In some respects, this is a difficult case. Pre-emption cases in the labor law area are often difficult because we must decide the questions presented without any clear guidance from Congress. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 286, 289 (1971); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 240-242 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 488 (1953). We have developed standards to assist us in our task, see e. g., Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976); Garmon, supra, but those standards are by necessity general ones which may not provide as much assistance as we would like in particular cases. This is especially true when the case is an unusual one. We are not confronted here with a suit between an employer and a union, see e. g., Sears, *524Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978); Machinists, supra; Garmon, supra, or with one between a union and one of its members, see, e. g., Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); Lockridge, supra; Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963). Such suits are common and have provided the vehicles for developing the standards we have established in this area. Rather, we have here a suit brought by former employees of petitioner who allegedly were hired as permanent replacements for striking union members. Our prior cases, therefore, provide little guidance in this novel area.
Despite the conceded difficulty of this case, I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that neither respondents’ breach-of-contract claim nor their misrepresentation claim is preempted by federal law. See ante, at 512. In my view these claims go to the core of federal labor policy. If respondents are allowed to pursue their claims in state court, employers will be subject to potentially conflicting state and federal regulation of their activities; the efficient administration of the National Labor Relations Act will be threatened; and the structure of the economic weapons Congress has provided to parties to a labor dispute will be altered. In short, the purposes and policies of federal law will be frustrated. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I
In NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395 (1952), the Court stated that “[t]he National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and employers.” Id., at 401-402 (footnote omitted). This process of “ordering and adjusting” competing employer and employee interests has been aptly described as “the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace.” Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 104 (1962). An integral part of this process is the use of economic pressure by both employers and unions to achieve bargaining goals. As the Court stated in NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. *525477 (1960): “The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.” Id,., at 489.
A union’s most important economic weapon is the strike. “The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor’s arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms . . . .” NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, 181 (1967). A strike is protected activity under § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and the right to strike is expressly recognized in § 13, 29 U. S. C. § 163. See NLRB v. Fleet-wood Trailer Co., 389 U. S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 233 (1963); NLRB v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672-673 (1951). Moreover, §2(3) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(3), “preserves to strikers their unfilled positions and status as employees during the pend-ency of a strike.” Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 233. See also Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, at 378; NLRB v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333, 345 (1938). “This . . . solicitude for the right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.” Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 233-234.
Employers also have lawful economic weapons at their disposal. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278 (1965); American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87 (1957). Among these weapons is one of particular relevance to this case: the right to hire replacements for striking employees. See NLRB v. Mackay Co., supra, at 345-347.
A variety of rules have been developed regarding the use of economic weapons by employers and unions. As noted, if an employee decides to strike he does not lose his status as an employee. If he offers to return to work at the end of an economic strike, the employer must reinstate him. Fleet-*526wood Trailer Co., supra, at 378. A refusal by the employer to reinstate the employee constitutes an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (a)(3), unless the employer can show that his action is supported by “‘legitimate and substantial business justifications.’” Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, at 378, quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U. S. 26, 34 (1967).
One such justification arises within the context of an economic strike when “the jobs claimed by the strikers are occupied by workers hired as permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue operations.” Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, at 379. In NLRB v. Mackay Co., supra, the Court recognized that an employer may replace strildng employees in an effort to carry on his business. 304 U. S., at 345. The employees’ right to strike does not deprive the employer of his “right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers.” Ibid. If the employer replaces the strikers, “he is not bound to discharge [the replacements] upon the election of [the strikers] to resume their employment. . . .” Id., at 345-346. “[T]he employer’s interest [in continuing operations] must be deemed to outweigh the damage to concerted activities caused by permanently replacing strikers. . . .” Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 232. The burden of proving the existence of this justification, however, is on the employer. Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, at 378. In this regard, the employer must prove that the workers hired to replace the strikers have been hired as permanent employees. See, e. g., NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F. 2d 567, 572 (CA7 1980); NLRB v. Murray Products, Inc., 584 F. 2d 934, 938-939 (CA9 1978). In Mars Sales & Equipment Co., the Court of Appeals stated:
“The replacements must be permanent at the time of the discharge ... or the discharge and refusal to reinstate constitute an unfair labor practice. ... If an employer hires replacements without a commitment or under*527standing that the job is permanent and also discharges the strikers, the interest in protecting economic strikers by an entitlement to reinstatement is not overcome by a substantial business justification. The employer has not had to offer the jobs on a permanent basis as an inducement to continuing his operations. Hence, an economic striker whose job has not been permanently promised to a replacement at the time the striking employee is discharged is entitled to reinstatement.” 626 F. 2d, at 572-573.
