliens once federal authorities have admitted them into this country. In light of the Court’s expansive observations in the instant case, that opinion bears quoting at some length:
“[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by [the Federal Government’s] constitutional power, whether latent or exercised. For example, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 415-422 (1948), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372-373 (1971), cited a line of *27cases that upheld certain discriminatory state treatment of aliens lawfully within the United States. Although the ‘doctrinal foundations’ of the cited cases, which generally arose under the Equal Protection Clause ‘were undermined in Takahashi,’ they remain authority that, standing alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” Id., at 355 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In De Canas the Court also held that Congress’ enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was insufficient to oust “harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general.” Id., at 358.
Thus, neither Congress’ unexercised constitutional power over immigration and naturalization, nor its exercise of that power in passing the INA, precludes the States from enforcing laws and regulations that prove burdensome to aliens. Under our precedents, therefore, state law is invalid only if there is “such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, supra, at 141,1 or if Congress has in some other way unambiguously declared its intention to foreclose the state law in question, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, at 157-158. In the absence of a conflict, “we are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of [a state law] in the absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, supra, at 146-147.
*28Notwithstanding these settled principles, the Court suggests in dicta that any state law which discriminates against lawfully admitted aliens is void, presumably without regard to the strength of the State’s justification, if Congress did not contemplate such a law. Ante, at 12-13. This standard seems to me clearly to reverse the presumption that normally prevails when state laws are challenged under the Supremacy Clause. The Court relies on language in three cases to support this proposition. On closer inspection, none of the three offers the precedential support for which the Court obviously grasps.
The first case, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948), involved a California statute that prohibited the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to aliens who were ineligible for citizenship. The language emphasized by the Court explains that “[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.” Id., at 419 (footnote omitted). In the Takahashi opinion, this statement is immediately followed by three citations, which the Court omits. These citations explain, and qualify, the otherwise broad language quoted by the Court. In the first of these cases, Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (1876), the Court considered a California law that, with certain extremely limited exceptions, prohibited any alien who was, or would likely become, “a public charge,” from entering the State through any of its ports. The Court held that the statute was pre-empted by federal law: “The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.” Id., at 280 (emphasis added).
The second case cited in Takahashi, Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915), concerned an Arizona statute limiting virtually all employment opportunities in the State to citizens. Although Truax involved an asserted repugnancy to the *29Equal Protection Clause, the Court also suggested that the challenged statute was in conflict with federal law. It is important to note that the Court interpreted the statute as “denying] to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood.” Id., at 41. The Court subsequently stated: “The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.” Id., at 42 (emphasis added).
The final case relied on in Takahashi is Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). The Pennsylvania statute at issue there required adult aliens to register with the State and to carry an identification card, which they were required to present on demand to state agents. The Court held that the statute was pre-empted by the federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, finding that “[t]he basic subject of the state and federal laws [was] identical,” id., at 61, and that the state law embodied requirements that Congress had studiously avoided in passing the federal Act, id., at 70-74.
Thus, in each of these cases, the Court found either a clear encroachment on exclusive federal power to admit aliens into the country or a clear conflict with a specific congressional purpose. It was with these cases in mind that the Court in Takahashi condemned “[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States.” 334 U. S., at 419. It is most unlikely, therefore, that the Court intended with one stroke of the pen to reverse the normal presumption applicable in cases challenging state enactments under the Supremacy Clause, and to declare such laws invalid without regard to the existence of a conflict with federal statutes or a usurpation of federal power over immigration.
The Court also relies on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), which struck down as a denial of equal protection a California law that withheld welfare benefits from lawfully *30resident aliens. As an alternative ground, the Court also declared the law invalid as an encroachment on federal power. On the basis of specific federal statutes barring the admission of aliens likely to become public charges, and providing for the deportation of aliens who become public charges because of factors that existed prior to entry, the Court inferred a congressional purpose not “to impose any burden or restriction on aliens who become indigent after their entry into the United States.” Id., at 377. The Court also concluded, relying on Truax, supra, that the law denied indigent aliens the “necessities of life,” and therefore “equate[d] with the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode.” The holding in Graham, therefore, offers no support for a presumption that all state laws burdening aliens conflict with amorphous federal power over immigration.
