delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, respondent Murphy, who was on probation, made incriminating admissions during a meeting with his probation officer. The issue before us is whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction into evidence of the admissions in Murphy’s subsequent criminal prosecution.
I
In 1974, Marshall Murphy was twice questioned by Minneapolis police concerning the rape and murder of a teenage girl. No charges were-then brought. In 1980, in connection with a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct arising out of an unrelated incident, Murphy pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of false imprisonment. He was sentenced to a prison term of 16 months, which was suspended, and three years’ probation. The terms of Murphy’s probation required, among other things, that he participate in a treatment program for sexual offenders at Alpha House, report to his probation officer as directed, and be truthful with the probation officer “in all matters.” Failure to comply with these conditions, Murphy was informed, could result in his return to the sentencing court for a probation revocation hearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-38 — C-35.
Murphy met with his probation officer at her office approximately once a month, and his probation continued without incident until July 1981, when the officer learned that he had abandoned the treatment program. The probation offi*423cer then wrote to Murphy and informed him that failure to set up a meeting would “result in an immediate request for a warrant.” Id., at C-35. At a meeting in late July, the officer agreed not to seek revocation of probation for nonpartici-pation in the treatment program since Murphy was employed and doing well in other areas.
In September 1981, an Alpha House counselor informed the probation officer that, during the course of treatment, Murphy had admitted to a rape and murder in 1974. After discussions with her superior, the officer determined that the police should have this information.1 She then wrote to Murphy and asked him to contact her to discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of his probationary period.2 Although she did not contact the police before the meeting, the probation officer knew in advance that she would report any incriminating statements.
Upon receipt of the letter, Murphy arranged to meet with his probation officer in her office on September 28, 1981. The officer opened the meeting by telling Murphy about the information she had received from the Alpha House counselor *424and expressing her belief that this information evinced his continued need for treatment. Murphy became angry about what he considered to be a breach of his confidences and stated that he “felt like calling a lawyer.”3 The probation officer replied that Murphy would have to deal with that problem outside the office; for the moment, their primary concern was the relationship between the crimes that Murphy had admitted to the Alpha House counselor and the incident that led to his conviction for false imprisonment.
During the course of the meeting, Murphy denied the false imprisonment charge, admitted that he had committed the rape and murder, and attempted to persuade the probation officer that further treatment was unnecessary because several extenuating circumstances explained the prior crimes. At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer told Murphy that she had a duty to relay the information to the authorities and encouraged him to turn himself in. Murphy then left the office. Two days later, Murphy called his probation officer and told her that he had been advised by counsel not to surrender himself to the police. The officer then procured the issuance of an arrest and detention order from the judge who had sentenced Murphy on the false imprisonment charge. *425On October 29, 1981, a state grand jury returned an indictment charging Murphy with first-degree murder.
Murphy sought to suppress testimony concerning his confession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that he was not “in custody” at the time of the statement and that the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary despite the absence of warnings similar to those required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed on federal constitutional grounds. 324 N. W. 2d 340 (1982). Although recognizing that the Fifth Amendment privilege generally is not self-executing, it concluded that, notwithstanding the lack of custody in the usual sense, Murphy’s failure to claim the privilege when he was questioned was not fatal to his claim “[bjecause of the compulsory nature of the meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond truthfully to his agent’s questions, and because the agent had substantial reason to believe that [Murphy’s] answers were likely to be incriminating.” Id., at 344. In the court’s view, “the agent should have warned [Murphy] of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination before she questioned him and . . . her failure to do so, when she had already decided to report his answers to the police, bars use of [Murphy’s] confession at this trial.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and federal courts concerning whether a statement made by a probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 459 U. S. 1145 (1983).4 We now reverse.
*426I — l 1 — I
The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to fee a witness against himself.” It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also “privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973). In all such proceedings,
“a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.” Id., at 78 (citations omitted).
A defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he has been convicted. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 316 (1976). The issue in this case is whether the Fifth Amendment right that Murphy enjoyed would be violated by the admission into evidence at his trial for another crime of the prior statements made by him to his probation officer.
*427A
We note first that the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert Murphy’s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones. In that respect, Murphy was in no better position than the ordinary witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination. The answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege. This much is reasonably clear from our cases.
As this Court has long acknowledged:
“The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.” United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 427 (1943) (footnote omitted).