See also International Assn. of M. & A. W., Dist. No. 8 v. J. L. Clark Co., 471 F. 2d 694, 696, 698 (CA7 1972). See generally H. & F. Binch Co. Plant of Native Laces, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 F. 2d 357 (CA2 1972); C. H. Guenther & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 427 F. 2d 983 (CA5 1970).
A different set of rules applies if employees have decided to strike in response to employer unfair labor practices. Under these circumstances, “the striking employees do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made.” Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 278 (1956) (footnote omitted). “Failure of the Board to enjoin [the employer’s] illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to strike against that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act.” Ibid. See Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, at 379, n. 5; NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., Inc., 594 F. 2d 223, 225 (CA9 1979).
These rules are the product of the “delicate task ... of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer’s conduct.” Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 229 (footnotes omitted). See also NLRB v. Truck Drivers, supra, at 96. The questions presented by this case cannot be addressed, or answered *528correctly, without due regard for the existence of these rules and the sensitivity of the process that produced them.
r-H HH
Respondents’ breach-of-contract claim is based on the allegation that petitioner breached its contracts with them by entering into a settlement agreement with the union that called for the gradual reinstatement of the strikers respondents had replaced. See App. 3a-5a. The strike involved in this case, however, arguably was converted into an unfair labor practice strike almost immediately after it started. See ante, at 494-495, 507-508. If the strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike, the striking employees were entitled to reinstatement irrespective of petitioner’s decision to hire permanent replacements. See NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F. 2d 1056, 1061 (CA10 1971); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F. 2d 720, 728-729 (CA6 1964). See also Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U. S., at 379, n. 5; Mastro Plastics Corp., supra, at 278; supra, at 527. Under these circumstances, federal law would have required petitioner to reinstate the striking employees and to discharge the replacements. In this light, it is clear that petitioner’s decision to breach its contracts with respondents was arguably required by federal law.
In Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 (1971), the Court stated that “[t]he constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field of law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority over the subject matter. ” Id., at 285-286. In this regard, “[i]t is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern.” Id., at 292. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), the Court stated that “[i]n determining the extent to which state regulation must yield to subordinating federal author*529ity, we have been concerned with delimiting areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration.” Id., at 241-242. The Court later noted that “[wjhen the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting.” Id., at 243 (footnote omitted).1 See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 178-179 (1967) (“[T]he broad powers conferred by Congress upon the National Labor Relations Board to interpret and to enforce the complex Labor Management Relations Act. . . necessarily imply that potentially conflicting ‘rules of law, of remedy, and of administration’ cannot be permitted to operate”).
*530In my view, these basic principles compel a conclusion that respondents’ breach-of-contract claim is pre-empted. The potential for conflicting regulation clearly exists in this case. Respondents’ breach-of-contract claim seeks to regulate activity that may well have been required by federal law. Petitioner may have to answer in damages for taking such an action. This sort of conflicting regulation is intolerable. As the Court stated in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra, if “the regulatory schemes, state and federal, conflict . . . pre-emption is clearly called for. . . .” 403 U. S., at 292.2
*531The Court recognizes that “had the strike been adjudicated an unfair labor practice strike, [petitioner] would have been required to reinstate the strikers . . . Ante, at 511. The Court concedes that the State “could not negate” this obligation, ibid., and states that the contracts at issue here could not be specifically enforced. Ante, at 511-512, n. 13. “To do so would be to deprive returning strikers of jobs committed to them by the national labor laws.” Ibid. In the Court’s view, however, “even had there been no settlement and the Board had ordered reinstatement of what it held to be unfair labor practice strikers, the suit for damages for breach of contract could still be maintained without in any way prejudicing the jurisdiction of the Board or the interest of the federal law in insuring the replacement of strikers.” Ante, at 512.3
Prohibiting specific enforcement, but permitting a damages award, does nothing to eliminate the conflict between state and federal law in this context. The Court fails to rec*532ognize that “regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 247. “The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.” Ibid. The force of these observations is apparent in this case. If an employer is confronted with potential liability for discharging workers he has hired to replace striking employees, he is likely to be much less willing to enter into a settlement agreement calling for the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges and for the reinstatement of strikers. Instead, he is much more likely to refuse to settle and to litigate the charges at issue while retaining the replacements.4 Such developments would frustrate the strong federal interest in ending strikes and in settling labor disputes.5 In addition, *533the National Labor Relations Board has suggested that any impediment to the settlement of unfair labor practice charges would have a serious adverse effect on the Board’s administration of the Act. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 13, n. 6.6 Finally, any obstacle to strike settlement agreements clearly affects adversely the interest of striking employees in returning to work, to say nothing of the public interest in ending labor strife. Consideration of these factors leads to the clear conclusion that respondents’ breach-of-contract claim must be pre-empted.7