Finally, the Court quotes from dictum appearing in a footnote in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S., at 358, n. 6, that “'state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.’” Ante, at 12-13. The principal support for this assertion was the passage previously quoted by the Court from Takahashi. As I have already indicated, that passage in context means a good deal less than it does out of context. Most important, however, De Canas itself suggests that the quoted footnote is not a fair description of the law. Although the statute at issue only affected illegal aliens, the principles recognized in the Court’s opinion were not so limited. Thus, the Court emphasized that “the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration,” 424 U. S., at 355, that Takahashi, Graham, and Hines found pre-emption only after examining specific congressional enactments, 424 U. S., at 355, that it was necessary to look for some “specific indication . . . that Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general,” id., at 358, and that pre*31emption should be found only.when it is possible to say “ ‘either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained,’” id., at 356 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S., at 142).
In sum, the fact that a state statute can be said to discriminate against aliens does not, standing alone, demonstrate that the statute is pre-empted, absent some form of congressional sanction. The statute in De Canas discriminated against aliens, yet the Court found no strong evidence that Congress intended to pre-empt it. Obviously, the fact that the aliens were in this country illegally was an important factor in ascertaining Congress’ intent. But, just as clearly, the fact that disadvantaged aliens are lawfully in the country does not authorize the Court to dispense with the particularized inquiry into congressional intent that pre-emption analysis traditionally has demanded.2 Discriminatory legislation may well be invalid under the federal civil rights laws as a denial of equal treatment, but under our precedents such a conclusion is possible only after an examination of the classification drawn by the State and its justification for doing so. Under the Court’s summary of pre-emption principles applicable to laws discriminating against aliens, these factors would be irrelevant.3 I cannot agree that such a summary accurately reflects the law.
*32The Court concedes that the proper application of its preemption principle “is likely to be a matter of some dispute,” ante, at 13, and then proceeds to resolve the case by finding a conflict between Maryland’s tuition policy and a collection of treaties and statutes that address the tax liability of certain nonimmigrant aliens. Although I find this conclusion quite unconvincing, it is gratifying to learn that in practice perhaps the Court’s new principle still demands proof of a conflict with federal law, just as traditional pre-emption cases instruct. Because the Court’s judgment relies on the asserted presence of such a conflict, its statements suggesting that such a particularized inquiry is unnecessary must be regarded as dicta, though unwise dicta at that. With this said, I turn to the Court’s discovery of a conflict with federal law.
II
The Court relies on two features of federal law. First, it notes that Congress has permitted nonimmigrant aliens holding G-4 visas to establish domicile in the United States. Ante, at 14. It then reasons that denying these aliens instate tuition conflicts with Congress’ decision. The Court offers no evidence that Congress’ intent in permitting respondents to establish “domicile in the United States” has any bearing at all on the tuition available to them at state universities. Federal law does not require the States to make residence or domicile the determinant of their tuition policies, and as the Court recognizes, Maryland has chosen not to do so in the case of nonimmigrant aliens. Moreover, unlike the state laws scrutinized in Truax and Graham, Maryland’s policy does not deprive respondents of a livelihood or the means of subsistence such that it could fairly be characterized as denying respondents “entrance and abode,” 239 U. S., at 42. *33The Court’s reference to “domicile in the United States,” therefore, is little more than a restatement of its more general principle that any laws burdensome to aliens who have been lawfully admitted are presumptively pre-empted absent congressional intent to “sanction” them. As I have already suggested, this turns pre-emption analysis on its head.
