concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree fundamentally with the Court’s view that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act permits jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination to adopt new voting schemes which perpetuate that discrimination. Congress intended the pre-clearance requirement to be a powerful measure for advancing the goals of the Fifteenth Amendment, and specifically reaffirmed that intention when it reenacted the Voting *137Rights Act in 1982. By holding that § 5 forbids only electoral changes that increase discrimination, the Court reduces § 5 to a means of maintaining the status quo. Because the Court’s interpretation of § 5 is flatly inconsistent with both the language and the purpose of that provision and is not supported by the decision in Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), I dissent from Parts III and IV of the Court’s opinion.
I would affirm the judgment below on the basis of the District Court’s conclusion, which this Court in no way questions, that the city of Lockhart’s “imposition of the numbered-post and staggered-term provisions has clearly had and will continue to have” a discriminatory effect on Mexican-American voters. 559 F. Supp. 581, 588 (1981) (emphasis added).1
Indeed, it bears repeating and should be reemphasized that the Fifteenth Amendment “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.” Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939).
I
The Court’s view that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act permits the adoption of a discriminatory election scheme, so long as the scheme is not more discriminatory than its predecessor, is inconsistent with both the language and the purpose of that provision. In focusing exclusively on whether Lockhart’s new election scheme worsens the position of minority voters, and ignoring whether the new scheme itself has a discriminatory effect, see ante, at 133-136, the Court substitutes an inquiry of its own invention for the inquiry mandated by § 5. For the reasons elaborated below, I believe that §5 forbids preclearance of a proposed election procedure that perpetuates existing discrimination.
*138A
The Court’s interpretation of §5 is inconsistent with the language of that provision. Section 5 provides that a covered jurisdiction must obtain preclearance of any new “voting qualification, or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the proposed
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group] . . . .” Ibid.
By its terms § 5 focuses on the effect of the new voting procedure itself, not on the difference between the new procedure and its predecessor. The statute specifically requires that the new procedure not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on a discriminatory basis. Although it is relevant for purposes of § 5 whether the change to the new practice diminishes minority voting strength, to say that the effect of the change is part of the § 5 inquiry is far different from holding, as the Court does, that this is the sole inquiry in determining whether a new procedure has a discriminatory effect. Nothing in the language of § 5 in any way suggests that a discriminatory election procedure satisfies §5 as long as the procedure does not increase the degree of discrimination.
B
The Court’s view is also wholly inconsistent with the purpose of § 5. The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act leaves no doubt that Congress intended §5 to prohibit the covered jurisdictions from adopting voting procedures which perpetuate past discrimination, which is precisely what the procedures proposed by Lockhart would do. Moreover, Congress reaffirmed this intent when it reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1982.
*139The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a direct response to the failure of prior efforts to implement the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress recognized that voting discrimination was a nationwide problem, and it therefore enacted a general prohibition of discriminatory practices. See, e. g., §§2, 3, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§1973, 1973a. Congress was particularly concerned, however, with the “systematic exclusion of Negroes from the polls that characterizes certain regions of this Nation.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1965). It identified a number of jurisdictions that had “engaged in widespread violations of the 15th amendment over a period of time,” id., at 14,2 and provided that these jurisdictions would be subject to certain stringent remedial measures that were not made applicable nationwide. The most important of these remedial measures was the preclearance requirement of §5.
The specific purpose of § 5 was to prevent these jurisdictions from continuing the pervasive practice of adopting new voting procedures which perpetuated existing discrimination. Congress was alarmed at the success with which certain States had evaded the strictures of earlier voting laws by resorting to “the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules ... for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 335 (1966) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The historical experience of attempts to enforce voting laws in those States revealed that “[bjarring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result, only in methods.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, supra, at 10. See also S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st *140Sess., pt. 3, p. 5 (1965).3 Congress concluded that enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment and the specific prohibitions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would not be effective if these States remained free to adopt new electoral procedures that continued to discriminate against minority voters. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 335.
In order to prevent such evasive maneuvers, Congress required jurisdictions with a pervasive history of voting discrimination to obtain preclearance of any new voting plan. As this Court has recognized, §5 was designed to suspend “all new voting regulations pending review by federal authorities to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimination.” 383 U. S., at 316 (emphasis added). “After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress . . . shift[ed] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” Id., at 328.