*534Respondents’ misrepresentation claim stands on a somewhat different footing than their breach-of-contract claim. There is no sense in which it can be said that federal law required petitioner to misrepresent to respondents the terms on which they were hired. Permitting respondents to pursue their misrepresentation claim in state court, therefore, does not present the same potential for directly conflicting regulation of employer activity as permitting respondents to pursue their breach-of-contract claim. Nor can it be said that petitioner’s alleged misrepresentation was “arguably protected” under Garmon. While it is arguable that petitioner’s alleged offers of permanent employment were prohibited by the Act and therefore pre-empted under Garmon, see n. 1, supra, careful analysis yields the conclusion that this is not a sufficient ground for pre-empting respondents’ misrepresentation claim.8 In my view, however, respondents’ misrepresentation claim is pre-empted under the analysis articulated principally in Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976).
The pre-emption doctrine described in Machinists finds its roots in Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485 (1953), and in *535Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252 (1964). During the course of considering a pre-emption question in Garner, the Court stated: “For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.” 346 U. S., at 500. In Morton, the Court considered whether a state court should be permitted to award damages under state law for injuries caused by union conduct that was assumed to be neither protected nor prohibited by federal law. 377 U. S., at 258. The Court stated that the answer to this question “ultimately depends upon whether the application of state law in this kind of case would operate to frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation.” Ibid. The Court held that it would. Id., at 260. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the self-help weapon at issue “formed an integral part of [the union’s] effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations with [the employer].” Id., at 259. Permitting the use of this weapon was “part of the balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the community.” Ibid. The Court concluded: “If the [state] law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe . . . , the inevitable result would be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.” Id., at 259-260.
Machinists relied on Garner and Morton in expressly articulating a branch of labor law pre-emption analysis distinct from the Garmon line of cases. The Court in Machinists described this branch as “focusing upon the crucial inquiry whether Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play *536of economic forces.’” 427 U. S., at 140 (citation omitted). While earlier cases had addressed this question within the context of union and employee activities, see id., at 147, the Court noted that “self-help is . . . also the prerogative of the employer because he, too, may properly employ economic weapons Congress meant to be unregulable.” Ibid. The Court stated: “Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether ‘the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes.’” Id., at 147-148 (citation omitted).9
As noted, see supra, at 525, employers have the right to hire replacements for striking employees. This is an economic weapon that the employer may use to combat pressure brought to bear by the union. Permitting the use of this weapon is part of the balance struck by the Act between labor and management. There is no doubt that respondents’ misrepresentation claim, involving as it does the potential for substantial employer liability, burdens an employer’s right to resort to this weapon. This is especially apparent when one considers the fact that the character of a strike is often unclear. A strike that starts as an economic strike, during which an employer is entitled to hire permanent replacements that he need not discharge to make way for returning strikers, may be converted into an unfair labor practice strike, in which case the employer loses his right to hire per*537manent replacements subsequent to the date of the conversion. See NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F. 2d 223, 225 (CA9 1979); NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F. 2d 1056, 1061 (CA10 1971); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F. 2d 720, 728-729 (CA6 1964). See also ante, at 507-508; supra, at 527.10 Moreover, in order to preserve his right to retain the replacements and to refuse to reinstate returning strikers, the employer must establish that the replacements have been hired on a permanent basis in order to continue his business operations. See supra, at 526-527. Only under these circumstances can the strikers’ right to reinstatement be overcome, and the consequent burden on the right to strike be justified.11
In order to avoid misrepresentation claims, an employer might decide not to hire replacements on a permanent basis or to hire permanent replacements only in cases in which it is absolutely clear that the strike is an economic one. Either of these developments would mean that employers were being inhibited by state law from making full use of an economic weapon available to them under federal law. Moreover, if an employer decided not to hire replacements on a permanent basis, his ability to hire replacements might be affected adversely. An employer also might decide to disclose to prospective replacements the possibility, even if it is remote, that the strike might be determined to have been an unfair labor practice strike and that he might be ordered to reinstate the strikers and to discharge the replacements. This course of action, however, might limit an employer’s ability to hire replacements, and it might have the further effect of *538rendering the replacements temporary under federal law, in which case the strikers would be entitled to reinstatement regardless of the nature of the strike. See supra, at 526-527.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that permitting respondents to pursue their misrepresentation claim in state court would limit and substantially burden an employer’s resort to an economic weapon available to him under federal law. This would have the inevitable effect of distorting the delicate balance struck by the Act between the rights of labor and management in labor disputes. For these reasons, respondents’ misrepresentation claim must be pre-empted.12