The second feature of federal law on which the Court relies consists of certain statutes and treaties that affect the tax liability of G-4 visaholders. The Court considers these statutes and treaties as an amorphous whole and concludes that the University’s policy “frustrates” the policies embodied in them. “The State may not recoup indirectly from respondents’ parents the taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State from collecting.” Ante, at 16. There are two serious flaws in this argument. First, the Federal Government has not barred the States from collecting taxes from many, if not most, G-4 visaholders. Second, as to those G-4 nonimmigrants who are immune from state income taxes by treaty, Maryland’s tuition policy cannot fairly be said to conflict with those treaties in a manner requiring its pre-emption.
The individual respondents in this case represent a class of G-4 visaholders or their dependents who are or may become students at the University of Maryland. The Court, contrary to the teaching of our cases,4 reasons as though the class members were a homogenous group. They are not, and the Court’s ignorance of relevant differences leads it into error. The named class representatives are dependents of employees of either the Inter-American Development Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop*34ment (the World Bank). As the Court notes, the salaries paid employees of these organizations are exempt by international agreement from taxation by any country other than their own. Ante, at 15. As the Court also notes, the exemption contained in the agreement establishing the World Bank has by statute been given the force of federal law in the United States. 22 U. S. C. § 286h; see ante, at 15-16.
Most G-4 visaholders, however, derive whatever tax immunity they enjoy in this country from §4(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA or Act), later reenacted as §893 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §893. That statute exempts the salaries paid to alien employees of international organizations from federal income tax. The principal purpose of the Act as a whole, which is now divided among many Titles of the United States Code, was to extend governmental privileges and immunities to international organizations and their officers and employees located in this country. H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1945). As noted, §4 amended the Internal Revenue Code to exempt the salaries of such officers and employees from federal income tax. As the relevant Committee Reports demonstrate, the exemption was strictly limited to salaries; income derived from commercial activities, investments, and other similar sources was not to enjoy an exemption, and all federal taxes other than those applicable to income remained fully effective. Ibid.; S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1945).
Section 6 of the bill, as originally introduced in the House, provided an exemption from state and local taxes as well.5 *35The Senate Committee deleted the exemption, reasoning that “this matter should be properly dealt with by the State and local authorities.” S. Rep. No. 861, supra, at 5. The House eventually agreed to the amendment, and the bill as enacted contains no exemption from state or local taxes.6 Floor debates confirm what the Committee amendment implied: although the Act provides an exemption from the federal income tax, it was not intended to foreclose the States from taxing employees of international organizations.7 Accordingly, employees of international organizations whose tax immunity derives solely from the IOIA can claim no federal immunity from state taxes. According to petitioners, approximately three-quarters of the international organizations whose employees hold G-4 visas fall into that category. Brief for Petitioners 29, n. 22. Therefore, even if one were to accept the Court’s reasoning that immunity from state taxes implies a right to in-state college tuition, many, if not most of the class members cannot benefit from the argument.8
*36The Court’s reasoning is flawed, however, and cannot help even those class members whose parents’ tax immunity is based on a treaty or international agreement.9 The State’s tuition policy is void under the Supremacy Clause only “to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute,” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S., at 158, or, of course, a valid treaty. As the Court stated in Ray, ibid.:
“A conflict will be found ‘where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . ,’ Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state ‘law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., [430 U. S.], at 526, 540-541. Accord, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (1976).”
There is, of course, no physical impossibility in the coexistence of the two policies. The treaties and agreements insure that signatory nations will not tax the salaries of foreign *37nationals employed by the designated organizations. The State of Maryland does not tax these salaries. It merely charges tuition for enrollment in its University that is higher than the tuition charged to American citizens and other foreign nationals who have been admitted to this country as immigrants.
The remaining question is whether Maryland’s tuition policy “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the treaties and agreements. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67. In answering this question, it is well to bear in mind certain guideposts that the Court appears to have forgotten: “It is, of course, true that even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.” United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 230 (1942). “Even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably possible will be construed so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising under them.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 143 (1938). In this case, the Court has gone out of its way to raise the banner of federal supremacy over the State’s University, without support in the language of the treaties and without examining the intent of the negotiating parties.