When Congress reenacted the Act in 1970, 1975, and 1982, it consistently reaffirmed the central purpose of § 5: to promote the attainment of voting equality by preventing the adoption of new voting procedures which perpetuate past discrimination. The House Report accompanying the 1970 extension of the Act viewed § 5 as a means of “preclud[ing]” the covered States from resorting to “new voting rules . . . in order to perpetuate discrimination.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, pp. 6-7 (1969) (emphasis added).4 Similarly, when *141Congress extended and amended the Act in 1975, it stated unequivocally that § 5 was adopted “[i]n order to insure that any future practices of these jurisdictions be free of both discriminatory purpose and effect.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 8 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 15 (1975). See also H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, supra, at 8, 57; S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 15-18. When Congress reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it stressed that § 5 is “designed to insure that old devices for disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by new ones,” to prohibit new “complex and subtle . . . schemes [that] perpetuate the results of past voting discrimination,” and to “eradicate] the continuing effects of past discrimination.” S. Rep. No. 94-417, pp. 6, 12, 44 (1982).5
The Court’s interpretation of §5 disregards the central purpose of that provision. The Court holds that § 5 is satisfied as long as a change in electoral procedure does not increase the level of discrimination, even if the new procedure perpetuates past discrimination. In holding that §5 prevents only the adoption of procedures that worsen the position of minority voters, the Court completely ignores the very reason why Congress imposed the preclearance requirement on jurisdictions with a pervasive history of voting dis*142crimination: to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination through the adoption of new discriminatory procedures. The Court’s interpretation of § 5 permits a covered jurisdiction to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment and the general prohibitions of the Voting Rights Act in precisely the way that Congress sought to foreclose.
The Court’s interpretation of §5 is not supported by the decision in Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). Beer did not hold that a nonameliorative change in electoral procedure should be precleared even if the new procedure perpetuates past discrimination. Today’s decision represents an extension of Beer which is unsupported by any of the purposes of the Voting Rights Act and is inconsistent with Congress’ understanding of § 5 when it reenacted the Voting Rights Act
The Court’s decision in Beer concerned an electoral change that improved the voting strength of minorities. In Beer the Court found that the reapportionment plan at issue enhanced the position of Negro voters, since it increased the number of districts in which they constituted a majority. 425 U. S., at 141-142. The Court stated its holding as follows: “We conclude . . . that such an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.” Id., at 141 (emphasis added). That the Court viewed the ameliorative nature of the reapportionment as central to its holding is confirmed by footnote 14 of the opinion, which states: “It is possible that a legislative reapportionment could be a substantial improvement over its predecessor in terms of lessening racial discrimination, and yet nonetheless continue so to discriminate on the basis of race or color as to be unconstitutional.” Id., at 142, n. 14.6
*143Beer did not involve a change in electoral procedure which, like the one before us, preserves the existing level of discrimination against minority voters. A new electoral scheme which does nothing more than perpetuate past discrimination differs in a critical way from a voting scheme which enhances minority voting strength. By improving the position of minority voters, an ameliorative change represents some progress in attaining voting equality, the fundamental goal of the Voting Rights Act. In contrast, an electoral scheme that does not enhance minority voting strength but merely maintains existing discrimination does not further any conceivable purpose of the Act. Although the reapportionment in Beer may not have eliminated past discrimination, at least it enhanced the political position of minority voters. This cannot be said of Lockhart’s 1973 charter, which merely continues the pattern of voting discrimination that has prevailed in that city.
While I dissented in Beer on the ground that preclearance of any electoral plan which has a discriminatory effect is inconsistent with the mandate of §5, the departure in Beer from the plain language of § 5 was at least reconcilable with the broad purposes of the Voting Rights Act. There is no similar justification for today’s decision. In light of the language and purpose of § 5 and the overall purposes of the Act, it is perverse to interpret §5 to authorize preclearance of *144electoral changes that maintain a discriminatory status quo. The Court’s interpretation of § 5 robs it of its basic function of preventing the perpetuation of past discrimination, without in any way advancing a single purpose of the Voting Rights Act.