The Court rejects the argument that the prospect of misrepresentation claims being filed in state court will burden an employer’s right to hire permanent replacements for employees engaged in an economic strike. The Court suggests that employers may avoid liability for misrepresentation by conditioning their offers of employment to replacements. In the Court’s view, a requirement that employers condition their offers of employment will not have an adverse effect on an employer’s ability to hire permanent replacements because under a system in which an employer is not liable for misrepresentation or breach of contract his offers are, as a matter of law, conditional. Honest employers would not make promises that they know they are not obligated to keep and, in any event, replacements would know that the offers were, in some respects, nonpermanent. See ante, at 502. Putting aside the validity of these observations, the Court’s analysis creates another problem: a requirement that employers condition their offers to replacements might render the replacements nonpermanent under federal law and result in employ*539ers being required to reinstate returning strikers regardless of the nature of the strike. The Court acknowledges this problem, and in order to resolve it, changes the law of permanency. See ante, at 501-504. The Court states:
“An employment contract with a replacement promising permanent employment, subject only to settlement with its employees’ union and to a Board unfair labor practice order directing reinstatement of strikers, would not in itself render the replacement a temporary employee subject to displacement by a striker over the employer’s objection during or at the end of what is proved to be a purely economic strike. The Board suggests that such a conditional offer ‘might’ render the replacements only temporary hires that the employer would be required to discharge at the conclusion of a purely economic strike. . . . But the permanent-hiring requirement is designed to protect the strikers, who retain their employee status and are entitled to reinstatement unless they have been permanently replaced. . . . [T]he protection is of great moment if the employer is not found guilty of unfair practices, does not settle with the union, or settles without a promise to reinstate. In that eventuality, the employer, although it has prevailed in the strike, may refuse reinstatement only if it has hired replacements on a permanent basis. If it has promised to keep the replacements on in such a situation, discharging them to make way for selected strikers whom it deems more experienced or more efficient would breach its contract with the replacements. Those contracts, it seems to us, create a sufficiently permanent agreement to permit the prevailing employer to abide by its promises.” Ante, at 503-504 (footnote omitted).
The fact that the Court feels compelled to announce a new standard of “permanency” under federal law highlights the need to pre-empt respondents’ misrepresentation claim in *540this case. The Court is in effect adjusting the balance of power struck by the Act between labor and management. The right to strike is so central to the Act that an employer can refuse to reinstate returning economic strikers only if he can show a legitimate and substantial business justification for the refusal. One such justification is the need to offer permanent employment to replacements in order to continue his business operations. See Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U. S., at 378-379; supra, at 526. If the employer has not had to offer employment to replacements on a permanent basis then there is no justification for refusing to reinstate the strikers. See NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F. 2d, at 572-573; supra, at 526-527. The Court’s change in the law of permanency weakens the rights of strikers and undermines the protection afforded those rights by the Act.13 *541Such adjustments in the balance of power between labor and management are for Congress, not this Court.14
The real problem in this case, and another factor that supports pre-emption, is that the words “permanent replace*542ment” have a special meaning within the context of federal labor law. This is not surprising since the words arise in a context that is at the core of federal labor law: the use of economic weapons to achieve legitimate bargaining objectives. Workers hired to replace striking employees on a permanent basis are nonpermanent to the extent that a strike may be determined to have been an unfair labor practice strike and that an employer may be ordered to reinstate strikers. They are also nonpermanent to the extent that a union may “win” a strike and force an employer to agree to a settlement that requires the reinstatement of striking employees. But such workers are “permanent” under other circumstances. There may be situations in which it is reasonably clear that a strike is an economic one and that an employer has a right to hire permanent replacements and to retain them even when the strike has ended. The employer also may be likely to “win” the strike and to find no need to settle with the union. Under these circumstances, a prudent employer still might find it necessary to condition his offers of employment to replacements in order to avoid even a remote possibility that he will be faced with potential liability for misrepresentation.15 *543This would burden his right to hire permanent replacements. Moreover, changing the law of permanency to accommodate this development compromises the rights of strikers, which are a crucial part of the federal scheme.