It is one thing to exempt employees of an international organization from tax liability on their salaries, which otherwise would be incurred by the employees simply by doing what they came to this country to do — working for international organizations such as the World Bank. It is another matter to restrict the State’s ability to recover its costs in providing educational services, which respondents were certainly not required to use. Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 262 (1934). Although a college education over the years has become accessible to increasing numbers of Americans, it can hardly be characterized as an unavoidable feature of life in this country. *38Thus, although the negotiating parties undoubtedly intended to lower the costs of international organizations by exempting employees from income taxes, it does not at all follow that they further intended to require the States to subsidize the cost of services which those employees or their families might choose to use.10
Indeed, the United States, which unlike the State of Maryland negotiated the agreements in question, clearly does not understand them to require that education for G-4 visa-holders be subsidized to the same extent as education for citizens or resident aliens. For example, the Federal Guaranteed Student Loan Program, which provides significant aid to students attending qualifying colleges and graduate schools, is available to American citizens and permanent resident aliens, but not to nonimmigrant aliens such as respondents. See 34 CFR § 682.201(a)(2) (1981). If this reflects the federal policy embodied in the treaties on which the Court relies, I fail to see how Maryland’s tuition policy “frustrates” it.
Ill
The lower courts’ principal basis for invalidating Maryland’s tuition policy was not the Supremacy Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause. Those courts interpreted the State’s policy as a classification based on alienage, and there*39fore subjected it to “strict scrutiny” on the authority of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), and later cases. In light of several recent decisions, however, it is clear that not every alienage classification is subject to strict scrutiny. In my view, the classification relied upon by the State in this case cannot fairly be called “suspect,” and therefore I would ask only whether it rests upon a rational basis. Because I believe it does, I cannot agree with the lower courts that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted by this Court as embodying the principle that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). By the same token, however, “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940).
All laws classify, and, unremarkably, the characteristics that distinguish the classes so created have been judged relevant by the legislators responsible for the enactment. The Equal Protection Clause, however, reflects the judgment of its Framers that some distinguishing characteristics may seldom, if ever, be the basis for difference in treatment by the legislature. The key question in all equal protection cases, of course, is whether the distinguishing characteristics on which the State relies are constitutional.
In the vast majority of cases our judicial function permits us to ask only whether the judgment of relevance made by the State is rational. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).11 In a very few other cases, we have required that the State pass a more demanding test because of *40the judgment that the classification drawn by the State is virtually never permissible from a constitutional perspective. Such classifications are deemed “suspect” and strictly scrutinized. Until 1971, only race and national origin had been so classified by the Court. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 494 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948).
In Graham v. Richardson, supra, the Court added alien-age to this select list. Apart from the abbreviated conclusion that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority,” id., at 372, the Court did not elaborate on the justification for “heightened judicial solicitude,” ibid. Subsequently, the Court observed that aliens, unlike other members of the community, were subject to the particular disadvantage of being unable to vote, and thus were barred from participating formally in the process of self-government. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 102 (1976). One could infer that rigorous judicial scrutiny normally was necessary because aliens were barred from asserting their interests in the governmental body responsible for imposing burdens upon them.
More recent decisions have established, however, that the political powerlessness of aliens is itself the consequence of distinctions on the basis of alienage that are constitutionally permissible.
“[I]t is clear that a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions. See [Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 647-649 (1973)]. Similar considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury service. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff’d, 426 U. S. 913 (1976). Likewise, we have recognized that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling those ‘important non-elective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,’ held by ‘officers who participate directly in the formu*41lation, execution, or review of broad public policy.’ Dougall, supra, at 647.” Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291, 296 (1978).
As the Court explained earlier this Term:
“The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition. Self-government, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the governors as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this community. Judicial incursions into this area may interfere with those aspects of democratic self-government that are most essential to it.” Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 439-440 (1982).
