delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the at-large system of elections in Burke County, Ga., violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Burke County’s black citizens.
I
Burke County is a large, predominately rural county located in eastern Georgia. Eight hundred and thirty-one square miles in area,1 it is approximately two-thirds the size of the State of Rhode Island. According to the 1980 census, Burke County had a total population of 19,349, of whom 10,385, or 53.6%, were black.2 The average age of blacks *615living there is lower than the average age of whites and therefore whites constitute a slight majority of the voting age population. As of 1978, 6,373 persons were registered to vote in Burke County, of whom 38% were black.3
The Burke County Board of Commissioners governs the county. It was created in 1911, see 1911 Ga. Laws 310-311, and consists of five members elected at large to concurrent 4-year terms by all qualified voters in the county. The county has never been divided into districts, either for the purpose of imposing a residency requirement on candidates or for the purpose of requiring candidates to be elected by voters residing in a district. In order to be nominated or elected, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election, and a runoff must be held if no candidate receives a majority in the first primary or general election. Ga. Code §34-1513 (Supp. 1980). Each candidate must run for a specific seat on the Board, Ga. Code § 34-1015 (1978), and a voter may vote only once for any candidate. No Negro has ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners.
Appellees, eight black citizens of Burke County, filed this suit in 1976 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The suit was brought on behalf of all black citizens in Burke County. The class was certified in 1977. The complaint alleged that the county’s system of at-large elections violates appellees’ First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights, as well as their rights under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971, 1973, and 1983, by diluting the voting power of black citizens. Following a bench trial at which both sides introduced extensive evidence, the court issued an order on September 29, 1978, stating that appellees were entitled to prevail and ordering that Burke County be *616divided into five districts for purposes of electing County Commissioners. App. to Juris. Statement 62a. The court later issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated that while the present method of electing County Commissioners was “racially neutral when adopted, [it] is being maintained for invidious purposes” in violation of appellees’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. Id., at 71a, 96a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F. 2d 1358 (CA5 1981). It stated that while the proceedings in the District Court took place prior to the decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), the District Court correctly anticipated Mobile and required appellees to prove that the at-large voting system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. 639 F. 2d, at 1375-1376. The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and that its conclusion that the at-large system was maintained for invidious purposes was “virtually mandated by the overwhelming proof.” Id., at 1380. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 811 (1981), and now affirm.4
II
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts. The minority’s voting power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority lines. While multimember districts have been challenged for *617“their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party,” Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 158-159 (1971), this Court has repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se. Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 66; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 142. The Court has recognized, however, that multimember districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment if “conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination” by minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. See also White v. Regester, supra, at 765. Cases charging that multimember districts unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of racial minorities are thus subject to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), made it clear that in order for the Equal Protection Clause to be violated, “the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240. Neither case involved voting dilution, but in both cases the Court observed that the requirement that racially discriminatory purpose or intent be proved applies to voting cases by relying upon, among others, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), a districting case, to illustrate that a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of equal protection cases charging racial discrimination. Arlington Heights, supra, at 265; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240.6
*618Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis both rejected the notion that a law is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than another. Arlington Heights, supra, at 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. However, both cases recognized that discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence. “Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” Ibid. Thus determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose “demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights, supra, at 266.
In Mobile v. Bolden, supra, the Court was called upon to apply these principles to the at-large election system in Mobile, Ala. Mobile is governed by three commissioners who exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the municipality. 446 U. S., at 59. Each candidate for the City Commission runs for one of three numbered posts in an at-large election and can only be elected by a majority vote. Id., at 59-60. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile alleging that the at-large scheme diluted their voting strength in violation of several statutory and constitutional provisions. The District Court concluded that the at-large system “violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by improperly restricting their access to the political process,” Bolden v. Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 399 (SD Ala. 1976), and ordered that the commission form of government be replaced by a mayor and a nine-member City Council elected from single-member districts. Id., at 404. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 571 F. 2d 238 (CA5 1978). This Court reversed.
Justice Stewart, writing for himself and three other Justices, noted that to prevail in their contention that the at-large voting system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs had to prove the *619system was “ ‘conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’” 446 U. S., at 66, quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149.6 Such a requirement “is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 446 U. S., at 66, and White v. Regester is consistent with that principle. 446 U. S., at 69. Another Justice agreed with the standard of proof recognized by the plurality. Id., at 101 (White, J., dissenting).