This principle has been applied in cases involving a variety of criminal and noncriminal investigations. See, e. g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 370-371 (1951); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 112-113 (1927). These cases, taken together, “stand for the proposition that, in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.” Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 654 (1976) (footnote omitted). Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were once said to have “waived” it, but we have recently abandoned this “vague term,” Green v. United States, *428355 U. S. 184, 191 (1957), and “made clear that an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Garner v. United States, supra, at 654, n. 9.
Although we have sometimes suggested in dicta that the usual rule might give way in situations where the government has “substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating,” Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552, 559 (1980), we have never adopted the view that a witness must “put the Government on notice by formally availing himself of the privilege” only when he alone “is reasonably aware of the incriminating tendency of the questions.” Id., at 562, n.* (Brennan, J., concurring). It has long been recognized that “[t]he Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative questions,” United States v. Monia, supra, at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and nothing in our prior cases suggests that the incriminating nature of a question, by itself, excuses a timely assertion of the privilege. See, e. g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a witness — even one under a general compulsion to testify — answers a question that both he and the government should reasonably expect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only whether the particular disclosure was “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. Kordel, supra, perhaps the first case squarely to hold that a witness under compulsion to make disclosures must assert the privilege in a timely manner, is illustrative. In answering interrogatories submitted by the Government in a civil case against a corporation, a corporate officer who had been notified of contemplated criminal action against him supplied evidence and leads helpful in securing his indictment and conviction. Although the relationship between the civil and criminal actions was clear and “[w]ithout question [the officer] could have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege,” id., at 7, he did not do so. The Court concluded without hesitation that “[h]is failure at any time to *429assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to complain now that he was compelled to give testimony against himself.” Id., at 10 (footnote omitted).
B
Thus it is that a witness confronted with questions that the government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to incriminate himself. If he asserts the privilege, he “may not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will incriminate him, at least without at that time being assured that neither it nor its fruits may be used against him” in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 473 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result) (emphasis in original). But if he chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty as the result of his decision to do so. As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized, application of this general rule is inappropriate in certain well-defined situations. In each of those situations, however, some identifiable factor “was held to deny the individual a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’” Garner v. United States, supra, at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941)). Because we conclude that no such factor was present here, we hold that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in excluding the probation officer’s testimony.
1
A well-known exception to the general rule addresses the problem of confessions obtained from suspects in police custody.5 Not only is custodial interrogation ordinarily con*430ducted by officers who are “acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought,” Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, but also the custodial setting is thought to contain “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 246-247 (1973). To dissipate “the overbearing compulsion . . . caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody,” United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the consequences of his failure to assert it. 384 U. S., at 467-469, 475-477. We have consistently held, however, that this extraordinary safeguard “does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.” Roberts v. United States, supra, at 560.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Murphy was not “in custody” when he made his incriminating admissions. He was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive conditions governing various aspects of his life, and he would be regarded as “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas corpus. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 241-243 (1963). But custody in that context has been defined broadly to effectuate the purposes of the writ, id., at 243; Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345, 349-351 (1973), and custody for Miranda purposes has been more narrowly circumscribed. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). Under the narrower standard appropriate in the Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy was not “in custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since there was no “ ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Cali*431fornia v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, at 495).
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the probation officer’s failure to inform Murphy of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial. Four factors have been advanced in support of this conclusion, but we find them, alone or in combination, insufficient to excuse Murphy’s failure to claim the privilege in a timely manner.
First, the probation officer could compel Murphy’s attendance and truthful answers. The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to explain how this transformed a routine interview into an inherently coercive setting. In our view, this factor subjected Murphy to less intimidating pressure than is imposed on grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the truth and placed in a setting conducive to truthtelling. Although warnings in both contexts might serve to dissipate “any possible coercion or unfairness resulting from a witness’ misimpression that he must answer truthfully even questions with incriminating] aspects,” United States v. Washington, 431 U. S., at 188, we have never held that they must be given to grand jury witnesses, id., at 186, and we decline to require them here since the totality of the circumstances is not such as to overbear a probationer’s free will. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 544 (1961).
Second, the probation officer consciously sought incriminating evidence. We have already explained that this factor does not give rise to a self-executing privilege, supra, at 428, and we pause here only to emphasize that police officers questioning persons suspected of crimes often consciously seek incriminating statements. The mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), and the probation officer’s knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case.
