delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether 18 U. S. C. § 2113(b), a provision of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, proscribes the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses.
H-H
On October 13, 1978, a Cincinnati man wrote a check for $10,000 drawn on a Cincinnati bank. He endorsed the check for deposit to his account at Dade Federal Savings & Loan of Miami and mailed the check to an agent there. The agent never received the check. On October 17, petitioner Nelson Bell opened an account at a Dade Federal branch and deposited $50 — the minimum amount necessary for new accounts. He used his own name, but gave a false address, birth date, and social security number. Later that day, at another branch, he deposited the Cincinnati man’s $10,000 check into this new account. The endorsement had been altered to show Bell’s account number. Dade Federal accepted the deposit, but put a 20-day hold on the funds. On November 7, as soon as the hold had expired, Bell returned to the branch at which he had opened the account. The total balance, with accrued interest, was then slightly over $10,080. Bell closed the account and was paid the total balance in cash.
Bell was apprehended and charged with violating 18 U. S. C. § 2113(b). The statute provides, in relevant part:
“Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, *358credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both . . .
Bell was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of specific intent. 649 F. 2d 281 (1981). The en banc court granted the Government’s petition for rehearing, however, and affirmed the conviction. 678 F. 2d 547 (1982) (Unit B). In so doing, it concluded that the statute embraces all felonious takings— including obtaining money under false pretenses. The court thus rejected Bell’s argument that § 2113(b) is limited to common-law larceny. Id., at 548-549. Because this conclusion is inconsistent with that reached in United States v. Feroni, 655 F. 2d 707, 708-711 (CA6 1981), and LeMasters v. United States, 378 F. 2d 262, 267-268 (CA9 1967), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.1 459 U. S. 1034 (1982). We now affirm.
II
In the 13th century, larceny was limited to trespassory taking: a thief committed larceny only if he feloniously “took and carried away” another’s personal property from his possession. The goal was more to prevent breaches of the peace than losses of property, and violence was more likely when property was taken from the owner’s actual possession.
*359As the common law developed, protection of property also became an important goal. The definition of larceny accordingly was expanded by judicial interpretation to include cases where the owner merely was deemed to be in possession. Thus when a bailee of packaged goods broke open the packages and misappropriated the contents, he committed larceny. The Carrier’s Case, Y. B. Pasch. 13 Edw. IV, f. 9, pl. 5 (Star Ch. and Exch. Ch. 1473), reprinted in 64 Selden Society 30 (1945). The bailor was deemed to be in possession of the contents of the packages, at least by the time of the misappropriation. Similarly, a thief committed “larceny by trick” when he obtained custody of a horse by telling the owner that he intended to use it for one purpose when he in fact intended to sell it and to keep the proceeds. King v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1779). The judges accepted the fiction that the owner retained possession of the horse until it was sold, on the theory that the thief had custody only for a limited purpose. Id., at 213-214, 168 Eng. Rep., at 209.
By the late 18th century, courts were less willing to expand common-law definitions. Thus when a bank clerk retained money given to him by a customer rather than depositing it in the bank, he was not guilty of larceny, for the bank had not been in possession of the money. King v. Bazeley, 2 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1799). Statutory crimes such as embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses therefore were created to fill this gap.2
The theoretical distinction between false pretenses and larceny by trick may be stated simply. If a thief, through his trickery, acquired title to the property from the owner, he has obtained property by false pretenses; but if he merely acquired possession from the owner, he has committed larceny *360by trick. See LaFave & Scott, supra n. 2, at 660-662. In this case the parties agree that Bell is guilty of obtaining money by false pretenses. When the teller at Dade Federal handed him $10,080 in cash, Bell acquired title to the money. The only dispute is whether 18 U. S. C. § 2113(b) proscribes the crime of false pretenses, or whether the statute is instead limited to common-law larceny.
t-H h — ( bH
A
Bell’s argument in favor of the narrower reading of § 2113(b) relies principally on the statute’s use of the traditional common-law language “takes and carries away.” He cites the rule of statutory construction that when a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term without defining it, Congress is presumed to intend the common-law meaning. See United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957). In § 2113(b), however, Congress has not adopted the elements of larceny in common-law terms. The language “takes and carries away” is but one part of the statute and represents only one element of common-law larceny. Other language in §2113(b), such as “with intent to steal or purloin,” has no established meaning at common law. See Turley, supra, at 411-412. Moreover, “taking and carrying away,” although not a necessary element of the crime, is entirely consistent with false pretenses.