I share the Court’s concern over the plight of workers hired to replace striking employees. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, however, strikes are, to some extent, “war.” See ante, at 500. As Judge Learned Hand stated more than 40 years ago in a case involving the reinstatement of strikers:
“It is of course true that the consequences are harsh to those who have taken the strikers’ places; strikes are always harsh; it might have been better to forbid them in quarrels over union recognition. But with that we have nothing to do; as between those who have used a lawful weapon and those whose protection will limit its use, the second must yield; and indeed, it is probably true today that most men taking jobs so made vacant, realize from the outset how tenuous is their hold.” NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 871 (CA2 1938).
It might be a better world if strike replacements were afforded greater protection. But if accomplishing this end requires an alteration of the balance of power between labor and management or an erosion of the right to strike, this Court should not pursue it.16 This Court’s notions of what would constitute a more “fair” system are irrelevant to determining whether certain state-law claims must be pre-empted because they interfere with the system of labor-management relations established by Congress.
*544I-H <1
Permitting respondents to pursue their breach-of-contract and misrepresentation claims in state court will subject employers to potentially conflicting state and federal regulation of their activities; interfere with the orderly administration of the National Labor Relations Act; and alter the balance of power between labor and management struck by Congress. For these reasons, the claims should be pre-empted, and the judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, therefore, should be reversed.
The Court went on to state, however, that considerations of federalism have “required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act . . . [o]r where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to Act.” 359 U. S., at 243-244 (footnote omitted).
The Court established the following standard:
“When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes.” Id., at 244 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 245 (“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted”).
The “arguably required” activity at issue in this case is not covered explicitly by Garmon’s “arguably protected, arguably prohibited” standard. See 359 U. S., at 244-245; n. 1, supra. Garmon focused on the need to protect the Board’s primary jurisdiction in order to avoid, among other things, conflicting interpretations of federal law. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 138-139 (1976). But the pre-emption of state-law claims based on activity arguably required by federal law must be seen as implicit in, and as flowing logically from, Garmon. If there is a need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the Board to avoid conflicting interpretations of federal law, then certainly there is an even greater need to pre-empt conflicting state regulation of activity that an employer might be required to pursue by the Board. The need to pre-empt conflicting state regulation of arguably required activity follows a fortiori from the arguably protected branch of Garmon.
I do not share the Court’s apparent belief that the character of any given strike can be predicted with anything approaching certainty. See ante, at 508-509, n. 12. As the Board points out: “Whether a particular strike is an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike ... is often unclear until the strike has ended. Where the character of a strike is contested, as it frequently is, the issue must be resolved in an unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board.” Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 12. See also id., at 12, n. 5. As noted, supra, at 528-529, the relevant concern is with “potential” conflict. See, e. g., Garmon, 359 U. S., at 242. In Garmon, the Court stated:
“The nature of the judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into the special problems of labor-management relations involved in a particular set of occurrences in order to ascertain the precise nature and degree of federal-state conflict there involved, and more particularly what exact mischief *531sueh a conflict would cause. Nor is it our business to attempt this. Such determinations inevitably depend upon judgments on the impact of these particular conflicts on the entire scheme of federal labor policy and administration. Our task is confined to dealing with classes of situations. To the National Labor Relations Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely limited demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and administration.” Ibid.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court also appears to rely on language in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350 (1940), to the effect that a Board order prohibiting an employer from taking advantage of contracts procured in violation of the National Labor Relations Act did not foreclose employees “from taking any action to secure an adjudication upon the contracts. . . .” Id., at 365. See ante, at 511-512, n. 13.
National Licorice Co. addressed the validity under federal law of contracts obtained by the employer through negotiations with an employee organization dominated by the employer. See 309 U. S., at 359-361. The case also addressed the scope of the Board’s remedial powers. Id., at 361-367. The Court in National Licorice Co. did not consider whether suits that might be brought by the employees in state court would be preempted by federal law.