The plurality went on to conclude that the District Court had failed to comply with this standard. The District Court had analyzed plaintiffs’ claims in light of the standard which had been set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1975) (per curiam).7 Zimmer set out a list of factors8 gleaned from *620Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, and White v. Regester, supra, that a court should consider in assessing the constitutionality of at-large and multimember district voting schemes. Under Zimmer, voting dilution is established “upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors.” 485 F. 2d, at 1305.
The plurality in Mobile was of the view that Zimmer was “decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause — that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.” 446 U. S., at 71. The plurality observed that while “the presence of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose,” the mere existence of those criteria is not a substitute for a finding of discriminatory purpose. Id., at 73. The District Court’s standard in Mobile was likewise flawed. Finally, the plurality concluded that the evidence upon which the lower courts had relied was “insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case.” Ibid. Justice Stevens rejected the intentional discrimination standard but concluded that the proof failed to satisfy the legal standard that in his view was the applicable rule. He therefore concurred in the judgment of reversal. Four other Justices, however, thought the evidence sufficient to satisfy the purposeful discrimination standard. One of them, Justice Blackmun, nevertheless concurred in the Court’s judgment because he believed an erroneous remedy had been imposed.
Because the District Court in the present case employed the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer, it is urged that *621its judgment is infirm for the same reasons that led to the reversal in Mobile. We do not agree. First, and fundamentally, we are unconvinced that the District Court in this case applied the wrong legal standard. Not only was the District Court’s decision rendered a considerable time after Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, but the trial judge also had the benefit of Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d 209 (1978), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit assessed the impact of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights and held that “a showing of racially motivated discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection voting dilution claim . . . .” 571 F. 2d, at 219. The court stated that “[t]he ultimate issue in a case alleging unconstitutional dilution of the votes of a racial group is whether the districting plan under attack exists because it was intended to diminish or dilute the political efficacy of that group.” Id., at 226. The Court of Appeals also explained that although the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer were important considerations in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those factors. “The task before the fact finder is to determine, under all the relevant facts, in whose favor the ‘aggregate’ of the evidence preponderates. This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case.” 571 F. 2d, at 224 (footnote omitted).
The District Court referred to Nevett v. Sides and demonstrated its understanding of the controlling standard by observing that a determination of discriminatory intent is “a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution” under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. App. to Juris. Statement 68a. Furthermore, while recognizing that the evidentiary factors identified in Zimmer were to be considered, the District Court was aware that it was “not limited in its determination only to the Zimmerfactors” but could consider other relevant factors as well. App. to Juris. Statement 70a. The District Court then proceeded to deal with what it considered to *622be the relevant proof and concluded that the at-large scheme of electing commissioners, “although racially neutral when adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes.” Id., at 71a. That system “while neutral in origin . . . has been subverted to invidious purposes.” Id., at 90a. For the most part, the District Court dealt with the evidence in terms of the factors set out in Zimmer and its progeny, but as the Court of Appeals stated:
“Judge Alaimo employed the constitutionally required standard . . . [and] did not treat the Zimmer criteria as absolute, but rather considered them only to the extent they were relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.” 639 F. 2d, at 1376.
Although a tenable argument can be made to the contrary, we are not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the District Court applied the proper legal standard.
Ill
A
We are also unconvinced that we should disturb the District Court’s finding that the at-large system in Burke County was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population. In White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 769-770, we stated that we were not inclined to overturn the District Court’s factual findings, “representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise.” See also Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 468 (1979) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment). Our recent decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273 (1982), emphasizes the deference Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 requires reviewing courts to give a trial court’s findings of fact. “Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless *623clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings . . . .” 456 U. S., at 287. The Court held that the issue of whether the differential impact of a seniority system resulted from an intent to discriminate on racial grounds “is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52(a)’s clearly-erroneous standard.” Id., at 287-288. The Swint Court also noted that issues of intent are commonly treated as factual matters. Id., at 288. We are of the view that the same clearly-erroneous standard applies to the trial court’s finding in this case that the at-large system in Burke County is being maintained for discriminatory purposes, as well as to the court’s subsidiary findings of fact. The Court of Appeals did not hold any of the District Court’s findings of fact to be clearly erroneous, and this Court has frequently noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts. See, e. g., Berenyi v. Information Director, 385 U. S. 630, 635 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409 (1962); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275 (1949). We agree with the Court of Appeals that on the record before us, none of the factual findings are clearly erroneous.
