dissenting.
I find the Court’s decision to vacate the stay of execution in this case simply incomprehensible. The stay was granted early this morning, at 12:05, by Judge James Dickson Phillips of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Phillips correctly decided that a stay was necessary in order to preserve a substantial issue raised by the condemned prisoner, James Hutchins. That issue — whether the exclusion for cause of potential jurors unequivocally opposed to the death penalty resulted in a biased jury during the guilt phase of the trial proceedings against Hutchins — is currently the subject of a conflict between judges of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina and remains undecided by this Court.
As the Court recognizes, Judge Phillips had jurisdiction over this case.* Late yesterday, Hutchins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an application for a stay of execution in the court of District Judge Woodrow W. Jones. Chief Judge Jones, however, acted only to deny the application, leaving in limbo Hutchins’ petition for habeas corpus. After taking this action, Chief Judge Jones apparently went home. As a result, when Hutchins approached Judge Phillips for relief, Judge Phillips was faced with an application to stay the execution scheduled to take place within a matter of hours, appended to which was a copy of Hutchins’ petition for habeas corpus that had been left undecided by the District Court.
*382Judge Phillips, knowing that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was then pending in the District Court, and would not be decided before Hutchins’ execution, correctly issued the stay to preserve the issue noted above. As Justice White and Justice Stevens note, the stay was properly issued to allow the District Court to act on the habeas petition. In addition, under 28 U. S. C. §2241, it was appropriate for Judge Phillips to treat the papers filed with him as an independent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, refer that petition to the District Court, and grant a stay under 28 U. S. C. §2251 pending decision by the District Court. See also All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651.
Despite its holding that Judge Phillips had jurisdiction to issue the stay, the Court has inexplicably concluded that Judge Phillips improperly exercised that jurisdiction. A stay issued by a lower court, however, should be vacated only upon a showing that issuance of the stay was an abuse of discretion. Far from being an abuse of discretion, the action of Judge Phillips was eminently reasonable and correct. Not only is there at least one other federal judge in Judge Phillips’ own Circuit who has ruled favorably on the merits of this question, see Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (WDNC 1984), and at least one District Court in Arkansas that has reached a similar conclusion, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1278 (ED Ark. 1983), appeal pending, No. 83-2113 (CA8, filed Aug. 8, 1983), but also this Court itself has recognized the potential validity of the claim. See, e. g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 516-518 (1968); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 545, and nn. 5, 6 (1968). See also Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
Finally, the State argues that Hutchins should pursue state-court remedies in light of yesterday’s Keeten decision. While this obviously is not the basis of the Court’s vacation of the stay, this in any event is a literal impossibility given the 6 p.m. *383deadline for execution. Indeed, in light of the constraints imposed on our deliberations by that deadline, the most disturbing aspect of the Court’s decision is its indefensible — and unexplained — rush to judgment. When a life is at stake, the process that produces this result is surely insensitive, if not ghoulish.
I dissent.
As Justice Marshall points out, the Court’s zealous efforts to reimpose Hutchins’ execution at the last minute may therefore be futile. North Carolina’s death penalty statute requires that a new date of execution be set once a stay of execution, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, is terminated. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15-194 (1983). As we have noted, the Court holds that Judge Phillips had jurisdiction to issue his stay. It thus appears that the North Carolina statute is applicable and will require that Hutchins’ execution be postponed.