If the exclusion of aliens from the political processes is legitimate, as it clearly is, there is reason to doubt whether political powerlessness is any longer a legitimate reason for treating aliens as a “suspect class” deserving of “heightened judicial solicitude.” Indeed, in Foley v. Connelie, supra, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68 (1979), and Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, supra, the Court plainly eschewed the application of strict scrutiny to the States’ exclusion of aliens from particular public offices.12 In my view, these decisions merely *42reflect the judgment that alienage, or the other side of the coin, citizenship, is for certain important state purposes a constitutionally relevant characteristic and therefore cannot always be considered invidious in the same manner as race or national origin.13
*43IV
The State’s policy in this case is to provide in-state tuition to residents of the State who are citizens and immigrant aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In-state tuition is not available to certain students, however, regardless of whether they have established residence within the State. Within this class are citizens who are financially dependent either on parents or on a spouse who is not domiciled in the State, as well as citizens who are members of the Armed Forces and have been assigned by the military to attend the University.14 Also within the class are nonimmigrant aliens, who have not been admitted to this country for permanent residence.
*44In each case in which the Court has tested state alienage classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, the question has been the extent to which the States could permissibly distinguish between citizens and permanent resident aliens. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977). We recently summarized these decisions as implying that “there would be few — if any — areas in which a State could legitimately distinguish between its citizens and lawfully resident aliens.” Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S., at 438 (emphasis added). In this case, however, the question is whether the State can distinguish between two groups, each of which consists of citizens and aliens. For two reasons, the State’s classification should not be deemed “suspect” and subjected to strict scrutiny.
First, unlike immigrant aliens, nonimmigrants such as G-4 visaholders are significantly different from citizens in certain important respects. Our previous decisions have emphasized that immigrant aliens have been lawfully admitted to this country for permanent residence and share many of the normal burdens of citizenship, such as the duty to pay taxes and to serve in the Armed Forces. Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 12; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S., at 107, n. 30; Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 645; Graham v. Richardson, supra, at 376. Implicit in these cases is the judgment that because permanent resident aliens are in so many respects situated similarly to citizens, distinctions between them are to be carefully scrutinized.15 Although there is le*45gitimate doubt whether these decisions have survived Foley, Ambach, and Cabell intact, their judgment about the need for strict scrutiny simply does not apply to state policies that distinguish between permanent resident aliens and nonimmigrants.
As noted earlier, nonimmigrant aliens holding G-4 visas, unlike resident aliens, are exempt from Maryland’s income tax, by operation of either international agreement or a combination of federal and state law.16 The University is substantially supported by general state revenues appropriated by the legislature, and of this sum nearly half is generated by the state income tax. See Brief for Petitioners 29, n. 23. Consequently, for the purpose of assessing tuition to the State’s University, G-4 nonimmigrant aliens are not situated similarly either to most citizens or to permanent resident aliens. They are distinguished by a trait that is obviously quite relevant from the State’s perspective, and legitimately so. Other nonimmigrant aliens are subject to state income taxes, but, as respondents concede, Brief for Respondents 12,14, 23, they are admitted to this country only temporarily and for limited purposes. These aliens are also not situated similarly to resident citizens or to permanent resident aliens because most are admitted on the condition that they cannot establish domicile in the United States. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 665 (1978). As a group, then, nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently different from citizens in relevant respects that distinctions between them and citizens or immigrant aliens should not call for heightened scrutiny.
Second, the State’s tuition policy, as it applies to G-4 visa-holders, simply cannot be broadly characterized as a classification that discriminates on the basis of alienage. It is more accurately described as a policy that classifies on the basis of *46financial contribution toward the costs of operating the University. In one class are citizens and permanent resident aliens, all of whom have lived in the State and have contributed to state revenues through the payment of income taxes. To these students the State offers its in-state tuition, which covers only a portion of the cost of educating each student. The remainder is subsidized through state revenues, to which the students themselves have contributed by paying the full spectrum of state taxes.