*432Third, Murphy did not expect questions about prior criminal conduct and could not seek counsel before attending the meeting. But the nature of probation is such that probationers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past criminality. Moreover, the probation officer’s letter, which suggested a need to discuss treatment from which Murphy had already been excused, would have led a reasonable probationer to conclude that new information had come to her attention. In any event, Murphy’s situation was in this regard indistinguishable from that facing suspects who are questioned in noncustodial settings and grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an investigation or that they are considered potential defendants. See United States v. Washington, supra, at 188-189; Beckwith v. United States, supra, at 346-348.
Fourth, there were no observers to guard against abuse or trickery. Again, this often will be true when a suspect is subjected to noncustodial interrogation, where no warnings are required. Murphy does not allege that the probation officer was not legitimately concerned with the need for further treatment, and we cannot conclude that her actions would have led a reasonable probationer to believe that his statements to her would remain confidential. A probationer cannot pretend ignorance of the fact that his probation officer “is a peace officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with his fellow peace officers.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 720 (1979). See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 447 (1982). Absent some express or implied promise to the contrary, he may also be charged with knowledge that “the probation officer is duty bound to report wrongdoing by the [probationer] when it comes to his attention, even if by communication from the [probationer] himself.” Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 720. The fact that Murphy apparently expressed no surprise on being informed that his statements would be made available to the police, moreover, strongly suggests that he was not misled by any expectation that his statements would remain confidential. *433See App. to Pet. for Cert. C-21 (testimony of Mara Widseth); id., at C-28 (testimony of Marshall Murphy).
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and probation interviews reveals the inaptness of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analogy to Miranda. Custodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers’ will and to confess. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 456-457. It is unlikely that a probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time, would give rise to a similar impression. Moreover, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into “an unfamiliar atmosphere” or “an interrogation environment . . . created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.” Id., at 457. Many of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. Murphy’s regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege. Finally, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure from an interrogator’s insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained. Id., at 468. Since Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.6
*434We conclude, therefore, that Murphy cannot claim the benefit of the first exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing.
2
The general rule that the privilege must be claimed when self-incrimination is threatened has also been deemed inapplicable in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to “foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and . . . compe[l] . . . incriminating testimony.” Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 661. Because revocation of his probation was threatened if he was untruthful with his probation officer, Murphy argues that he was compelled to make incriminating disclosures instead of claiming the privilege. Although this contention is not without force, we find it unpersuasive on close examination.
In each of the so-called “penalty” cases, the State not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions “capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 806 (1977). In most of the cases, the attempt to override the witnesses’ privilege proved unsuccessful, and the Court ruled that the State could not constitutionally make good on its prior threat. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S., at 79-84; Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 283-284 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278-279 (1968). These cases make clear that “a State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, supra, at 805. Occasionally, however, an individual succumbed to the pressure placed upon him, failed to assert the privilege, and disclosed incriminating information, which the State later sought to use against him in a criminal prosecution. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), was such a case, and the Court *435held that an individual threatened with discharge from employment for exercising the privilege had not waived it by responding to questions rather than standing on his right to remain silent. Id., at 498-499.
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege distinguishes cases of this sort from the ordinary case in which a witness is merely required to appear and give testimony. A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.7
*436Even so we must inquire whether Murphy’s probation conditions merely required him to appear and give testimony about matters relevant to his probationary status or whether they went further and required him to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent. Because we conclude that Minnesota did not attempt to take the extra, impermissible step, we hold that Murphy’s Fifth Amendment privilege was not self-executing.
As we have already indicated, Murphy was informed that he was required to be truthful with his probation officer in all matters and that failure to do so could result in revocation of probation. The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court made clear that this was indeed the case, but its conclusion that the probation officer’s failure to give Murphy adequate warnings barred the use of his incriminating statements in the criminal trial did not rest on the ground that a refusal to furnish incriminating information would have justified revocation of probation. Although the court recognized that imposing a penalty for a valid exercise of the Fifth Amendment *437privilege could impermissibly foreclose a free choice to remain silent, 324 N. W. 2d, at 342-343, it did not purport to find that Minnesota’s probation revocation statute had such an effect. The court relied instead on the fact that Murphy was under legal compulsion to attend the meeting and to answer truthfully the questions of a probation officer who anticipated incriminating answers. Id., at 344. Such compulsion, however, is indistinguishable from that felt by any witness who is required to appear and give testimony, and, as we have already made clear, it is insufficient to excuse Murphy’s failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner.