B
The District Court found that blacks have always made up a substantial majority of the population in Burke County, App. to Juris. Statement 66a, n. 3, but that they are a distinct minority of the registered voters. Id., at 71a-72a. There was also overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial lines. Id., at 72a-73a. Hence, although there had been black candidates, no black had ever been elected to the Burke County Commission. These facts bear heavily on the issue of purposeful discrimination. Voting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black interests without fear of political consequences, and without bloc voting the minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of their race. Because it is sensible to expect that at least some *624blacks would have been elected in Burke County, the fact that none have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful exclusion. See White v. Regester, supra, at 766.
Under our cases, however, such facts are insufficient in themselves to prove purposeful discrimination absent other evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 167 (1977); White v. Regester, supra, at 765-766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149-150. See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 66 (plurality opinion). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals thought the supporting proof in this case was sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination. The supporting evidence was organized primarily around the factors which Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d 209 (CA5 1978), had deemed relevant to the issue of intentional discrimination. These factors were primarily those suggested in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973).
The District Court began by determining the impact of past discrimination on the ability of blacks to participate effectively in the political process. Past discrimination was found to contribute to low black voter registration because, prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks had been denied access to the political process by means such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries. The result was that “Black suffrage in Burke County was virtually non-existent.” App. to Juris. Statement 71a. Black voter registration in Burke County has increased following the Voting Rights Act to the point that some 38% of blacks eligible to vote are registered to do so. Id., at 72a. On that basis the District Court inferred that “past discrimination has had an adverse effect on black voter registration which lingers to this date.” Ibid. Past discrimination against blacks in education also had the same effect. Not only did Burke County schools discriminate against blacks as recently as 1969, but also some schools *625still remain essentially segregated and blacks as a group have completed less formal education than whites. Id., at 74a.
The District Court found further evidence of exclusion from the political process. Past discrimination had prevented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic Party affairs and in primary elections. Until this lawsuit was filed, there had never been a black member of the County Executive Committee of the Democratic Party. There were also property ownership requirements that made it difficult for blacks to serve as chief registrar in the county. There had been discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the hiring of county employees, and in the appointments to boards and committees which oversee the county government. Id., at 74a-76a. The District Court thus concluded that historical discrimination had restricted the present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in the political process. Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized, that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, serve to maintain the status quo.
Extensive evidence was cited by the District Court to support its finding that elected officials of Burke County have been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black community,9 which increases the likelihood that the political process was not equally open to blacks. This evidence ranged from the effects of past discrimination which still *626haunt the county courthouse to the infrequent appointment of blacks to county boards and committees; the overtly discriminatory pattern of paving county roads; the reluctance of the county to remedy black complaints, which forced blacks to take legal action to obtain school and grand jury desegregation; and the role played by the County Commissioners in the incorporation of an all-white private school to which they donated public funds for the purchase of band uniforms. Id., at 77a-82a.
The District Court also considered the depressed socioeconomic status of Burke County blacks. It found that proportionately more blacks than whites have incomes below the poverty level. Id., at 83a. Nearly 53% of all black families living in Burke County had incomes equal to or less than three-fourths of a poverty-level income. Ibid. Not only have blacks completed less formal education than whites, but also the education they have received “was qualitatively inferior to a marked degree.” Id., at 84a. Blacks tend to receive less pay than whites, even for similar work, and they tend to be employed in menial jobs more often than whites. Id., at 85a. Seventy-three percent of houses occupied by blacks lacked all or some plumbing facilities; only 16% of white-occupied houses suffered the same deficiency. Ibid. The District Court concluded that the depressed socioeconomic status of blacks results in part from “the lingering effects of past discrimination.” Ibid.
Although finding that the state policy behind the at-large electoral system in Burke County was “neutral in origin,” the District Court concluded that the policy “has been subverted to invidious purposes.” Id., at 90a. As a practical matter, máintenance of the state statute providing for at-large elections in Burke County is determined by Burke County’s state representatives, for the legislature defers to their wishes on matters of purely local application. The court found that Burke County’s state representatives “have retained a system which has minimized the ability of Burke County Blacks to participate in the political system.” Ibid.