In the other class is an equally mixed group of citizens and aliens. Some of these citizens do not reside in the State and therefore do not pay state taxes. Others do reside in the State, but are financially dependent on parents or a spouse who is domiciled elsewhere and therefore do not help finance the operation of the University through income taxes. Non-immigrant aliens holding G-4 visas also reside in the State but, like citizens in this class, do not pay state income taxes.17 To all members of this class the State charges a higher, so-called “out-of-state” tuition, although one that still does not fully cover the cost of education. Just as it may seem unfair for a State to deny to a resident alien the right to participate in public benefits to which he has contributed through taxes, it might seem equally unfair to allow G-4 visaholders to participate, on a par with taxpaying resident citizens and permanent resident aliens, in public benefits to which they have not contributed. Whether or not such a judgment is correct, a policy justified in such terms cannot fairly be called the product of xenophobic prejudice. Given the State’s decision to treat immigrant aliens on a par with citizens, its decision to require a higher tuition of G-4 nonimmigrant aliens cannot *47be characterized as a classification on the basis of alienage.18
Consequently, for either of these reasons, the “strict scrutiny” authorized by Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), even if it is still applicable to discrimination against permanent resident aliens, has no proper application to the State’s policy in this case. The only question, therefore, is whether “the State’s classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State.” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976). The State has articulated several purposes for its policy of denying in-state tuition to nonimmigrant aliens. One purpose is roughly to equalize the cost of higher education borne by those students who do and those who do not financially contribute to the University through income tax payments. The purpose surely is a legitimate one, and I should think it evident that the State’s classification rationally furthers that purpose.19
*48y
On June 23, 1978, approximately two months after our decision in Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647 (1978), the University’s Board of Regents adopted a “clarifying” resolution establishing beyond doubt that the State’s policy excluding GU4 visaholders from eligibility for in-state tuition was not based on their lack of domicile. For this reason, we remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, having concluded that this case was no longer controlled by Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), as limited by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 771 (1975). Toll v. Moreno, 441 U. S. 458, 461-462 (1979). On remand, the District Court concluded that although the clarifying resolution adopted on June 23, 1978, eliminated the “conclusive presumption” that respondents could not establish domicile, the existence of such a presumption before that date denied respondents due process under the teaching of Vlandis v. Kline, supra.
There is legitimate doubt whether at this late date anything remains of Vlandis v. Kline but its lifeless words on the pages of these Reports. Such doubts, however, need not be resolved in this case. The University has made clear that domicile is not the principal consideration underlying its tuition policy as applied to respondents, and in my view that policy is rationally related to other legitimate purposes proffered by the State. The classification challenged by respondents did not change on June 23, 1978. If the classification is valid today, as I believe it is, then it was valid before the State issued its “clarifying” resolution. A statute’s con*49sistency with the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause should not depend on which purpose state officials choose to emphasize at a particular time, as long as one of the State’s purposes is rationally served by the statute. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S., at 426 (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it”).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The state courts in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), had not addressed the question in light of their determination that Congress had completely barred state action in the field of employment of illegal aliens. Consequently, this Court also deferred consideration of the issue. Id,., at 363.
As the Court obligatorily notes, ante, at 12, n. 17, but promptly ignores, our decisions in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68 (1979); and Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432 (1982), all upheld state laws that expressly discriminated against lawfully admitted resident aliens. Such decisions would not have been possible if the mere fact that a law discriminated against aliens placed it in irreconcilable conflict with federal power over immigration.
As I have always understood the Supremacy Clause, if a state law is inconsistent with federal law, the state law is unenforceable. The inconsistency is made no less fatal because the State has a rational basis for, or a compelling interest in, its actions. Under the majority’s formulation, a state law that arguably discriminates against aliens conflicts with federal *32law, and unless further modifications of the pre-emption doctrine are in the offing, that will be the end of the matter.