I do not share the Court’s apparent view, see ante, at 508-509, n. 12, that the outcome of all unfair labor practice proceedings can be predicted with any confidence. See, e. g., Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 5. In any event, the important point is that the threat of potential liability to replacements is likely to deter an employer from settling in any case in which the unfair labor practice charges provide him with the chance to present a strong, or perhaps even a colorable, defense.
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that strike settlement negotiations are part of the collective-bargaining process. As the Court stated in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), “[s]tate law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of [the collective-bargaining] process . .. strikes at the very core of federal labor policy.” Id., at 104.
Moreover, it is a legitimate bargaining demand for a union to seek reinstatement of strikers in preference to replacements. See Portland Stereo-typers’ Union No. 48, 137 N. L. R. B. 782, 786 (1962).
We recognized the importance of strike settlement agreements in Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U. S. 17 (1962), when we noted that the settlement agreement involved in that case was “an agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them.” Id., at 28. The Court went on to state: “[The agreement] came into being as a means satisfactory to both sides for terminating a protracted strike and labor dispute. Its terms affect the *533working conditions of the employees of both respondents. It effected the end of picketing and resort by the labor organizations to other economic weapons, and restored strikers to their jobs. It resolved a controversy arising out of, and importantly and directly affecting, the employment relationship.” Ibid.
Strike settlement agreements are enforceable under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). As we stated in Lion Dry Goods, “[i]f this kind of strike settlement were not enforceable under § 301(a), responsible and stable labor relations would suffer, and the attainment of the labor policy objective of minimizing disruption of interstate commerce would be made more difficult.” 369 U. S., at 27.
The Board states: “Over 82% of Board unfair labor practice complaints are resolved through settlement. Since the Board issues nearly 8,000 complaints a year, its regulatory mission would be frustrated by any impediments to settlements.” Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 13, n. 6.
Even assuming that such analysis is necessary, this claim clearly does not fall within the exceptions to the pre-emption doctrine described in Garmon. See n. 1, supra. The claim at issue here hardly can be said to relate to activity that is “a merely peripheral concern of the . . . Act.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 243. Moreover, the conduct at issue here does not touch “interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.” Id., at 244 (footnote omitted). In this regard, this case is readily distinguishable from cases like Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977), and Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966). The breach-of-contract claim is not based on “ ‘intimidation and threats of violence’ affectpng] such compelling state interests as to permit the exercise of state jurisdiction.” Linn, 383 U. S., at 62. Nor does the claim involve malicious libel, see ibid., or the *534intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from conduct “so outrageous that ‘no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ ” Farmer, supra, at 302.
If this strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike almost immediately after it started, see ante, at 494-495, 507-508; supra, at 528, petitioner’s offers of permanent employment to replacements may have constituted additional unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1). See NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F. 2d 1338, 1341 (CA5 1980); ante, at 508. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978), suggests, however, that this is not a sufficient ground for pre-emption under the “arguably prohibited” branch of Garmon. Unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board based on this arguably prohibited conduct would not be identical to the state-court action involving respondents’ misrepresentation claim. See 436 U. S., at 196-197.
See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337, 1339 (1972) (“[T]he need for preserving the balance of power established by Congress in labor-management relations against disturbance by the application of state laws or decisions making a different accommodation furnishes compelling reason for federal preemption in the areas predominantly involving employee self-organization, collective bargaining, or the use of economic power to secure organizational or bargaining objectives, regardless of whether the alleged misconduct is ‘arguably protected or prohibited’ ”).
As noted, supra, at 528, the strike in this case arguably was converted into an unfair labor practice strike almost immediately after it started. See ante, at 494-495, 507-508.
More than likely, it was the need to carry this burden that caused petitioner to have respondents sign the statements involved in this case. See ante, at 494-495.
It is also true that the prospect of facing misrepresentation claims would make an employer less likely to enter into an agreement settling a strike for the same reasons that were discussed with respect to the breach-of-contract claim. See supra, at 528-533. This would also undermine the policies of the Act and affect adversely its administration. See supra, at 532-533. and nn. 4. 5. and 6.
The Court suggests that the conditional nature of an offer and promise of permanent employment “does not render the hiring any less permanent if the conditions do not come to pass.” Ante, at 504, n. 8. The Court goes on to state: “All hirings are to some extent conditional. As the Board recognizes, . . . although respondents were hired on a permanent basis, they were subject to discharge in the event of a business slowdown.” Ibid. There is a difference, however, between conditions that turn on the performance of the employee, or on the state of the economy, and conditions that depend on the sole discretion of the employer. In the latter case, the condition renders the initial promise of “permanence” wholly illusory.