The state court did not attempt to define the precise contours of Murphy’s obligation to respond to questions. On its face, Murphy’s probation condition proscribed only false statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution. “At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the [Fifth Amendment].” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 439 (1974). Yet Murphy, although he had a right to do so, see State v. Austin, 295 N. W. 2d 246 (Minn. 1980), did not seek clarification of the condition. Without the benefit of an authoritative state-court construction of the condition, we are hesitant to read into the truthfulness requirement an additional obligation that Murphy refi'ain from raising legitimate objections to furnishing information that might lead to his conviction for another crime.
Whether we employ a subjective or an objective test, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. There is no direct evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent. Unlike the police officers in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 *438(1967), Murphy was not expressly informed during the crucial meeting with his probation officer that an assertion of the privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty. And the fact that Murphy apparently felt no compunction about adamantly denying the false imprisonment charge on which he had been convicted before admitting to the rape and murder strongly suggests that the “threat” of revocation did not overwhelm his resistance.
If Murphy did harbor a belief that his probation might be revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that belief would not have been reasonable. Our decisions have made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege. It is not surprising, then, that neither the state court nor any state officer has suggested otherwise. Indeed, in its brief in this Court, the State submits that it would not, and legally could not, revoke probation for refusing to answer questions calling for information that would incriminate in separate criminal proceedings. Brief for Petitioner 36-39, and n. 7. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8, 10-14.
Minnesota’s revocation statute, which was accurately summarized in Murphy’s notice of probation, see App. to Pet. for Cert. C-33 — C-34, authorizes revocation “[w]hen it appears that the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his probation or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or execution of sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (1982). Revocation is not automatic under this provision. Even if the probation officer desires revocation, a probationer must be afforded a hearing, Pearson v. State, 308 Minn. 287, 289-290, 241 N. W. 2d 490, 492-493 (1976); State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381, 386-387, 154 N. W. 2d 699, 702-703 (1967), and the court must find that he violated a specific condition, that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. State v. Austin, *439supra, at 250. We have not been advised of any case in which Minnesota has attempted to revoke probation merely because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct; and, in light of our decisions proscribing threats of penalties for the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights, Murphy could not reasonably have feared that the assertion of the privilege would have led to revocation.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Murphy was deterred from claiming the privilege by a reasonably perceived threat of revocation.
3
A third exception to the general requirement of a timely assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, closely related to the penalty exception, has been developed in the context of the federal occupational and excise taxes on gamblers. In recognition of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling activities and the fact that claiming the privilege in lieu of filing a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held that the privilege may be exercised by failing to file. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968). See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971).
“[MJaking a claim of privilege when the disclosures were requested, i. e., when the returns were due, would have identified the claimant as a gambler. The Court therefore forgave the usual requirement that the claim of privilege be presented for evaluation in favor of a ‘claim’ by silence. ... If a particular gambler would not have incriminated himself by filing the tax returns, the privilege would not justify a failure to file.” Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 658-659, n. 11.
But, while a taxpayer who claims the privilege instead of filing gambling tax returns necessarily identifies himself as a gambler, a probationer confronted with incriminating ques*440tions ordinarily will have no problem effectively claiming the privilege at the time disclosures are requested. There exists, therefore, no reason to forgive the requirement that the claim be presented for evaluation in a timely manner.8
H-1 HH t — i
We conclude, in summary, that since Murphy revealed incriminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled incriminations. Because he had not been compelled to incriminate himself, Murphy could not successfully invoke the privilege to prevent the information he volunteered to his probation officer from being used against him in a criminal prosecution.
The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
Reversed.
The parties stipulated in the trial court that Alpha House was covered by federal statutes providing for the confidentiality of patient records in federally assisted drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, 21 U. S. C. §1175 and 42 U. S. C. §4582, and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, 42 CFR pt. 2 (1982). Although the Alpha House counselor legitimately informed Murphy’s probation officer of his incriminating admissions, we assume, without deciding, that the counselor could not have provided the information to the police. See id., §§ 2.39(a), 2.63; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. We assume, as well, that the probation officer could not have made the counselor’s information available for use in a criminal prosecution. See 42 CFR § 2.39(d) (1982); Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7.