“[A] host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a heterogenous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Section 6 of the original bill, H. R. 4489, read as follows:
“International organizations shall be exempt from all property taxes imposed by, or under the authority of, any act of Congress, including such acts as are applicable solely to the District of Columbia or the Territories; and shall be entitled to the same exemptions and immunities from State or local taxes as is the United States Government.” 91 Cong. Rec. 10867 (1945).
Section 6 is codified at 22 U. S. C. § 288c and now reads:
“International organizations shall be exempt from all property taxes imposed by, or under the authority of, any Act of Congress, including such Acts as are applicable solely to the District of Columbia or the Territories.”
Thus, sponsors of the legislation in the House assured their colleagues that the bill would not admit such employees as immigrants. In addition, the following exchange occurred:
“Mr. RANKIN. This bill does not interfere with State laws in any way?
“Mr. ROBERTSON of Virginia. None whatever.” 91 Cong. Rec. 10866 (1945).
In the Senate, Senator Taft explained that his Committee had deleted the proposed exemption contained in §6 because it “felt that that was wholly beyond the power of Congress.” 91 Cong. Rec. 12432 (1945).
G-4 visaholders residing in Maryland who are relieved of federal taxes under the Internal Revenue Code have also been exempted from Maryland taxes by operation of state law. Maryland’s tax code provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the net income taxable under state law is the taxpayer’s federal adjusted gross income. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 81, § 280(a) (1980). By operation of 26 U. S. C. § 893, that amount will not *36include wages paid by an international organization. The State’s decision indirectly to relieve class members of state taxes on their salaries of course provides no basis for pre-emption of the State’s tuition policy under the Supremacy Clause.
The District Court, which concluded that the State’s tuition policy interfered with Congress’ exclusive control over immigration, nevertheless rejected the argument that the policy conflicted with the treaties and agreements relieving respondents of liability for income taxes.
“In this case it is apparent that there is no ‘clear conflict’ between the policies in question. The University’s Policy seeks to confer certain economic benefits on individuals closely affiliated with the State of Maryland. The mere fact that one of the factors which is considered in determining eligibility for this benefit is whether or not the applicant’s income is taxed by Maryland does not necessarily imply that the policy conflicts with the tax policies contained in the relevant international agreements. The ‘conflict’ between these policies, in and of itself, is too attenuated to warrant invalidating the University’s Policy.” 489 F. Supp. 658, 667 (Md. 1980).
As petitioners explain, tuition and fee charges do not pay the full cost of a university education at the University of Maryland. In fiscal year 1981, for example, the University received appropriations from general fund revenues in the amount of $164 million. Brief for Petitioners 29, n. 23. Nearly half of general fund revenues are provided by the State’s income tax. Ibid. The State, therefore, subsidizes the cost of education at the University. The amount of the subsidy, of course, is considerably greater for students who are eligible for in-state tuition. Since residents of the State normally pay income tax, and thereby indirectly contribute to the subsidy, it is not unreasonable for the State to accord such persons a reduced tuition. By charging respondents out-of-state tuition, the University is merely asking them to pay their fair share of the cost of state-supported education.
“This standard reduces to a minimum the likelihood that the federal judiciary will judge state policies in terms of the individual notions and predilections of its own members, and until recently it has been followed in all kinds of ‘equal protection’ cases.” Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 681-682 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
As suggested earlier, we have affirmed “the general principle that some state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of self-government.” Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U. S., at 73-74. “[I]n those areas the State’s exclusion of aliens need not ‘clear the high hurdle of “strict scrutiny,” because [that] would “obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic value of citizenship.” ’ Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S., at 295 (citation omitted).” Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S., at 439 (footnote omitted). The Court has recognized that the strength of the State’s interest is great when it seeks to exclude aliens from its political processes, but selection of the appropriate level of “scrutiny” traditionally *42has depended, not on the nature of the State’s interest, but on the nature of the burdened class. If the Court has eschewed strict scrutiny in the “political process” eases, it may be because the Court is becoming uncomfortable with the categorization of aliens as a suspect class.