B
To support its interpretation of § 5, the Court relies solely on a statement in Beer to the effect that § 5 is designed to prevent retrogression in the position of minority voters. Ante, at 134, citing 425 U. S., at 141. That statement, which was made in an opinion addressing an electoral change that reduced discrimination, rested on an isolated passage in the legislative history of the 1975 reenactment of the Voting Rights Act. That passage does not support today’s decision. The passage appears in a section of a House Judiciary Committee Report which criticized the narrow view of §5 that had prevailed within the Department of Justice. The Committee noted that the Department of Justice had chosen to focus exclusively on “whether the administration of [an electoral] change has been, is, or will be without bias.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 60 (1975). The Committee criticized this view of § 5 as unduly narrow:
“We recommend that the Department of Justice, in determining whether a change affecting voting will have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race or color, apply the standard as Congress intended it and as the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted it. That standard is not fully satisfied by an indication that the administration of the change affecting voting will be impartial or neutral. Rather that standard can only be fully satisfied by determining . . . whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting in *145view of the political, sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within the community proposing the change.” Ibid.
It may be inferred from this passage that the Committee intended § 5 to prohibit changes that would diminish the voting strength of minorities. There is no indication, however, that in criticizing the Department of Justice for ignoring the effect of the change as part of the “broader inquiry” into discriminatory effect under §5, ibid., the Committee meant to suggest that a discriminatory scheme should be precleared as long as it does not increase the existing level of discrimination. The Report simply does not address the proper treatment of such a scheme.
C
When Congress reenacted § 5 in 1982, it did so on the understanding that § 5 does not allow covered jurisdictions to adopt voting procedures which maintain existing discrimination. Congress reenacted § 5 on the assumption that the rule laid down in Beer governed ameliorative changes. In a section of its Report specifically addressing the reenactment of § 5, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
“Under the rule in Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), a voting change which is ameliorative is not objectionable unless the change ‘itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.’ 425 U. S., at 141; see also 142, n. 14 (citing to the dilution cases from Forston v. Dorseyi, 379 U. S. 433 (1965),] through White v. Regester[, 412 U. S. 755 (1973]). In light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 12, n. 31 (1982).
In stating the “rule in Beer” in terms of the holding of that decision, the Committee clearly indicated its understanding that that rule applies to ameliorative changes. There is no *146indication that the Committee understood Beer also to apply to nonameliorative changes. Indeed, the implication is to the contrary, and the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments, including the same Report from which this passage is taken, shows that Congress repeatedly stressed that §5 is intended to prevent covered jurisdictions from adopting voting schemes that perpetuate existing discrimination. See supra, at 141.
In addition, the second sentence of the passage quoted above confirms that Congress did not intend to limit the focus of § 5 to whether an electoral change worsens the position of minority voters. The Committee indicated that a new procedure would be denied preclearance under § 5 if it violated the standards governing the amended § 2. A voting procedure violates §2 if it “results in a denial or abridgement” of the right to vote on a discriminatory basis, whether or not the procedure worsens the position of minority voters. Pub. L. 97-205, §3, 96 Stat. 134, 42 U. S. C. §1973 (1982 ed.).7 In reenacting §5 with the intent that a voting pro*147cedure violating § 2 should be denied preclearance under § 5, Congress surely made clear its understanding that § 5 forbids the adoption of a voting procedure that maintains existing discrimination whether or not the change is retrogressive.
There is no justification for the Court’s refusal to consider the 1982 reenactment of § 5 and amendment of § 2. Ante, at 133, n. 9. Both went into effect immediately and are applicable to this case. Pub. L. 97-205, § 6, 96 Stat. 135. In deciding that Lockhart’s 1973 charter does not have the “effect of abridging or denying the right to vote” within the meaning of §5, the Court is bound to apply the law as it now stands. Although Congress reenacted § 5 without change, its understanding of the scope of that provision is plainly relevant to the issue before us. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 384-388 (1982). By extending Beer and holding that discriminatory electoral schemes may be precleared as long as they do not increase the level of discrimination, the Court has interpreted § 5 in a manner squarely inconsistent with Congress’ intent in reenacting that provision.
Ill
In my view § 5 does not authorize the preclearance of any electoral scheme that is discriminatory in effect and that does not reduce past discrimination. The very purpose of § 5 is to prevent covered jurisdictions from circumventing the protections of the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution by the adoption of electoral schemes which perpetuate past discrimination. The considerations that may support the pre-clearance of ameliorative schemes have no application to electoral changes which perpetuate past discrimination or which actually increase the level of discrimination.