Two other aspects of § 2113(b) show an intention to go beyond the common-law definition of larceny. First, common-law larceny was limited to thefts of tangible personal property. This limitation excluded, for example, the theft of a written instrument embodying a chose in action. LaFave & Scott, supra n. 2, at 633. Section 2113(b) is thus broader than common-law larceny, for it covers “any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100.” Second, and of particular relevance to the distinction at issue here, common-law larceny required a theft from the possession of *361the owner. When the definition was expanded, it still applied only when the owner was deemed to be in possession. Section 2113(b), however, goes well beyond even this expanded definition. It applies when the property “belong[s] to,” or is “in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of,” a covered institution.
In sum, the statutory language does not suggest that it covers only common-law larceny. Although § 2113(b) does not apply to a case of false pretenses in which there is not a taking and carrying away, it proscribes Bell’s conduct here. The evidence is clear that he “t[ook] and carrie[d] away, with intent to steal or purloin, [over $10,000 that was] in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of” Dade Federal Savings & Loan.
B
The legislative history of § 2113(b) also suggests that Congress intended the statute to reach Bell’s conduct. As originally enacted in 1934, the Federal Bank Robbery Act, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783, governed only robbery — a crime requiring a forcible taking. Congress apparently was concerned with “ ‘gangsters who operate habitually from one State to another in robbing banks.’”3 S. Rep. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934) (quoting Justice Department memorandum); see 78 Cong. Rec. 2946-2947 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934).
By 1937 the concern was broader, for the limited nature of the original Act (“ha[d] led to some incongruous results.’” H. R. Rep. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937) (quoting Attorney General’s letter to the Speaker). It was possible for a thief to steal a large amount from a bank “ ‘without displaying any force or violence and without putting any one in fear,’” id., at 2, and he would not violate any federal law. *362Congress amended the Act to fill this gap, adding language now found at §§ 2113(a) and (b). Act of Aug. 24,1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749. Although the term “larceny” appears in the legislative Reports, the congressional purpose plainly was to protect banks from those who wished to steal banks’ assets — even if they used no force in doing so.
The congressional goal of protecting bank assets is entirely independent of the traditional distinction on which Bell relies. To the extent that a bank needs protection against larceny by trick, it also needs protection from false pretenses. We cannot believe that Congress wished to limit the scope of the amended Act’s coverage, and thus limit its remedial purpose, on the basis of an arcane and artificial distinction more suited to the social conditions of 18th-century England than the needs of 20th-century America. Such an interpretation would signal a return to the “incongruous results” that the 1937 amendment was designed to eliminate.
> H — 1
We conclude that 18 U. S. C. § 2113(b) is not limited to common-law larceny.4 Although § 2113(b) may not cover the full range of theft offenses, it covers Bell’s conduct here. His conviction therefore was proper, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is
Affirmed.
Most Courts of Appeals have taken a broad reading of § 2113(b). See, e. g., United States v. Hinton, 703 P. 2d 672, 675-677 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, post, p. 1121; United States v. Shoels, 685 P. 2d 379, 381-383 (CA10 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-5550; United States v. Simmons, 679 F. 2d 1042, 1045-1049 (CA3 1982), cert. pending sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201; United States v. Guiffre, 576 F. 2d 126, 127-128 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 833 (1978); cf. United States v. Johnson, 575 F. 2d 678, 679-680 (CA8 1978) (dictum); but see United States v. Rogers, 289 F. 2d 433, 437-438 (CA4 1961) (dictum).
The historical development of common-law larceny and related crimes is discussed in detail in several treatises. See, e. g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 618-622 (1972); J. Hall, Theft, Law and Society 3-58 (2d ed. 1952).
The narrow concern of the 1934 Congress is illustrated in its rejection of a broad bill that would have gone well beyond bank robbery. The rejected bill, for example, explicitly would have covered taking property by false pretenses. S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., §2 (1934).
There are dicta in Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101 (1943), that suggest a narrow reading of § 2113(b), but our conclusion today is consistent with the Jerome holding. The only issue then before the Court was whether the Act’s burglary provision, now codified in § 2113(a), proscribed entering a bank to commit a state-law felony.