The Court further suggests:
“Had [petitioner] not settled and no unfair practices had been filed, surely it would have been free to retain respondents and obligated to do so by the terms of its promises to them. The result should be the same if [petitioner] had promised to retain them if it did not settle with the union and if it were not ordered to reinstate strikers.” Ibid.
If petitioner had not settled in this case and the strike was later adjudicated to have been an economic one, petitioner might have been free to retain respondents and to refuse to reinstate the strikers. The record suggests that petitioner hired respondents on a permanent basis in order to continue business operations. See ante, at 494-495. It is difficult to imagine, however, how a conditional offer like the one described by the Court could be construed as an offer of permanent employment. Under the terms of the Court’s conditional offer, the employer is simply saying that he will *541retain the replacements unless he decides, or is ordered, to reinstate the strikers. As the Court notes, ante, at 501, the Board requires an employer to “show that the men [and women] who replaced the strikers were regarded by themselves and the [employer] as having received their jobs on a permanent basis.” Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 165 N. L. R. B. 514, 516 (1967), aff’d sub nom. Truck Drivers and Helpers Local No. 728 v. NLRB, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 195, 403 F. 2d 921 (1968). See also Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 N. L. R. B. 214, 220 (1974), enf’d, 514 F. 2d 995 (CA6 1975) (“While an employer may hire permanent replacements during the course of the strike in order to protect and continue his business, and need not discharge those permanent replacements in order to create vacancies for economic (as distinct from unfair labor practice) strikers who wish to return to work, . . . the employer’s hiring offer must include a commitment that the replacement position is permanent and not merely a temporary expedient subject to cancellation if the employer so chooses”). It seems clear that the conditional offer endorsed by the Court could not reasonably be construed to give rise to an understanding that the replacements had received their jobs on a permanent basis. This is why the result should not be “the same if [petitioner] had promised to retain [respondents] if it did not settle with the union and if it were not ordered to reinstate strikers.” Ante, at 504, n. 8.
As the Court of Appeals stated in Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F. 2d 99 (CA7 1969): “The justification for not discharging replacements in order to reinstate strikers, found in Mackay and mentioned in Fleetwood, is the need of the employer to assure permanent employment to the replacements so that the necessary labor force can be obtained to maintain operations during a strike.” Id., at 105. “If an employer hires replacements without a commitment or understanding that the job is permanent and also discharges the strikers, the interest in protecting economic strikers by an entitlement to reinstatement is not overcome by a substantial business justification. The employer has not had to offer the jobs on a permanent basis as an inducement to continuing his operations.” NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F. 2d 567, 573 (CA71980). See also Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 10. The Court’s rule might help to shield employers from misrepresentation or breach-of-contract claims, see ante, at 505-506, n. 9, but it will undermine the right to strike.
As additional support for its conclusion, the Court appears to rely on J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 332 (1944), for the proposition that “in*542dividual contracts of employment must give way to otherwise valid provisions of the collective-bargaining contract, . . . but. . . the Board ‘has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such contracts except as to their effect on matters within its jurisdiction.’” Ante, at 506, quoting 321 U. S., at 340. “[T]he discontinuance of . . . individual contracts [is] ‘without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee may have acquired under such contract or to any defenses thereto by the employer.’” Ante, at 506, quoting 321 U. S., at 342 (emphasis in original). It is important to note that the individual contracts in J. I. Case Co. were not tainted by any unfair labor practice, arguable or otherwise. See id., at 333. In any event, the Court in J. I. Case Co. did not consider whether suits based on the individual contracts that might be brought by employees in state court would be pre-empted by federal law. See also n. 3, supra.
In its amicus brief, the Board suggests that under the broad misrepresentation theory involved in this case, see Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 15, n. 7, an employer still might be vulnerable to a fraud suit even if he refuses to enter into a settlement agreement and litigates the character *543of the strike. Id., at 16, n. 9. “If it were ultimately determined that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike and reinstatement of the strikers is required, the replacements could still maintain that the employer fraudulently induced job applicants to accept employment knowing that there was a possibility that reinstatement of the strikers might be ordered.” Ibid.
The Board suggests that respondents might have an action against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Id., at 21, n. 11. There is no need to reach this question in this case.