with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the plurality’s opinion relating to the application in this case of the plain-view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not join the plurality’s opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently:
“One cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’ from the text and context and historic content of the Fourth *745Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 'unreasonable searches’ and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.” Id., at 70.
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited Justice Frankfurter’s Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the importance of the Warrant Clause. 407 U. S., at 316. Although I would not say that exceptions can be justified only by “absolute necessity,”1 I stated that they were “few in number and carefully delineated.” Id., at 318. This has continued to be my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 825 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain-view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality portion of the opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The plurality today states that this opinion “has *746never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court.” Ante, at 737. Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade.2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent Brown does not dispute that Officer Maples’ initial intrusion was lawful. Brown also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggest, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloons such as the one Officer Maples seized.
*747Accordingly, I concur in the judgment as it is consistent with principles established by our prior decisions.
1 have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA1 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CA10), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 949 (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 1309, 1313-1314 (CA51978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67 (CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).