That judgment was shared by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the first clause of the first section of that Amendment confirms the importance of citizenship by defining the means of obtaining it in a way that encompassed the freed slaves: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside.” Citizenship is also a concept fundamental to structures and processes established elsewhere in the Constitution:
“The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government. The assumption of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an association with the polity which, in a democratic republic, exercises the powers of governance.” Ambach v. Norwick, supra, at 75.
Justice Blackmun has chosen to respond to this portion of the dissent, but misunderstands my point. I have observed that the political powerlessness of aliens is the result of state-created classifications which this Court has upheld as constitutional. One may nevertheless conclude, as Justice Blackmun does, that the political powerlessness of aliens is still a reason for applying strict scrutiny to alienage classifications. My point, to which Justice Blackmun’s concurrence is unresponsive, is that a classification which is constitutionally relevant to many important state purposes should not be considered “suspect.” It is beside the point to recognize that alienage may be irrelevant for some other purposes. Were this consideration conclusive, all state classifications would be considered “suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause because every classification is relevant to some purposes and irrelevant to others.
The State’s written policy, effective since 1975, reads in part as follows:
“1. It is the policy of the University of Maryland to grant in-state status for admission, tuition and charge-differential purposes to United States citizens, and to immigrant aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in accordance with the laws of the United States, in the following cases:
“a. Where a student is financially dependent upon a parent, parents, or spouse domiciled in Maryland for at least six consecutive months prior to the last day available for registration for the forthcoming semester.
“b. Where a student is financially independent for at least the preceding twelve months, and provided the student has maintained his domicile in Maryland for at least six consecutive months immediately prior to the last day available for registration for the forthcoming semester.
“c. Where a student is the spouse or a dependent child of a full-time employee of the University.
“d. Where a student who is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States is stationed on active duty in Maryland for at least six consecutive months immediately prior to the last day available for registration for the forthcoming semester, unless such student has been assigned for educational purposes to attend the University of Maryland.
“e. Where a student is a full-time employee of the University of Maryland.
“2. It is the policy of the University of Maryland to attribute out-of-state status for admission, tuition, and charge-differential purposes in all other cases.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a-168a.
For example, in Nyquist, the Court stated:
“Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis.” 432 U. S., at 12.
In addition, nonimmigrant aliens are not required to register for military service. See 50 U. S. C. App. § 453(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V); 32 CFR § 1611.2 (1980).
Other nonresident aliens whose tax liability is not the subject of a treaty or special law such as the IOIA are subject to taxation only on income received from sources within the United States at a maximum rate of 30%. 26 U. S. C. § 871(a)(1).
Respondents, citing Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S., at 9, argue that strict scrutiny applies even when the State discriminates only against a certain subclass of aliens rather than all aliens. In Nyquist, the State argued that its law limiting financial assistance for higher education to citizens and resident aliens who declared their intention to seek citizenship was not a classification on the basis of alienage. Rather, it distinguished between aliens who intended to become citizens and those who did not. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the statute was “directed at aliens and that only aliens [were] harmed by it.” Ibid. In this case, however, the State also denies in-state tuition to certain resident citizens, as well as to G-4 visaholders. Moreover, even if the State denied in-state tuition to G-4 visaholders alone, strict scrutiny would not be called for. As argued in the text, G-4 visaholders and other nonimmigrant aliens, unlike permanent resident aliens who were the subject of discrimination in Nyquist, are not so similarly situated to citizens as to render distinctions between such aliens and citizens “suspect.”
As respondents note, G-4 visaholders do pay state taxes other than the income tax. State and local property taxes, however, do not enter the general funds of the State and thus do not support the operation of the University. Brief for Petitioners 29, n. 23. In any event, “a State does not *48violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970). Respondents’ exemption from the income tax sufficiently distinguishes them from citizens and other aliens who do pay such taxes, and therefore contribute a greater portion of their incomes to support the University, that the State’s decision to require higher tuition payments is certainly rational.