An electoral change which preserves the status quo should be denied preclearance if the new procedure continues to deny minority voters an equal chance to participate in the *148electoral process and elect candidates of their choice.8 The District Court noted that although Mexican-Americans constitute over 40% of the population of Lockhart, only one Mexican-American has ever served on the governing body. Because of the established pattern of racial bloc voting in Lockhart, Mexican-American voters can elect candidates of their choice only by leveraging their vote through single-shot voting. As the District Court recognized, the imposition of numbered posts and staggered elections, both features of the 1973 charter, diminishes this leverage to the detriment of minority-supported candidates.9 The District Court concluded that the use of staggered terms and numbered seats in Lock-hart has had and will continue to have a “discriminatory effect on Mexican-American voters’ ability to elect candidates of their choice.” Since this conclusion is undisturbed by the Court, § 5 preclearance should be denied for the simple reason that preclearance of a voting scheme that will perpetuate a history of voting discrimination is flatly inconsistent with the very purpose of § 5.
1 also agree with Justice Blackmun that the decision below should be affirmed on the separate ground that the District Court’s factual finding that the electoral changes had a retrogressive effect is not clearly erroneous.
See also H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 16 (1975) (explaining expansion of list of covered jurisdictions to include those with a “systematic pattern of voting discrimination and exclusion against minority group citizens” who are from environments in which the dominant language is other than English).
The House Report accompanying the 1965 Act described at great length the “ingenuity and dedication of those determined to circumvent the guarantees of the 15th amendment.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1965). Certain jurisdictions would adopt facially neutral changes in voting requirements which ensured that “white political supremacy was unlawfully maintained.” S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 8 (1965) (emphasis added).
The Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
“If it had not been for Section 5 of the present Act, there is no telling to what extent the states and communities covered might have legislated and manipulated to continue their historical practice of excluding Negroes from *141the Southern political process.” Joint Views of Ten Members of the (Senate) Judiciary Committee Relating to Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., printed at 116 Cong. Rec. 5521 (1970) (emphasis added), cited in S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 7 (1982).
This Court’s decisions have consistently recognized that § 5 was designed to prevent the adoption of new electoral procedures that would maintain pre-existing voting discrimination. In Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 548 (1969), the Court stated that Congress enacted § 5 to counter the historical practice of some States “of simply enacting new and slightly different requirements with the same discriminatory effect” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Most recently, in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 182 (1980), the Court observed that Congress readopted the § 5 preclearance requirement in 1975 in order “to promote further amelioration of voting discrimination” and “to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination” (emphasis added) (quoted in S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra, at 10, n. 19, 53.
It is hardly an answer to say, as the Court does, ante, at 134, n. 10, that Beer did not “distinguish between” ameliorative changes and changes that *143do not enhance minority voting strength. The decision in Beer, as Congress recognized when it reenacted § 5 in 1982, see infra, at 145-146, concerned only an ameliorative reapportionment, and the Court specifically stated its holding in terms of a change in electoral procedure that is ameliorative. It simply had no occasion to consider the proper treatment under §5 of discriminatory electoral procedures that do not lessen past discrimination. Today’s decision extends Beer to cover electoral schemes that are not ameliorative. The Court does not even attempt to demonstrate that this extension can be squared with the language, purpose, and legislative history of § 5, or that it serves any purpose of the Voting Rights Act. The reason for the Court’s silence is obvious: Congress clearly intended § 5 to prohibit the adoption of electoral procedures that perpetuate past discrimination.
Section 2 provides:
“(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
“(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”
This is the test that governs the determination of whether a voting procedure “results in a denial or abridgement” of the right to vote in violation of § 2 as recently amended. See n. 7, supra. See also S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982); see generally id., at 15-43.
Congress specifically identified numbered posts and staggered terms as ‘‘discriminatory elements of the elections process” which “often dilute emerging minority political strength” “in the covered jurisdictions, where there is severe racially polarized voting.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-227, p. 18 (1981). See also S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra, at 10 (identifying numbered posts as one of the “impediments that still face minority voters”).