*627The trial court considered, in addition, several factors which this Court has indicated enhance the tendency of multimember districts to minimize the voting strength of racial minorities. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 143-144. It found that the sheer geographic size of the county, which is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode Island, “has made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places or to campaign for office.” App. to Juris. Statement 91a. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the size of the county tends to impair the access of blacks to the political process. Id., at 92a. The majority vote requirement, Ga. Code § 34-1513 (Supp. 1980), was found “to submerge the will of the minority” and thus “deny the minority’s access to the system.” App. to Juris. Statement 92a. The court also found the requirement that candidates run for specific seats, Ga. Code § 34-1015 (1978), enhances appellees’ lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate. Because Burke County has no residency requirement, “[a]ll candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in ‘lilly-white’ [sic] neighborhoods. To that extent, the denial of access becomes enhanced.” App. to Juris. Statement 93a.
None of the District Court’s findings underlying its ultimate finding of intentional discrimination appears to us to be clearly erroneous; and as we have said, we decline to overturn the essential finding of the District Court, agreed to by the Court of Appeals, that the at-large system in Burke County has been maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal access to the political processes in the county. As in White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 767, the District Court’s findings were “sufficient to sustain [its] judgment . . . and, on this record, we have no reason-to disturb them.”
IV
We also find no reason to overturn the relief ordered by the District Court. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals discerned any special circumstances that would mili*628tate against utilizing single-member districts. Where “a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not ‘exceed’ the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the ‘condition that offends the Constitution.’ ” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 282 (1977) (emphasis deleted), quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 738 (1974).10
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1977, p. 90 (1978).
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, PHC80-V-12, p. 5 (Mar. 1981). In 1930, Burke County had a total population of 29,224, of whom 22,698 or 78% were black. *615U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, II Characteristics of the Population, pt. 2, p. 229 (1943). The percentage of blacks in the total population of Burke County has steadily diminished over the last 50 years.
App. to Juris. Statement 72a.
The District Court’s judgment was stayed pending appeal to the Court of Appeals. 439 U. S. 948 (1978). The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate on April 6, 1981, pending disposition of the case here.
Purposeful racial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of adverse differential treatment. Absent such purpose, differential impact is subject only to the test of rationality. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 247-248.
With respect to the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality held that the Amendment prohibits only direct, purposefully discriminatory interference with the freedom of Negroes to vote. “Having found that Negroes in Mobile ‘register and vote without hindrance,’ the District Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the appellants invaded the protection of [the Fifteenth] Amendment in the present case.” Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 65. Three Justices disagreed with the plurality’s basis for putting aside the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 84, n. 3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 102 (White, J., dissenting); id., at 125-135 (Marshall, J., dissenting). We express no view on the application of the Fifteenth Amendment to this case.
The plurality noted that plaintiffs’ claim under §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, added nothing to their Fifteenth Amendment claim because the “legislative history of §2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.” 446 U. S., at 60-61.
We specifically affirmed the judgment below “without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals.” 424 U. S., at 638.
The primary factors listed in Zimmer include a lack of minority access to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for *620multimember or at-large districting, and the existence of past discrimination which precludes effective participation in the electoral process. 485 F. 2d, at 1305. Factors which enhance the proof of voting dilution are the existence of large districts, anti-single-shot voting provisions, and the absence of any provision for at-large candidates to run from geographic sub-districts. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals held that “proof of unresponsiveness by the public body in question to the group claiming injury” is an essential element of a claim of voting dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. 639 F. 2d, at 1375. Under our cases, however, unresponsiveness is an important element but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred.
Appellants contend that the District Court should not have divided Burke County into five districts but should have allowed appellants to devise a plan for subdividing the county and to submit their plan for preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. This contention was not properly raised in the Court of Appeals and was not addressed by that court. We therefore do not address it. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970).
Appellants also contend that the doctrine of unconstitutional dilution of voting rights arising from an at-large election system does not apply to county governing bodies. We find no merit to this contention, having previously affirmed a judgment that at-large elections for the governing body of a parish (county) unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976).