It is unclear whether the probation officer could have ordered Murphy to pursue additional treatment as a condition of probation. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-14 (testimony of Mara Widseth). But there is no evidence that she used treatment as a subterfuge or that her sole purpose was to obtain incriminating statements for the police. Under our view of the case, such a purpose would not change the result. Infra, at 428, 431.
The trial court concluded that Murphy’s statement did not constitute an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination: “[Wlhatever his real intent may have been, we are persuaded by the probation officer’s testimony that he did not express [the] desire [to talk to an attorney] in any context other than a civil suit for the breach of confidentiality.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-13 — B-14. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach this question, and, although we see no reason to question the trial court’s factual finding, our analysis of the case makes further consideration unnecessary. Although a request for a lawyer during custodial interrogation is sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 709 (1979), Murphy was not in custody, infra, at 433, and he had no federal right to have an attorney present at the meeting. See United States v. Rea, 678 F. 2d 382, 390 (CA2 1982); People v. Ronald W., 31 App. Div. 2d 163, 165, 295 N. Y. S. 2d 767, 769 (1968), aff’d, 24 N. Y. 2d 732, 249 N. E. 2d 882 (1969); Hughes v. Gwinn, - W. Va. -, -, 290 S. E. 2d 5, 7 (1981).
Compare, e. g., United States v. Steele, 419 F. Supp. 1385, 1386-1387 (WD Pa. 1976); People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12-13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1966); and State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 582-584, 442 P. 2d 11, 15-16 (1968), with, e. g., United States v. Miller, 643 F. 2d 713, 715 (CA10 1981); United States v. Holmes, 594 F. 2d 1167 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 873 (1979); Nettles v. State, 248 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. App. 1971); *426Connell v. State, 131 Ga. App. 213, 205 S. E. 2d 513, 514 (1974); State v. Hartman, 281 N. W. 2d 639, 643-644 (Iowa App. 1979); and People v. Parker, 101 Misc. 2d 800, 802-804, 421 N. Y. S. 2d 561, 562-563 (1979).
We emphasize that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of the meeting. A different question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police themselves in a custodial setting.
Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court found that Murphy believed that his probation could have been revoked for leaving the meeting or that he remained in the office for this reason. Since the meeting was scheduled at a mutually convenient time and was arranged pursuant to a request that did not include any threat, it is unlikely that Murphy believed that terminating the meeting would have jeopardized his probationary status.
The situation would be different if the questions put to a probationer were relevant to his probationary status and posed no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. If, for example, a residential restriction were imposed as a condition of probation, it would appear unlikely that a violation of that condition would be a criminal act. Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions relating to a residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was tried for another crime. Neither, in our view, would the privilege be available on the ground that answering such questions might reveal a violation of the residential requirement and result in the termination of probation. Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 782 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 455 F. 2d 932, 933 (CA5), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 856 (1972). Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is *436compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used in revocation proceedings.
Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probationer’s “right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake,” Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 284 (1968); see Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 805-806 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278 (1968), and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or from using the probationer’s silence as “one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact” in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, supra, at 808, n. 5. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 317-318 (1976).
Nothing in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971), requires a different conclusion. In that case, which arose before the Court recognized a privilege not to file gambling tax returns, the taxpayer filed a return that was introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution for income tax evasion. A majority of the Court considered the disclosures to have been compelled incriminations, id., at 672 (plurality opinion); id., at 704-705 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting), but the taxpayer was not immunized against their use because Marchetti and Grosso were not given retroactive effect. 401 U. S., at 674-675 (plurality opinion); id., at 700-701 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Even assuming that the taxpayer’s disclosures would have been excluded if we had applied Marchetti and Grosso retroactively, “[i]t does not follow necessarily that a taxpayer would be immunized against use of disclosures made on gambling tax returns when the Fifth Amendment would have justified a failure to file at all.” Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 659, n. 13 (1976). In other words, a taxpayer making incriminating disclosures on a return filed after Marchetti and Grosso could not necessarily prevent the use of those disclosures in a criminal prosecution because he had been afforded an effective way to assert the privilege. Murphy’s situation, we believe, is analogous to that of the post -Marchetti taxpayer: Since he could have asserted the privilege effectively but failed to do so, his disclosures cannot be viewed as compelled incriminations.